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Chapter 1  
Introduction
“We are programmed to receive. 
You can checkout any time you like, but you can never leave!” 
 (The Eagles, Hotel California, 1977)
1. Setting the stage
“Personal data is the new oil of the Internet and the new currency of the 
digital world.”1 This statement by the European Consumer Commissioner 
pinpoints the importance of personal data in contemporary society. Over 
the last decade, society has become an information society, with information 
and knowledge as key assets for development. Currently, we are heading 
towards a data society,2 in which the collection and processing of data is at 
the heart of the economy. 
A specific type of data that is frequently processed is personal data. Processing 
of personal data leads to tensions concerning control and power. Commercial 
organizations try to leverage data to create value, while individuals have 
perceptions of harm and powerlessness concerning the use and protection 
of their data.3 The personal data of customers have become a major asset 
for commercial companies. Together with technological developments in the 
field of ICT and internet services, this implies that personal data about every 
individual are collected, further processed, and analyzed for commercial 
purposes by numerous businesses.
The massive use of personal data also leads to concern among individuals. 
“Three out of four Europeans accept that revealing personal data is part of 
everyday life, but they are also worried about how companies – including 
search engines and social networks – use their information.”4 People are 
concerned about lack of control and lack of transparency. Individuals have 
1 Meglena Kuneva, European Consumer Commissioner, March 2009.
2 Van Lieshout et al. 2012, p. 20.
3 World Economic Forum 2012. 
4 European Commission. Data Protection: Europeans share data online, but privacy 
concerns remain – new survey. Press release IP/11/742, Brussels, 16 June 2011, on 
survey results of the Eurobarometer on “Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic 




few means to prevent their data from being processed, while at the same 
time they have no clear view of the purposes of the processing. The impact 
the processing may have on the individual is even more opaque.
1.1. Digital Interactions
In everyday life, individuals present themselves in interactions with others 
and with institutions. They make all kinds of decisions concerning themselves 
and choose for specific (re)presentations in specific contexts. However, 
nowadays everyone also has an online life in the form of digital personae. 
These digital personae are digital representations of the individual. For 
instance, social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook5 provide a platform 
for individuals to create a personal profile page which can contain all kinds 
of information, from name, age and gender to personal interests, videos and 
photos, and blogs. Other entities create digital personae as well in the form of 
detailed records, based on (personal) data from individuals,  to make certain 
decisions, such as excluding someone from an offer. Thus, these decisions 
do affect the individuals. Next to digital personae, numerous data sets are 
created to represent individuals who are unknown to the creating entity. 
These are called profiles and are in a web context typically constituted from 
data concerning, for instance, browsing behavior of an individual.
Human beings are protected with rights such as privacy, integrity and 
dignity, as laid down, for example, in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The function of these rights is 
to protect individuals in their everyday life against infringements against or 
violations of their body or personality. The rights enable individuals to live 
an autonomous life. For digital personae and profiles, rights or other forms 
of protection do not exist for obvious reasons as rights concern individuals, 
not tangible nor intangible goods such as information. Nevertheless, digital 
personae and profiles increasingly, certainly metaphorically, lead their 
own (digital) life. However, they are closely connected to the individuals 
they represent, even though some of the characteristics of the digital 
representation may not conform to reality. 
The way individuals are represented in data and the way decisions based 
on these data affect individuals has an influence on identity. On the one 
hand, companies decide on how to create a representation and what models 
to use to that end. According to Turow, personalized advertising has the 
effect of social and consumer discrimination, which results from three 
converging developments: “advertising practitioners’ infatuation with data 
about online audiences, the rise of companies that can provide that data in a 
5 See <http://www.facebook.com>.
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readily accessible form, and the growth of technologies that can selectively 
serve advertising to individuals based on the data associated with them.”6 
Commercial interests make that individuals are seen as “targets or waste”.7 
Nevertheless, “the version of you being constructed [by others] is probably 
not who you think you are.”8 Companies often claim that the data they process 
is anonymous. However, even when no directly identifying information 
is available in the data set, as is the case with profiles, based on the data 
and specific links, such as cookie identifiers, they can reach and somehow 
affect this individual: “If a company can follow and interact with you in the 
digital environment […] its claim that you are anonymous is meaningless, 
particularly when firms intermittently add offline information to the online 
data and then simply strip the name and address to make it ‘anonymous’.”9
On the other hand, individuals can, if they are aware of the models, feel the 
need to modify their identity. As Lanier indicates: “[W]e are beginning to 
design ourselves to suit digital models of us.”10 In this respect, it is important 
to realize that the models are not objective. Commercial companies create 
these models with a commercial interest in mind. The decisions based on 
the models can be double-biased: first there is the model, which is a form 
of representation as chosen by the company, and, second, there is the 
decision which is biased by the commercial interest or the philosophy of the 
company. For instance, search results on Google are based on the digital 
persona Google has of the individual who enters the search term, and, even 
though Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make 
it universally accessible and useful,11 the displayed results are based on 
opinions of Google that are implemented in the search algorithms.12
Because the data of the digital representation can be used to affect an 
individual by taking decisions based on the data that constitute the digital 
persona or the profile, the rights of the individual are at stake. This has 
triggered the present research, which explores whether protecting digital 
personae can help to protect the privacy of individuals. Profiles, as closely 
related to digital personae, are taken into account along this study as well, 
and the exact differences between digital personae and profiles, and what 
these differences mean for the individual, will be discussed extensively. 
Digital personae will be used as a red thread and where relevant differences 
with profiles appear, these will be addressed explicitly. 
6 Turow 2011, p. 90.
7 Turow 2011, p. 89.
8 Rosen 2000.
9 Turow 2011, p. 190.





Technological development in the field of digital personae and profiles 
brings new challenges for privacy and data protection. Besides, the debate on 
the importance of privacy, in particular in relation to the Internet, is livelier 
than ever. This was also recognized in an OECD report on Personhood and 
Digital Identity, which stated: “[G]iven the importance of these issues for 
the future information society, more investigation is needed into how to 
address gaps in international data protection in light of the emergent identity 
infrastructure”.13 This research takes a strategic approach towards privacy 
protection in a digital environment.
1.2. Digital personae
Digital personae are (digital) representations of individuals. This is, however, 
still a vague definition which needs further explanation.  For this study 
the starting point will be the definition of digital personae given by Roger 
Clarke: “The digital persona is a model of an individual’s public personality 
based on data and maintained by transactions, and intended for use as a proxy for 
the individual”.14 This definition clearly reflects the issue of representation. 
Furthermore, Clarke makes a distinction between projected digital personae 
and imposed digital personae. A projected digital persona is created by the 
individual and is strictly related to the way this individual wants to present 
himself. A personal web page is a good example of this form. In contrast, the 
imposed digital persona is created by institutions based on the information 
they collect(ed) about the individual, and this persona has a certain function 
related to the goals of the institution. Based on digital representations, 
decisions are made, some of them unknown to the individuals affected. 
However, the link between the digital persona and the individual is clear 
and the decisions clearly have an influence on these persons. This may 
affect the privacy and autonomy of the individual and result in unreasonable 
constraints on the construction of identity.
With regard to the projected persona and the imposed persona, Clarke states: 
“The individual has some degree of control over a projected persona, but it 
is harder to influence imposed personae created by others. Each observer 
is likely to gather a different set of data about each individual they deal with, 
and hence to have a different gestalt impression of that person.”15 In this 
study, a third form of digital persona is presented which is more prevalent 
in contemporary practice: the hybrid persona, which is a combination 
13 OECD 2007.
14 See: <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigPersona.html>. Last accessed: 
May 18, 2008. 
15 See: <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DigPersona.html>. Last accessed: 
May 18, 2008.
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of projected and imposed elements. In this form, the individual provides 
certain information, which is combined with information by another entity. 
For instance, when an individual creates a profile page on Facebook, the 
information posted on the page is a projected element. Facebook combines 
this information with data concerning web browsing behavior and analyses 
of data provided by other members of the SNS. The result is an enriched data 
set that forms a digital persona of the individual.
A distinction between digital representations and software agents can be 
made. Software agents perform certain actions on behalf of an individual or 
company and may thus also function as a representation. We have skipped 
the question whether intelligent agents should be able (or in fact allowed) 
to perform transactions and to make decisions. They already can. In this 
light, it should be taken into account that in the near future the capabilities 
of digital personae may be extended. However, this study primarily focuses 
on the passive digital persona.
Another form of passive data sets are profiles. These are closely related to 
digital personae, with the main difference that profiles concern individuals 
who cannot be identified, whereas digital personae represent known 
individuals. Enriching data sets by means of monitoring and profiling, 
or with processes of data mining, occurs in both governmental contexts 
(e.g. surveillance for security purposes) and in commercial contexts (e.g. 
profiling for the purpose of targeted advertising). In this study, the focus will 
be on the use of digital personae and profiles in commercial contexts. The 
processing of data concerning individuals can have implications for privacy 
and is subject to data protection legislation.
1.3.  Privacy and data protection legislation
The European Directive on the protection of personal data (Directive 
95/46/EC,16 DPD) regulates the processing of personal data. Article 2(a) 
of this Directive gives a definition of personal data: “‘personal data’ shall 
mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one 
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity”. Examples are name and address. The Directive is 
applicable if personal data are being processed. 
16 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281.
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Given the need for clarification of the notion “personal data” in various 
contexts, the Article 29 Working Party adopted an opinion on the concept 
of personal data. The Working Party argued that the technological state 
of the art at the time of the processing, as well as the future technological 
possibilities during the period for which the data will be processed, have to 
be considered. More specifically, the Article 29 Working Party stated that “if 
[the data] are intended to be kept for 10 years, the controller should consider 
the possibility of identification that may occur also in the ninth year of 
their lifetime, and which make them personal data at that moment”.17 Since 
technology is developing rapidly, in many cases it will not be possible for 
the controller to “guess” the means that might be used within a few years 
time. Trying to foresee the possibility of identification after 10 years can be 
extremely difficult for a controller and therefore the question arises whether 
data protection legislation must be applied in all relevant applications, 
following a “just-in-case” model.18 In this light, the distinction between 
digital personae and profiles is important. Similarities and differences 
between the two19 will be used throughout this study to clarify the use and 
impact of data sets concerning individuals.
It is important to distinguish between privacy and data protection. “[T]he vast 
bulk of continental Europe actually subscribed to privacy as a fundamental 
Human Right in terms of Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and viewed data protection as hierarchically one step below that, 
a kind of enabling right which exists to protect the hierarchically one step 
higher fundamental right to ‘private and family life’.”20 Data protection is 
necessary in order to enjoy informational privacy. This implies that personal 
data which are a part of digital representations also need to be protected. 
Following Joel Reidenberg’s suggestion of a Lex Informatica,21 there 
currently is a plea for a Lex Personalitatis,22 which, next to personality rights, 
also encompasses such concepts as the right to a guarantee of confidentiality 
and integrity in information-technology systems. In essence, this approach 
is an elaboration of data protection to current technological developments. 
Social and technological developments have put the sustainability of the 
current Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) under pressure. “[T]he 
Directive is becoming increasingly out-dated, is not sufficiently clear in its 
objectives, is more bureaucratic and burdensome than it needs to be and is out 
17 Article 29 Working Party 2007. 
18 Cf. Fischer-Hübner & Hedbom 2007. They proposed this model in relation to RFID 
technologies.
19 See Chapter 2, section 4.
20 Cannataci 2008. 
21 Reidenberg 1978. 
22 Cannataci 2008. 
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of step with good regulatory practice.”23 An evaluation of the Directive was 
needed.24 In January 2012, the European Commission presented a proposal 
for a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which is to replace the 
current DPD. The aim of this proposal is to update data protection regulation 
to meet current technologies and practices and to reinforce the rights of the 
individual provided for by the DPD, while at the same time improving legal 
certainty for data controllers as regards the applicability of the DPD.
1.4.  An alternative approach
Because it can be difficult to foresee what information will be revealed by certain 
data in the future, the question is whether it is sufficient to look at bits of data 
as such, as is now the case in data protection legislation, or whether protection 
of complete digital personae, including personal data and data that may 
become personal data, is a viable alternative.  Holistic digital representations 
are increasingly created from separate data. Data are connected, so even 
data which are not considered to be personal data yet, because they cannot 
directly or indirectly be connected to an individual, have a link to a person via 
the representation. Digital representations are conglomerates of data. The 
background for data protection legislation is, among other things, to enable 
privacy protection. By focusing on privacy as a whole, taking an alternative 
approach by protecting digital personae might lead to a similar or even better 
result. This alternative approach might include providing protection for digital 
personae, which may also make it easier, or more legitimate, to set certain rules 
and basic requirements for the creation and use of digital personae. As a result, 
it will become easier to balance rights and duties. In this study, the possibilities 
for protecting digital personae, possibly by embedding them as a new concept 
in the legal system, will be explored.
2. Aim of the study
The aim of this study is to investigate whether privacy and autonomy of 
individuals can be better protected by implementing the concept of the 
digital persona in law. The use of digital personae and profiles clearly has 
an effect on the rights of individuals. These effects will be described from 
a multidisciplinary perspective. When the effects and related rights of 
individuals that need to be protected are set out, an analysis will be made 
of possible ways to implement the digital persona in law. First, the concept 
will be analyzed from the perspective of existing legal constructs and then a 
proposal for a new implementation will be presented.
23 Information Commissioner UK, ‘Invitation to Tender – Review of EU Data Protection 
Law’, 14 April 2008.
24 See, for instance, EDPS 2007.
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The main research question to be answered in this study is the following:
Can the (legal) protection of digital personae as coherent data sets, taking into 
account that they are used by businesses as a basis for making decisions that affect 
real-world individuals, improve the protection of privacy and autonomy of the 
individuals represented by these digital personae?
In order to answer this question, the following subquestions are relevant:
- What are digital personae?
- How are digital personae used?
- How are individuals affected by decisions based on digital personae?
- What rights of the individual are at stake?
- How are these rights protected?
- Are these rights adequately protected in view of digital personae?
- If not, how can the protection of these rights be improved? 
These sub questions will be answered step by step throughout this study.
The research is carried out from a European perspective, in the sense that 
EU legislation forms the regulatory framework for this study. Furthermore, 
the study is particularly focused on the commercial domain, so the use of 
digital personae by governmental institutions is excluded. This limitation 
is related to the major differences that appear between the governmental/
administrative and commercial purposes, as well as the legal safeguards that 
apply to these contexts. Moreover, the type of impact related to the use of 
digital personae by governments may significantly differ from the impact 
resulting from commercial use.
3. Methodology
Although this study was mainly executed from a legal perspective, sociology 
and ethics were also relevant disciplines. The questions on the representation 
of individuals in the form of digital personae and profiles include societal 
issues that are central to the debate on Internet and ICT development, as well 
as privacy and data protection. In addition, a technological component is 
included to make data collection and use in an internet context more concrete.
 
The author does not have a degree in all disciplines, so obviously the 
research and findings related to the non-legal field may show limitations. 
Nevertheless, based on a literature study and conversations with experts in 
the relevant fields, the descriptions should be appropriate for the purposes 
of this study. Several research methods were used in this study. Most of the 
work is based on desk research. With the author having a background in law, 
the research concerning other disciplines, such as sociology and philosophy, 
was based on handbooks and key literature in these disciplines. For the legal 
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and technical work, a great deal of literature on the subjects was consulted.
This research contains a case study on Facebook’s tracking practices,25 
which required technical experiments. These tests were performed by the 
author himself. The findings have been confirmed by Facebook, and have 
been reproduced by researchers from German and Dutch Data Protection 
Authorities and the Wall Street Journal, amongst others. Discussions on the 
findings took place with Facebook engineers, in particular Gregg Stefancik, 
and with Ulrich Kühn of the Datenschutzbeauftragte Hamburg, Germany. 
More general in-depth discussions on the technical details and workings 
took place with Ashkan Soltani and Chris Hoofnagle. Additional findings 
and comments on the Facebook case study were derived from qualitative 
interviews with Luc Delany, Facebook’s European Policy Manager, and 
Gregg Stefancik.
For the case study on Google, several documents and communications, 
in particular between Google and the CNIL, were analyzed. A third case 
study concerns real-time web personalization and the combination of online 
and offline data. This study is based on literature and six semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with representatives of companies who are involved in 
these activities. One interview was telephone-based, the other five were face-
to-face interviews. The interviewees of this case study have expressed their 
will to remain anonymous, which is respected. Amongst the interviewees 
two persons are active in the credit rating and finance industry and two 
persons are working at an insurance company that uses the described 
technologies. One interviewee works as a tracking technology provider. The 
telephone interview concerned a representative from an EU advertising 
branch organization.
Furthermore, interim results have been presented at several (inter)national 
conferences and summer schools and received feedback from participants as 
well as informal talks have been very valuable for collecting information and 
getting ideas in the right direction.
4. Outline of the study
This study is divided into three parts: (1) Theory and Abstract Level; (2) 
Practice and Concrete Level, and; (3) Protecting Digital Personae. In Part 
1, “Theory and Abstract Level”, the theoretical background of the study will 
be described. Digital personae and profiles are representations of individuals 
and can be seen as digital identities, so a first step is to look what identity 
and representation actually mean (Chapter 2). Identity will be discussed 
25 Chapter 5, section 4.1.
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from the perspective of sociology, philosophy, and media theory. In Chapter 
3, the concept of the digital persona will be discussed. First, the step from 
presentation and representation to digital presentation and representation 
will be made and the digital persona will be compared to profiles. In this 
study, the focus is not on the process of profiling (including machine learning 
and correlations), but on profiles as coherent data sets resulting from data 
collection practices.26 Second, the specific forms of digital personae will be 
assessed, including reasons for the creation of digital personae. 
In Chapter 4, the legal background of the study will be presented.  Autonomy 
and privacy will be discussed as the main value and right to be protected. 
They are related to the human dignity, identity, informational self-
determination, and contextual integrity. Subsequently, the general level of 
the legal implementation of these values and rights at a European level will be 
described, followed by the more specific level of data protection regulation. 
Part 2 of the study, “Practice and Concrete Level”, starts with a description 
of the use of digital personae (Chapter 5). First, a short fairy tale will be told 
to sketch the ‘life’ of a digital persona. Second, the events in the fairy tale 
will be explained by describing the technical processes of web interactions 
and cookie use. The Chapter will end with two case studies on large web 
companies that create and use digital personae: Facebook and Google, and a 
case study on the combination of online and offline data sources and real-time 
web personalization. In Chapter 6, shortcomings in current data protection 
regulation observed in the previous chapters will be described. Here, the way 
in which the use of digital personae affects the rights of individuals will also 
be discussed. On the basis of all this, at the end of Chapter 6, the overall 
problem definition of this study will be presented.
In Part 3, “Protecting Digital Personae”, a solution is sought for the problem 
thus presented. In Chapter 7, an assessment will be made of existing legal 
constructs that may offer opportunities to protect digital personae. This will 
show advantages and drawbacks and allow focusing on the exact difficulties 
that have to be taken into account when implementing the concept of the 
digital persona in law. Finally, in Chapter 8, a proposal will be presented for 
embedding the digital persona in law. The limitations of the proposal will 
also be discussed and a final conclusion will be drawn, including the answer 
to the main research question of this study.
26 Compare Custers, Calders, Schermer & Zarsky 2013, p. 4.
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Chapter 2  
Identity and Representation
1. Introduction
For the purpose of this study, several disciplines need to be combined, 
or at least interrelated, since the topic of digital personae and the privacy 
protection of individuals is inherently an interdisciplinary one. In, this 
chapter, the theoretical framework of this study will be presented, in order 
to clarify the terms used (e.g. digital persona, individual, representation, 
profile, identity) and to validate the choices made in defining these terms. The 
interpretation of these terms depends to a large extent on the disciplinary 
view that is taken. Not only will the different disciplinary viewpoints be 
described, but also how the terms themselves relate to each other. A number 
of theories will be described and the relations between these theories will 
be discussed. The aim of this chapter is not to give an extensive overview 
of and insight in all identity and representation theories, so a selection has 
been made of a number of theories and authors to be discussed. The selected 
theories and their authors are generally accepted as the main contributors 
to the relevant concepts in their disciplines. The primary sources have been 
used as a starting point, supplemented with secondary literature.
Presentation and representation are important terms in relation to identity 
theory and in relation to how digital personae function as proxies for 
individuals. These terms are briefly introduced in section 2. In section 
3, the concept of identity is described with a focus on sociological (3.1), 
philosophical (3.2), and media theory (3.3) perspectives. Next, the link 
to the digital environment is made by looking at digital presentation and 
representation (4). Subsequently, there is a description of digital personae 
(4.1) and of profiles (4.2), and a description of how a profile can transform 
into a digital persona (4.3), followed by a comparison between the two (4.4). 
In the comparison, use is made of semiotics to analyse how digital personae 
and profiles acquire meaning and how they relate to each other. Finally, in 
section 5, a synthesis is presented in which the main findings and relations 
from the chapter are briefly summarized. 
2. Presentation and representation
A number of issues are relevant to be able to describe the impact and value 
of digital personae. The digital persona is a form of a digital representation 
of an individual. Obviously, representation is closely related to presentation. 
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In short, it can be said that a presentation is the direct and active form 
of presenting something, whereas representation is more indirect. 
“Representation means a presenting again, a presenting of something not 
present, which may take a linguistic as well as a visual form.”27 Nevertheless, 
the terms are somewhat confusing, since presenting an object to an audience, 
whether or not in real time, leads to a representation of the object concerned. 
The way of presenting always includes the interpretation of the presenter, 
thereby distinguishing the presentation from the original object. In addition, 
the audience interprets the presentation, thereby creating a follow-up 
representation. For each cycle of representation, a relationship between 
three terms is involved; “an object28 is a representation of something for 
some information-processing device.”29 This triadic relationship will be 
elaborated in section 4.4 below. In the context of this study, it is useful to note 
that the information-processing device can be a human being or a machine. 
Traditionally, humans have made interpretations of the objects concerned 
whereas nowadays ‘interpretation’ often takes place through automatic 
devices. 
  
Representation is a central issue and is strongly related to identity. Identity 
can relate to an object or to an entity (subject or person). In the context of 
this study, identity is discussed in relation to natural persons, which I will 
call entities.30 In order to gain more insight into the concept of identity 
and its relation to presentation and representation, this phenomenon 
will be described in detail in the following sections, using different 
disciplinary approaches. Special attention will be paid to the sociological 
and philosophical approaches, because they are more specifically related to 
individuals and their (re)presentations.
3. The concept of identity
Identity is a complex phenomenon: its meaning depends on the disciplinary 
approach that is taken. In general, identity is related to sameness or 
difference, i.e. something is the same as it was under different conditions, 
or something diverges from another thing to which it is compared. It has to 
do with being identical. In mathematical terms, identity can be defined as A 
= A (sameness), but A ≠ B (difference). Gottfried Leibniz31 held that x = y if 
27 Goody 1997, p. 31.
28 Note that the terminology is used differently by different authors. For C.S. Peirce, for 
instance, the object here is the interpretant, whereas ‘object’ in his terminology is the 
original (the something that is represented). See also section 4.4 below.
29 Goody 1997, p. 32.
30 Cf. Clarke 2003.
31 Leibniz 1969, p. 308.
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and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well and if every predicate 
true of y is true of x as well. This theory is commonly known as Leibniz’s 
law. If any concession is necessary to conclude that x = y, the theory does not 
apply.32 Logic describes this as x = y if x is the same thing as y. 
It becomes more complicated when the aspect of time (or a different 
conditional factor) is introduced. The question whether a table is the same 
table as it was a year ago can be answered positively, notwithstanding the fact 
that the table might now have some scratches or may have changed colour a 
little because it has been in the sun. However, it can not be claimed to be 
identical in mathematical terms, given the different characteristics. Similar 
problems arise with regard to individual persons. I am still the same person 
as I was ten years ago,but in a different sense, taking into account physical 
and mental changes, I am not. In this context, specifications of identity in 
personal, sociological, and cultural identity can apply. The focus of the 
concept of identity then shifts from ‘being identical’ towards ‘identification’ 
in the meaning of ‘identifying as’ or ‘identifying with’. ‘Identifying as’ has to 
do with identifying an individual as George, a specific individual, whereas 
‘identifying with’ has to do with connecting someone to a group, such as 
heavy-metal music lovers. 
Another quite common approach towards identity is to use the term ‘identity’ 
to refer to an ‘identifier’ or a token for identification.33 Identity, then, means 
any set of attributes that individuates an individual within a group. In some 
cases, one single attribute can be sufficient, for instance, a genetic profile 
or a unique identification number. Or the combination of a password and a 
username to access a certain web service is called an identity. This approach 
is problematic, since the terms ‘identity’ and ‘identifier’ are used as exact 
synonyms while they are not. A distinction can be made between types of 
(digital) identities, with a focus on their richness. An extensive set of data 
can form a rich identity of an individual, whereas a small set can form a 
poor identity. A unique identifier, which refers to an individual but does not 
contain any further information concerning the individual, can be called a 
super poor identity. However, unique identification numbers exist which are 
constructed in a way that they contain information such as age, gender, and 
region. For instance, in Belgium, the INSZ-number is used as an identification 
number for social security services. The number’s composition is: YY.MM.
DD XXX-XX, where YY.MM.DD signifies the date of birth of the holder 
and XXX-XX is a serial number.34
32 Margolis 1971, p. 217.
33 See for instance: Nabeth & Hildebrandt 2005; Hildebrandt, Koops & de Vries 2008. 
34 Roosendaal, Steinbrecher, Leenes & Buitelaar 2009.
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Having described these general approaches towards identity, presentation 
and representation can be introduced. An individual, George, can take a 
picture of himself, taking a specific pose, and thereby presenting himself; 
the picture is a representation. Another person can look at the picture and 
identify the individual on the picture as George. Here, George is identified. 
The George on the picture, however, is not George, but a representation of 
George, since the picture shows an image of George and is not identical to 
the physical person George.
In order to give more detailed insight into the relation between identity, 
presentation, and representation, the concept of identity will be elaborated 
on below from the disciplinary perspectives of sociology, philosophy, and 
media theory.
3.1. Identity in sociology
In sociology, several theories concerning identity have been developed. The 
importance of identity is related to people’s need for interaction. Social life 
is based on interaction and saturated with a myriad of implicit and explicit 
behavioral codes and concepts. Which kind of behaviour is expected from 
an individual is strongly connected to the social role of the individual and the 
social context in which the interaction takes place. The role a person plays 
gives clues about the expected behavior. This is also the reason why people 
find it important to pigeon-hole others; it provides a frame of reference 
and gives clues on how interaction should take place. Whether a person 
complies with the social rules or not is part of self-expression and can give 
opportunities to individuals to change their (perceived) role and the way they 
are perceived by others.
Another important aspect is audience segregation. People let their behavior 
depend on the presence of  other people: the audience. For instance, an 
individual behaves differently in a family context than in an employment 
context. This all has to do with identity construction. 
Three of the main contributors to sociological identity theories are George 
Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman, and Anthony Giddens. Their theories will 
be discussed below.
Mead is the founder of the symbolic interactionism which is described in his 
standard work Mind, Self, and Society.35 According to Mead, the self is active 
and creative, and he stresses people’s ability, through the mechanism of self-
interaction, to form and guide their own conduct. People can influence their 
35 Mead 1934.
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
21
own behaviour, based on reflections on themselves. People try to estimate 
their (public) presence by assuming what others think of their conduct. Mead 
explains that communication is a process whereby each person ‘takes the role 
of the other’; that is, each person ‘assumes the attitude of the other individual 
as well as calling it out in the other’, which would be impossible without self-
interaction. As Elliott36 puts it: “The self for Mead is at once individuality 
and generality, agent and recipient, sameness and difference” which means 
that “the self is the agency through which individuals experience themselves 
in relation to others, but also an object or fact dealt with by its individual 
owner as he or she sees fit.” 
Mead makes a specific distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. “The ‘I’ is 
the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the ‘me’ is the 
organized set of attitudes of others assumed by a person. The attitudes of 
the others constitute the organized ‘me’, and then the person reacts to that 
as an ‘I .”37 So, the attitudes of others are seen by an individual and make 
the individual aware of himself. This self a person is aware of is called the 
‘me’. The individual responds on the basis of this self-consciousness. This 
response is given by the ‘I’, as an “action over against that social situation 
within his own conduct,”38 and this is what constitutes the ‘I’. The ‘I’ is that 
with which individuals identify themselves. After an action has taken place, 
the action becomes part of the past experiences of the individual and thus 
becomes part of the ‘me’. 
 
The individual wants to present himself to others in a way that is assumed to 
be appropriate for the given situation. As a result of this situation-oriented 
behavior, “in different social contexts various aspects of the complete self 
are more evident.”39 In order to achieve this appropriate presentation, 
the individual creates an image of himself in his own mind, which reflects 
the way in which the individual thinks others look at him. This image is a 
representation of the assumed interpretation (also a representation) by 
others. 
An even more direct link between identity and presentation is made by 
Erving Goffman in his book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.40 “The 
self consists for Goffman in an awareness of the multiplicity of roles that are 
performed in various situated contexts [...] [P]ublic identity is thus performed 
for an audience, and the private self knows that such performances are 
36 Elliott 2001, p. 26.
37 Mead 1934, p. 175.
38 Mead 1934, p. 175.




essential to identity and to the maintenance of respect and trust in routine 
social interaction.”41 Goffman clarifies the distinction between self and 
identity in the sense that an identity is performed and the self is the effect of 
the scene that comes off. The performed identity is dependent on the context 
in which the individual interacts. In this respect, the roles an individual can 
play can be referred to as partial identities.  
With regard to the role performance, a performer (an individual) tries to 
engender in his audience the belief that there is a specific relation to them. 
According to Goffman42 “[f]irst, individuals often foster the impression that 
the routine they are presently performing is their only routine or at least their 
most essential one. (…) Secondly, performers tend to foster the impression 
that their current performance of their routine and their relationship to their 
current audience have something special and unique about them.” Relating 
a role or performance to a specific audience and keeping the presentation 
of the self restricted to the attributes and characteristics that fit this role is 
essential in social life. Goffman calls this ‘audience segregation’ and states 
that “by audience segregation the individual ensures that those before whom 
he plays one of his parts will not be the same individuals before whom he 
plays a different part in another setting.”43 The self consists of several partial 
identities which are each related to a specific context. Thus, an individual is 
always known by his audience as the identity that is shown in the specific 
context. There is “no such thing as a ‘core self’, but rather an evolving 
network of various relational roles.”44 
A late-modern approach is taken by Giddens, who states that “[t]he self is 
seen as a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible. We are, not 
what we are, but what we make of ourselves.”45 In this view, the individual 
has the main control over the development of his self and identity. Identity 
development is less dependent on roles and more related to social acceptance. 
The development of personal identity is a relatively young phenomenon. 
“Through the Middle Ages, identity was largely equated with the visible 
person.”46 Identity depended on social rank and gender, which could 
immediately be seen because of dress codes, and people were mostly seen 
by people who knew them anyway, due to the lack of social and geographical 
mobility and the stability of social groups. The contact of people with 
41 Elliott 2001, pp. 31-32.
42 Goffman 1959, pp. 48-49.
43 Goffman 1959, p. 49.
44 Van den Berg 2009, p. 42.
45 Giddens 1991, p. 75.
46 Baumeister & Muraven 1996.
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strangers increased with the advent of urbanization. People’s rank in society 
became changeable because of social mobility, and people began to try to 
pass for their betters.47 The idea of the existence of an inner identity as an 
important and large part of the self continued to grow. “In short, changes 
in social relations and the progressive questioning of self-knowledge have 
removed identity from the realm of the obviously visible. Adapting to these 
changes, identity has come to be understood as an inner, hidden identity 
that is only indirectly known, such as by being expressed in one’s actions or 
roles.”48 
Riesman49 has formulated a personality framework describing the 
development of personality in  the pre-modern, the early-modern, and the 
late-modern eras. In the pre-modern era, personality could be characterized 
as tradition-directed. Relationships were based on what young people 
learned from their parents; they were controlled by etiquette and developed 
before adulthood. Pre-modern personality was heteronomous, and due to 
this minimal range of choice “the apparent social need for an individuated 
type of character [was] minimal.”50 This started to change in early-modern 
societies. Personality was more inner-directed, meaning that individuals 
are steered into a specific direction by the elders towards destined goals. A 
person self-governs his career, but based on the patterns set earlier. In late-
modern society, the inner-directed personality was replaced by the other-
directed character type. This type of character was “sensitive to others – to 
their opinions and their approval.”51 Individuals take account of what the 
current standards of behaviour are when they decide, for example, on their 
consumption patterns. 
The process of identity development is closely related to cultural 
developments. The social structure and personality are two interrelated 
concepts. Côté52 makes the link by using Riesman’s framework. In terms 
of social-identity formation, the three described eras relate to ascribed 
(pre-modern), achieved (early-modern), and managed (late-modern) social 
identity, respectively. Gecas and Burke define these terms as follows: “ ‘[A]
scribed’ means assigned on the basis of some inherited status; ‘achieved’ is 
used in the sociological sense by which social position is to be accomplished 
on one’s own; and ‘managed’ means reflexively and strategically fitting 
oneself into a community of ‘strangers’ by meeting their approval through 
47 Baumeister & Muraven 1996.
48 Baumeister & Muraven 1996.
49 Riesman 1950.





the creation of the right impressions.”53
3.2.  Identity in philosophy
In philosophy, there are different identity theories, and the main difference 
with the sociological approach is that identity in a philosophical sense can 
also refer to objects/things instead of only individuals/people.
One theory is ‘reference theory’.54 In this theory, statements that refer to a 
person can fulfil the function of a reference depending on certain conditions. 
For instance, stating that ‘the French ambassador is ill’ says something about 
the French ambassador (has meaning) to a person who knows the ambassador 
or has a certain relationship to this ambassador (an appointment). However, 
stating in the same context that ‘Mr. Renaud is ill’ only makes sense to people 
who know that Mr. Renaud is the French ambassador. It is also possible that 
in another context someone who is more closely related to Mr. Renaud gets 
informed. Whether an indication to a person serves as a reference depends 
on the audience’s knowledge of and relation to this person. It depends 
on whether the information in the reference is connected to the correct 
individual and makes sense to the audience.
A distinction can be made between reference and pure reference. “An 
expression is being used in a purely referential fashion if its sole purpose is to 
indicate, for the hearer, a particular mental file, or ‘pigeon hole’, which he is 
assumed to possess on a certain individual. Where the hearer is assumed to 
have more than one such file on an individual being referred to, it will not be 
legitimate, on the present view, to replace one expression by another which, 
although it refers to the same individual, cannot be expected to indicate, for 
the hearer, the same file.”55 
 
Reference is based on attributes (properties) and is aimed at pointing at a 
specific individual (identification). Attribution can be risky in the sense 
that bodies and persons can easily be equated. “An identity (the so-called 
‘physicalist study’) that holds that a person, with all his psychological 
attributes, is nothing over and above his body, with all its physical attributes, 
attributes properties to physical bodies and to persons in the same sense 
of ‘attribute’.”56 Thus, a description of a person can refer to the person (as 
identity) or to his body (physical) and, depending on the attribute, to both. 
For instance, the height of a person is an indication of the body as well as of 
53 Cf. Gecas & Burke 1995, cited in Côté 1996.
54 Compare Lockwood 1971, p. 210.
55 Lockwood 1971, p. 210.
56 Margolis 1971, p. 225.
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the person as a whole. However, X has pain in his tooth refers to a physical 
condition by referring to a mental condition of the person (having pain). 
Thus, attributes can refer to individuals, but, depending on the kind of 
attribute, they can refer to the body or to the person (an identity) as well.57 
Ricoeur58 relates the ‘person’ to identifying reference. In his opinion, “[t]o 
identify something is to be able to make apparent to others, amid a range of 
particular things of the same type, of which one we intend to speak. (…) [Here,] 
identifying is not yet identifying oneself but identifying ‘something’.”59 We 
can speak about ‘things’. Individuals, as entities that make up the world, can 
be spoken about as ‘things’ of a particular type.60 A specific focus of personal 
identity relates to the temporal dimension of the self. Individuals “have a 
history, are their own history.”61 
A distinction Ricoeur makes, and which can be problematic in relation to the 
permanence in time, is the distinction between idem identity (sameness) and 
ipse identity (selfhood). Idem-identity (“What am I?”62) is “the bundle of our 
experiences of how we are identified and mirrored by others as being the same: 
sameness in time (“I am still the same as I was yesterday”) and sameness with 
others (“I belong to the category of Swedish academics”). However, although 
Ricoeur does not propose that there is anything outside this idem-identity, he 
shows nevertheless how idem-identity gives at the same time rise to also a more 
existential experience (“Who am I?”), which he calls ipse-identity.”63 
The idem-identity can, thus, be connected to an identifier; it refers to 
an inference of what is idem about a certain person from a third-person 
perspective, whereas ipse-identity is connected to identity as a sense of self (a 
first-person perspective). The two forms are closely interrelated, because the 
‘I’ can take a third-person perspective on himself.
3.3. Identity in media theory
The way of presenting and representing individuals is to a large extent 
dependent on the technical means available. It must be possible to distribute 
information, whether this is in written text, an image, or spoken words. 
Obviously, the more sophisticated means are available, the more sophisticated 
57 Margolis 1971, p. 225.
58 Ricoeur 1992.
59 Ricoeur 1992, p. 27.
60 Ricoeur 1992, p. 32.
61 Ricoeur 1992, p. 113.
62 Ricoeur 1992, p. 122.
63 Hildebrandt, Koops & de Vries 2008, p. 22.
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the (re)presentation will be, since a combined set of applications can lead 
to a very ‘realistic’ image of an individual. In a sense, the public ‘sees’ the 
individual before it.
In the context of media theory, a more technical approach towards identity 
can be taken. Identity is then closely related to identification: the possibility 
to single out a specific individual in a group. “An identity is any subset of 
attributes of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this individual 
person within any set of persons. So usually there is no such thing as ‘the 
identity’, but several of them”64 The several identities qualify as partial 
identities. In a digital environment, a partial identity can have an identifier, 
such as an e-mail address or username. The identifier singles out the 
individual in the group of users in the specific context. An important point 
is that here identification is used in the sense of being able to single out an 
individual. The connection to a name of an offline individual is not necessary. 
Traditional interaction via the Internet used to be solely text-based. E-mail, 
BBSs, MUDs, and IRCs are the best known examples.65 However, even 
between these four types, differences occur with regard to the form of 
communication and the audience addressed by the messages. E-mail is a 
typical form which combines elements of written and spoken communication. 
Messages are delivered at the personal account of the recipients. The number 
of recipients is usually limited, except in the case of spam or chain mail, 
and replies can be sent to the e-mail account of the sender. This form of 
communication is rather private. Since e-mail was costly in its early days, 
the messages were often formal and short, without disclosing too much 
personal information. The only personal detail that was always disclosed 
was the e-mail address of the sender. A variant on e-mail is a BBS (Bulletin 
Board System), which is also text-based, but “distinguished by the size of 
the audience it attempts to reach and the technological manner in which 
messages are read”66 Messages are sent to a single computer address where 
they are posted and can be read or replied to by the visitors of the website. 
Replies have the form of a thread, a succession of the original message and all 
related reactions. For specific topics, newsgroups were started with people 
interested in the particular field of the conversations. The messages posted 
on the BBS are visible to all visitors of the website.
IRC stands for Internet Relay Chat and is the first form of written communication 
that occurs in real time. The messages posted by the people participating in the 
conversation become immediately visible. All messages are shown in inverse 
64 Pfitzmann & Hansen 2008.
65 Cf.: Wood & Smith 2005.
66 Wood & Smith 2005.
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chronological order, so there is not always a clustered conversation of two 
people communicating visible on the screen, but it is interrupted with posts of 
others which were sent in the meantime between the post and the reply. A last 
typical form of internet interaction is via MUDs (Multi-User Domains, also 
called Dungeons). These are virtual environments (worlds) used for role-playing 
games. Interaction exists because usually more users are connected at any given 
time. The users steer their ‘characters’ by typing various commands. “As players 
participate, they become authors not only of text but of themselves, constructing 
new selves through social interaction.”67 
The World Wide Web (WWW) has increasingly become a portal to various 
forms of communication and interaction and for the presentation of any 
topic via websites. Next to ordinary text, it is now possible to share or display 
pictures and videos, and to play sounds. People create extensive profiles on 
social network sites (SNSs), where they present themselves, share personal 
information, and try to establish a network of connections which is shown to 
the others in the network.68 
The MUDs described above were typical game environments. As Turkle69 
indicated, the users constructed new selves through the social interaction 
in these games. This insight already points towards identity construction. 
The trend of identity construction and the presentation of self has continued 
over time and has gained an impulse with the advent of SNS and related 
kinds of websites and it has more and more become a key issue for users to 
know and influence how they are perceived by others. Obviously, presenting 
yourself including pictures or videos and a visible network of connections 
has more impact on individuals and their identity than a presentation merely 
in text, often even restricted to a specific area of interest or discussion 
topic. The interactive construction of content is the typical feature of Web 
2.0 applications. The term ‘prosumer’ appears regularly in this context,70 
to indicate the active role of consumers as producers of content. This also 
has implications for the identity of individuals. “In the online environment, 
where a person is ‘@’, where she can ‘go’ and what she can ‘get’ are more 
significant, in terms of identity, than where she is, or where she is from.”71
From the different forms of online communication described above, it can 
be concluded that context and technical means influence the way in which an 
67 Turkle 1995, p. 12.
68 boyd & Ellison 2007.
69 Turkle 1995.
70 For instance: Kotler 1986; Ritzer 2010; Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010, and specifically in 
relation to Web 2.0: Bruns 2009.
71 Barney 2004, p. 152.
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individual is represented. When applications become more sophisticated, more 
diverse data concerning individuals can be disclosed or distributed. Sets of these 
data can form a representation of individuals in a digital form, a digital persona.
4. Digital presentation and representation
In this section, the concepts of presentation and representation will be 
discussed in the context of the digital environment.
4.1. Digital personae
A digital persona is a representation of an individual, identifiable72 by the one 
who creates and/or uses the data set. The concept of the digital persona was 
introduced by Roger Clarke, who defined it as: “a model of an individual’s 
public personality based on data and maintained by transactions, and 
intended for use as a proxy for the individual.”73 The representational 
capacity is a key element. It follows from the definition that functioning as a 
proxy for a specific individual is intended, so the representations that qualify 
as a digital persona are limited to those data sets which contain an identifying 
link to an entity.  Solove, however, takes a much broader perspective when he 
talks about a digital person. He states that “it is ever more possible to create 
an electronic collage that covers much of a person’s life – a life captured in 
records, a digital person composed in the collective computer networks of 
the world.”74 His digital person includes digital personae as well as profiles, 
which will be discussed later on, and other data sets. In the case of a digital 
persona, the purpose of its creation is known beforehand, and therefore the 
data that are needed to form the representation are also known, at least to a 
certain extent. This implies that creating a digital persona can be compared 
to filling out a template since it is known which attributes the creator needs.
Clarke distinguishes between projected personae and imposed personae. A 
projected digital persona is “an image of one’s self that an individual conveys to 
others by means of data,” for instance, by creating a personal page on a social 
network site, whereas the imposed digital persona is “an identity projected 
onto a person by means of data, by outside agencies such as corporations and 
government agencies,”75 for instance, a record created by a credit rating agency. 
A combined form is also possible, for instance, when an electronic patient 
record (usually called a ‘profile’) is created. The individual concerned is closely 
involved in the creation and provides a major part of the data. The health care 
72 Identifiability can take different forms. See below, section 4.3.
73 Clarke 1994.
74 Solove 2004, p. 1.
75 Clarke 1994.
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provider stores the data and adds personal interpretations and other data (e.g. 
diagnoses and personal observations). The creation and maintenance of the 
digital persona is based on transactions, which can be any kind of interaction 
between the individual concerned and persons or technical devices.
The data that form a digital persona can function as or are a representation 
of an individual’s partial identity. A partial identity is a subset of attributes 
of a complete identity, where a complete identity is the union of all attributes 
of all identities of this person.76 Usually, a digital persona is created for use 
in a specific context, so the data that are relevant for the purpose are limited 
to this context. For instance, data concerning the income and taxation of an 
individual are not relevant for a medical file, so they should not be included. 
Even though the represented individual is aware of the existence of digital 
personae, he does not always know what its exact contents are. In particular 
in the case of imposed personae, the individual may be aware of part of the 
data, mainly those data that are  included as a matter of course, such as name 
and address and specific context-related data, but the individual may not 
know which additional data are part of the representation (e.g., a medical 
diagnosis).
4.2. Profiles
Another form of digital representations of individuals are profiles. They are 
the result of an automated process where large data sets are processed in 
order to compose (a set of) characteristics which can be used as a basis for 
decision making. A profile is a set of correlated data,77 which is created with 
the use of profiling technologies, a set of technologies with as a common 
characteristic the use of algorithms or other techniques to create, discover 
or construct knowledge from huge sets of data. Profiling can be defined 
as “[t]he process of ‘discovering’ correlations between data in databases 
that can be used to identify and represent a human or nonhuman subject 
(individual or group) and/or the application of profiles (sets of correlated 
data) to individuate and represent a subject or to identify a subject as a 
member of a group or category”78 or the creation of a representation based 
on automated monitoring of individual behavior. The data can be aggregated 
from different sources. In first instance, there is no direct connection to an 
entity, so individuals who may be affected later on are not necessarily aware 
of the data collection.
76 Pfitzmann & Hansen 2008.
77 Hildebrandt & Gutwirth 2008, p. 19.
78 Hildebrandt & Gutwirth 2008, p. 19.
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Profiles concern groups or individuals. Group profiles describe a set of 
attributes concerning a group of people and are created with a data mining 
process. The group can be a group because of its public manifestation, like 
a group of students or family members, showing the connection between 
the individuals or the members of the group can think of themselves as a 
community. The group profile can also be based on categorisation if the 
members share an attribute and are put into a category because of this 
characteristic. Thus, the starting point for a group profile can be an existing 
group of which a profile is made. Another way to create a group profile is to 
aggregate personal profiles.
Group profiles can be distributive or non-distributive. In the case of a 
distributive group profile, the attributes of the group are also the attributes 
of all the members of the group. For instance, the attribute of ‘not being 
married’ for a group of bachelors also counts for each individual member of 
the group. For non-distributive group profiles, matters are more complicated. 
Consider again the group of bachelors, and suppose an indication is added 
that this group has a higher risk of getting a liver disease. This higher risk 
applies to the group, but not to each individual, e.g., because other factors, 
like drinking behaviour, are also relevant. The association is statistical 
rather than determinate. The information contained in the profile envisages 
individuals as members of groups; it does not envisage the individuals as 
such.79
A personal profile is a property or a collection of properties80 of a particular 
individual.81 This individual does not have to be identified or identifiable 
yet when data is added to the profile, but only recognized, for instance, 
based on a cookie. The profile is created based on monitoring behavior of 
the individual concerned. Whether an individual fits a profile depends on 
the realization of the related characteristics. With the help of a personal 
profile, individuals can be recognized and identified because their behavior 
conforms to their past behaviour. Conversely, correlations between data 
provide a kind of prediction based on past behavior (probability).82 In this 
respect, a distinction can be made between an inductive and a deductive 
approach to profiling. Inductive profiling focuses on identifying behavior, 
whereas the latter is related to monitoring behavior.83
79 Vedder 2004.
80 Note that property, characteristic or attribute are used as synonyms here.
81 Custers 2004, p. 52.
82 Hildebrandt & Gutwirth 2008, p. 18.
83 Canhoto & Backhouse 2008, p. 49.
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Profiling is not just about data, but about inferred knowledge. Hildebrandt84 
gives two reasons why this can be worrying: “1) non-distributive group 
profiles are based on probabilities, which means that the group profile 
does not automatically apply to each member of the group, 2) profiles may 
reveal sophisticated knowledge about a person that is more intimate than 
sensitive personal data.” These worries indicate that the use of profiles 
in relation to individuals is relevant to pay attention to as well. There are 
important differences between digital personae and profiles, in particular in 
relation to the identifiability of the concerned individual. Along this study, 
it is important to keep an eye on the differences between profiles and digital 
personae.
The table below gives an overview of the main characteristics of digital 
personae and profiles. As shown, the main differences between the two 
concern the way in which they are created and the extent to which the 
represented individual is aware of content/existence of the data set. A profile 
can be connected to an individual later on, while a digital persona and an 
individual are linked from the start.













Awareness Individual is often aware Individual is not usually aware
Connection to 
individual Beforehand
Can be connected/applied to a specific individual 
later on
Table 1. Characteristics of digital personae and profiles.
4.3. From profile to digital persona
Even though there is no direct connection to a specific entity, a profile can 
be connected to or applied to an individual later on. The connection to an 
individual can be made based on the identification of an individual as having 
one or more attributes contained in the profile. Leenes85 distinguishes 
different forms of identifiability. Depending on the data in the data set, in his 





or R-identifiability for Recognition identifiability. L-identifiability means 
that there is a register or table that provides the connection between an 
identifier and an individual, such as a phone directory which links phone 
numbers to names. In case of a digital persona, the data set always contains 
an L-identifier, like a name or a passport number. This implies that there 
is a direct connection to an individual and that data protection legislation 
applies.
Profiles do not contain L-identifiers, but they connect to individuals in an 
indirect manner. As shown above, an individual profile may contain an 
R-identifier, such as a cookie, which facilitates the recognition of the individual 
when he returns to the site of the profiling entity (e.g. Amazon). A group 
profile refers to a number of people. People who share a certain behavior or 
attribute that is in the profile can be identified as belonging to a certain class. 
After recognition as a member of a group, an identifier can be issued to enable 
R-identification in the future. According to Leenes,86 the typical procedure 
will be: after the group profile is instantiated to the individual, an R-identifier 
(e.g., a cookie) is issued to the individual to maintain the link. The group profile 
is now an individual profile. It is important to note that at this point (R-ID in 
profile), there is no link to an identified or identifiable entity.











Figure 1. The relation between digital personae and profiles. The C-ID is a non-individual identifier 
belonging to a class that applies to all individuals in the group. 
 
An individual profile can become a digital persona if an L-identifier is added. For instance, an 
individual at a certain point in time gives identifying information, or the information is obtained from 
another source. The L-identifier makes the connection between the individual profile and an offline 
individual. Since the data in the profile is provided by a third party, it takes the form of an imposed 
digital persona. With regard to data protection, group profiles are excluded. Individual profiles, 
however, are in a grey area, because there can be discussion on whether an R-Identifier can 
indirectly identify an individual. An example of such a discussion can be found in IP-addresses.87 
Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the relation between profiles and digital personae. 
 
 
4.4 Comparing digital personae and profiles 
 
Digital representations of individuals consist of sets of digital data. These data can be in text, images, 
video, and so on. They represent the individual in the sense that they present an image of the 
individual without the individual himself being necessarily (physically) present. Presenting something 
in text or images is always a form of representation, since it refers to an original (absent) object. How 
this representation works can be explained with the help of semiotics, in particular, the theory of the 
‗triad of meaning‘ as developed by C.S. Peirce. His triad is a model of how things acquire meaning.88 
The process of ascribing meaning to a certain object is always an interactive process between three 
things: the object, the sign, and the interpretant. The object is the thing to which a certain meaning, 
the knowledge of the object at a specific moment (the interpretant89), is ascribed. This object can be 
anything, physical as well as virtual. The only precondition is that the receiver of information that 
leads to the interpretant is able to have an idea about the object, for instance, based on past 
experiences. The sign is something that stands for the object, since it is impossible to have 
knowledge of an object in a direct manner. ―The sign is an instruction for interpretation, a mechanism 
which starts from an initial stimulus and leads to all its illative90 consequences.‖91 This implies that, 
for every person, the interpretant can be different, since the sign is interpreted and this interpretation 
can lead to different outcomes.  
                                                          
87 Article 29 Working Party 2007. 
88 Van Driel 1991, p. 49. 
89 The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of the result of the process of interpretation. It is formed in 
the mind of the receiver of the information. 
90 The sign triggers the individual to start interpreting and to acquire meaning to something. 
91 Eco 1984, p. 26. 
Figure 1. The relation between digital personae and profiles. The C-ID is a non-
individual identifier belonging to a class that applies to all individuals in the group.
An individual profile can become a digital pers na if an L-identifier s 
added. For instance, an individual at a certain point in time gives identifying 
information, or the information is obtained from another source. The 
L-identifier makes the connection between the individual profile and an 
86 Leenes 2008.
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offline individual. Since the data in the profile is provided by a third party, it 
takes the form of an imposed digital persona. With regard to data protection, 
group profiles are excluded. Individual profiles, however, are in a grey area, 
because there can be discussion on whether an R-Identifier can indirectly 
identify an individual. An example of such a discussion can be found in IP-
addresses.87 Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the relation between 
profiles and digital personae.
4.4. Comparing digital personae and profiles
Digital representations of individuals consist of sets of digital data. These 
data can be in text, images, video, and so on. They represent the individual in 
the sense that they present an image of the individual without the individual 
himself being necessarily (physically) present. Presenting something in text 
or images is always a form of representation, since it refers to an original 
(absent) object. How this representation works can be explained with the help 
of semiotics, in particular, the theory of the ‘triad of meaning’ as developed 
by C.S. Peirce. His triad is a model of how things acquire meaning.88 The 
process of ascribing meaning to a certain object is always an interactive 
process between three things: the object, the sign, and the interpretant. 
The object is the thing to which a certain meaning, the knowledge of the 
object at a specific moment (the interpretant89), is ascribed. This object 
can be anything, physical as well as virtual. The only precondition is that 
the receiver of information that leads to the interpretant is able to have an 
idea about the object, for instance, based on past experiences. The sign is 
something that stands for the object, since it is impossible to have knowledge 
of an object in a direct manner. “The sign is an instruction for interpretation, 
a mechanism which starts from an initial stimulus and leads to all its illative90 
consequences.”91 This implies that, for every person, the interpretant can 
be different, since the sign is interpreted and this interpretation can lead to 
different outcomes. 
To clarify this, consider the following example. A table is a thing and an 
object. The word ‘table’ is a sign that stands for an object with a flat top and a 
number of legs (a table). By looking at the word ‘table’ knowledge about the 
object is obtained. This knowledge is the interpretant and the construction 
87 Article 29 Working Party 2007.
88 Van Driel 1991, p. 49.
89 The interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of the result of the process of 
interpretation. It is formed in the mind of the receiver of the information.
90 The sign triggers the individual to start interpreting and to acquire meaning to 
something.
91 Eco 1984, p. 26.
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of this knowledge usually takes place in the human mind. The interpretant, 
the mental image formed in the mind of the receiver of the sign, refers to the 
object, the table, but the exact image can be different for each individual. 
Peirce’s theory can be visualised as follows:
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H re, the individual is the objec , th  l men  to which a certain meaning 
i  ascribed. Th data set is the sig  that th re is an i dividual and shows 
information which can be inte preted and which l ads to the interpretant, a 
digit l persona. The interpretant has to reveal the knowledge concerning the 
individual at a certai  moment. The digital persona can become the starting 
point for a new semiotic process in the function of a new sign. This sign is 
interpreted and leads to a new interpretant and further knowledge about the 
original object, the individual.
Now, consider the same process with the digital persona replaced by a 
(distributive) profile.
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In this case, the data set can be interpreted, leading to a profile. The data, 
however, are now related to an unknown or potential individual instead of to 
an individual, known to the entity who interprets the data set, as is the case 
with a digital persona. Once the individual is known, the profile can become 
an imposed digital persona in the sense that the individual is considered to 
be in conformity with the profile. It is an image projected onto a person by 
others.
A digital persona stems from data that are directly related to and provided by 
a specific individual. A group profile stems from data that are collected from 
numerous individuals and forms an image that might be applicable to one or 
more of the individuals in the group. It appears that digital personae can be 
seen as explicit representations of individuals, whereas profiles are implicit, 
or more indirect, representations. Nevertheless, both manifest themselves 
in the same way: a data set. The major difference concerns the way in which 
meaning is ascribed to the individual. In the case of a digital persona, the 
meaning is ingrained beforehand while, in the case of a profile, certain 
attributes or patterns can reveal information. Given these differences, 
when profiles and digital personae are used as a basis for making decisions 
concerning individuals, the implications for the individual can be different. 
The way meaning is ascribed to the individual, depending on whether use 
is made of a digital persona or a profile, can have implications for privacy 
and autonomy. These implications can be related to context shifting, for 
instance, if profiles are projected onto an individual in another context than 
the profile was created for, or if restrictions are used, or if the use of a profile 
or a digital persona leads to exclusion from certain offers. Another possible 
implication is that the digital persona becomes so rich, because of large-
scale aggregation and interpretation of data, that the information in the 
digital persona, and thus the knowledge that can be obtained from it, reveals 
information the individual concerned himself was not even aware of. Since 
profiles relate to an unknown individual, it is preliminarily assumed that the 
impact on the privacy and autonomy of the individual of using profiles as a 
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basis for decisions is lower than when a digital persona is used. Basically, 
legal effects often require that the individual is known, which is only the case 
with digital personae a a representation. Nevertheless, the use of profiles can 
also have a large impact and will be considered along this study as well.
5. Synthesis
Two main aspects relevant for this study that occur in different theories 
and disciplinary approaches are identity and identification. Sociological and 
philosophical theories focus on the formation of identities and how identity 
functions as a distinctive factor for individuals or entities. When looking 
at identity in the sense of social or personal identity, the characteristics of 
the individual that make him a certain person or personality are the central 
element. Identity changes over time, because individuals deal with new 
experiences and can change their behavior according to different contexts. 
Identities can be separated into a number of partial identities which are 
applicable to specific contexts. Partial identities and context separation allow 
individuals to develop and manage different aspects of their personality, 
without being restricted by information from other contexts that may be 
irrelevant or inconvenient in a certain setting. The development of a personal 
identity is facilitated by interaction with other individuals, but also by self-
reflection. Individuals take into account how they think they are perceived 
by others and then act according to this perception or not, depending on 
whether or not they agree with the image.
A more technical approach can be found in media and communication 
theory and focuses on identification in the sense of defining with whom you 
are dealing. Here, the identity, for instance, a combination of a username and 
a password, needs to sufficiently single out an individual in a group. This 
restricted approach is not followed in this study. A (super poor) ‘identity’ 
in this sense could be referred to as an ‘identifier’. In this study, an identity 
presents or represents personal characteristics of an individual and shows 
how he is situated in particular contexts. This identity, in digital form, is 
called a ‘digital persona’. 
Social-identity formation was divided into three types, namely, ascribed, 
achieved, and managed identity. They refer to the individual in a certain 
context. The formation of an identity is an iterative and temporal process. 
Even though the three types could be related to the pre-modern, the 
early-modern, and the late-modern era, respectively, they all seem to have 
parallels with other concepts as well. With regard to the establishment of an 
identity, the ascribed and achieved identities seem to have parallels with the 
imposed and projected persona. An ascribed identity was determined by the 
parents and controlled by etiquette, so others were, at least to a large extent, 
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responsible for the creation of the identity. When translated to a digital 
persona, the imposed persona shows the same characteristics. In the case 
of an achieved identity, the individual self-governed his career. In a similar 
sense a projected digital persona is a representation that is governed by the 
concerned individual himself. 
The last form was the managed identity, where individuals take account of 
current standards and the opinions of other individuals. This implies that 
choices are made about which behavior is shown to whom and in what 
context. This fits very well into the modern concept of informational self-
determination. Individuals can have the possibility to manage their own 
identity by taking care of what data are disclosed to whom and in what 
specific context.92 
The connection between the types of identity formation and the main 
characteristics of the historical eras does not exactly fit to the creation of 
digital representations. While the pre-modern, the early-modern, and the 
late-modern eras refer to the position of the individual in identity formation 
as subordinate, inner-directed, and other-directed, in digital form, this only 
goes for the projected digital persona. Imposed digital personae and profiles 
are created by others and are seen as reflections of identities, because they 
represent individuals. The individual himself, however, is not involved, or 
only indirectly, so the interaction types that determine the identity formation 
are not applicable here.
Another central aspect that occurs in different theories and disciplinary 
approaches is representation. Digital personae have a representational 
capacity; they can function as a proxy for an individual. This implies that 
some connection between the data set and an offline individual has to be 
established. Closely related to digital personae, mainly because of their 
function as representations, are profiles. These data sets also contain 
information and attributes concerning individuals or groups, but are not 
connected to an offline individual. As shown, profiles can take the form of 
an imposed digital persona if an identifier which establishes the link to an 
individual is added to the data set. The way in which digital personae and 
profiles originate differ and so do the way data are collected and processed. 
This is an indication that digital personae and profiles have to be treated 
differently when they are used as input for making decisions that affect 
individuals. 
92 These aspects highlight the link between identity and privacy, which is clearly reflected 
in the privacy definition given by Agre (1997) (see Chapter 4 section 2 below). 
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The distinction between projected and imposed digital personae is equally 
relevant. The individual’s amount of control and supervision over his 
representation differs depending on what form of persona is concerned. 
At least the knowledge of or insight into the data that are part of the 
representation is important, since informational self-determination can only 
be achieved if an individual has insight into his data and is able to influence 
the contents of a digital representation.
The impact and relevance of digital personae for individuals can be 
approached from a number of viewpoints. One major aspect is that digital 
personae have a close connection to the identity of individuals. They can 
represent (a part of) this identity or they can reveal how an individual’s 
identity is perceived by others. Similarly to the context-related presentation 
of self, digital personae are context-related. The creation of digital personae 
or of the underlying data sets is done with a specific purpose and is aimed at 
functioning in a particular context.
Profiles, thus, relate to individuals that are not identified or identifiable. As 
indicated, however, it is very well possible that a profile becomes a digital 
persona by combining the data with an identifier. In the next chapter, the 
concept of the digital persona will be elaborated upon and specific forms of 
digital personae are presented. This will provide more insight in how digital 
personae are created and for what purposes. Moreover, it will clarify why 
sometimes commercial companies argue that a digital persona is a profile, 
therewith stressing the importance of taking both forms of data sets into 
account in this study. 
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Chapter 3  
Digital Persona: Definition and Appearance
1. Introduction
This chapter explores the concept of the digital persona in more detail. There 
are numerous digital personae in existence, but still it is hard to define exactly 
what a digital persona is. The aim of this chapter is to come to a definition 
and a list of features which can help to indicate whether a certain digital 
representation is a digital persona or not. In order to fulfill this aim a three 
step approach will be taken. First, a general definition of digital personae 
will be given and the different forms of digital personae will be defined (2). 
Roger Clarke’s definitions of the projected and imposed digital persona will 
be taken as a starting point, and then a third form will be introduced; the 
hybrid digital persona. 
Having discussed the general definition and the three forms in more detail, 
the chapter continues by sketching a background of the use of digital 
personae. This will give an insight in why digital personae are created. It 
will be elaborated on what representation (‘persona’) means in this context 
(3.1) and what ‘digital’ implies (3.2). Then, section 3.3 discusses what the 
combination of these two aspects, as they appear in ‘digital persona’, means 
in practice.
Subsequently, section 4 discusses a number of relevant features which 
are helpful in deciding whether some digital data set constitutes a digital 
persona. The features together show what a digital persona can look like, 
its practical appearance. The features are divided into three categories 
which chronologically connect to ‘the life cycle of a digital persona’. First, 
there is data collection. Then, the set of data takes a certain form, and, third, 
there is the application of the digital persona in practice. Each feature will 
be explained from a practical point of view with the help of a case study 
on Google, which is woven into the section and can be recognized on its 
presentation in separate text blocks. The end of the section describes how 
the features can function as a tool to indicate whether some representation 
is a digital persona or not, and what form of a digital persona it is.
2. The digital persona in general and its three specific forms
According to Clarke’s definition, a digital persona is ‘a model of an 
individual’s public personality based on data and maintained by transactions, 
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and intended for use as a proxy for the individual’93. There are two aspects in 
this definition that need specific attention. One aspect is the ‘public personality’. 
Public can refer to what is presented to the outside world, so then ‘public’ is 
interpreted as opposite to ‘private’. When using a common understanding of 
these terms, public means that something is available to other people, regardless 
who they are, whereas private means that availability is restricted to yourself (in 
your mind). Intuitively, certain representations, like medical dossiers or financial 
records, definitely have a private character. However, these representations are 
part of your public personality and they can be seen as digital personae. Besides, 
lots of digital personae are created or enriched with data that are collected behind 
the scenes with the help of monitoring technologies. These data are revealed by 
individuals, but are not available for everyone. Nevertheless, In Clarke’s terms 
the data are part of your public personality. Thus, Clarke’s definition refers to 
data that are not only in your mind, but that are disclosed or communicated, or 
became available to others in another way.  
A second point deserving attention are the ‘transactions’ needed to maintain 
the digital persona. Digital personae can have a static form, meaning that 
there are no transactions concerning the data the digital persona consists 
of. Besides, even without transactions, interpreted in a broad sense like 
any interaction between the digital persona and another entity, the digital 
persona can be maintained. It can just be stored in a database or file system. 
This is why Clarke means database transactions. The digital persona as such 
was created by such a transaction in the first place. So, if maintenance is 
needed this is done by transactions.
It seems that with the development of the Internet and automation of 
processes, some aspects of the definition became inappropriate. In order to 
connect to current practices, I would like to propose a new definition of the 
digital persona. In that definition, emphasis is on the connection to a real-
world individual. This, because the representation element is central, but 
the represented individual is affected by decisions taken based on the digital 
persona. It is not possible to say exactly what data and how much data are 
needed to speak of a digital persona. In any case it is relevant whether the 
digital representation can be connected to an offline individual, because the 
digital persona has to serve as a proxy for decision making with an effect on 
the individual herself. This connection, however, does not necessarily imply 
identification of the individual in the sense of having a name. Moreover, a 
digital persona is a gradual concept. Depending on context and purpose, 
more or less data are needed to establish the connection to an offline 
individual. When including these characteristics, I come to the following 
definition: 
93 Clarke 1994.
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A digital persona is a digital representation of a real-world individual, which 
can be connected to this real-world individual and includes a sufficient amount 
of (relevant) data to serve, within the context and for the purpose of its use, as a 
proxy for the individual.
In this definition, the connection to the real-world individual and the 
representational function are included. Representation, however, is 
connected to context and purpose of the digital persona, which emphasizes 
the fact that data in the representation are context-bound and the creation of 
the digital persona is related to an intended purpose. This can be compared 
with partial identities, where individuals disclose information appropriate 
for the specific context and choose to keep other information secret. For 
instance, information shared with colleagues differs from information 
shared with friends or family members. Besides, there is special attention 
for the fact that a digital persona consists of data, but that it cannot be said 
how many data are needed exactly. This depends on context and purpose for 
which the digital persona is intended to be used.
In the theoretical framework, two types of digital personae were presented.94 
These two forms were introduced by Clarke in 199495. He distinguishes 
between the projected digital persona, which is created by the represented 
individual himself, and the imposed digital persona, which is created by 
another party than the represented individual, like a company or institution. 
These two are presented as black and white distinctions. In today’s practice, 
a hybrid form is more prevalent. In this hybrid form, the starting point is 
either a projected or an imposed persona, and this digital persona is then 
combined or enriched with data from the other form. Thus, the influence of 
the individual in the creation can vary between 0 and 100 percent. The three 
forms of digital personae will be described in more detail below.
2.1. The projected digital persona
In Clarke’s words a projected persona is “an image of one’s self that an 
individual conveys to others by means of data.”96 A pure form of a projected 
digital persona is not often found. In this statement, I use a strict interpretation 
of the projected persona. When an individual fills out a web form with some 
personal details, this is not completely a form of a projected persona, even 
though the individual provides the data himself. Basically, the requested data 
are selected by another party and very often refusing to fill out a certain part 
of the form is technically impossible. Besides, depending on the purpose of 





the web form, lying about details is just not possible. For instance, one could 
lie about one’s address, but that will result in not receiving ordered goods. 
So, I take as a starting point that for the projected persona, the individual has 
to be in control97 of choosing the form and contents of the representation. 
A possible example of a projected digital persona is a personal homepage. 
On such a page individuals can present themselves in whatever way they 
want. The representation can include text, pictures, videos, and music, 
and can be designed in a way the individual desires. The information in 
the representation can be related to a specific purpose, such as leisure and 
fun, or a professional function. The personal homepage is created on the 
initiative of the represented individual and contains information provided 
by this individual only. This is an important aspect, for when interactive 
functionalities, such as blogging or chat where others can post replies or 
reactions, are added, the website becomes a hybrid digital persona, since 
the content on the website no longer solely originates from the user himself. 
An obvious and intended form of this can be found on social network sites 
(SNS, see below), where interaction between the (social) network members 
is the main focus.
2.2. The imposed digital persona
An imposed digital persona is a persona which is created by another party 
than the concerned individual. The data are collected and provided by this 
other party. An imposed digital persona is “an identity projected onto a 
person by means of data, by outside agencies such as corporations and 
government agencies”98. A proper example of an imposed digital persona 
is a record made by a credit rating agency. These agencies register whether 
someone has a debt or a loan, and whether she is paying bills too late. Records 
often also include information on mobile phone subscriptions. Thus, the 
information in the record originates from different sources other than the 
data subject. Based on the data in the record an analysis can be made on the 
creditworthiness of an individual. Companies can consult the credit records 
before granting someone a credit, giving a postponement of payment or 
selling a subscription.
The way of presenting the credit rating to a company can be organized in 
different forms, ranging from objective facts, only indicating whether one 
has a loan or whether one has paid bills too late in the past, to subjective 
97 Of course, for control technical possibilities and the technical capability of the creator 
are relevant. Here, however, these factors are excluded and control only has to do with 
determining what data are disclosed or not.
98 Clarke 1994.
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(value) judgments such as “this person is a defaulter”.  The statement that 
someone is a defaulter is an interpretation of the data in the record, probably 
supplemented with other data. This interpretation, or value judgment, can 
be added to the record, therewith becoming part of the digital persona.
Credit rating agencies have information on the creditworthiness of 
individuals, sometimes combined with a categorization or risk indication. 
Creditworthiness is derived from previously or currently existing debts, 
loans, and subscriptions for mobile phone providers. Obviously, one wants 
to be sure that it is financially safe to give a loan to someone in the sense that 
one can expect that the individual is able to pay his debts. In the Netherlands, 
the Bureau Krediet Registratie (BKR99, Credit Registration Office) is the 
central institution which serves as a provider for credit information. The 
BKR does not judge on payment behavior, but only provides information on 
loans, credits, and mobile phone subscriptions. A registered BKR member, 
for instance a bank, credit card company, or mobile phone provider, can ask 
for this information and has to decide on the potential risk herself. However, 
even though BKR states not to judge, it can provide a member, on special 
request, with a credit score next to the information in the central credit 
information system (Centraal Krediet Informatiesysteem, CKI) which can be 
accessed directly by members. A credit score gives an indication whether 
there can be expected a high or a low risk when a member grants a credit 
to an individual. A CKI record concerning an individual includes personal 
data (surname (maiden name), initial(s), date of birth, address, residence) 
and data from the registered agreement(s) (amount of money loaned or 
maximum to spend, moment the agreement started, the month in which the 
agreement has to be paid off completely, the month in which the agreement 
was actually ended, type of the agreement, special circumstances occurring 
during the agreement). After an agreement has ended, the retention term 
starts which means that the data are stored for another five years.100 
Some specialized companies go a lot further and try to collect as much data 
as possible in order to be able to categorize individuals in specific groups, 
including data about, for instance, age, family composition, income, and 
buying behavior. A well-known example of such a company is Experian.101 
Experian describes itself as “a global leader in providing information, 
analytical and marketing services to organisations and consumers to help 
manage the risk and reward of commercial and financial decisions.” One 
of the services they offer is the Mosaic program, which is a combination of 
a number of databases and surveys which has led to a detailed analysis of 
99 See: <http://www.bkr.nl/>. 
100 See: FAQ on BKR site: <http://www.bkr.nl/MeestGesteldeVragen.aspx?pid=77>. 
101 See: <http://www.experian.com>. 
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consumer behaviour. For instance, according to Experian’s website, Mosaic 
United Kingdom is a set of 67 types of consumers, divided in 15 groups, 
and “provides an accurate understanding of the demographics, lifestyles 
and behaviour of all individuals and households in the UK.” The database 
is available as either a person, household or postcode database. This means 
that for each individual in the UK a digital representation is made which is 
connected to one of the 67 types of consumers. 
Another product by Experian is Hitwise, which gives an overview of clicking 
behaviour of Internet users, by showing graphics of specific websites or 
industries and which sites were visited before or afterwards. The data also 
include the breakdown of new and returning visitors.  
The imposed digital personae as described above in the examples of BKR 
and Experian are connected to an individual from the moment of their 
creation on. However, it is also possible to establish an imposed digital 
persona starting with a group profile. Identifying an individual as belonging 
to a certain category or fitting within a profile connects the individual to the 
data in the profile. Then, the group profile becomes an individual profile for 
this specific individual and, thus, an imposed digital persona. So, imposed 
digital personae can be created on an individual level from the beginning on, 
or can originate from a group profile which is connected and applied to a 
specific individual afterwards.
2.3. The hybrid digital persona
While the projected and the imposed digital persona originally were the 
two basic forms of digital representations, technological development has 
led to a new form: the hybrid digital persona. The Internet has developed 
from a broadcast information medium (web 1.0) to a social collaborative 
environment where every user can contribute content (web 2.0). The active 
role played by the individual, instead of merely consuming information 
available on the web, changed the way digital representations are created. 
For instance, a profile on a social network site (SNS) is created by the 
individual himself. She can make his own personal profile page, add 
information concerning age, gender, interests, work, etc., and post pictures 
and videos. Even though the format of the profile page is determined by 
the SNS provider, the representation is designed by the individual. An 
essential function of a social network site is to establish connections with 
other users; create the social network. Usually, the list of people with whom 
there is a connection is displayed on the profile page. From that point on, 
the connections become part of the representation as well, because the 
people one has in his network also says something about social status. 
Important indicators are the kind of contacts (business connections, friends, 
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stereotypes) and the number of connections. Kind of contacts can refer to 
whether someone has a network of business connections or friends and to 
the way the contacts present themselves, for instance as belonging to certain 
groups like gothics or Burning Man festival visitors102. More essentially in 
this context, people with whom there is a connection can also add content to 
each other’s personal profile page in the form of text messages, comments, 
pictures, or videos. This is where the initially projected profile becomes 
hybrid.103 The interaction and mutual exchange of content is also the point 
where an SNS profile page distinguishes itself from a traditional personal 
homepage, which had a more static form as created by the individual and no 
facilities for external contributions. 
To give a flavor of the richness of hybrid digital personae, SNS can serve as 
an example. For instance, “a fully filled-out Facebook profile contains about 
forty pieces of recognizably personal information, including name; birthday; 
political and religious views; online and offline contact information; gender, 
sexual preference, and relationship status; favorite books, movies, and 
so on; educational and employment history; and, of course, picture”104. 
Besides, there appears to be a correlation between the number of SNS an 
individual participates in and the number of attributes disclosed. The more 
SNS profiles, the more personal information is provided by the individual.105 
A fully filled-out profile is, however, not necessary to constitute a digital 
persona. Even with a small amount of data there is a representation which can 
be connected to an offline individual. Besides, the forty attributes mentioned 
by Grimmelmann are only the attributes that count as recognizably personal 
information. Other information can be captured in blogs, comments, videos, 
or whatever an individual uses to fill the profile page, and this information 
can probably also be connected to the individual and might even be more 
revealing, for instance when discussing a medical complaint one has.  This 
is personal information as well. Facebook, however, does not ask for this 
information as part of the standard profile attributes.106
 
102 For an example of how this can cause discomfort, see: Donath & boyd 2004, p. 78. They 
give an example of a school teacher who had friends displaying pictures of wild dancing 
at the Burning Man festival and she got questions on this from her pupils after one of 
them had invited her to connect on Friendster, therewith gaining access to her profile, 
including the pictures of her contacts.
103 See also the dissertation by Rachel Marbus (to appear in 2013) in which also a hybrid 
persona is recognized.
104 Grimmelmann 2009, p. 1149.
105 Irani, Webb, Li & Pu 2009, p. 271.
106 Forty attributes containing personal information might seem quite a rich profile. 
However, in the Netherlands, the Electronic Child Record has been introduced (see 
section 3.3 below) which can contain up to 1200 attributes concerning a single child.
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What is important is that the profile page forms an image of an individual 
and can function as a proxy for this individual. SNS facilitate asynchronous 
communication in message services or blogs which can be commented on, 
so even when the concerned individual is not online, a communication (or 
conversation) can still be started or continued. Besides, the data on the 
profile page as such form an image from which information concerning the 
represented individual can be distracted. The individual presents himself 
via the profile page for the purpose of social networking. His own physical 
presence is not necessarily required for interaction with others.
3. Why digital personae are created
The three forms of digital personae described above are created in a wide 
variety of contexts and purposes. Here, purposes means types of use on a 
more detailed level. For instance, a digital persona can be used as a reference, 
like in a traditional address book, it can be used as input for risk calculations, 
such as credit rating reports, or it can be used as a tool for social interaction, 
like a profile page on an SNS. Thus, specific purposes are related to the 
practical application of the digital persona. On a more general level, the 
purposes of its creation relate to the constituent parts of the concept ‘digital 
persona’. When analyzing these parts, these purposes become clear. First, 
there is the function of a digital persona as a proxy, which basically means 
the representation part and refers to the ‘persona’ in digital persona. Second, 
there is ‘digital’, which relates to the digitalization of data which facilitates 
automated processing. These two aspects will be discussed briefly and then 
an elaboration on the effect of combining these two elements will follow.
3.1. Representation (persona)
The first reason for creating digital personae is representation of individuals. 
Individuals are involved in interactions with all kinds of companies, 
institutions, and other individuals. Digital proxies are a practical solution, 
because it is impossible and undesirable to be physically present for all 
interactions. Impossible, since many interactions take place online or in 
automated systems, and undesirable because the costs for interactions 
would increase, even though physical presence is not always necessary. For 
instance, it is very useful when an employer can check data regarding bank 
accounts in a digital file instead of having to ask each employee every single 
time again when he wants to pay salaries.107 This kind of representation 
107 There is a tension between efficiency and the requirements for legitimate data processing 
as laid down in the Data Protection Directive (DPD). The DPD requires consent of the 
individual in many cases, so the individual has to be involved, but from the perspective 
of efficiency this is undesirable. Often, this is solved by letting the individual give her 
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in a file was already common practice before the digital era. However, 
nowadays interactions are much more diverse and very often individuals are 
not even aware of an interaction taking place. This lack of awareness can 
be related to two things. First, the physical absence in interaction facilitates 
asynchronous communication and results, meaning that an individual may 
become aware of a decision afterwards, without being directly involved in 
the decision making process. Because of this asynchronous interaction, one 
can experience this as just being subjected to a decision without having been 
consulted. However, in fact the digital representation was consulted as were 
it the concerned individual himself. 
Personal details Employee status Financial details
Name Workingman Employee number 20059876 Salary/month 2345,67
Initials J.C. (James) Employed since 2005-09-01 Cumulative 65543,21
Date of birth 1983-08-24 Function Researcher Year-end bonus 1234,00
Address Gateway 23 Start of contract 2008-09-01 Bank account 112233445
Postal Code 45678 End of contract 2013-08-31 Bank Village bank
City Downtown Function scale 9/3 City Downtown
Telephone 023-65348762
E-mail J.C.Workingman@gmail.com
Table 2. Example of a digital representation of an employee.
The above table is an example of a digital representation of an individual. 
It shows some personal details of an employee. Specific information is 
included for the personnel department and financial administration. Based 
on the data in the ‘Employee status’ section, it can be concluded that every 
year on September 1st, the employee shifts up in the function scale. It also 
shows the end date of the contract and the function of the employee. The 
‘Financial details’ are for the financial department, so they can consult this 
table to see what salary has to be paid each month and to which bank account. 
The combination of the data makes that with a shift in function scale the 
employee also gets a higher salary. As Clarke states: “In the abstract world of 
information systems, each entity and each identity is represented by various 
records, each of which contains a collection of data-items, each of which 
represents a real-world attribute.” And “[o]rganisations have increasingly 
come to rely on records as a means of dealing with people, rather than 
dealing with the people themselves.”108
consent in a contract or by accepting general terms and conditions. However, the 
acceptability or legal validity of these practices is restricted because individuals cannot 
always foresee the exact implications. 
108 Clarke 2008, p. 222.
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3.2. Facilitating automated processing (digital)
The second reason is to enable automated processing of the data in the 
representation. Once data are digital, machines can read the data and run 
algorithms on the data. First, this means that processes can be (partially) 
automated, which is more efficient in terms of time and effort. Secondly, 
the automated processing of data, in particular running algorithms, leads to 
opportunities for discovering new or more information in the data. With the 
means of computers it is possible to recognize patterns in data which can 
reveal new knowledge concerning groups or individuals. Besides, it is much 
easier to add data to a digital persona automatically. For instance, when 
online behavior, such as click trails and web history, is recorded, the data 
can be connected to the digital persona right away. Involvement of a human 
being is not necessary.
Another advantage of automated processing is that digital representations 
can be compared easily on sharing attributes. This is a very practical tool 
for defining groups of people or making categories. Obviously, this is also 
possible with traditional paper-based data sets, but doing this electronically 
is much faster and much easier. Besides, the extra facilities of discovering 
knowledge which cannot be seen at first sight or by just running through a 
card deck enable users of digital data sets to improve and optimize their work 
or services and to allocate resources optimally.
Table 3 shows an overview of district, brand of car, and salary of a number 
of people who live in the same city. At first sight, the table has no strange 
information and it is easy to imagine that it is difficult to extract information 
from such a table when it concerns hundreds or thousands of records. 
However, with automated processing patterns and exceptions can be 
revealed. The brands in the table can be connected to information on average 
prices of these car brands. By running a simple algorithm it appears that 
people with a higher salary have more expensive cars. This is kind of logical, 
but it also appears that people with a high salary who live in the centre of the 
city have relatively cheap cars. 
 
















Table 3. Overview of living district, car brand, and salary of a number of citizens.
These data can be correlated with other data to find out why this exception 
exists. It may, for instance, appear that the reason for this is that there is a 
high car theft rate in the centre, or that the traffic and parking practice in the 
city centre is a real mess, like for instance in Paris, so people who live in the 
centre decide to buy a cheap car so it is not that bad if it gains some dents. 
There is a famous example which clarifies the difference between querying 
and data mining; ‘the parable of the beer and diapers’. It reads as follows:
Some time ago, Wal-Mart decided to combine the data from its loyalty 
card system with that from its point of sale systems. The former 
provided Wal-Mart with demographic data about its customers, the 
latter told it where, when and what those customers bought. Once 
combined, the data was mined extensively and many correlations 
appeared. Some of these were obvious; people who buy gin are 
also likely to buy tonic. They often also buy lemons. However, one 
correlation stood out like a sore thumb because it was so unexpected.
On Friday afternoons, young American males who buy diapers 
(nappies) also have a predisposition to buy beer. No one had predicted 
that result, so no one would ever have even asked the question in 
the first place. Hence, this is an excellent example of the difference 
between data mining and querying.109
109 Whitehorn 2006. 
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Thus, data mining technologies (running algorithms) can reveal information 
that one would never have asked for himself. To complete the story, here is the 
analysis of the correlation between beer and diapers. It appears that young 
American males often go drinking with their friends on Friday evenings. 
Once a young American becomes a father, he is not that free in going out 
anymore. Taking care of his offspring forces him to stay at home. However, 
he can still drink beer, but needs to be remembered of that. So, placing the 
beer next to the diapers in a store increases the sale of beer.
3.3. ‘Digital persona’
Having described the aspects of representation of an individual and digital 
form it can now be discussed what the combination of these two means. 
Basically, it means that the facilities of digital data processing are affecting 
individuals. First, the discovery of knowledge based on recognizing patterns 
or combining data by running algorithms reveals knowledge concerning an 
individual. Knowledge the individual himself might not even be aware of. 
This means that the user of the digital persona can take decisions concerning 
the represented individual, based on knowledge about this individual which 
is not available at first sight and is not disclosed by merely looking at the data 
set. But “once matter has ‘gone digital’, it can also be stored and transferred as 
binary bits”110. “This is the crux of the digital revolution: digital matter (e.g., 
in form of consumer information) becomes free-flowing and free-floating, 
in technical as well as symbolic terms.”111
Running algorithms or queries on digital personae allows automatic selection 
of individuals, based on attributes in the data set. As a result, individuals 
can be subjected to inclusion or exclusion. However, whether an individual 
is subjected to such a decision remains (often) unknown to the concerned 
individual himself, even though it certainly is a decision that affects the 
individual.112
The interaction between individual and the other entity is often not even 
intended to include active participation of the individual, but is meant 
as automated processing behind-the-scenes. For instance, when buying 
something in a web shop, the shop owner and the visitor want some ‘magic’ 
to happen in order to optimize the shopping experience, make it convenient 
for the visitor, and fruitful for the shop owner. The shop owner wants to 
collect data on the interests of a visitor and, based on that, generate some 
personalized recommendations. The collected data, possibly connected to 
110 Lunefeld 1999 (cited in: Zwick & Dholakia 2004, p. 31).
111 Zwick & Dholakia 2004, p. 31.
112 See Chapter 5 of this study.
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older data from earlier visits, form the digital representation and immediately 
there are some automated decisions taken. It is on purpose that the individual 
is not actively involved here, since that would make the shopping experience 
less convenient.113 114 
A recent example of a digital persona is the Electronic Child Record 
(Elektronisch Kind Dossier, ECR). In the Netherlands, the ECR was 
introduced on July 1st 2010 for every child in the age of 0 until 19 years. 
The ECR will replace the traditional paper files and data to be included in 
the ECR is based on these files. Except for the digitization, not that much 
should change then. However, two main reasons why this is not the case can 
be identified. “First, ECR is based on a data set that standardizes content 
to allow for information exchange between different youth-healthcare 
organizations. The data set, although being based on the traditional paper 
files, is complemented with new kinds of personal data that are perceived 
relevant by youth healthcare professionals (the total list covering more than 
30 pages115).”116 Thus, the digital form is much more extended than the 
traditional paper dossier. Managing such extensive dossiers is much easier 
when they are digitized, since automated search and filtering can be executed. 
“Second, by means of behavioral-screening questionnaires to be filled in 
by parents, children or teachers longitudinal psycho-social information on 
children is collected nation-wide and based on that information children will 
be sorted in different categories.”117 The categorization is also included in the 
ECR itself. This means that, on the one hand, digitization facilitates nation-
wide comparisons and analyses of the child records, which also enables 
pigeon-holing of children, and, on the other hand, it becomes clear that the 
ECR is a detailed representation of a child and that the ECR can be treated 
as if it were the represented child himself. Based on the ECR, decisions 
are taken that affect the child and his parents even though the child is not 
(necessarily) aware of these decisions and the grounds on which they are 
taken. For instance, parents with a low income can be seen as an indication 
that a child has a higher risk of becoming involved in criminal behavior. 
It can be decided to flag the child’s dossier, because of this information. 
113 There are some exceptions. For instance, Amazon.com offers its customers the 
opportunity to reflect on the recommendations with the help of a grading system.
114 Here, the difference between online and offline is also important. When a shop 
employee approaches a customer with the question whether she can be of help and what 
the customer is searching for, this is usually experienced as considerate. However, when 
this situation takes place in an online context, meaning that customers have to answer 
questions, tick boxes, or reply to pop-up screens, this will most likely be experienced as 
annoying.
115 Which comes down to a list of about 1200 attributes. 
116 Hof, Leenes & Fennell 2009, p. 157.
117 Hof, Leenes & Fennell 2009, p. 157.
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Children are connected to risk-profiles and when a potential risk appears 
the frequency of contact moments with youth-healthcare professionals will 
be increased, whereas children with a very low risk will have less frequent 
contact moments. 
The ECR is a typical example of a digital persona. It has a digital format which 
is used to facilitate data exchange between youth-healthcare professionals 
and to compare data in an automated manner. Besides, the ECR gives a 
compound overview of a child in the context of youth-healthcare. The 
physical presence of the child is no longer necessary to take decisions 
regarding the child, since the ECR serves as a proxy.
4. The practical appearance of digital personae
Having described the three types or forms of digital personae and the reasons 
for using digital personae, the question remains what exactly constitutes a 
digital persona. Is a certain amount of data necessary? Is a personal identifier 
needed? Or is identification of an individual in the sense of singling-out or 
recognizing someone sufficient? These questions are difficult to give a clear-
cut answer to. However, it is possible to identify a number of relevant features, 
which can be of use when talking about digital representations and deciding 
whether a specific representation is a digital persona or not. These features 
can be divided into three categories: the collection of the data that constitute 
the digital persona, the form of the digital persona, and the application of 
the digital persona. In order to illustrate the features from a more practical 
perspective, a use case on Google and its (related) services is integrated.
Meet James:
James is a 32-year old person whose whereabouts on the web are integrated in text 
blocks along this chapter in order to provide a more practical background to the 
discussed features. He works in the research industry and has some knowledge of 
ICT and web applications. James is frequently online, in private contexts as well 
as for professional purposes. As a researcher he has to find a lot of information 
and, like many people, he often uses Google’s search engine as a starting point to 
gather information on the topics he is occupied with, albeit only to get a grasp on 
the relevant and related issues of a topic. James’ research is about ICT and law, so 
he has a more than average interest in general terms and conditions and privacy 
statements as used by companies on the Internet.
The text blocks in italics together present a use case concerning Google and 
its affiliated services.118 This case is chosen for many people use one or more 
118 The information included in this use case is derived from the General Terms and 
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of Google’s services. Besides, the accumulated services Google offers and the 
tools it uses, combined with the Google-Double Click merger, give an excellent 
opportunity to show how far-reaching the ‘Google Empire’ is and how this 
affects ordinary Internet users. Whilst serving as a use case, it also functions as a 
clarifying tool on the features related to digital personae.
4.1. Collection of data
This subsection describes how data are collected in order to establish a 
digital persona. As indicated above, the data can originate from different 
sources. In the case of a projected digital persona, the data are provided by 
the concerned individual himself. In the cases that other parties are (partly) 
responsible for the creation of the digital persona, the data can either be 
created by this other party, collected by this party from other sources, or the 
data can just be obtained from the concerned individual by merely asking, 
for instance in a web form. 
The creation of data by the party that also creates (and uses) the digital 
persona can take different forms. A basic form is that data are collected 
from communications, like e-mail contact or just a physical meeting. 
In these cases, the concerned individual is aware of the communication 
taking place and in fact just provides the data himself for the purpose of the 
communication. This does, however, not mean that the individual is also 
aware of the data being collected and stored in order to function as a proxy. 
Another form, somewhat more distinguished from awareness because of 
concrete communication is to collect data on the interaction one has with 
a web service. This can be, for instance, a click trail or search terms one 
entered in order to find interesting products or information. This form of 
data collection is related to monitoring individual behavior. One step further 
than merely collecting data is to analyze the data, or to add interpretations 
to certain behavior, leading to the creation of new data that were not directly 
revealed by the concerned individual. For instance, an individual can be 
categorized as having a certain interest, or as a defaulter. Because the data 
are really created by another party than the concerned individual himself, 
this underscores the imposed character of this digital persona.
 
Data can also be obtained from other sources than the concerned individual 
himself or the party who creates or uses the digital persona. For instance, 
a credit rating agency obtains data from banking institutions, telephone 
Conditions as used by Google and applied to their different services. As a reference, 
I have used the Terms in their extensive form, like they were available before the 
introduction of the new policy on 1st March 2012. These new Terms will be discussed 
later on in Chapter 5, section 4.2.1. 
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companies and other financial institutions in order to create a digital persona 
of an individual. In a web context, Google is a good example, obtaining data 
from numerous web sites which have implemented one or more of Google’s 
services, such as Google maps or YouTube videos, or who are participating 
in programs such as AdSense or Google Analytics. Google Analytics and 
AdSense use so-called web bugs to track visitors of web sites.119 A web 
bug is an image of 1 by 1 pixel, so the user does not see it, included in a 
web page, and it issues a cookie to the visitor’s web browser. Every time 
someone visits a page which includes one of the features related to Google, 
Google receives a package of data concerning this visit including this cookie. 
Research120 showed that with these web bugs, Google covers about 88,4% 
of the total domains in a data set of almost 400.000 unique domains121 and 
92 of the top 100 sites. The tracking and monitoring of browsing behavior 
provides Google with information to derive interests of individuals, which 
allows for better performance of their services (the search engine provides 
more relevant results which are related to your interests) and for targeted 
advertising. When a company wants to obtain other information from a 
visitor of their webpage, like name address, and contact details, it is obvious 
just to ask the individual to provide these data, for instance by using a web 
form. 
With regard to the collection of the data that form the digital representation, 
several aspects are of importance. A first issue is whether the concerned 
individual knows about the data collection, so whether the collection takes 
place consciously or unconsciously from the perspective of the represented 
person. Obviously, in the case of a projected digital persona, the data 
collection is conscious since the individual provides the data himself. In the 
case of the imposed or hybrid digital persona, however, the collection, at 
least partly, often takes place without the individual being aware. In some 
cases, the individual becomes aware afterwards, when a certain effect of 
the collection is noticed, but sometimes, the individual never knows about 
the collection of data. In this regard, it is also relevant to be aware of the 
distinction between the collection of data as such and the creation of a digital 
persona from these data. For instance, when data are collected on a large 
scale, without connecting them to individuals, and the data are used to create 
group profiles, then there is data collection but there are no digital personae 
created from the data. So, it has to be data that are related to an individual.
119 The presence of these web bugs can, for instance, be checked by using Ghostery, a 
Firefox browser plugin, which lists the web bugs on a web page. 
120 Gomez, Pinnick & Soltani 2009, p. 4. 
121 This large number is only a small part of the entire internet. However, it gives a clear 
indication that the coverage of Google on commercial websites can be assumed to be 
very high.
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James frequently uses the Google search engine and has a Gmail account. In 
order to open the Gmail account he had to provide a number of personal details 
and he knows that these are stored by Google. The details include username 
and password, which are obviously necessary to use the service. James has read 
the general terms and conditions and found out that Google, as a provider of 
the service, has access to his emails and list of contacts. What he does not count 
for is that Gmail monitors his email patterns and the contacts and groups he is 
emailing. Another thing he pays attention to is that the displayed advertisements 
are targeted ads, based on region, language, and contents of his emails. Being 
subjected to these ads is the price James pays for using the service, because in fact, 
businesses pay for having their advertisements displayed, therewith making it 
possible for Google to provide the Gmail service for free. Once an email message 
is opened, Gmail screens the message on keywords in order to flag it as spam if 
appropriate. However, the screening of the contents of the email message also 
facilitates the displaying of targeted advertisements, which are relevant according 
to the content of the email message. When a message is closed, the ads disappear 
as well.
When using the search engine, James obviously knows that he is entering a search 
term. Since he is a bit familiar with ICT and has some privacy interests, he knows 
that the search terms are stored by Google. The search terms are used as input for 
a bidding process, the Google auction, which takes place right before the search 
results are displayed and determines which sponsored advertisements appear on 
top and in the right column of the result list. Advertisers bid on keywords that are 
related to their businesses, so the sponsored links that show up are in fact targeted 
advertisements as well.122 Google stores the search terms accompanied with data 
on the IP address, browser type, language, time and date of the session, and some 
other technical data about the user’s computer. Based on a cookie, the device 
belonging to the stored data can be recognized. Even though James is aware of 
the retention of his search history, he is not aware that this history is processed in 
order to provide James with personalized search results every time he submits a 
new query. The entire history in combination with the personalization of future 
searches gives a quite profound overview of the interests and needs of James in a 
digital form.
The retention period and use of search data depends on some settings chosen by 
James. When James would not have a Google account or does not log in, Google 
explains that it stores up to 180 days of search activity linked to his browser’s 
cookie, including queries and results that he clicks. However, James has a Google 
account because of the Gmail service he uses, and when he has signed-in, Google 
personalizes his search experience on his entire Web History. In his account, James 




Two aspects that show up are the difference in the time frame of the used search 
history. With an account, this is unlimited, whereas without an account, called 
anonymous search, there is a restriction to 180 days. Another main point is that 
anonymous personalized search is based on search activity, i.e. prior use of the 
search engine, whereas when James uses his account, his entire Web History is used 
for personalization of the search results. This means that sites James frequently 
visits, and thus no search is needed to find them, are also included, as well as all 
his other whereabouts on the web Google is able to track. As indicated, Google 
covers a large part of the web with its web bugs, so, basically, that boils down to 
almost all web activity.
Signed-in Personalised Search Signed-out Personalised Search
Where the data Google 
uses to customize is stored
In Web History, linked to James’ Google 
Account
On Google’s servers, linked to an 
anonymous browser cookie
How far back Google uses 
search history
Indefinitely or until James removes it Up to 180 days
Which searches are used 
to customize
Only signed-in search activity, and only if James 
is signed up for Web History (default setting)
Only signed-out search activity
Table 4. Google personalized search.
James is aware of the Google search engine and Gmail collecting data about him. 
Nevertheless, the data sources are far more extended than he can imagine. Google 
provides a service called Google Analytics, which is helping companies to analyze 
their web pages by giving insight in website traffic and marketing effectiveness. 
Every website that uses Google Analytics sets a cookie which sends information 
about the visitor to Google. The same counts for Double Click, which was acquired 
by Google, and provides targeted ads on websites, and Google Adsense which 
helps companies to display targeted advertisements and gain revenues from that. 
The number of websites connected to one or more of these services is enormous, 
so the Google Empire is much bigger than the search engine and email service, at 
least when it comes to data collection with the help of web bugs. 
Another aspect concerning the collection of data is whether the collection 
takes place once or if it takes place repeatedly. When data collection takes 
place only once, the digital persona will have a static form (see also below). 
However, it is possible that only one time data are collected, but that the data 
are processed several times in order to take decisions or to add additional 
information. For instance, a record of an employee held by his employer 
is usually created only once (when the employee gets the job) and is then 
used several times to pay salaries, calculate leave hours, and communicate 
information from the employer. The real collection of data takes place once. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the data cannot be updated. When an 
employee moves to a new address or has another relevant change in data, the 
record can be updated. In this regard, updates take place because of relevant 
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changes in order to keep the data accurate. When no changes take place, the 
data just remain the same and will just be collected once.
Repeated data collection is, obviously, possible as well. In that case, new 
data concerning a  similar activity are collected each time the activity is 
undertaken. For instance, the collection of data on web or search history 
takes place every time one is active on the Internet. The data can differ each 
time, but usually there will also be a (large) overlap. This overlap is due to 
standard actions, such as e-mail checking or logging in on a social network 
site. In other words, an individual will usually show a typical behavior related 
to a specific activity, which implies that the individual can also be recognized 
on his behavioral patterns. An identifier, like a name, number, or username/
password combination, is not necessary to link different sessions to the same 
individual. Nevertheless, the use of an account makes the linkage of sessions 
much easier. For instance, when shopping on a web site like Amazon.com, 
a user can log in, thereby facilitating that data on search and purchases 
are directly connected to an individual. Every session, new data are 
collected, and based on the history of purchases and searches personalized 
recommendations are made by Amazon.com. The collection of data takes 
place repeatedly and the different sessions can be compared in order to find 
out whether interests are changing over time.
James’s data are collected repeatedly, namely every time he is active on the web. 
The data are then accumulated with the earlier data, so they do not replace them. 
Nevertheless, similar actions to earlier web visits function as a confirmation of 
behavior, which may lead to even better personalized results in the search engine. 
By collecting and accumulating the data, the most recent and most important 
interests of James are detected.
Another important feature with regard to the collection of data is whether the 
collection of data takes place within the context of the digital representation or 
whether it exceeds this context. With data collection taking place only within 
the context of the digital persona, I mean that the data are only collected in 
that specific context, but also that the data are only related to the context in 
which the digital persona is intended to be used. Thus, when referring to 
Amazon.com again, it would mean that the data Amazon collects are only 
data that are revealed when interacting with the Amazon.com web site, 
and that there are no data collected from other web sites that might reveal 
interests of users. Besides, the data are only related to the specific context, 
so to the buying of products from Amazon.com. Data about other contexts, 
such as health status or family composition should be excluded.123
123 In first instance, these kinds of data are not collected by Amazon.com, but it might be 
possible to make assumptions on these issues based on revealed interests. For instance, 
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Context exceeding data collection can mean that data are collected from 
other contexts as well, like tax authorities that complement data from tax 
filing forms with data from professional social networking sites such as 
LinkedIn, in order to check the accuracy of data. LinkedIn was meant to 
function as a networking tool to maintain and expand a professional network. 
Use of LinkedIn profiles as input for taxation is exceeding the context. This 
means that exceeding a context usually counts for both combined contexts as 
such. Either, context data are enriched with other data or data from another 
context are transferred to a context for which they were not meant. The 
combination of the data has as a result that both contexts collapse. 
Another form of exceeding a context is that data are collected that are 
irrelevant for the intended context and use of the digital persona. Think, 
for instance, about the health data or family composition data as mentioned 
above.
The data collected about James, which together constitute his digital persona, are 
not context bound. Data from the Gmail service are collected in this environment, 
but for the search engine and the entire digital representation or footprint of 
James, data are obtained from various contexts. Since James uses the Internet for 
professional as well as for leisure or private purposes, the contexts from which data 
are collected are co-mingled and separations between the contexts collapse. This 
becomes even more the case when the devices used by James to go on the Internet 
are used in the different contexts, or when the devices are connected to each other 
via the Internet, for instance when James is accessing his work computer during 
the weekend at a distance in order to download some files to finish some work.
A last feature regarding data collection is which party is responsible for the 
collection of data. A first distinction is the distinction between the concerned 
individual himself and another party as responsible. When another party 
is responsible, there can be made another distinction, namely between data 
processor and data controller. The data processor is the one who actually 
processes the data.124 The data controller is the one who defines what data are 
processed and how and why.125 When the data controller is another person than 
when a man, next to detectives and thrillers, is also looking for picture books, he 
probably has one or more children and, usually, a female partner as well. Amazon.com 
does, however, not ask for family composition or marital status as account data.
124 Compare Directive 95/46/EC, Article 1(e): “‘processor’ shall mean a natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on 
behalf of the controller”.
125 Compare Directive 95/46/EC, Article 1(d): “‘controller’ shall mean the natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the 
purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community laws or 
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the data processor, the data controller is the responsible party. When processor 
and controller is one and the same person, this is the responsible party. 
The responsible party for collecting data about James and constituting a digital 
representation of James is Google. However, as mentioned earlier, Google has 
a huge Empire and also obtains data from other parties, like DoubleClick with 
whom they merged. In the end, however, all data come together at Google, so 
Google itself is responsible for the combination and accumulation of the data. 
Google is processor and controller at the same time.
4.2. The form of the digital persona
The form of the digital persona as a feature refers to what the digital 
persona looks like. This has to do with the amount and kind of data in the 
representation, as well as with the dynamics of the data.
With regard to the form of a digital persona, it is important to know whether 
it is static or dynamic. That is to say, does the digital persona evolve along 
with the represented individual or does it always stay the same? Here is a 
clear link with the collection of data as a once-only or a repeated process. 
How rigid the data are can, however, also be related to the kinds of data and 
the amount of data in the digital persona.
As indicated earlier, data about James are collected by Google every time James 
browses the Internet. The continuous accumulation of data and the related 
processing imply that the digital representation Google has created of James is 
not static, but dynamic. It evolves along with James’ interests and whereabouts.
Another form-related aspect is whether the digital persona is a rich or a poor 
representation. Richness can refer to two things: the amount of data in the 
digital persona (mathematical number) or the amount of information in 
the digital persona (information-value). When a representation consists of 
very few data, it is a poor representation. Only a username and password 
is perfectly sufficient to access an account and to recognize an individual, 
supposed that only one person uses the username password combination. 
However, when no other data are connected, it is merely an identifier and 
not a real representation. There is no capability of functioning as a proxy 
for the individual. This implies that there is more needed than only an 
identifier to speak of a digital persona. Nevertheless, how many data exactly 
cannot be said, since functioning as a representation depends on which data 
are available in the representation and which data are needed for a specific 
regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated 
by national or Community law”.
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purpose. Sometimes, only few data are sufficient, whereas in other cases 
the more data available, the better. Related to the kind and the amount 
of data is the (possible) information value. From a set of data, knowledge 
can be derived which increases the value of the data set as such. The more 
information there is when analyzing the set of data, the better it can function 
as a proxy for an individual.
A digital representation as created by Google is extremely rich, at least when 
taking the perspective of the amount of data. With about 88 percent web 
coverage, it can be said that James is pretty well monitored concerning his 
Internet behavior, and all these data are accumulated by Google. However, not 
only from the perspective of amount of data, but also from the information value 
perspective the representation is very rich. All data are processed in order to reveal 
specific interests and possible opportunities for targeted advertising, as well as to 
personalize search results listed in the search engine. Even though the arguments 
for doing this are related to improving web experience and not being disturbed 
by irrelevant information and advertisements, the data set and the results from 
the processing of the data form a very detailed digital persona, which includes 
knowledge about James he is probably not even aware of himself.
Another aspect of form is whether the data in the digital persona includes a 
unique identifier or not. It was mentioned above that lack of a unique identifier 
does not necessarily mean that data cannot be linked to each other and to an 
individual. This is related to so-called primary and secondary keys. A unique 
identifier is a primary key, which directly establishes the link to an individual. 
A secondary key, however, means that when collecting data in any case there 
comes a point where there are enough data to make this link, even though there 
is no unique identifier. The entire set of data is then unique for an individual.
Even though the unique identifier might be less relevant to establish the 
connection between a data set and an individual, it is an important aspect when 
looking at linkability of different data sets. A unique identifier can be used in 
different settings, which implies that different digital personae can be linked 
to each other as belonging to the same individual. An example of a unique 
identifier is the Burger Servicenummer (Citizen Service Number, BSN). This 
is a unique number for each citizen in the Netherlands. The unique identifier 
as part of the data set is an attribute belonging to the represented individual. 
Just as with the other attributes an attribute functions as an identifier when 
it enables the user of a data set to single-out an individual based solely on 
this attribute. That means that the group of people one belongs to is also 
relevant. The more people there are in a group, the bigger the chance that an 
attribute is not unique for one individual in this group.126
126 See also Koot 2012.
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The unique identifier that facilitates the connection of the data to James is, in first 
instance, his IP address or addresses. Whether an IP address is considered to be 
personal data is still debated. However, at least the IP address is an R-identifier, 
meaning that it can be used to recognize the same device, therewith facilitating the 
connection of different sessions to each other.
James uses different devices, but regularly checks his Gmail account on all these 
devices. Because he accesses the same account, the different devices (and IP 
addresses) can be recognized as belonging to the same person, because Google 
plants the same cookie whenever James logs in. The only problem that remains 
is that different people can use the same device with the same IP address. For 
instance, James’ work computer is sometimes used by one of his colleagues, and his 
personal laptop is often used by his family members. Nevertheless, the enormous 
amount of data collected on interests and behavior enables separation between 
different users on the same IP address. This can relatively easily be derived from 
a browsing session, which usually has a standard pattern for each person. For 
instance: check private mail, check work mail, look at a news site, check company 
web page, etc..
The IP address can be recognized, but that does not mean that the person behind 
the IP address can be identified with a name. However, James helps Google a 
little bit by googling his own name from time to time, a so called vanity search.127 
James wants to know what information about him is available on the web. The 
web behavior, together with this vanity search, can lead to identification of the 
individual behind the IP address. Paradoxically, checking which information is on 
the web implies adding new information behind the scenes.
4.3. The application of the digital persona
A last important category is the application or use of the digital persona. 
Application has to do with application for whom, to whom, and with the range 
of the application. A first aspect is whether the digital persona is used for, or in 
the interest of, the concerned individual himself, for the organization that creates 
the digital persona, or for a third party. For whose interest a digital persona is 
used is closely related to the purpose of the creation of the digital representation. 
It can be assumed that a projected digital persona is always used in the interest 
of the concerned individual himself, since he creates the representation himself. 
The way it is created and the information contained in the digital persona is 
linked to the interests of the individual. However, it is very well possible that an 
individual creates a digital persona of himself with a focus on another party who 
might have an interest in using this persona. Then, the interest is shared with 




Strict imposed digital personae are usually created in the interest of 
the creating party128 or a third party. The representation is meant for 
specific purposes that are related to the aims of another party than the 
concerned individual. A credit rating is meant to inform companies about 
the creditworthiness of an individual. The company can then decide to 
give a loan or not.129 Hybrid digital personae can have combined interests 
incorporated. For instance, a medical file is created in the interest of a doctor, 
but, obviously, also in the interest of the patient, because the patient has an 
interest in accurate medical information on which decisions on treatment 
are based.
The digital persona Google created is used by Google herself. It is in Google’s 
interest to provide the best advertisement and search system possible, because 
that is their business. However, next to that Google inclines to use the data in the 
interest of James. James should not be bothered with non-interesting information 
and should have a convenient web experience. Thus, both Google and James have 
a (possible) interest. Nevertheless, the real application of the digital persona as 
meant here is for Google only and Google is strongly insisting in their claims of 
respecting privacy, so they do not share the data with third parties. That would 
ruin their business as well, obviously.
An interesting aspect is that Google claims not to process personal data130 (so 
in their view an IP address is not personal data) and for that reason also rejects 
requests from individuals who want insight in their data on the basis of Directive 
95/46/EC. Thus, the data are not even shared with the represented individual. 
However, there is the problem of singularizing.131 The problem of singularizing 
implies that individuals may be recognized within a group when data belonging 
to that individual accumulate, even when (other) personal data remain private. 
When taking into account that each and every transaction in an information 
system leaves a digital trace behind, it becomes clear that the accumulation of 
data can be enormous and that it, thus, becomes easier to link data to a single 
individual. The more data available, the more unique combinations of these data 
128 This may include the improvement of services, such as keeping a customer account 
which allows for automated filling of order forms, which is, of course, also in the interest 
of the individual customer who does not have to provide the same details again when 
returning to a website to buy a product.
129 Of course, there is also an interest of the concerned individual, either to be protected 
from loaning too much and getting into financial trouble, or to show that the individual 
is creditworthy and that no problems are expected when giving a loan. So, in the end the 
individual is helped, assuming that all data in the credit rating are correct. However, this 
interest of the individual is not the prior aim of a credit rating (agency).
130 For instance, in a presentation by Peter Fleischer (privacy counsel Google) at a meeting 
of the Vereniging Privacy Recht (VPR) in September 2010.
131 Dobias, Hansen, Köpsell, Raguse, Roosendaal, Pfitzmann & Zwingelberg 2011.
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are. The more data disclosed to a party over time, the lower the fingerprinting 
threshold becomes, which means that after a certain amount of time individuals 
can be uniquely identified and recognized when they appear in a new transaction, 
even when this new transaction is done from another computer or another 
location than the previous ones.132
Another aspect is whether the digital persona is used within the context in 
which it is created or whether the application exceeds this context. In this 
respect it is important to remind that the creation of a digital persona is 
related to a specific context and purpose. A medical dossier is created in a 
medical context with the purpose of facilitating good medical treatment by 
showing medical history and diagnoses. As long as the digital persona stays 
within this context there is, usually, no problem. However, when the medical 
dossier exceeds its context, for instance when an insurance company gains 
insight and uses it to decide whether an individual can get certain insurance 
or not, the original purpose is lost and the individual gets affected in another, 
possibly negative way. Digital personae are context-bound, so looking at the 
application range is an important aspect.
Whether the application of the digital representation of James is bound to the 
context in which it was created is difficult to say. Not because it is unclear where it 
is applied, but more because the creation context practically covers the entire web. 
And that is also the application range. Specific applications are the personalized 
search results and the targeted advertisements in James’ Gmail account. However, 
with the help of AdSense, targeted ads appear on numerous websites which can 
be visited.
The application range can refer to the context range as well as to the range 
of individuals to whom a digital persona is applied. Use can be restricted to 
only the individual of whom the digital persona is a representation, or the 
application can concern a group. The latter can, for instance, be the case 
in a recommender system of an online shop. When an individual visits 
the shop and reveals an interest for a specific book or genre, the digital 
persona of another individual with a shared interest can be used to generate 
recommendations for this visitor. When this process takes place repeatedly, 
the application of a digital persona ranges a multitude of individuals. For 
this kind of purposes, a digital persona is used in a comparable form as an 
individualized group profile.  A digital persona is meant to be a proxy for 
an individual, so applying it to a multitude of individuals is not the primary 
goal intended. However, in particular digital personae which are, at least 
partly, the result of some kind of individual monitoring activity can perfectly 




some information on a type of person; individuals are pigeon-holed, which 
is also done with profiling activities. Nevertheless, most digital persona will 
stay connected to the individual they represent only.
The digital representation is meant to provide James with personalized 
information and advertisements. This means that the representation is applied 
to James as the represented individual and not to a group. Nevertheless, the data 
collected about James can be used as input for aggregation in order to make group 
profiles which can provide information that can be applied to several persons. 
Interests may overlap, so individuals who share some interests might be addressed 
with additional interests other individuals have. In that case, however, it concerns 
the aggregated data and the information derived from the processing of these 
data, and not the individual representation as a whole.
A last relevant feature regarding the application of digital personae is whether 
the use has a legal effect or only non-legal effects. With a legal effect I mean 
that the individual concerning whom a decision is taken based on his digital 
persona is influenced by this in the sense of gaining or losing rights or duties. 
For instance, when tax authorities look at a digital persona and find out that 
one’s salary is low enough to receive additional subsidies this has a legal 
effect; the individual has a right to subsidies. Clearly, the opposite situation 
is also possible, namely that an individual has received subsidies but has no 
right to them because of a (too) high income. Here, the individual gets a duty 
to pay back the subsidies to the tax authorities. In a commercial context, legal 
effects may occur, for instance, when a service provider decides that a user 
has breached the Terms and Conditions or other contractual obligations, 
and holds the individual user liable or denies further access to the service. 
Non-legal effects can be related to mere verification of information. Another 
example is deciding on a kind of medical treatment. Based on a digital 
persona, there can be inclusion or exclusion of certain commercial offers. 
Even though an individual might be of opinion that he also has a ‘right’ to 
the discount his neighbor received, this is not a legal right. This means that 
non-legal effects can also directly influence individuals. Nevertheless, if the 
exclusion is structural and the individual is excluded from certain offers or 
benefits repetitively, it may become a form of indirect discrimination, which 
is a legal effect. 
James can be affected in a legal sense by decisions taken by Google based on his 
digital representation, such as being held liable or being structurally excluded 
from offers or information.
The table below gives an overview of the relevant features, as discussed 
above, per category.
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Table 5. Features of digital personae.
5. How to determine whether a data set is a digital persona?
The remaining question, of course, is how one can determine whether a set 
of data is a digital persona. Based on the features and categories indicated in 
the previous section, one can subject a data set to a three step test. The three 
steps are related to the three categories. Each step consists of a question 
which can be answered with yes or no. When all three questions are answered 
positively, the data set constitutes a digital persona.
The first question is a really obvious one: Is there a data set? Without one, 
there is no digital representation or whatsoever possible. However, it is an 
important question to ask, because it helps in focusing on what exactly one is 
looking at. One has to find out what data are collected in the set and whether 
one wants to look at an entire set or only at a part of it. 
If the first question is answered positively, the second question to ask 
is whether the data set constitutes an image of (a partial identity of) an 
identifiable individual. This question emphasizes that it concerns a digital 
representation of a real-world individual and that it is necessary to be able 
to connect the representation to this individual. This connection can be 
established with a unique identifier, for instance a name, but it can also be 
based on a combination of data or certain attributes that can single out an 
individual. Another option is to make the connection based on recognition 
of the individual as being the same person as to which other data belong.   
The third question refers to practical application of the data set and asks 
whether the data set is used to take decisions concerning the represented 
individual. If this is confirmed, it shows that the digital representation can 
serve as a proxy for the individual in the specific context and for the specific 
purpose. It also means that the use of the digital persona affects a real-world 
individual and that the physical presence of this individual is not necessary 
for taking decisions. 
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It might appear that with these three simple questions an enormous number 
of data sets can qualify as digital personae. That is a valid conclusion. The 
number of databases in which individuals appear is huge. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, information about an average person is stored in 250 to 500 
databases.133 However, being represented in hundreds of databases does not 
necessarily mean that this is bad. That depends on how the representations 
are used and how the individual is affected by this use. The features that 
were presented in the three categories can be of help in determining how 
the individual is affected by the use of digital personae and whether this is 
positive or negative or does not make any difference as compared to being 
directly involved as an individual. This will be the subject of the next chapters, 
which map how individuals are affected. In particular, the perspectives of 
privacy and data protection and individual autonomy will be taken.
133 Schermer & Wagemans 2009, p. 40. The authors of this report take a narrow 
definition of database to come to this number. When taking into account all processing 
activities where personal data are involved, one would probably come to thousands of 
registrations.
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Chapter 4  
Human dignity and related values and rights 
and their legal protection
1. Introduction
In the previous chapters it has been shown that digital personae consist 
of data sets which can be used as a basis for making decisions concerning 
individuals and that these decisions affect the individual. As a result, some 
interrelated concepts are relevant here; privacy, identity, and autonomy. 
At a fundamental level, individual human beings are considered to have an 
inherent value, usually referred to as human dignity. This dignity implies 
that individuals need to be protected against harm to their physical and 
mental status. Each individual has to be respected for its uniqueness, which is 
reflected in key concepts such as bodily integrity and the non-discrimination 
principle. Uniqueness, and the ability to be unique and to determine who 
you want to be, is directly related to identity. In order to construct an own 
identity, the autonomy of the individual has to be guaranteed. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an insight in what exactly needs 
protection. The triangle of privacy, identity, and autonomy forms the 
key concepts surrounding and supporting human dignity. Next to that, 
the relation between the concepts is made more concrete by the concepts 
of informational self-determination and contextual integrity. The digital 
persona is a representation of an individual. The individual as such has 
human dignity, but the digital persona has not; it is not a human being. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that much communication and information 
processing nowadays is taking place in a digital form, decisions based on a 
digital persona may influence the level of autonomy of the individual and, 
therewith, affect human dignity. 
Privacy is instrumental to individual autonomy and the construction of 
identity. The protection of privacy is, thus, strongly related to respect for 
human dignity. With this in mind, it is evident that the right to privacy is 
internationally recognized as a fundamental right. At a more concrete level, 
privacy, in relation to digital information, can be specified, or narrowed 
down, to data protection.
This chapter will first discuss the concepts of human dignity, autonomy, 
identity, informational self-determination, contextual integrity, and privacy 
and how these are related (2). After having provided this framework, an 
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assessment will be made of the applicable laws and regulations in relation to 
the protection of the concepts. First, in section 3, a more fundamental level 
will be discussed by looking at the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Then, in section 4, the more 
practical level of data protection legislation will be discussed. Finally, a 
conclusion will be drawn (5).
2. Main concepts and their relation
This section will discuss the main concepts that relate to the way individuals 
function in society, in everyday life. The aim is to indicate why the concepts 
are relevant and how they connect to each other. Once the concepts and their 
relations are clear, it is possible to translate them to the context of digital 
personae. First, a brief overview of the concepts will be given. The overview 
is presented as a top-down approach. Nevertheless, the different concepts 
often mutually influence or support each other, so the approach should 
not be interpreted as strictly hierarchical. After the overview, each of the 
concepts will be elaborated upon in a separate subsection.
I consider human dignity to be the overarching value of the concepts. It is an 
intrinsic value human beings have and is the real basis of fundamental rights. 
In particular, this can be seen in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union in which human dignity is presented as such. Each and 
every human being should be respected in his dignity, which also explains 
the prohibition of, for instance, slavery and torture. These, but also other 
forms of constraining the physical or mental freedom of individuals, restrict 
the autonomy of individual human beings and therewith infringe upon 
human dignity. 
The autonomy of individuals is their capacity and ability to make their own 
individual independent choices and set their own long-term and short-term 
desires and goals. Individuals decide what they want to achieve and how 
they want to achieve this. Working towards a goal implies that the individual 
makes choices on how he wants to be seen by others, so autonomous acting 
facilitates the construction of identity. 
Individuals develop or construct their own identity. Desires and goals 
are often context-related, so what an identity looks like may be different 
according to different contexts. This implies that, in different contexts, 
different (partial) identities are created. In order to construct an identity, 
specific choices can be made by the individual on what information to share 
with whom and in what specific context.
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The ability to selectively share or disclose information is called informational 
self-determination. It entails the sharing of information by the individual 
himself, but also control over the collection or disclosure of data concerning 
the individual by others. Individuals often choose to only disclose information 
in a specific context. The (explicit) choice to limit and control disclosure also 
means that the information should not be transferred to another context, 
unless there are specific circumstances or interests that prevail over the 
informational self-determination of the individual. 
Information being bound to a specific context and not being transferred to 
other contexts is called contextual integrity. Contextual integrity also mean 
that, in the case that information is transferred, it should be done in respect 
of the rules and uses that are related to the original context in which the 
information was disclosed.
In order to achieve informational self-determination and contextual integrity, 
privacy is a key concept to be respected. The relation between privacy and the 
other concepts can also be seen in the development of definitions of privacy, 
which sometimes refer to these specific concepts. The right to be left alone134 
provides the individual with Lebensraum and enables him to keep secrets and 
the ability not to disclose certain information. Westin135 defined privacy 
as individuals determining when and how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others (informational self-determination). 
As indicated by the definition of privacy given by Agre,136 privacy provides 
the freedom from unreasonable constraints in the construction of identity. 
The different aspects of privacy thus support several related concepts. Each 
of the concepts indicated above will now be elaborated upon.
2.1. Human dignity
At an international level in Western society there is the belief that each and 
every individual has an inherent value, often referred to as human dignity. It 
is often mentioned as the general fundamental value to which other values 
relate. As indicated in the explanations of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, “[t]he dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right 
in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights” and “the dignity 
of the human person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this 
Charter.”137 A number of values and rights, such as privacy, bodily integrity, 
134 Warren & Brandeis 1890.
135 Westin 1967.
136 Agre 1997.




autonomy, and equality, are instrumental to the protection of human 
dignity.138 139 Even though there are criticisms, mainly in philosophical 
debate, on whether there really is such a thing as human dignity and not just 
dignity as belonging to people, but also to trees and animals,140 and autonomy 
as a specific characteristic of human agency,141 in the ethical-legal discourse 
the fundamental value of human dignity is broadly accepted and supported.
2.2. Autonomy
In relation to human rights, a classical definition of autonomy is “a complex 
assumption about the capacities, developed or undeveloped, of persons, 
which enable them to develop, want to act on, and act on higher-order plans 
of action which take as their self-critical object one’s life and the way it is 
lived.”142 Individual autonomy, thus, entails the ability of an individual to 
make their own choices and to define their own desires. To act autonomously 
means that the individual is mentally able to freely make conscious choices 
(internal), but also that there are no external constraints that limit possibilities 
to make choices freely and independently. Two important concepts in this 
context are freedom of choice and freedom to act. Restrictions to the latter 
can be external constraints, such as being locked up, or internal constraints, 
such as fear. With regard to freedom of choice several forms of restrictions 
are possible. First, the range of options can be too limited. What ‘too limited’ 
means, depends on the specific context in which limitations occur. Second, 
problems can occur concerning the eligibility of the available options, 
and, third, restrictions can be based on the significance143 of the available 
options. Freedom to act and freedom of choice are instrumental to the 
value of autonomy in a practical sense. Here, a distinction can be made 
between the concept of autonomy as a right and the concept of autonomy 
138 Some of these rights are not always separated, because they are all interrelated. The 
right to bodily integrity, for instance, is often seen as part of privacy, the right to life, or 
human dignity itself. See: Roosendaal & Kosta, p. 36.
139 J. Nickel, “Human rights”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006 edition): 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/> (last accessed March 30, 2010).
140 R. Streiffer, “Human/Non-Human Chimeras”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2009 edition): <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chimeras/#5> (last accessed March 
30, 2010).
141 De Mul and Van den Berg give an overview of criticisms on human autonomy. Critics 
refer to influences external from the individual which determine the way an individual 
acts. De Mul & Van den Berg challenge these critics by stating that: “having incomplete 
control does not imply having no control at all.” In particular, they refer to the ‘reflexive 
loop’ which is a distinctive ability of human agency to affirm its actions in retrospect, so 
post actio. De Mul & Van den Berg 2011. 
142 Richards 1989, p. 205.
143 Significance can be judged objectively (significance in general) or subjectively (individual 
preferences).
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as a psychological condition of self-government. In this context, autonomy 
as a right is a right against actions that attempt to disrupt or undercut the 
psychological condition; it is a right not to be treated in certain ways.144 An 
individual has to be able to make its own conscious choices on desires to be 
realized and goals to be achieved. Individual autonomy is foundational in the 
explanation of certain moral rights and values, such as the right to be treated 
as a free and equal moral person for which it serves as a basis.145 
According to Gerald Dworkin:146
A person is autonomous if he identifies with his desires, goals, and 
values, and such identification is not in itself influenced in ways which 
make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual. 
Spelling out the conditions of procedural independence involves 
distinguishing those ways of influencing people’s reflective and 
critical faculties which subvert them from those which promote and 
improve them. 
An individual has to be able to exercise his right to individual autonomy. 
This means that, with an eye to equality, the necessary resources need 
to be distributed equally amongst individuals. Education, employment 
opportunities, medical services, and housing, among other things, are 
essential in the exercise of the right, so an unequal distribution of these 
resources implies a violation of the basic regard for individual autonomy.147 
If an individual is equipped with the necessary resources he can use his 
competences to act autonomously. In this respect, a distinction can be 
made between the ordinary meaning of ‘competence’ which is related to 
natural ability, and a legal meaning, which refers to the possession of legal 
powers. According to Feinberg there are no degrees in this, but ‘competence’ 
expresses an all or nothing concept.148 It is a capacity one has or does not 
have. Nevertheless, it is very well possible that an individual is autonomous 
only within certain limits. In a broader sense than only competence, an 
autonomous individual has the capacity to select her own tastes, preferences, 
opinions, goals, and desires. It is a conscious choice which has to be made, 
and not merely conforming to other’s opinions, which makes an authentic 
individual.149 Choices and desires have to be confirmed or adapted 
continuously by the individual himself. Personal development or changes in 
the environment an individual lives in may influence choices and desires. So, 
144 Christman 1989, p. 6.
145 Christman 1989, p. 18.
146 Dworkin 1989, p. 61.
147 Christman 1989, p. 19.
148 Feinberg 1989, pp. 28-29.
149 Feinberg 1989, p. 32.
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preferences may change over time; desires are not (always) consistent.150 To 
conclude, autonomy is fundamental to exercising human rights and to live a 
decent life as an individual. Making individual choices and defining wishes 
and desires are key elements, which emphasize the value of the individual as 
a human being. Restrictions on autonomy should be as limited as possible.
2.3. Identity151
Making choices and defining wishes and desires is closely related to identity. 
Identity is who you are as an individual and how you want to be perceived by 
others. So, it has an internal and an external element. The internal element 
can be described as how human beings acquire a sense of self.152 The external 
element relates to social interaction with others. This interaction, however, 
is not similar in all situations. The world is divided into different contexts 
which are seen as separate audiences on which a certain (partial) identity 
or aspect of identity is projected. As Hekman puts it: “(…) I am social in 
interaction with specific others, and understanding identity must attend to 
both the general (social) and the specific (individual). In other words, we are 
all embedded but we are all embedded differently at different locations.”153 
Keeping the audiences and roles separated is what Goffman154 called 
‘audience segregation’.
Identity is construed by making individual choices and defining individual 
desires, so to be autonomous is imperative to being able to construct a 
personal identity. As explained in the theoretical framework, identity directly 
relates to the way an individual presents himself. 
2.4. Informational self-determination
To maintain different representations it is necessary to be able to control 
what data are shared with whom. The individual has to be able to decide 
on whether to share certain information or not, and to make distinctions 
between audiences that receive that information. Informational self-
determination supports control over disclosure of data.
Rouvroy and Poullet state that informational self-determination means “that 
an individual’s control over the data and information produced about him is a 
150 Richards 1989, p. 205.
151 A broader description of identity and its main aspects from several disciplinary 
perspectives was presented in Chapter 2 of this study.
152 Hekman 2004, p. 22.
153 Hekman 2004, p. 23.
154 Goffman 1959.
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(necessary but insufficient) precondition for him to live an existence that may 
be said ‘self-determined’.”155 They focus more on the identity aspect, pointing 
out that an individual having control over what data are produced about him 
facilitates a self-determined existence. The individual can construct his own 
identity and control what data may become part of that identity. In fact, it 
underscores the determination aspect of the ‘informational self’ more than 
the self-determination of information concerning the individual. From that 
perspective, restricting individual self-determination to control over data 
and deciding what can be done with personal data is probably too narrow, 
at least when control is considered as the ability to agree or disagree on the 
production and use of data. Schwartz calls this the ‘autonomy trap’ and 
indicates that the “organization of information privacy through individual 
control of personal data rests on a view of autonomy as a given, preexisting 
quality.”156 The problem, however, is that in the information age individual 
self-determination itself is shaped by the processing of personal data. The 
use of personal data sets the terms under which an individual participates in 
social and political life. For instance, “the act of clicking through a ‘consent’ 
screen on a web site may be considered by some observers to be an exercise 
of self-reliant choice. Yet, this screen can contain boilerplate language that 
permits all further processing and transmission of one’s personal data.”157 
In the end, the autonomy trap refers to a specific form of individual choice 
being ‘locked-in’. For instance, an individual can make a choice to access 
and use a service, such as the Google search engine. However, in this case, 
using the service implies agreeing to the General Terms and Conditions of 
Google. These Terms include consent to sharing personal information or to 
the processing of personal data. This consent is given implicitly, and often 
even while being unaware, and is not what the individual actually meant to 
do when using the search engine. Using the search engine without implicit 
acceptance of the Terms is not possible. Giving consent is a locked-in choice. 
In cases where the individual is unaware of the Terms, it is impossible to 
make a conscious choice or to compare the Terms with these of a comparable 
service in order to choose for the service with the most convenient Terms. 
Moreover, General Terms and Conditions in most cases include permission 
to extensive processing of personal data, which means that for a lot of web 
services there are no real alternatives with better Terms available. It is clear 
that when being locked-in there is not much control left. Besides, even the 
self-reliant choice that has to guarantee control by the individual is often not 
that self-reliant, since not clicking on ‘consent’ implies no access to the web 
service. The choice is, thus, not about whether someone agrees to have his 
data processed, but about whether someone wants to access the service or 





not. The fact that accessing the service implies agreeing on the processing of 
data is often overruled by the desire or need to access the service.158 
When emphasizing the identity aspect of informational self-determination, 
as argued by Rouvroy and Poullet and Schwartz, it can be concluded that 
only purely projected digital personae can be accepted as supporting or 
enabling informational self-determination. Basically, whenever information 
is created or processed by someone else the individual loses control over 
the construction of his identity. Imposed and hybrid digital personae, then, 
do not support informational self-determination. Nevertheless, a basic 
approach of only allowing projected digital personae is impossible to hold 
in the information society. This implies that when other entities store, for 
instance, preferences of individuals, the individual has to be able to change 
these preferences according to his own preference adaptations. 
Informational self-determination is bound to contexts. The choice of 
whether to disclose certain data depends on the specific context in which an 
individual is interacting. The importance of context can be best described in 
the light of contextual integrity.
2.5. Contextual integrity
Contextual integrity is important to keep data in the context where it belongs 
and to respect the (implicit) rules that govern behavior concerning personal 
data in specific contexts. The concept of contextual integrity in informational 
privacy originates from Nissenbaum, who defines it as “compatibility with 
presiding norms of information appropriateness and distribution.”159 She 
specifies the concept by articulating variables which can help determine 
whether a particular action is a violation of privacy, such as “the nature of the 
situation, or context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; 
the roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information 
subjects; on what terms the information is shared by the subject; and the 
terms of further dissemination.”160 Thus, contextual integrity means that 
information has to be kept within a context and that the way the data are 
treated has to be in compliance with the general rules and specific agreements 
that are made concerning that context.
Evidently, data are usually disclosed within a specific context and to the people 
who belong to this context. In this respect it is important to understand that 
158 This practice illustrates how choices can be restricted or limited and, thus, how 
autonomy can be affected.
159 Nissenbaum 2004.
160 Nissenbaum 2004.
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disclosing information in a way which makes it accessible to everyone, for 
instance by posting something in a public space on the internet, does not 
always mean that it is intended to be disclosed to and be made available for 
use by everyone. A distinction has to be made between the intended audience 
and the actual audience. The intended audience is the people that belong in 
the context in which the information is disclosed. The actual audience is 
the people who in fact have access to the disclosed information, regardless 
of whether they belong to the specific context in which the information is 
disclosed.  
As can be derived from the variables articulated by Nissenbaum (see above), 
purpose binding is an important component. It means that the disclosure 
of information and its further processing is bound to a specific purpose. 
This purpose has to be defined before the processing of data takes place. 
The purpose often defines the context, since information can be disclosed 
to people who may belong to several contexts, while the information is 
only meant to be used in one of these contexts. Further dissemination 
of data, probably to another context, has to be in accordance with the 
indicated purpose for which the data were disclosed. However, in principle 
dissemination out of the initial context is not possible when contextual 
integrity is at stake. A new context means a new purpose and a new audience. 
Of course, the question that arises is what exactly a context is.
Nissenbaum defines contexts as “structured social settings, characterized by 
canonical activities, roles, relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), 
and internal values (goals, ends, purposes).”161 “Contexts are not formally 
defined constructs, but […] are intended as abstract representations of 
social structures experienced in daily life.”162 A context is a restricted area. 
The restrictions can be based on several indicators, such as space, topic, 
time, relationship between the actors, etc. The role-relation that applies to 
the situation is a main indicator. In order to give more substance to this, I 
quote Brown:163
[R]egarding an individual seen as the occupant of a social role, there 
is information to which only someone standing in the appropriate 
role-relation can be expected to have access. (By role-relation I mean 
a relation in which one person stands to another by virtue of the 
respective roles occupied by the two persons.) There is, for example, 
information about me which my bank manager possesses but which 
my employer does not, there is information which both of these 
161 Nissenbaum 2010, p. 132.
162 Nissenbaum 2010, p. 134.
163 Brown 1990, pp. 76-77, emphasis in original.
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possess but which my doctor does not, and much to which my doctor 
has access but the former do not, and so on. As I have pointed out 
earlier, however, there is probably little significant information about 
me which is not possessed by somebody or other.
Yet this last fact does not worry me unduly. What would worry me 
is the idea that some person (other than someone to whom I stand 
in a very close and perhaps unique role-relation, such as my wife) 
had access to all this information, or that such information were 
distributed indiscriminately. A part, then, of what is essential to the 
integrity of a person’s social identity as seen “from the inside” is 
not some special set of facts to which only he or she has access, nor 
the exercise of total control over the information relating to him or 
her, but rather that access to particular information is systematically 
related in the appropriate way to the network of social relationships 
in which that person stands to others by virtue of their places in the 
role structure. A breach of privacy can be said to have occurred wherever 
the flow of information becomes divorced from the social role structure 
in some way. For want of a better label we might call this the Short 
Circuit Effect.
The combination of the roles of interacting parties and the relation between 
these parties thus determines the context in which information is disclosed 
or otherwise processed. As Brown indicates, the flow of information 
is connected to the social role structure at stake. This is exactly what 
Nissenbaum means with contextual integrity. The way in which interaction 
takes place and the way information is shared or processed can be considered 
to be appropriate when this matches with the roles and relations at stake. 
Treating data inappropriately within the context or transferring it to another 
context implies a crossing of the boundaries within which the data should be 
treated in order to protect privacy and individual autonomy. The same goes 
for combining data from different contexts by making connections between 
data sets or by adding data from another context to the context in which an 
interaction takes place. For instance, in a job interview the candidate shows 
sufficient capacities and skills and the potential future employer decides 
to include private information on drinking behavior during the weekends 
which is available on an SNS profile. As a result, the decision on hiring the 
candidate is not taken at the end of the interview. Information from another 
context is used to come to a decision, regardless of whether this information 
is relevant for the job or not.
2.6. Privacy
Privacy can be distinguished into different dimensions. Common 
distinctions are between spatial, relational, communicational, and 
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informational privacy.164 Informational privacy relates to the protection of 
personal data and has two main components.165 The first concerns being free 
from the interference of others, not being watched, and is at the core of the 
right to privacy. The second element comes into play once a third party has 
information and the individual wants to control the use and dissemination 
of this information. Obviously, many aspects of an individual’s life are 
captured in data, which implies that informational aspects from the other 
dimensions become part of informational privacy as well. Information 
concerning home environment (smart metering), relationships (social 
networking sites), and body (medical records) is made compatible with the 
informational dimension. This implies that the use of information can also 
impact the other dimensions of privacy. The focus in this study, however, 
will be on informational privacy only.
As indicated above, there is no clear-cut definition of privacy. Nevertheless, 
the concept has developed over time and in this development several 
aspects have been highlighted. The right to privacy was first coined by 
Warren and Brandeis166 in 1890. The writing of their article was instigated 
by photographs and newspaper enterprises that “have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life.” Mechanical inventions and other 
developments facilitated the recording and storing of information as well 
as the broad distribution of this information. Warren and Brandeis were of 
the opinion that not every aspect of life that could be recorded should be 
allowed to be recorded, since several aspects belonged to the private sphere 
of individuals. With an eye to respect for this private sphere, they defined 
privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’. 
Over the years, the technologies that facilitated data collection increased, 
in particular surveillance technologies, leading to a loss of control of the 
individual on the disclosure of personal information. 
In 1967, Westin came up with his definition of privacy as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”167 This definition clearly includes the concept of informational 
self-determination. A direct link between privacy and identity was brought 
164 There have been several efforts to come to a clear and concise definition of the concept 
of privacy. The definition will not be discussed here. For those interested in the 
discussion and efforts, see, for instance, the valuable work done by Parent (1983), who 
approaches the concept from different views and disciplines, and the extensive work by 
Solove: Solove 2002; Solove 2006; Solove 2008.  
165 Lloyd 2008, p. 7.




to the fore in Agre’s definition of privacy as presented in 1997, where he 
speaks of projecting to the world. Agre defines privacy as the freedom from 
unreasonable constraints on constructing identity and control over aspects 
of identity projected to the world.168 Taking Goffman’s findings into account, 
the definition of privacy as given by Agre is a bridge between these findings 
and the approach of Nissenbaum towards privacy as contextual integrity.169 
Aspects of identity can be projected to the world, which is usually a specific 
context. The information shared as part of an identity should be kept within 
the context in which it was shared and should only be used according to the 
rules that apply to that specific context.
With respect to informational privacy, the protection of privacy is often 
narrowed down to data protection, which can be seen as an intermediate 
value that facilitates privacy.
2.7. Conclusion
As shown in the sections above, the concepts of dignity, autonomy, identity, 
and privacy are closely related. One cannot exist without the other. On the 
one hand, autonomous (independent) choices have to be made in order to 
decide on the identity an individual wants to develop and, in relation to 
that, what information to share with whom and for what purposes. On the 
other hand, privacy, with the related main concepts of informational-self-
determination and contextual integrity, is a necessary condition to facilitate 
this autonomy.
As was indicated in the introduction to this chapter, individual autonomy 
and identity are directly connected to the inherent value human beings have. 
This inherent value is often referred to as human dignity. Human dignity 
is a central concept in the protection of individuals and the fundamental 
rights they have at an abstract level in international treaties. The following 
section will discuss the two most relevant treaties applicable in Europe: the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (EU Charter).
3. Fundamental rights and values
A legal system is meant to offer protection. What is protected can basically 
be everything, but usually things are protected that are deemed important 
168 Agre 1997, p. 7.
169 Nissenbaum 2004.
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to make a society work properly. In other words, the law reflects the values 
of a society in order to maintain social order.170 For instance, human beings 
are considered to have an inherent value in society and, thus, need to be 
protected. The right to life, or the prohibition of murder, is aimed at offering 
such protection. What values are relevant in the context of the concepts 
described in the previous section and how they are laid down in law will be 
discussed in this section. 
Fundamental rights171 are fundamental in the sense that they need to be 
protected and respected in every case and for every single individual. The 
incorporation of these rights in international treaties is meant to emphasize 
their importance. Slavery and torture were forbidden and the cruelties from 
World War II were an incentive to explicitly lay down basic concepts such 
as equality and non-discrimination and freedoms individuals should be 
able to enjoy. Fundamental rights are, in first instance, rights to protect the 
individual against the state or the government, so they primarily focus on 
vertical relationships. However, this vertical relationship is also applied to 
horizontal relationships, since states have a duty to protect the fundamental 
rights properly. States, thus, have to guarantee, in their legal systems or 
otherwise, that individuals can exercise or enjoy their rights in horizontal 
relationships as well. If a state fails in fulfilling this duty, the state can be held 
liable for infringements on the fundamental rights of its individual citizens. 
In the context of the European Union, fundamental rights are now laid 
down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. An important basis for this 
Charter can be found in the European Convention on Human Rights. Both 
will be discussed more elaborately below.
3.1. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)172 is an extensive 
international treaty aiming at a broad recognition and respect of fundamental 
rights and values for individuals. After the Second World War, the question 
of human rights was important, because “[t]here was a general consensus 
that freedom was the only basis on which peace could be established 
in Europe and that the plea of sovereign inviolability might hamper the 
170 Durkheim 1973, p. 67. For extensive discussions on the function of law and its relation 
with rules, see, for instance; Hart 1961; Pound 1922.
171 I will use the terms ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘human rights’ as synonyms. Similar rights 
are legally protected in different treaties under both these headings, so their meaning is 
essentially the same.
172 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, CETS No.: 005, Rome, 4/11/1950.  
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exercise of individual freedom, as it had in fact done in Nazi Germany.”173 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the ten founding members of 
the ECHR wanted to make a largely symbolic statement of their liberal 
democratic identity.174 The protection of human rights in every country 
was seen as a necessary condition for European unification,175 so in 1950 
the members drafted the international treaty on primarily political and civil 
rights which now embraces every state in Europe except Belarus. With a 
current combined population of nearly 800 million it is widely regarded as 
the most successful experiment in the transnational judicial protection of 
human rights in the world.176  
Section I of the ECHR, articles 2–18, contains the fundamental rights and 
freedoms that have to be guaranteed by the signatories. The rights relate to 
the inviolability of the body (articles 2-5), fair legal proceedings (6-7), privacy 
(8), freedoms of opinion and speech (9-12), effective remedies against 
infringements upon the rights and freedoms (13), and non-discrimination 
(14). Articles 15-18 contain limitations and exceptions on the protection of 
the rights and freedoms. The most relevant fundamental right for this study 
is, thus, laid down in article 8 of the ECHR: the right to respect for private 
and family life. Article 8 ECHR reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
As can be seen, the first paragraph presents the right of protection of the 
privacy of individuals. In its interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR, 
the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that this right covers an 
individual’s physical and social identity and the right to personal development 
and personal autonomy.177 The second paragraph states that interference 
with the right is only allowed when certain conditions are met. “[G]iven the 
fundamental nature of the Convention rights, the first paragraph should be 
widely interpreted, and the second one narrowly. Rights must therefore be 
173 Weil 1963, p. 22.
174 Greer 2008.
175 Weil 1963, p. 22.
176 Greer 2008.
177 De Hert 2008.
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‘stretched’, and limitations limited.”178 The grounds of restriction are tested 
against two requirements.179 First, an interference of the right has to be ‘in 
accordance with the law.’ There must be a legal basis for the interference in 
the law of the state involved. This does not necessarily have to be a national 
law, but the requirement also implies a certain quality of the law. Second, the 
interference has to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the light of one 
or more of the mentioned interests. Whether this is the case, in practice, is 
determined to a large extent by applying the proportionality principle and 
the ‘margin of appreciation.’ The proportionality principle requires that an 
interference with the right “is not excessive in relation to the legitimate needs 
and interests which have occasioned it.”180 The margin of appreciation means 
that the individual states have a certain measure of discretion in deciding 
what they deem necessary in a democratic society, in order to enable them 
to decide in light of national morals and customs. The protection of the right 
is the starting point, and limitations have to be avoided as much as possible. 
As indicated, several aspects concerning identity, as related to human 
dignity, are protected by the right to private life. Next to that, “[a]lthough the 
European Convention and the case-law of the European Court on Human 
Rights does not recognize a right to informational self-determination, 
many data protection aspects are brought under the scope of Article 8 of 
the Convention […] by the Court.”181 Brouwer182 gives an overview183 of 
cases in which certain aspects of data protection were at stake. A first case 
on the relation between recording of personal data by public authorities and 
private life was Leander v. Sweden,184 where data stored in secret police files 
were not accessible or refutable by the individual (data subject), but were 
communicated to the employer of the individual. This was considered an 
interference with Article 8. A comparable case was Segerstedt-Wiberg and 
others v. Sweden,185 concerning storage and retention (up to 30 years) of 
data in secret police files. In Rotaru v. Romania186 data concerning (political) 
memberships were stored in secret files. The court referred to the Leander 
case and also repeated its earlier conclusions from the Niemitz v. Germany187 
178 Korff 2009.
179 For an extensive discussion, see: Van Dijk & Van Hoof 1998, Chapter 8, section 8 (pp. 
761-772).
180 Van Dijk & Van Hoof 1998, p. 80.
181 De Hert 2008.
182 Brouwer 2008.
183 In Chapter 6 of her thesis, pp. 147-176. The following overview is based on Brouwer’s 
work.
184 Leander v. Sweden, Appl. No. 9248/81, Series A, No. 116, 26 March 1987.
185 Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden, Appl. No. 62332/00, 6 June 2006.
186 Rotaru v. Romania, Appl. No. 28341/95, 4 May 2000.
187 Niemitz v. Germany, Appl. No. 13710/88, 16 December 1992.
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case that “respect for private life must also comprise, to a certain degree, the 
right to establish and develop relationships with other persons.”188 The free 
establishment of relationships is directly related to the construction of an 
identity, since it allows for deciding to what groups of people an individual 
wants to belong. The consideration of the Court that information concerning 
these relationships should not be stored and abused for purposes that do 
not directly relate to the membership shows the importance of contextual 
integrity to facilitate this free establishment of relationships.
With respect to identity and autonomy, the Pretty189 case is particularly 
relevant. In this case, the Court considered autonomy a ‘principle’ and 
physical and social identity issues of which ‘aspects’ are sometimes protected 
under Article 8 ECHR.190 Nevertheless, in Odièvre v. France191 a number of 
judges had a joint dissenting opinion in which autonomy and identity were 
considered to be ‘rights’. “We are firmly of the opinion that the right to an 
identity, which is an essential condition of the right to autonomy (Pretty v. 
the United Kingdom, 25 April 2002, § 61) and development (Bensaïd v. the 
United Kingdom, 6 February 2001, § 47), is within the inner core of the 
right to respect for one’s private life.”192 So, both cases showed that a close 
relationship between privacy, autonomy, and identity is recognized by the 
European Court of Human Rights. To what extent each of the concepts is 
protected under Article 8 ECHR is strongly debated.
A broad interpretation of the first paragraph can also be seen in the positive 
obligations states have to protect the rights, also in relations between 
individuals. “[T]he mere fact that an individual has infringed a provision of 
the Convention cannot lead to a finding against the state. It is necessary for 
the conduct of the private individual to be seen as originating in a failing 
on the part of the state itself or as tolerated by it.”193 ‘Private life’ is a broad 
concept and cannot be defined exhaustively, but case-law on the concept 
indicates that at least it includes: the physical and moral integrity of the 
person; the physical and social identity of the individual, including his sexual 
identity; the right to personal development or fulfillment; the right to have 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world.194 Under the 
heading of identity, the right to one’s image is covered as well. In this respect, 
188 Brouwer 2008, p. 155.
189 Pretty v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 2346/02, April 29 2002.
190 De Hert 2008.
191 Odièvre v. France, Appl. No. 42326/98, 13 February 2003.
192 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral 
Barreto, Tulkens and Pellonpää, paragraph 11, emphasis in original.
193 Akandji-Kombe 2007, p. 14.
194 Akandji-Kombe 2007, p. 37 (my emphasis).
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a case in point was Von Hannover v. Germany,195 in which it was ruled that 
“it is incumbent on states to ensure that the right of persons under their 
jurisdiction to their image is respected by third parties.”196 The right to 
respect for private life can outweigh the right to freedom of expression when 
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. In the words of the Court: 
“The Court reiterates the fundamental importance of protecting 
private life from the point of view of the development of every human 
being’s personality. That protection – as stated above – extends 
beyond the private family circle and also includes a social dimension. 
The Court considers that anyone, even if they are known to the general 
public, must be able to enjoy a “legitimate expectation” of protection 
of and respect for their private life.”197
Based on the ECHR, states, thus, have to protect the right to privacy of 
individuals. While most of the case law mentioned above concerned vertical 
relationships, between state authorities and individuals, the protection 
should also be safeguarded in horizontal relationships.198 This means that 
signatories have to implement laws that protect the rights mentioned in the 
ECHR. Case law of the European Court on Human Rights shows that it 
may even extend to requiring positive action from private persons.199
3.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The European Union (EU) has also put human rights on its agenda. Already 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, some steps were 
taken to protect EU citizens’ fundamental rights better by introducing a 
procedure to take action against EU countries that violated the fundamental 
rights of their citizens in Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
In 2002, an EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights 
was established to exercise monitoring and advisory functions and, in 2007, 
an EU Fundamental Rights Agency was established.200 The European 
Court of Justice has consistently treated the ECHR as a special source of 
inspiration for the general principles of EU law.201 Because all EU Member 
States are party to the ECHR, the ECHR and comparable treaties are seen 
as minimum standard to derive EU general principles from. “The consensus 
195 Von Hannover v. Germany, Appl. no. 59320/00, 24 June 2004. 
196 Akandji-Kombe 2007, p. 39.
197 Von Hannover v. Germany, Appl. no. 59320/00, 24 June 2004, at §66.
198 X and Y v. Netherlands, 26 March 1985.
199 Hokkanen v. Finland, 23 September 1994.
200 Craig & De Búrca 2008, p. 404. 
201 Craig & De Búrca 2008, p. 383.
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in relation to the ECHR, at any rate, appears to be that it represents a floor 
rather than a ceiling, and that while the level of protection for rights should 
not fall below what is provided by the Convention, EU law can provide more 
extensive protection.”202 Because of the idea that EU law could provide more 
extensive protection, in 1999 the initiative was taken to draft a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights for the EU (Charter). After some political difficulties, 
in 2007 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,203 
integrated as a Charter in the Lisbon Treaty, was accepted. The text of the 
Charter replaced the text of the European Constitution of December 2000 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st, 2009.
That the ECHR served as a source of inspiration for the Charter is very clear 
in the Charter itself. In the Preamble it is stated that: 
This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of 
the Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, 
in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international 
obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of 
the European Court of Human Rights. (Emphasis added)
Furthermore, Article 52(3) of the Charter indicates that rights in the Charter 
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR should be interpreted 
in the same way as those laid down in the ECHR. Nevertheless, while scope 
and meaning are similar, more extensive protection by Union law is still 
allowed. This is in line with the Treaty of the European Union which has 
Article 6 as its key provision concerning fundamental rights. According to 
paragraph 2 of this Article, “[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law.”
The Lisbon Treaty made some major changes to the EU Treaty (TEU). 
With regard to the protection of fundamental rights, Article 6 of the TEU 
now shows that there are three pillars that are relevant in supporting this 
protection. First, the Charter has a similar legal status as the TEU itself 
(Article 6(1) TEU); second, the EU will join the ECHR (Article 6(2) TEU) 
and; third, the fundamental rights as laid down in the ECHR and in the 
202 Craig & De Búrca 2008, pp. 385-386.
203 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01.
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constitutional traditions of the Member States remain as general principles 
of EU law.204 The most interesting part is probably that the EU as a whole 
will (and according to the TEU has to) accede to the ECHR. The ECHR will 
be amended for this purpose in the sense that it becomes possible for this 
transnational organization to enter.205 
The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are divided into six main 
categories: Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, Citizenship, and Justice. 
The modern character of the Charter can be seen in the proclamation 
of some specific rights that are not contained in the ECHR, such as data 
protection, bioethics and the right to good administration.206 The right 
to autonomy is covered by the provisions under the heading of Dignity. It 
includes the right to physical and mental integrity,207 and of course human 
dignity itself.208 Privacy is covered in Title II: Freedoms. Article 7 includes 
the right to respect for private and family life, home and communications. 
The coverage is similar to Article 8 ECHR, but in order to take account 
of technological developments, the wording ‘correspondence’ has been 
replaced by ‘communications’.209 The explanation of the rights is based on 
the case law of the European Court on Human Rights.210 In the context of 
information technology, the right to protection of personal data as mentioned 
in Article 8 is of particular importance.211 Interestingly, the commentary of 
EU justice on this provision gives an explanation of the right, based on case 
law of both the European Court on Human Rights (on Article 8 ECHR) and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (on Directive 95/46/EC). As regards 
the horizontal effect of provisions on personal data protection an important 
reference is made to the Lindqvist212 case, in which the ECJ decided that 
“loading personal information on to a webpage is […] considered processing 
of personal data because it is made accessible to an indefinite number of 
204 Claes 2009.
205 For more information on the interaction between the ECHR and the Charter, see 
Steiner & Woods 2009, p. 141-147. 
206 See: <http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/rights_values/index_en.htm> (last accessed 
March 29, 2010).
207 Article 3(1): Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental 
integrity.
208 Article 1: Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.
209 Article based legal explanation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Online 
available at: <http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=14> (last accessed June 
28, 2012).
210 EU Justice commentary to Article 7 of the Charter: <http://www.eucharter.org/home.
php?page_id=81> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
211 Article 8(1): Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her.
212 C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 6 November 2003.
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people.”213 A more fundamental perspective is offered by reference to the 
Peck case214 at the Strasbourg Court, in which it was decided that release 
and broadcast on local television of a person’s image caught on CCTV was 
a violation of his privacy, because the person “was entitled to the protection 
of his identity.”215 In this explanation, the concept of privacy is, thus, directly 
linked to identity.  
The introduction of human dignity in the Charter is interesting since most 
constitutions, as well as the ECHR, do not contain this right. The major 
example of a constitution which already included it before is the German 
Constitution. In German case law216 human dignity in combination with the 
general personality right (allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) was relied upon to 
affirm the existence of the right to informational self-determination.217 This 
combined application of rights, together with the introduction of human 
dignity in the Charter and the explanation of human dignity as “the real 
basis of fundamental rights”218 shows the interrelation between autonomy, 
privacy, and identity as key concepts to protect human dignity.
For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the fundamental value of individual 
autonomy and the right to privacy as covered by the ECHR as well as the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These rights are 
seen as fundamental and need to be protected. “Individual autonomy is an 
idea that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own 
person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken 
as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external 
forces.”219 By protecting the freedom from torture and the freedom from 
slavery in Articles 3 and 4 of the ECHR, the two basic conditions for 
individual autonomy are facilitated; “a capacity for intentional action and 
independence of controlling influences.”220 One of the most prominent 
rights that is of importance in the context of individual autonomy, however, 
213 EU Justice commentary to Article 8 of the Charter: http://www.eucharter.org/home.
php?page_id=82 (last accessed June 28, 2012).
214 Peck v. United Kingdom, 28 January 2003.
215 EU Justice commentary to Article 8 of the Charter: <http://www.eucharter.org/home.
php?page_id=82> (last accessed June 28, 2012) (my emphasis).
216 Volkszählungsurteil of 15 December 1983 (BVerfGE 65 E 40).
217 Hert 2008.
218 Article based legal explanation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Online 
available at: <http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=8> (last accessed June 28, 
2012).
219 J. Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (edition 2009), < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/> 
(last accessed May 23, 2012).
220 Custers 2004, p. 117.
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is the right to privacy. Together, the value of autonomy and the supportive 
right to privacy enable the individual to live his life and to participate in daily 
interactions in a free and independent manner. The presumption is that 
these rights might be influenced by the use of digital personae.
The strict relation between privacy and autonomy is also emphasized in the 
work of Cohen.221 She critically examined the categorical arguments that 
are brought to the fore by companies and threaten data protection interests. 
The arguments cannot outweigh privacy rights of the individual and 
reflect “fundamentally political choices about the allocation of power over 
information, cost, and opportunity.”222 Data subjects are seen as objects and 
both legal and technical tools are needed to provide strong data protection, 
because autonomy requires freedom from scrutiny and categorization 
by others. “Development of the capacity for autonomous choice is an 
indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the governance of 
the community and its constituent institutions – political, economic, and 
social.”223 It has to be taken into account, however, that too strict protection 
of privacy may have negative implications and conflict with individual 
autonomy in the end. This can, for instance, be the case when shielding of 
information results in knowledge being unavailable to a data controller, 
with the effect of a discriminatory decision concerning the individual. So, a 
balance has to be found between privacy and antidiscrimination.224
The rights and values mentioned above have fundamental status and have to 
be protected. Their description is at an abstract level, so the exact meaning 
in practice has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. At a European level, 
however, there is more guidance on how to protect the rights in practice. In 
particular, specific legislation was drafted to protect the right to privacy. At 
a practical level the focus is on the protection of personal data.
4. The regulation of data protection
In order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right 
to privacy, of the EU citizens, it was indicated that accurate protection of 
personal data is necessary. Appropriate rules on the processing of personal 
data are instrumental to achieve proper protection of the right to privacy of 
the individual. As early as in 1980, the OECD, consisting of more countries 
than only those in the EU, adopted Guidelines on the protection of personal 
221 Cohen 1999-2000.
222 Cohen 1999-2000




data.225 In reaction, the Council of Europe drafted Convention 108, the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, which was signed in Strasbourg on January 
28th, 1981. This Convention stressed the need for protection of personal data 
in order to protect individuals and their right to privacy. It was, however, a 
treaty, leaving a lot of freedom to the signatories on how to implement the 
principles laid down in the Convention. Since the amount of data processing 
increased enormously and proper protection of data was needed, while 
still enabling the processing of these data, mainly in the light of economic 
interests, more unity amongst EU Member States was needed. This unity 
could only be achieved by a legally binding instrument.226 To this end, in 1995 
the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 95/46/EC on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive, DPD). 
The Directive needed to be implemented at a national level by each Member 
State, but ensured a minimum level of protection and an enforcement 
mechanism. The DPD contains a framework for the legitimate processing 
of personal data. Next to grounds for making processing legitimate, there 
are a number of requirements that have to be fulfilled, such as information 
obligations and principles like data minimization and purpose binding. 
 
In some sectors specific vulnerabilities or particularities may occur, for 
which the DPD may not provide sufficient legal protection. For the sector of 
electronic communications, the EU has considered it necessary to supplement 
the general Data Protection Directive with a sector-specific data-protection 
directive, which was part of a larger set of directives regulating the electronic-
communications sector (formerly known as the telecommunications sector). 
This is Directive 2002/58/EC.227
“Directive 95/46/EC must be viewed as the ‘lex generalis’ which is applicable 
to the processing of personal data unless a ‘lex specialis’ determines 
otherwise.”228 In that sense, the DPD has general applicability and is the 
legal document to which other legal texts often refer. An example can be 
found in Directive 2002/58/EC (hereinafter: E-Privacy Directive), which is 
such a ‘lex specialis’. Article 1(2) of Directive 2002/58/EC states that the 
provisions of this Directive particularise and complement Directive 95/46/
EC for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1. So, only those situations 
225 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data. 
226 Bennett 1997, p. 106.
227 Amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2009, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 11–36.
228 Cuijpers, Roosendaal & Koops 2007, p. 26.
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regarding processing of personal data that are not covered by the E-Privacy 
Directive fall within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC. “Moreover, article 2 
explicitly states that the definitions of Directive 95/46/EC, as well as those 
of Directive 2002/21/EC concerning a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, shall apply regarding 
Directive 2002/58/EC.”229
The DPD is internationally seen as a strong framework for privacy protection. 
The Directive is implemented in the national laws of all EU Member States. 
However, its reach is much wider and is not always appreciated. The DPD 
contains a section on transfer of personal data to third countries, which 
are the countries outside the EU, so “[w]hile the objective of the European 
Union’s (1995) Data Directive is “domestic,” given the inevitability of 
cross-border data flows it attempts to protect the data privacy of Europeans 
regardless of where data are transferred and processed. In this case spill-
over is inherent if the Directive’s protection is to be effective; the “domestic” 
legislation has a transnational footprint.”230 Entities in third countries 
receiving and processing personal data from EU citizens have to comply 
with the DPD. This compliance can be acknowledged via a so-called safe 
harbor agreement.231 232
4.1. Definitions
In order to understand the scope and applicability of the DPD, it is helpful to 
have a brief overview of the most important definitions as used in the DPD. 
These are listed in Article 2 of the DPD:
“For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) ‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person 
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity;
229 Cuijpers, Roosendaal & Koops 2007, p. 26.
230 Kobrin 2003.
231 Murphy 2001.
232 For the US: 2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy 
of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently 
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified under document 
number C(2000) 2441), Official Journal L 215 , 25/08/2000 P. 0007 – 0047.
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(b) ‘processing of personal data’ (‘processing’) shall mean any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;
(c) ‘personal data filing system’ (‘filing system’) shall mean any 
structured set of personal data which are accessible according to 
specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a 
functional or geographical basis;
(d) ‘controller’ shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where 
the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria 
for his nomination may be designated by national or Community law;
(e) ‘processor’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of 
the controller;
(f) ‘third party’ shall mean any natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body other than the data subject, the controller, 
the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the 
controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data;
(g) ‘recipient’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body to whom data are disclosed, whether a 
third party or not; however, authorities which may receive data in the 
framework of a particular inquiry shall not be regarded as recipients;
(h) ‘the data subject’s consent’ shall mean any freely given specific and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies 
his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.”
In Opinion 4/2007233 of the Article 29 Working Party the concept of personal 
data, which is the key concept in determining whether the DPD is applicable 
to the processing of data, is thoroughly examined. They distinguish between 
four key elements in the definition; 1) any information; 2) relating to; 3) 
identified or identifiable; and 4) natural person.
4.1.1. Any information
With regard to the first element, the Article 29 WP notes that this underscores 
the broad approach aimed for by the Directive. Any information about a 
person is included, regardless of the “position or capacity of those persons 
233 Article 29 Working Party 2007.
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(as consumer, patient, employee, customer, etc.).”234  The information can 
be objective or subjective and does not necessarily have to be true or proven. 
The wording ‘any information’ also allows for including information in 
whatever form. It can be text, video, pictures, sound, and so on. How the 
information is stored is irrelevant. The Working Party explicitly mentions 
biometric data as a special case,235 since these data can be considered content 
of information as well as the link between the information and the individual. 
Because biometric data are unique to a single individual, they can also be 
used as an identifier.
4.1.2. Relating to
Information relating to an individual is, in other words, information about 
that individual. In many cases the relationship between data and an individual 
is self-evident, such as when the data are stored in an individual employee file 
or in a medical record. In other cases, however, the link is more indirect. This 
is often the case when the information is about objects. These objects belong 
to individuals, but there have to be additional means or information to create 
the link.236 To consider information to be related to an individual at least one 
of three elements should be present: ‘content’, ‘purpose’ or ‘result’.
A ‘content’ element is present when the information as such is about an 
individual, regardless of the (intended) use of the information. The ‘purpose’ 
element means that the information is used or is likely to be used “with the 
purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or behavior 
of an individual.”237 A ‘result’ element is present when the use of the data 
is likely to have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests.238 The 
elements are alternative and not cumulative. This implies that one piece of 
data may relate to different individuals based on each different element. A 
specific focus on someone is not necessary.  
4.1.3. Identified or identifiable
“A natural person can be considered as ‘identified’ when, within a group of 
persons, he or she is ‘distinguished’ from all other members of the group.”239 
If identification has not taken place, but it is possible to do so, the individual 
is ‘identifiable’. For determining whether someone who has access to the data 
234 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 7.
235 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 8.
236 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 9.
237 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 10.
238 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 11.
239 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 12. 
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is able to identify the individual, all means likely reasonably to be used either 
by the controller or by any other person have to be taken into account.240
4.1.4. Natural person
The Directive is applicable to personal data of natural persons. This is a 
broad concept which makes the protection independent of the nationality 
or residence of the individual at stake. The concept of personality of human 
beings is commonly understood as “the capacity to be the subject of legal 
relations, starting with the birth of the individual and ending with his 
death.”241 Thus, in principle personal data relate to identified or identifiable 
living individuals.  However, some situations are possible where data 
concerning deceased persons or unborn children may indirectly receive 
some protection. This may be the case, for instance, when the data also relate 
to other (living) persons, or when a data controller makes no difference in his 
files between living and deceased persons, because he is unable to ascertain 
whether a person to whom data relate is still living, or it may be based on 
other national laws which bring deceased or unborn persons under the scope 
of the Directive.242
Legal persons are excluded from the protection of the Directive. Nevertheless, 
in some cases data concerning a legal person may also relate to an individual, 
e.g. when a business carries the name of a natural person. Some provisions 
of Directive 2002/58/EC extend the scope of Directive 95/46/EC to legal 
persons. However, this study focuses on individuals and not on legal persons, 
so this aspect will not be discussed here.The protection of the personal data 
of individuals is based on a number of principles, which will be discussed 
below.
4.2. Principles underlying data protection regulation
Taking autonomy and privacy into account, a number of principles exist 
that formed the starting point for data protection legislation. The OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data set out a number of basic principles in Articles 7-14. The principles 
relate to the concepts described earlier in this Chapter. The aim was to 
protect the privacy of the individual, but the list of principles takes account 
of the other concepts as well. These principles read as follows: 
240 Identifiability will be discussed extensively in Chapter 6 below.
241 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 22.
242 Article 29 Working Party 2007, pp. 22-23.
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Collection Limitation Principle
“7. There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data 
should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with 
the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”
In this principle, several aspects of the key concepts are addressed. First of all, 
there is the limitation on the collection of personal data which can be directly 
related to privacy, in particular in the sense of a right to be left alone. Only 
for lawful and fair purposes may personal data be collected, so interference 
with the private sphere is not allowed otherwise. Where appropriate, the data 
subject has to have knowledge (must be informed) of the data being collected. 
This calls for transparency, which is a necessary condition for individuals to 
have some form of control over the information that is collected, because the 
individual can to a certain extent influence what data are disclosed. This is 
even more so if the individual has consented to the use of the data. Thus, next 
to privacy, this principle also supports informational self-determination.
Data Quality Principle
“8. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be 
used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, 
complete and kept up-to-date.”
This principle requires the quality of the data in the sense that they are 
relevant, accurate, complete, and regularly updated. A connection can be 
made to human dignity, since the principle is meant to prevent incorrect 
data. The collection and use of wrong data would infringe human dignity, 
because it is not respectful to the inherent value of the unique individual. This 
can also be linked to identity, where inaccurate data would conflict with the 
identity an individual wants to create and express. In addition, the principle 
supports autonomy, because it prevents wrong decisions from being taken 
or inaccurate preferences being stored. 
Purpose Specification Principle
“9. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified 
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to 
the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with 
those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.”
This principle is directly related to contextual integrity. It stresses the 
requirement that data are collected for a specific purpose within a specific 
context. As a result, the data should not be used in a different context if this 
implies a change of purpose incompatible with the initial purposes of the 




“10. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise 
used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 
9 except:
a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
b) by the authority of law.” 
This limitation on disclosure or other uses of the data supports informational 
self-determination. The data that have been disclosed or collected for one 
purpose may be used for that purpose only. Any other use or disclosure has 
to be based preferably on the consent of the individual or otherwise on the 
law.
This principle also relates to contextual integrity, because it prohibits making 
the data available for other purposes, which often implies another context 
as well. Another relation for this aspect is identity, because data belong to 
an (partial) identity the individual has created for the specific purpose or 
context and should not simply be shared for another purpose or context 
where another (partial) identity might be used.
Security Safeguards Principle
“11. Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards 
against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, 
modification or disclosure of data.”
Security safeguards have to prevent any form of losing or leaking personal 
data. This principle is probably directly necessary as a condition for all of the 
concepts. Obviously, if data are not properly protected, informational self-
determination and contextual integrity are infringed upon. The individual 
loses control of the data, and they can be used in other contexts than the 
one in which they were collected. As a result, data are available to people 
who should not have access to them, which infringes upon the privacy of the 
individual. When the data are accessed or used by others it also hampers the 
free construction of (partial) identities and the development of autonomous 
choices and desires.
In the end, the loss of data concerning individuals and losing control over 
what is done with the data implies that information about who an individual 
is becomes available to others as well. This may impact human dignity in the 
sense that it is not respectful to the intrinsic value of the individual human 
being.
Openness Principle (often called Disclosure)
“12. There should be a general policy of openness about developments, 
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practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily 
available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the 
main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the 
data controller.”
Only if this principle is respected can an individual exercise some control 
over what data are disclosed (informational self-determination) and what 
his identity looks like. Also control afterwards, by requesting an overview 
of the processed data and, if necessary, having them corrected or deleted, 
supports informational self-determination. Transparency is necessary, since 
control can only be executed over data which the individual knows have been 
collected about him.
Individual Participation Principle (often called Access)
“13. An individual should have the right:
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether 
or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him within a reasonable 
time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and 
in a form that is readily intelligible to him; 
c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and 
d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to 
have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.”
This principle complements the previous one and supports informational 
self-determination as well as identity. Also autonomy is related to this 
principle, in particular when it concerns the correction of data in order to 
make the information meet the desires and preferences of the individual.
Accountability Principle
“14. A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures 
which give effect to the principles stated above.”
This final principle simply supports all other principles to be respected by 
data processors. It also provides an instance for individuals with complaints 
concerning data processing if they feel that they are being harmed in light of 
one or more of the other principles.
5. Conclusion
In this Chapter, the fundamental values of human dignity and autonomy 
and the fundamental right to privacy were discussed, as well as their 
relationship with identity. Two related key concepts that were distinguished 
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are informational self-determination and contextual integrity. It appeared 
that the protection of these rights and values is deemed very important 
in light of the personal development of the individual as an entity with an 
intrinsic value. In order to protect autonomy and the construction of identity, 
privacy is legally protected. In practice, the focus in legislation aiming at the 
protection of informational privacy is on data protection. The OECD has 
adopted guidelines on data protection which list a number of basic principles 
that must be respected. Each of the principles was briefly discussed in 
relation to the key rights and values that need to be protected.
The principles are reflected in the DPD. Directive 95/46/EC forms a very 
rigid European framework on the handling and electronic processing 
of personal data. It defines what personal data are and what processing is 
allowed and under what circumstances. However, some difficulties remain 
with regard to the terminology and its meaning. Besides, the step from 
data protection to the more fundamental level of privacy protection and, in 
relation to that, the protection of identity and autonomy, has moved to the 
background.243 The framework, thus, may be very rigid, but mainly provides 
requirements and guidelines for the processing of personal data and does not 
provide sufficient protection of the fundamental values and rights that were 
presented in this Chapter. These difficulties and their implications for the 
level of protection provided by the regulatory framework will be discussed in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters, where the theories described in Part 
1 of this study will be assessed at the practical level.
243 This aspect is criticized in relation to the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
that is to replace the DPD as well, in particular, because references to ‘privacy’ have 
been replaced by ‘data protection’ (See Chapter 7 below).  
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Chapter 5  
The Use of Digital Personae and Profiles
1. Introduction
Digital personae and profiles represent real-world individuals. This means 
that the use of digital personae and profiles may have a direct effect on these 
individuals. As indicated in the previous Chapter, individuals are recognized 
as having human dignity which is protected by fundamental rights every 
individual has. Thus, an important aspect when researching the practice 
of using digital personae and profiles is whether fundamental rights of the 
individual are influenced. 
In this Chapter, an insight will be given in the practical construction and 
use of digital personae. First, an introduction (section 2) is presented in the 
form of a small fairytale: the Story of Aydee the Avatar. This is an abstract 
description of how a digital persona ‘lives’ in cyberspace. Having described 
this, the fairytale will be made more concrete by discussing the workings of 
web interactions (section 3). This is a technical part, which provides insight 
in what happens in a web interaction, what parties are involved, and what 
data are stored. This part will end with a brief interim summary.
In section 4, three real world examples of the collection of data and 
construction of digital personae will be described. First, there is a case study 
of Facebook, a social networking site which combines data provided by 
the members with data they collect outside of the network. Then, there is 
Google, a large company with numerous web services that can be combined. 
The third case study concerns the combination of online and offline data and 
the use of data to change the form and contents of web pages in real time, 
depending on the individual visitor. Along the case studies, there will be 
points where the individual is identified and the data set is a digital persona, 
but there will also be points where the data set is a profile. The profiles can, 
however, relatively easily become a digital persona. Section 5 will give a brief 
summary of the implications of the use of digital personae. The implications 
may differ for digital personae and profiles. These implications will be 
discussed more elaborately in the next Chapter.
2. The life of a digital persona
Having described the importance of privacy and autonomy of the individual 
in relation to human dignity, it is now time to make a comparison between 
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situations where a digital persona is used and situations where this is not 
the case. This in order to find out to what extent the use of digital personae 
really affects the privacy and autonomy of the individual. Informational self-
determination and contextual integrity were indicated as basic requirements 
for the construction of a personal identity free from unreasonable constraints. 
Only when these requirements are met it is possible to retain control over 
aspects of identity projected to the world. 
A general comparison between situations involving and not involving 
digital personae can be made based on interactions in an offline setting 
and interactions in a digital environment. Kang244 has made an excellent 
comparison between two mall visits, one offline and one in cyberspace. 
He describes how an individual can visit a mall, wander through several 
shops, buy something and pay cash, browse some magazines and books in a 
book store, and finally buy a scarf which is paid with a credit card. Only the 
credit card transaction is recorded, which makes it the exception of all other 
transactions and interactions where the individual remains “a barely noticed 
stranger.”245 However, when doing the same in an online environment “the 
exception becomes the norm.”246 Every step is recorded, it is analyzed how 
long the individual looks at an item, what he seems interested in, in which 
order ‘shops’ are visited and for how long, and so on. “All these data generated 
in cyberspace are detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, 
and permanent.”247  
In Kang’s description it becomes clear that in digital interactions all steps 
taken by the individual are recorded. However, in order to assess the 
effects of the use of a digital persona it is necessary to find out how these 
data constitute a digital persona and how these data are used. This section 
discusses these issues by, first, telling the story of Aydee the Avatar to show 
how a digital persona ‘lives’ in cyberspace, and then analyzing the story and 
giving a technical description of web interactions.
2.1. The story of Aydee the Avatar
Once upon a time, there was an avatar called Aydee. Even though this 
creature was a representation in digital form of a real world individual, his 
model, it had the impression that it could very well function on its own, 
almost experiencing autonomy. This impression was constituted by the 
fact that Aydee had a number of very specific, somewhat extraordinary 
244 Kang 1998.
245 Kang 1998, p. 1198.
246 Kang 1998, p. 1198.
247 Kang 1998, p. 1199.
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characteristics. First of all, Aydee lived in the digital world, which made 
him capable of being present at different places at the same moment and 
communicating with other actors simultaneously. Second, Aydee had the 
virtue of unlimited memory. Everything that happened to him was stored 
in his memory and available at any moment. And third, the aspect that 
really made Aydee feel like being an autonomous entity was that he could 
communicate with others on behalf of the real world individual he was 
representing without the direct involvement of this individual and often 
without this individual even knowing. There was, however, one thing that 
sometimes made Aydee feel useless. His life felt incomplete. Even though 
over the years huge amounts of data related to all events that occurred to 
him became part of his memory, he was still not encompassing the entire 
personality of his real world model. The reason for this was that Aydee was 
a contextualized avatar, only serving online commercial purposes. He was 
functioning as a representation when his model wanted to buy books and 
videos at Amazon.com, filled out questionnaires, and ordered the groceries 
online to have them delivered at his home address. Due to this limited context, 
Aydee had no clue about his health status, his job, or his family affairs. 
Aydee’s life felt flat, one-dimensional. The other issues were attributed to 
some of his colleague avatars which he did not know. In fact, Aydee just lived 
his life in cyberspace without even knowing his real-world model. Obviously, 
they had never met.
Aydee was always very helpful in fulfilling the requests of others. For instance, 
when Aydee’s model once wanted to buy some alcoholic drinks, the shop 
owner derived from the information Aydee consisted of his date of birth, 
because he had to be over 18 to be allowed to purchase these drinks. And 
when his model decided to work on his intellectual skills and signed up for a 
political discussion forum, using Aydee as his avatar, hisname, ID number, 
favorite movie and book, and dietary preferences were automatically entered 
in the account form. In fact, Aydee had no choice but to be helpful here, 
because without completely filling out this form he was denied access to the 
forum.
One day Aydee was used to log on to the website of the local groceries store 
to order some products for home delivery. Aydee automatically provided 
the name and address details necessary for the delivery. Also credit card 
details were provided to facilitate the payment of the order. His model was 
ticking boxes which led to a shopping list and Aydee instantly remembered 
everything that was ordered.
 
Another day, Aydee was approached by Bucks Tore, Amazon.com’s 
computer system, with a request for some information. “Hey Aydee,” Bucks 
Tore said, “could you please tell me which books you purchased lately?” 
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For Aydee, this was a very easy question to answer because his memory 
was so good. Helpful as he was, he provided Bucks Tore with the requested 
data. Aydee did not know why the data were needed, but still, what could 
be the problem with providing them. The request from Bucks Tore kept on 
wandering through his mind and gently reminded him of some nice books 
he had purchased. Some more direct reminders were provided in the form of 
advertisements of Amazon.com being displayed at places visited by Aydee. 
A couple of days later his model decided to visit the Amazon.com bookstore. 
Usually, his model started by identifying himself as Aydee with a username 
and password when he entered the shop, but not this time. He decided just 
to browse through the store and when he found something nice, he could 
still make himself known in order to receive personal treatment. Almost 
immediately after entering the bookstore, some of Amazon.com’s assistants 
approached him, offering their help and showing some books that he might 
find interesting to read. It surprised Aydee that the recommended books 
were so in line with his personal interests, as if they exactly knew what he 
came for. This was even more amazing since Aydee himself did not have any 
specific idea of the books he might want to purchase. After his model had 
briefly browsed through the recommendations, he bought two of the books. 
He identified himself, by providing the credentials related to Aydee, in order 
to enable Bucks Tore and his assistants to look up his address and credit card 
details, made the payment and left the store.
During the walk home, Aydee kept on wondering how it was possible that 
the shop assistants were able to give such good recommendations. He moved 
his hand towards the inside pocket of his coat to grab a piece of paper and 
make a note about this curious incident. But on the way to his pocket he felt 
something and all of a sudden everything fell in place. Aydee had just slid his 
hand along a badge he was wearing. It was his Amazon.com Customer ID 
Badge. That’s it: Aydee was recognized because of his badge and from the 
moment he entered the store on, the shop assistants had been knowing who 
he was and what his interests were without telling or showing him that they 
read his badge. How considerate of them.
Day after day went by and Aydee kept on doing his things. Nothing really 
happened. Then a day came that his model wanted to buy a present. He was 
thinking of a nice set of earrings for his girlfriend, but it had to be a surprise. 
He knew a nice jewel store where he sometimes came, but this store was 
owned by a friend of them. This friend regularly chatted with his girlfriend 
and she would definitely not keep her mouth shut about the earrings he 
bought if they met again. To keep it a surprise, he put on a raincoat and a hat 
as well as a pair of sunglasses. Because he needed to have a name when he 
would purchase something, he chose to use his pseudonym Alte Rigo. He 
had also learned a lesson from his earlier experience at the Amazon.com 
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store, so he took off his ID badge. Well-disguised he headed for the jewel 
store. 
When he had found a nice set of earrings, he went to the pay at the checkout 
desk. He gave his name (Alte Rigo), address, and bank details. Suddenly, 
the shop owner was alarmed. “You are not Alte Rigo, you are Aydee!”, she 
shouted. “I can see it on your address and bank account! Are these earrings a 
gift for your girlfriend?” Despite all his efforts to remain pseudonymous, he 
was recognized. Aydee admitted that he had used another name because he 
wanted to keep his purchase a surprise. After he had explained the situation, 
the shop owner promised to keep her mouth shut and not to inform his 
girlfriend on the issue. “That was close”, Aydee thought.
Even though Aydee was perfectly capable of doing his work in the commercial 
context, the incompleteness concerning his identity made him feel slightly 
miserable. He desired to be complete and decided to look for an opportunity 
to learn about his unknown dimensions and decided to chase their shadows. 
Fortunately for Aydee, this opportunity did not take long to take place. Only 
shortly after Aydee started struggling with his limited competences to expose 
a complete identity, an electronic request came from a health insurance 
company. Aydee was recognized as belonging to his model based on address 
and bank details that it contained. The insurance company already had 
contact with another avatar belonging to the same individual and this avatar 
provided the company with health data. The company was interested in the 
broader interests and eating habits of the individual. Combining the avatars 
would give the company a much more detailed insight in the personal aspects 
of the individual who, apparently, wanted to become a client of them. Aydee 
saw this as an opportunity to grow by incorporating health data. Delighted 
by the request and focusing on his chances to become mature Aydee replied 
to the request by providing everything he remembered concerning the 
purchases on Amazon.com and in the online groceries. He would give any 
information they wanted, immediately and without asking questions.
Unfortunately, it turned out that the company only took the data and did not 
provide Aydee with the health data they already had. It was one-way traffic 
of valuable information and Aydee remained suffering from a restricted 
identity while his colleague was enriched with his knowledge. No luck this 
time. But at least now he knew that he had to look for overlapping data with 
other avatars in order to finally make one complete identity.
Days went by with nothing really happening. But then, Aydee had some 
strange experience. When walking through the shopping street he made a 
stop to look in the display window of a small pharmacy. He made some small 
movements to take a better look at some of the displayed products, but saw 
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another person making similar movements on the other side of the window. 
He entered the shop take a closer look at this person, but, when looking in the 
display window from the inside, no other person appeared to be present. So 
he stepped outside again and took another look. And yes, there was the other 
person again. He made some gestures which were simultaneously followed 
by the other. Then, things fell in place. Aydee realized that the other person 
was a mirror image of himself. Now he could see what he really looked like. 
Most things were not that surprising, but one thing had not been that explicit 
before. His model was showing some male pattern baldness. It never came 
to Aydee’s mind before that this was possible, but now he was aware of this 
typical characteristic of himself. 
When continuing through the shopping street, Aydee was suddenly attracted 
by some advertisements that appeared in front of him. Earlier, the ads did 
never really bother him, but this time it was different. An advertisement 
appeared, showing a picture of someone with a thick head of hair, supported 
with the text: “How would you like this?”. Below the text, a bottle of hair-
restorer was visible, stamped with a special discount prize. Was this just a 
coincidence? Aydee decided to ignore the advertisement and continue his 
walk. A little bit further, he entered a shop and was confronted with another 
advertisement. This time it was a book, called “Proud to be bald”, and 
subtitled “Baldness as a key to success”. It was a marketing book, written by 
Steve Balder, the famous CEO of some software company. This looked more 
like it, and Aydee’s model instantly bought the book. Slightly flabbergasted 
by the series of coincidences Aydee was confronted with, but also delighted 
by the ease of getting used with his newly discovered characteristic, he went 
home.
How the story ends is still uncertain. It will probably stay in our minds for 
some time, or probably not. But it will last in the memory of Aydee and the 
shop owners forever and ever…
2.2.  Aydee the Avatar: background
Like all fairytales, the tale about Aydee the avatar is meant to teach us 
a lesson. Aydee is presented as some kind of a living and thinking, say 
conscious, entity. This approach is metaphoric. As indicated, Aydee lives in 
the digital world and consists of data. It is a digital persona, representing a 
real-world individual and the data in the digital persona are data concerning 
this individual. Real-world individuals all have a number of digital personae 
representing them, like data sets in databases, account information, or digital 
records. In contrast with the way Aydee is presented, these personae are 
passive, not active, and they can be consulted electronically. Governments 
and companies use these digital representations all the time in order to make 
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analyses and take decisions concerning the individual. These decisions can 
be relatively harmless, such as the decision of a company to serve someone 
an advertisement or not, but they can also have a more severe impact, 
such as a decision to cancel a subsidy. The following sections will discuss 
the implications of the use of digital personae as regards to information 
differences concerning real world individuals.
2.3. Information differences affecting individuals
As indicated above, there is a lesson to be learnt from Aydee’s story. The 
lesson is related to the characteristics Aydee has. These are characteristics 
that are typical for online communication and digital representations in 
particular. The purpose of the fairytale was to sketch how a digital persona 
functions and is used for different purposes. When compared to a situation 
where there is no digital persona and interactions take place between the 
concerned individual and another actor directly, some important information 
differences occur. These differences can have an impact on privacy and 
autonomy of the individual. This impact will be discussed later on (in Chapter 
6), but first, there will be a description of the information differences. These 
differences will be related to Aydee’s characteristics, namely digital form, 
inexhaustible memory, and the capability of being involved in an interaction 
without the knowledge or involvement of the concerned individual.
2.3.1. Digital form
The digital form facilitates several things. Everything that happens with the 
digital persona is stored in some digital form, either intentionally as part of 
the data, or non-intended by the digital traces that are left. As a result, a lot 
of information is stored that is not stored in a non-digital situation. Unlike 
online, offline, the exact way of wandering through a supermarket or book 
store and how long an individual stands in front of a shelf or holds a book to 
read the back flip is not recorded.248 
Some of the information can even be considered as new information. For 
instance, browsing behavior or other characteristics or preferences can 
become clear from the collection, combination, and analysis of data. By 
doing this, it is even possible that information concerning the individual 
becomes available the individual himself was not even aware of.
248 However, new practices are being exploited to do exactly this with the use of intelligent 
cameras and eye tracking Technologies: <http://bizz.knack.be/economie/business/
nieuws/camera-s-analyseren-uw-winkel gedrag/article-4000016241950.htm> (last 
accessed June 28, 2012).
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As opposed to non-digital information or direct interaction with the 
concerned individual, the use of digital data makes it easy to share, transfer 
or copy the data. The data is not bound to one physical space, but can be 
distributed anywhere. This makes it easy to combine information in order to 
gain extra knowledge about an individual. The sharing and copying of digital 
information can also have the effect of collapsing contexts. This means 
that information which is meant to be available in one context, for instance 
family, also becomes available in another context, like work. Linkage of 
information is usually based on matching specific attributes. In the example 
of the insurance company, data was linked based on shared attributes in two 
databases, namely address and bank details. The similarity in the attributes 
led to the conclusion that the information Aydee had had to belong to the 
same individual as the one who was already registered in the insurance 
company’s database.
2.3.2. Inexhaustible memory
Aydee also had the characteristic of inexhaustible memorizing capacities. 
This attribute sees to the fact that “there is no digital oblivion.”249
This characteristic has two sides, namely an internal and an external side. 
The internal side is directly related to the memorizing capacities of Aydee. 
He remembers everything he does and everything that has happened to 
him. The external side relates to the digital environment Aydee lives in. Not 
only does Aydee remember everything, but his environment also stores a 
lot of data. The connection between the data and digital representation has 
to be made in order to come up with the correct data and to present good 
recommendations. In the story, Aydee appears to be recognized because 
he was wearing a badge with his Customer ID. This is a metaphor for the 
attributes on which recognition in real situations takes place. Usually, the 
attribute is an IP address or a cookie250 which is installed on the computer 
of the user. As a result it is difficult to act anonymously or pseudonomously, 
like in the example of the jewel store, or to make a new start. Recognizing a 
returning user is fairly easy. 
One step further is the use of so-called third-party cookies. These are cookies 
distributed via a website by a third party. When the third party executes 
this process amongst several websites it is possible to trace users over the 
internet. This is illustrated in the story with the part on the male pattern 
baldness of Aydee. First, he ‘discovers’ that he has this characteristic. Here, 
249 Dobias, Hansen, Köpsell, Raguse, Roosendaal, Pfitzmann, Steinbrecher, Storf & 
Zwingelberg 2011, p. 93.
250 More on this in the next section. 
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he discloses this information on one website, namely that of the pharmacy. 
Then, along his way he is confronted with advertisements that refer to this 
baldness and promote a hair-restorer. When Aydee shows no interest in this, 
the advertisements get adapted to his preferences. When he later enters the 
bookstore an advertisement is shown with an opposite approach, namely not 
to be ashamed of his baldness, but to be proud of it. Aydee is recognized as 
being the same person and earlier behavior is analyzed and used to improve 
the quality of the targeted advertisements.
2.3.3. Being involved in an interaction without knowledge or involvement of 
concerned individual
The use of digital personae can take place without the concerned individual 
being aware. This is due to a lack of transparency of what exactly happens 
during an interaction in a digital environment. The first thing is that every 
step leaves a trace in log files. But also extra traces are created, for instance 
with the cookies. These are installed automatically on the computer of the 
individual, usually without giving an explicit notification.251 The cookies 
facilitate the storage of individual settings or preferences, but can also be 
used to track users over several sites. The fact that a personally interesting 
advertisement appears is not a coincidence, but it is unclear to ordinary 
users how exactly it is possible that this advertisement is displayed. More 
often, users are not even aware of the fact that an advertisement may be 
personalized, instead of the relevance being a coincidence.
Strongly related is the lack of control by the individual. Obviously, when an 
individual is unaware of data collection or tracking practices, it is impossible to 
exercise control over this. But also when an individual is aware, control may be a 
difficult issue. Often, at least some technical knowledge is required, for instance 
to adjust technical settings to not allowing cookies or to minimize disclosure of 
data. And, in a lot of instances it is not even an option to keep data private. Not 
disclosing the required data will lead to unavailability of a service.  This aspect 
is also closely related to constraints on the construction of one’s identity. In the 
story, the example of providing a date of birth when buying alcoholic drinks 
can be considered a constraint. Even though there are less invasive alternatives 
possible, such as providing a credential that one is over 18, the date of birth may 
still be a reasonable constraint in this specific interaction. However, signing 
up for a political forum and having to provide a favorite book and movie is less 
reasonable. These data are completely irrelevant for the specific interaction and, 
thus, should not be required for signing up. The request for dietary preferences 
is even more unreasonable. These preferences may disclose information on 




political forum, can obviously be misused for targeting purposes. The question 
arises how data are exactly collected and stored and what they can be used for. 
This will be discussed in the next section.
3. Technical description
In order to find out what exactly happens behind the scenes in digital 
interactions and what information exactly is collected and by whom, 
a viable question to ask is where exactly the memory of Aydee is located. 
The short answer is that part is internal, as belonging to Aydee himself, and 
part is external, as stored in the browser, the systems of service providers, 
or third parties. This section aims to give an insight in the exact amount of 
information collected and stored, the type of information it concerns, and 
under what conditions the information is stored. First, some basic examples 
of web interaction are given to identify the relevant actors. Then, a more 
detailed view is taken to indicate what information is stored and where.
3.1. What happens in a web interaction?
When an individual visits a web site several data exchanges take place. In a 
simple browser interaction, the browser sends an HTTP request to the server 
of the requested page and receives a response containing the data for the 
website being displayed.252 
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Figure 5. An HTTP Request and response. 
 
The HTTP request and response contain information about the systems between which the 
interaction takes place. The request below, for instance, shows that I have used a computer with a 
Windows operating system with English as preferred language and a Firefox browser, version 3.6.10. 
 
Request 




HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:30:55 GMT 
 
Data is requested and sent in a response. The web server of the requested page makes a log entry 
of this interaction. Each request and response results in a separate log entry. Usually, a page 
consists of different parts and has some images or other media embedded. Then, the request goes in 
parts for each part of the website, each resulting in a log entry on the web server. The example below 
has a web page with two images embedded. 
 
 
Figure 6. An HTTP interaction for several pieces of content. 
 
The first request is responded to by sending the web page and an indicator for the browser to send a 
new request for the images. Below is an example of a request for an image on the website of Privacy 
International. The GET request asks for the image and includes a line indicating that 
privacyinternational.org was the referrer for this request. 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/images/stripes2.gif 
GET /images/stripes2.gif HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.privacyinternational.org 
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English as preferred language and a Firefox browser, version 3.6.10.
Request
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; 
rv:1.9.2.10) Gecko/20100914 Firefox/3.6.10
252 Images remade based on Conti 2009, pp. 60-61.




Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:30:55 GMT
Data is requested and sent in a response. The web server of the requested 
page makes a log entry of this interaction. Each request and response results 
in a separate log entry. Usually, a page consists of different parts and has 
some images or other media embedded. Then, the request goes in parts for 
each part of the website, each resulting in a log entry on the web server. The 
example below has a web page with two images embedded.
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Figure 6. An HTTP interaction for several pieces of content.
The first request is responded to by sending the web page and an indicator 
for the browser to send a new request for the images. Below is an example of a 
request for an image on the website of Privacy International. The GET request 
asks for the image and includes a line indicating that privacyinternational.


















The embedded media can also come from another web server, leading to log 
entries on multiple servers.


















Figure 7. An HTTP interaction with different content providers. 
 




















HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Length: 43 
Content-Type: image/gif 
Figure 7. An HTTP interaction with different content providers.














Refer r: http:// dition.cnn.com/
Cooki : UID=264d3357-81.23.243.145-1260171972





Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 13:53:26 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Set-Cookie: UID=264d3357-81.23.243.145-1260171972; expires=Sat, 
22-Sep-2012 13:53:26 GMT; path=/; domain=.scorecardresearch.com
P3P: policyref=”/w3c/p3p.xml”, CP=”NOI DSP COR NID OUR IND 
COM STA OTC”
Expires: Mon, 01 Jan 1990 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-cache=Set-Cookie, no-store, 
proxy-revalidate
Server: CS
This request concerns an image (see Content-type in the request) which is 
provided by b.scorecardresearch.com and shown on the website of CNN 
(the referrer). As can be seen, the request goes directly to the web server of 
scrorecardresearch.com, without the CNN server being involved anymore. 
Thus, the log entry is created on the web server of scorecardresearch.com 
and not on CNN’s web server. When a web site contains a lot of external 
information, so-called third-party content, log entries concerning one web 
visit can be numerous and can be spread over a large amount of web servers. 
All these log entries contain at least the basic information concerning the 
web browser, such as operating system, browser type, and language settings. 
Also browser plug-ins, such as Adobe Flash or Java plug-ins, can usually be 
stored in a log entry. 
The log entries are parts of the external memory of Aydee. The servers of 
visited web sites store information about these visits. It became clear that 
the visited web sites are not only web sites that are visited consciously, by 
typing the URL in the browser address bar or by clicking on a link, but also 
other web sites which have placed content on the visited web sites. But what 
exactly is in this memory and to what extent can this memory be connected 
to Aydee? 
A web server log is a  text file which typically contains a few items or 
attributes. First, there is the hostname or IP address of the device that made 
the request; the user’s machine. Then, there is date and time of the request 
and the HTTP request itself, accompanied by an HTTP status code of the 
response (200 if successful). When a web site is accessed via a link on another 
page, the referring URL is included as well. Finally, there is the information 
concerning the user’s device which is also included in the request, such as 
operating system, browser type and version, and plug-ins.
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An example of a log file in Common Log File Format, which is the format 
accepted by all HTTP servers, is as follows:253
remotehost rfc931 authuser [date] “request” status bytes
The explanation of the different parts of the log file is this:
Remotehost: Remote hostname (or IP number if DNS hostname is not 
available, or if DNSLookup is Off). 
rfc931: The remote logname of the user. 
Authuser: The username as which the user has authenticated himself. 
[date]: Date and time of the request. 
“request”: The request line exactly as it came from the client. 
Status: The HTTP status code returned to the client. 
Bytes: The content-length of the document transferred. 
When all log files related to one device are combined, this memory, thus, 
contains information about all connections or web interactions made by that 
device. The log files all stand on their own, but can be connected based on 
the hostname or IP address in the file. However, the IP address which is used 
by (attributed to) a device is not necessarily always the same. IP addresses 
can be dynamic within one environment and devices, in particular portable 
ones, can have different IP addresses attributed when connected to different 
networks or internet access points. An individual can also use a proxy for 
his device to shield the IP address. Next to a device not always having the 
same IP address, one IP address can also be attached to several devices, for 
instance within a small network. 
The content of the web server logs has no direct reference to Aydee and 
there are some flaws in the connection of server logs to one and the same 
person. However, even when the IP address cannot be used as a common 
identifier, the other information concerning browser and operating system 
can disclose whether log entries belong to the same device or not. Research 
executed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) shows that web 
browsers can leave ‘fingerprints’ behind when you surf the web.254 The fact 
that these fingerprints are left behind is no surprise. The information is 
included in the HTTP header and is also part of the log files, or can be stored 
separately. It concerns information about the configuration and version of 
the operating system, system fonts, the browser, and browser plug-ins. What 
253 Example from World Wide Web Consortium: <http://www.w3.org/Daemon/User/
Config/Logging.html# common_logfile_format>, (last accessed September 24, 2010).
254 Press release Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), “Web Browsers Leave ‘Fingerprints’ 
Behind as You Surf the Net”. May 13th 2010, online available at: http://www.eff.org/
press/archives/2010/05/13 (last accessed June 28, 2012).
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
113
is more surprising is that these few details can uniquely identify a browser 
with Java or Flash installed in 94,2% of the cases.255 Java and Flash are very 
common plug-ins and are often needed to completely display a web page. 
Users can change the settings of their browser or update versions of plug-
ins, but the EFF research also showed that in 99,1% of the cases a fingerprint 
was correctly recognized as an ‘upgraded’ version of a previously observed 
browser’s fingerprint. As a result, it is possible to map visits and requests 
coming from one unique browser. The uniqueness of the browser also 
facilitates the distinction of several devices behind one IP address.256 
When log files are connected to unique browsers, the logs become more and 
more personal. The exponential use of portable devices, such as laptops and 
smart phones, has made that single devices are mostly used by one individual 
only. Each device has its own browser, so even when an individual is not 
identified he can be recognized based on his personal browser.
Log files contain parts of the external memory of Aydee and the separate 
files can be connected to each other. Another important part is covered by 
the use of cookies.
3.2. Cookies
In this subsection the workings and function of cookies will be explained in 
more detail.
3.2.1. What is a cookie?
A cookie is a small text file which is placed on the hard disk of the computer 
of the user by his web browser. The placement is the result of a request to do 
so by the web server of the visited website. Every time the website is visited, 
the information stored in the cookie will be read by the server. This means 
that the web server can follow the visits of a user and respond to preferences 
earlier disclosed by the user.257 A distinction can be made between session 
cookies and persistent cookies. Session cookies are erased at the end of a 
browsing session, whereas the latter remain on the user’s hard disk until the 
user erases them or until they expire at a set date and time. Persistent cookies, 
thus, enable tracking user visits.258 When a cookie expires, the browser simply 
deletes the text file from the user’s hard drive. Cookies are passive text files, 




258 Mercado Kierkegaard 2005.
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use the cookies to perform actions such as adapting to preferences of users, 
processing transparent user passwords, and logging user requests. 









Figure 8. An HTTP interaction including a cookie. 
 
Cookies consist of name-value pairs. In its simplest version, a cookie only contains an identification 
number and expiration date as unique information. Name, host, path and connection can be similar 
for different cookies when one website domain issues cookies to several users. Cookies can only be 
read by systems in the same domain as the cookie‘s originator. For instance, my identification cookie 




Host: www.ssrn.com  
Path: / 
Send for: Any type of connection 
Expires: woensdag 29 februari 2040 13:40:09 
 
Name is the name of the cookie and content is the unique identification number which is connected 
to this cookie in my browser. The host is the server that issued the cookie. This cookie has an 
expiration date, which is displayed in Dutch, because of my systems language being Dutch.  
 
When the user types a URL in his browser address bar for a return visit to a website, the request for 
accessing the server is sent together with the cookie which was installed on the user‘s hard disk. 
Thus, basically, the cookie is issued by a server and can only be accessed by that server when a 
user returns. During one browser session, the cookie can also be used for purposes such as 
remembering the contents of a shopping cart, creating a quick checkout, or searches within a 
website. 
 




User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; rv:1.9.2.10) Gecko/20100914 
Firefox/3.6.10 







As a response, the ssrn.com server sends the web page content and also installs 6 new cookies on 
my hard disk: 
 
Response 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 12:03:24 GMT 
Set-Cookie: CFID=13627525;expires=Tue, 22-Sep-2009 12:03:24 GMT;path=/ 
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=34394831;expires=Tue, 22-Sep-2009 12:03:24 GMT;path=/ 
Set-Cookie: CFID=13627525;domain=.ssrn.com;path=/ 
Set-Cookie: CFTOKEN=34394831;domain=.ssrn.com;path=/ 
Figure 8. An HTTP interaction including a cookie.
Cookies consist of name-value pairs. In its simplest version, a cookie only 
contains an identification number and expiration date as unique information. 
Name, host, path and connection can be similar for different cookies when 
one website domain issues cookies to several users. Cookies can only be read 
by systems in the same domain as the cookie’s originator. For instance, my 





Send for Any type of connection
Expires: woensdag 29 februari 2040 13:40:09
Name is the name of the cookie and content is the unique identification 
number which is connecte  to this cookie in my browser. The host is the 
server that issued the cookie. This cookie has an expiration date, which is 
displayed in Dutch, because of my systems language being Dutch. 
When the user types a URL in his browser address bar for a return visit to a 
website, the request for accessing the server is sent together with the cookie 
which was installed on the user’s hard disk. Thus, basically, the cookie is 
issued by a server and can only be accessed by that server when a user returns. 
During one browser session, the cookie can also be used for purposes such 
as remembering the contents of a shopping cart, creating a quick checkout, 
or searches within a website.
Now, when I visit the ssrn.com website again, my browser sends the request 
together with the cookie-ID:
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Request
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; 
rv:1.9.2.10) Gecko/20100914 Firefox/3.6.10







As a response, the ssrn.com server sends the web page content and also 
installs 6 new cookies on my hard disk:
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 12:03:24 GMT
Set-Cookie: CFID=13627525;expires=Tue, 22-Sep-2009 12:03:24 
GMT;path=/















3;expires=Fri, 14-Sep-2040 12:03:24 GMT;path=/
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In a picture it looks like this:














31%23cfid%3D13627525%23;expires=Fri, 14-Sep-2040 12:03:24 GMT;path=/ 
 
In a picture it looks like this: 
 
 
Figure 9. An HTTP interaction including cookie exchanges. 
 
Cookies can replace each other and have different functions. As can be seen in the response above, 
some cookies expire immediately (session cookies), but there are also persistent cookies with an 
expiration date in 2040. 
 
3.2.2. Third-party cookies 
 
It was indicated above that cookies can be sent only to the domain server that issued them. This is a 
protection that prevents other websites than the sites visited from illicitly requesting sensitive 
information (such as a cookie that verifies that you are logged into your web mail account). However, 
there is one important loophole here. If you visit a website with third-party content, such as 
advertisements, the advertiser‘s domain can issue you a cookie because, technically, your browser 
visited its domain.259 In the picture below the server of the third party who delivers Image 1 also sets 
a cookie in the browser of the individual. 
 
                                                          
259 Conti 2009, p. 75. 
Figure 9. An HTTP interaction including cookie exchanges.
Cookies can replace each other and have different functions. As can be seen 
in the response above, some cookies expire immediately (session cookies), 
but there are also persistent cookies with an expiration date in 2040.
3.2.2. Third-party cookies
It was indicated above that cookies can be sent only to the domain server that 
issued them. This is a protection that prevents other websites than the sites 
visited from illicitly requesting sensitive information (such as a cookie that 
verifi s that you are logged into your web mail account). However, there is 
one important loophole here. If yo  visit a website with third-party content, 
such as advertisements, the advert ser’s domain can issue you a cookie 
because, technically, your browser visited its domain.259 In the picture below 
the server of the third party who delivers Image 1 also sets a cookie in the 
browser of the individual.
259 Conti 2009, p. 75.
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Figure 10. An HTTP interaction including third party cookies. 
 
Third-party cookies work similarly as the ‗normal‘ cookies as described above, but they have one 
specific characteristic; they are issued by third parties via the server of the visited website. Because 
the cookies are issued by third parties, these third parties receive the information when a user visits a 
website. The third parties can have mechanisms to issue their cookies on several websites and, thus, 
have the ability to track a user over several websites. This can facilitate the analysis of browsing 
behavior and link visits to extract preferences and to create profiles. 
 
When a web site uses cookies and also provides content at another web site, the site gets the 
information that you visited this other web site combined with the cookie. Below is an example from 
cnn.com. First, there is a request with all cookies erased and one of the content items comes from 
facebook.com. On CNN‘s web site this is a small field which is clickable to share news messages via 




















Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 
X-Cnection: close 
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 10:22:19 GMT 
Figure 10. An HTTP interaction including third party cookies.
Third-party cookies work similarly as the ‘normal’ cookies as described 
above, but they have one specific characteristic; they are issued by third 
parties via the server of the visited website. Because the cookies are issued 
by third parties, these third parties receive the information when a user 
visits a website. The third parties can have mechanisms to issue their cookies 
on several websites and, thus, have the ability to track a user over several 
websites. This can facilitate the analysis of browsing behavior and link visits 
to extract preferences and to create profiles.
When a web site uses cookies and also provides content at another web site, 
the site gets the information that you visited this other web site combined 
with the cookie. Below is an example from cnn.com. First, there is a request 
with all cookies erased and one of the content items comes from facebook.
com. On CNN’s web site this is a small field which is clickable to share news 
messag s via your Facebook rofile.
http://www.faceb ok.com/exter /l gin_status.php?api_key=64b......
GET /extern/login_status.php?api_key=64b….
Host: www.facebook.com


















Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 10:22:19 GMT
Content-Length: 0
After this CNN session I visited the Facebook web site and then returned to 
the CNN site. The same request now includes the Facebook cookie which 



































Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2010 10:28:10 GMT
Content-Length: 0
Facebook can now connect the visit to the CNN web site to an individual (with 
a) Facebook account. The Facebook logo on CNN’s web site indicates that 
there is some sort of connection between the two or at least that a connection 
can be established. However, for ordinary users it will not be clear that the 
connection is made in any case, so not only when an individual actually uses 
the clickable logo to share a news item. And even when the functionality is 
used, individuals may not be aware of the connection between the web sites, 
but just think they are navigating to Facebook.com. Nevertheless, whereas in 
the case of Facebook the connection can be guessed, there are lots of other 
cases where this is not so easy. Third-party content which is embedded on 
the CNN web site does not necessarily have to be recognizable as third-party 
content. Videos, images, or other types of content seem to be part of the web 
site and its news items, but in fact are very often links to other domains.
While it is difficult to understand the number of external web sites activated 
and involved in the delivery of content on a web page, and possibly issuing 
cookies, it is even more difficult to imagine when a similar process takes 
place without real content being displayed. This is the case with so-called 
web bugs. Web bugs, or web beacons, are images with a size of only 1x1 pixel, 
which means that they are practically invisible. Technically, it is web content, 
but the visitor of a web site cannot see the image. Nevertheless, this image 
has to be requested by the browser and, thus, can also be sent as a response 
including a cookie. As a result, the functionality of web bugs is similar to that 
of visible advertisements or other third party content. “Web beacons are a 
tool that can be used to deliver a cookie in a third party context. This allows 
companies to perform many important tasks – including unique visitor 
counts, web usage patterns, assessments of the efficacy of ad campaigns, 
delivery of more relevant offers, and tailoring of web site content.”260 




Obviously, one way to connect several web site visits to a single user is to 
let individuals create user accounts. Every time a user visits a web site and 
logs in to his account, the data in the log file are connected to this account or 
to a cookie belonging to this account. However, the difference is that with 
logging in it no longer matters which device is used. An individual can log in 
from several places and use several devices to access the same web site. The 
cookies are stored in the browser of each individual device, but the account 
makes the visits connectable anyway. 
When an individual has an account, for instance on Amazon.com, the 
website can be completely personalized for this single individual. Accessing 
the Amazon web site without logging in does show the latest searches from 
previous visits from the computer used. Logging on to the account, however, 
can also result in personal settings and preferences, as well as showing the 
purchase history of the individual or a personal wish list with items selected 
for this individual to remember. Browsing to Amazon.de, a web site I 














As can be seen, a cookie is included in the request. As a result of this cookie, 
the device from which the request was sent is recognized and the latest 
viewed item, in this case Daniel Suarez’s Daemon, is displayed on the web 
site together with some recommendations related to this book.
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visible advertisements or other third party content. ―Web beacons are a tool that can be used to 
deliver a cookie in a third party context. This allows companies to perform many important tasks – 
including unique visitor counts, web usage patterns, assessments of the efficacy of ad campaigns, 
delivery of more relevant offers, and tailoring of web site content.‖260  
 
 
3.3. User accounts 
 
Obviously, one way to connect several web site visits to a single user is to let individuals create user 
accounts. Every time a user visits a web site and logs in to his account, the data in the log file are 
connected to this account or to a cookie belonging to this account. However, the difference is that 
with logging in it no longer matters which device is used. An individual can log in from several places 
and use several devices to access the same web site. The cookies are stored in the browser of each 
individual device, but the account makes the visits connectable anyway.  
 
When an individual has an account, for instance on Amazon.com, the website can be completely 
personalized for this single individual. Accessing the Amazon web site without logging in does show 
the latest searches from previous visits from the computer used. Logging on to the account, however, 
can also result in personal settings and preferences, as well as showing the purchase history of the 
individual or a personal wish list with items selected for this individual to remember. Browsing to 
Amazon.de, a web site I previously visited, results in the following HTTP request: 
 
http://www.amazon.de/ 
GET / HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.amazon.de 











As can be seen, a cookie is included in the request. As a result of this cookie, the device from which 
the request was sent is recognized and the latest viewed item, in this case Daniel Suarez‘s Daemon, 
is displayed on the web site together with some recommendations related to this book. 
 
 
Figure 11. Amazon web page with stored information. 
                                                          
260 Martin, Wu & Alsaid 2003. 
Figure 11. Amazon web page with stored information.
Now, when logging in to my personal account, the site is personalized 
by showing my name in the welcoming message, by giving more 
recommendations based on past purchases, and by trying to encourage me 
to improve my recommendations by valuing my 7 past purchases.






Now, when logging in to my personal account, the ite is personalized by showing my name in the 
welcoming message, by giving more recommendations based on past purchases, and by trying to 





Figure 12. Personalized Amazon web page. 
 
So, in the case of an online web shop, the account of the individual forms the complete memory 
concerning purchases and interests in that particular web shop. Not only purchases are recorded, but 
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the same individual. Also, when connected to the same router, the IP address can be similar for a 
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can be uniquely identified and followed across the world. Finally, there are more sophisticated 
mechanisms, also with a weaker link, such as search query behavior or browsing behavior. 
Obviously, many people show a specific pattern they follow when accessing the internet. Often, first 
one or more e-mail accounts are checked, then perhaps a news web site, and some social 
networking sites, and finally the individual starts to search for something using his favorite search 
engine. These patterns are easy to recognize and can be quite unique. The more standard web sites 
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the complete memory concer ing ur h ses and interests in t t particular 
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looked at and for how long. Furthermore, all visits have a time stamp in the 
log file, which means that the frequency and pattern of visiting the web shop 
is available in the web server.
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account from different devices, these devices apparently all belong to the 
same individual. Also, when connected to the same router, the IP address 
can be similar for a few devices. The different devices can be indicated based 
on different cookies. A portable device can be used in numerous places and 
during travelling, while still having the same cookie. So, the device can be 
uniquely identified and followed across the world. Finally, there are more 
sophisticated mechanisms, also with a weaker link, such as search query 
behavior or browsing behavior. Obviously, many people show a specific 
pattern they follow when accessing the internet. Often, first one or more 
e-mail accounts are checked, then perhaps a news web site, and some social 
networking sites, and finally the individual starts to search for something 
using his favorite search engine. These patterns are easy to recognize and 
can be quite unique. The more standard web sites visited in this pattern, the 
easier it is to recognize and individualize. 









Figure 13. Linking devices to individuals.261 
 
But also groups of individuals can be connected based on their web activity. By using information like 
IP addresses, cookies, and third party cookies it is possible to map which individuals share address 
books, interests, have mail connections, have been searched for by others, and so on and so forth. 
 
 
3.5. The memory and existence of Aydee 
 
The question still remains whether the data collected by several parties and stored in log files and 
cookies belong to the external memory of Aydee, his internal memory, or whether they are part of 
Aydee himself. As described in the story of Aydee, Aydee is a context-bound digital persona. The 
real-world individual, his model, uses Aydee as a partial identity for online commercial purposes. 
Taking that into account, the data as provided by the individual for commercial purposes is Aydee. 
Aydee is then a projected digital persona and consists of a username and password, address details, 
bank account or credit card details to make payments, and probably some specific data or interests 
indicated by the individual. In this form, Aydee is functioning as a representation for his model and 
does not include information that cannot be given directly by the individual. So, the individual is still in 
control over the disclosed data. 
  
When Aydee is presented to others, namely online commercial companies, they see Aydee. As soon 
as a cookie is placed in the browser of the individual and additional information is stored, Aydee 
becomes a hybrid digital persona. The representation can then be extended further and further, 
including purchasing history, interest analysis, browsing patterns, etc. All these data become part of 
the memory of Aydee, but not of the initial Aydee as created by the individual. Instead, a new 
representation is created, based on Aydee. These two different representations can be distinguished 
easily based on the access parties have to the representation. The initial Aydee (Aydee1) was 
created by the individual and presented to a company. In that case, the individual and the company 
have access to the same Aydee (1) with the same amount of information. However, the new 
representation as created by the company (Aydee2), including the initial Aydee, but extended with 
new information, is only accessible by the company. The individual cannot access all the information 
at the same time. 
 
Another issue is how the representation is interpreted. The individual creates Aydee in the form of an 
account. The company, however, starts with the account information and adds information to get a 
more complete image of the individual behind the representation. The representation can be 
connected to a profile, resulting in predictions of interests and desires of the individual. In the end, 
the digital persona as used by the company can become so rich that it is seen, or treated, as if it 
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and consists of a username and password, address details, bank account or 
credit card details to make payments, and probably some specific data or 
interests indicated by the individual. In this form, Aydee is functioning as a 
representation for his model and does not include information that cannot 
be given directly by the individual. So, the individual is still in control over 
the disclosed data.
 
When Aydee is presented to others, namely online commercial companies, 
they see Aydee. As soon as a cookie is placed in the browser of the individual 
and additional information is stored, Aydee becomes a hybrid digital persona. 
The representation can then be extended further and further, including 
purchasing history, interest analysis, browsing patterns, etc. All these data 
become part of the memory of Aydee, but not of the initial Aydee as created 
by the individual. Instead, a new representation is created, based on Aydee. 
These two different representations can be distinguished easily based on 
the access parties have to the representation. The initial Aydee (Aydee1) 
was created by the individual and presented to a company. In that case, the 
individual and the company have access to the same Aydee (1) with the same 
amount of information. However, the new representation as created by 
the company (Aydee2), including the initial Aydee, but extended with new 
information, is only accessible by the company. The individual cannot access 
all the information at the same time.
Another issue is how the representation is interpreted. The individual 
creates Aydee in the form of an account. The company, however, starts 
with the account information and adds information to get a more complete 
image of the individual behind the representation. The representation can be 
connected to a profile, resulting in predictions of interests and desires of the 
individual. In the end, the digital persona as used by the company can become 
so rich that it is seen, or treated, as if it were the real-world individual himself 
with whom an interaction takes place.262 As Zwick and Dholakia state: 
[T]he consumer is constituted by language and the language governing 
the electronic market space is constituted by databases. The consumer 
(as a meaningful representation, not as a body) does not exist outside this 
constitutive field of discursive power. Hence, the consumer’s digital identity 
is his or her real identity because marketing is targeted toward the consumer 
profile rather than the real person.263   
262 Gürses & Berendt 2010, p. 309.




In the previous part, the technical mechanisms of information processing 
in web interactions have been described. The description gave an insight 
in what data are stored and where. It was indicated as the external memory 
of Aydee. However, the internal memory might be quite similar, with great 
overlaps, so the question arises whether the memory as such, i.e. the set of 
data, is not just Aydee himself. This part will further discuss the question 
which data are stored where and how they are connected to Aydee and to the 
individual. 
As shown in the previous part, several data concerning web interactions are 
stored in different forms at different locations. Cookies can function as a 
means to store data at the hard disk of the individual’s device; log files contain 
data that are stored on the server of the service provider. User accounts can 
include personal data, preferences, and personal settings of the individual, all 
stored in databases of the service provider. The cookies sent together with 
the HTTP request allow for connection of the database data to the device or 
user account. 
Connecting and analyzing data can also lead to new information. This 
information is not (directly) disclosed by the individual, but can be derived 
from patterns or specific behavior that are shown. A rather common purpose 
of connecting and analyzing data is to identify personal interests or to create 
a personal profile of an individual. The profiles or specific outcomes of the 
data analysis can be used as a basis for decision making. 
The theoretical framework (Chapter 2) already included a description of 
profiling and how it works. In the practice of web interaction, it means that 
data concerning the interaction are collected and probably combined with 
other data to construct individual or group profiles. As indicated in the 
technical description, cookies and web bugs, as means to collect data, can 
be used by the service provider of the initially visited web site, as well as by 
third parties. These third parties provide visible or invisible content to the 
web site. The provision is programmed in such a way that a cookie is installed 
via the HTTP response to the user’s browser. Remarkably, it appears that 
service providers are not always aware of these third-party cookies being 
spread to the visitors of their web sites. A 2009 case study264 on the web site 
of Levis showed that Levis.com loads nine tracking tags that link to eight 
third party companies. None of these companies were acknowledged in the 
Levis privacy policy. This could either mean that the policy was incomplete, 
or that Levis was just not aware of this data collection. In the privacy 
264 Dwyer 2009.
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policy, however, it was stated that Levis did not share personal information 
without the user’s consent.265 The tracking cookies can be used to track a 
user’s browsing within a website or across multiple sites, therewith mapping 
behavior and interests.
Profiling activities can result in a very complete image of an individual, 
including lots of information. Specific about this information is that it is 
new information resulting from the profiling or data mining process. The 
analysis and processing of input data discloses additional information, next 
to the information that was disclosed by the individual or his actions. It is 
indirect information, possibly revealing facts or characteristics concerning 
the individual that the individual himself was not even aware of. Interests or 
desires of the individual become apparent even before the individual knows 
he has these interests and desires. This phenomenon is sometimes referred 
to as companies creating a ‘database of intentions’.266 Obviously, knowing 
individual intentions is of extreme value for marketers or commercial 
companies in general, as well as for governmental institutions. A fictional 
example of the latter can be found in the famous movie Minority Report,267 
where intentions of individuals are monitored to predict crimes. This idea has 
certainly inspired commercial companies. For instance, Social Intelligence 
promises to predict future behavior of employees based on information 
derived from SNS and other internet sources.268 The service does not focus 
on past behavior like obscene photos or drunk partying, but on the social 
character of an individual, thereby, for instance, predicting whether someone 
will function better in a group or in a more individualized function. Next 
to companies, governments are also interested in predictive technologies. 
Pattern-based data mining is used to combat terrorism by trying to single 
out possible terrorists based on certain characteristics or behavioral patterns 
they reveal.269
4. Case studies
Having described how a digital persona ‘lives’ in cyberspace, as illustrated 
by the story of Aydee the Avatar, and having shown the general technicalities 
of web interactions and cookies, it is now time to present practical examples. 
265 Dwyer 2009.
266 Battelle 2005-2006.
267 DreamWorks/20th Century Fox 2002, directed by Steven Spielberg.
268 See: http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/features/article.php/12297_3905931_1/Pre-
crime-Comes-to-the-HR-Dept.htm (last accessed June 27, 2012).
269 Rubinstein, Lee & Schwartz 2008. Rubinstein also indicates that there are criticisms to 
pattern-based data mining in a criminal context, because it might be conflicting with the 




First, an example of Facebook will be given, by briefly introducing the service 
and the creation of an account. Since it is of particular interest to describe 
what data are collected and added to the digital persona, the example will 
also contain several scenarios of how Facebook tracks internet users over the 
web, when they visit other websites than facebook.com.
Second, an example of Google will be described, with a particular focus on 
the combination of different services hosted by Google and the connection 
between those services.
4.1. Facebook
Facebook is, with about 1 billion members,270 the biggest and most 
successful social networking site worldwide. Due to its size, it is highly 
influential on the web as one of the most important services to which other 
websites connect by implementing so-called ‘social tools’. It even seems that 
Facebook is changing the way web content is rated concerning relevance, 
therewith shifting online business from a ‘Hit and Link economy’ to a ‘Like-
economy’.271
The start of Facebook’s history took place in February 2004, when students 
Mark Zuckerberg, Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz, and Chris Huges 
launched the small scale social networking project ‘TheFacebook’ for 
Harvard College students (Harvard University). In March 2004, the network 
was expanded to other American universities. Membership of TheFacebook 
was limited to students of certain (by TheFacebook selected) universities. 
After providing the network for several universities in the US and Canada, in 
2005 a version was launched for schools and employees of several companies, 
such as Apple and Microsoft. By purchase of the web domain facebook.com, 
TheFacebook simply became Facebook. Only in September 2006, Facebook 
became a completely public network and accessible for everybody (of age 
13 and older).272 As of March 2012 Facebook was preparing to enter the 
stock market with an estimated value of 100 billion US Dollars.273 In the 
Prospectus to enter the stock market, the number of active users indicated 
was even 901 million.274 In early October 2012, this number was above 1 
270 See: http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts where Facebook claims to have 1 billion 
monthly active users as of October 2012 (last accessed November 30, 2012).
271 Helmond & Gerlitz 2012.
272 Kirkpatrick 2010.
273 Tyler 2012. 
274 Active users are users that logon to Facebook at least once a month. The Prospectus is online 
available at: <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512175673/
d287954ds1a.htm> (last accessed April 26, 2012). 
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billion.275 The estimated value, however, has dropped from the moment 
Facebook entered the stock market (on May 1st 2012) and the value is now 
close to 50% of the initial value.276.
The basic functionality of social networking sites, so also of Facebook, is to 
have users create a personal profile page and make ‘friends’. Making friends 
can be done by inviting other users to become a friend. Essentially, different 
users confirm a certain relationship and therewith gain access to each other’s 
profile pages. However, if privacy settings are kept ‘open’, related connections 
(Friends of Friends) or random others also have access to the profile. People 
with whom the user has a connection are displayed on the profile page.
When creating a personal profile page on Facebook an important factor is 
the registration of personal information and preferences. What information 
is shared is, to a certain extent, steered by Facebook. For instance, Facebook 
requires the use of a real name when creating an account and prohibits 
the use of pseudonyms. According to Facebook, this is necessary in order 
to facilitate finding people on the network whom users already know 
offline. Even though that sounds logical it is not strictly necessary for the 
functionality of Facebook, since people who know each other offline can 
share their usernames and then become friends on Facebook as well. 
Furthermore, it is very well possible that users want to connect to people 
with whom they share certain interests. In that case, the real name of the user 
is of no importance. Facebook actively checks whether users obey their real 
name policy and blocks profile pages of which they suspect the user to be in 
breach of this policy.277 
Other forms of steering the sharing information are the limited choice in 
categories to classify friends and labels to describe relationship statuses. 
Another way to classify friends is by creating lists, for instance for school 
or work/colleagues. In order to collect as much information as possible, 
Facebook encourages members to use settings which make their information 
public. The more information people share, the more information others 
will share, because of social effects such as ‘peer pressure’.278 Facebook 
is famous for its default settings of information to be visible not only to 
275 See: <http://www.wired.com/business/2012/10/facebook-case-for-optimism/> (last 
accessed October 21, 2012).
276 See WSJ online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904443751045775
93711737087098.html> (last accessed October 21, 2012).
277 As indicated in email messages to people whose account had been blocked. The practice 
was confirmed by Luc Delany, European Policy Manager Facebook, in a personal 
communication on 10 November 2011.
278 Acquisti & Gross 2006, p. 15, 17; boyd 2008, p. 133; Donath & boyd 2004, p. 80.
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‘friends’ but also to ‘friends of friends’279 and for indicating this setting as 
‘recommended’.280 Besides, it has been shown that most users stick to the 
default settings, regardless of what these settings are.281
Facebook integrates several tools and functionalities, such as chat, blogs, 
games and e-mail. On the profile page, textual information as well as photos 
and videos can be showed. This combination of tools makes it attractive to 
use Facebook as the central platform for all online communications. 
Facebook, thus, allows for the creation of a digital persona. At first sight, it 
seems to be a projected persona, since the individual provides the information 
that forms the representation, even though Facebook hugely influences what 
information is shared on the profile page. Nevertheless, the digital persona 
on Facebook certainly is a hybrid digital persona, because Facebook collects 
much more information concerning the individual, which can be connected 
to the individual account. This additional information is collected via the 
‘social tools’ Facebook provides for other websites to integrate. Probably, the 
best-known of these tools is the ‘Like’ button.
4.1.1. The Facebook ‘Like’ Button282
The Facebook Like button is an image displaying a thumbs-up symbol 
accompanied by the word ‘Like’. According to Facebook, “[t]he Like button 
lets a user share your content with friends on Facebook. When the user clicks 
the Like button on your site, a story appears in the user’s friends’ News Feed 
with a link back to your website.”283 Anyone can display the button on his 
website by simply implementing the code which is available for free. The 
button can thus be used by content providers to have web users promote 
content and create links on their Facebook profile pages. When clicking the 
Like button, a login field opens in a pop-up window to log on to Facebook. 
Log on results in the creation of the link to the website at issue on the 
Facebook profile page. When a user is already logged on to Facebook, the 
creation takes place immediately. 
In April 2010, at their f8 conference, Facebook announced Instant 
Personalizer and Social Plugins, two services that allowed partners to 
279 Lemons 2011, p. 9.
280 Lemons 2011, p. 19.
281 Thaler & Sunstein 2008, pp. 8-9.
282 This part is based on an earlier paper: Roosendaal 2010. An elaborated version of this 
paper has been published as Roosendaal 2012.
283 “Like Button - Facebook Developers,” See: <http://developers.facebook.com/docs/
reference/plugins/like> (last accessed March 22, 2011). 
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leverage the social graph — the information about a user’s relationships on 
the site that the user makes available to the system — and provide a channel 
for sharing information between Facebook and third parties. For example, 
websites could implement a Like button on their own pages that enables 
users to share content from that site with their connections on Facebook.284 
The value of displaying the Like button on a website becomes clear from the 
statistics. Sites that have added such social plugins from Facebook reported 
increases in traffic in excess of 200%. Besides, the time spent and the number 
of articles read on websites with Like buttons also increased by over 80%.285 
The button represents 12.9% of the distribution of third-party widgets.286 
It also appears that, within months, the use of social plugins had reached 
millions of sites.287 The penetration rate of the Like button in the top 10,000 
websites reached over 4% in the first six months after its introduction,288 and 
it is likely that it will continue to grow.289
While the Like button can help content providers to generate traffic to 
their websites, it is also a tool for Facebook members to add information 
about their interests to their personal profile page. Thus, it fits perfectly 
in the ongoing trend of social networking sites like Facebook encouraging 
members to share personal information.290 Obviously, for sharing items 
from the web, the Like button is a very useful tool, because it allows direct 
linking without having to copy and paste complete URLs and the content is 
made up in a readable manner automatically.
4.1.2. Cookies, recognition, and identification
As indicated, there are numerous third parties which deliver content to 
websites and place cookies. Usually, the function of these third parties is to 
284 boyd & Hargittai 2010.
285 “The Value of a Liker – Facebook,” <http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-media/
value-of-a-liker/150630338305797> (last accessed March 22, 2011).
286 “Facebook Like Box Usage Statistics,” <http://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/Facebook-
Like-Box> (last accessed March 22, 2011).
287 “Facebook Stats Likers,” <http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/09/29/facebook-
stats-likers/> (last accessed September 29, 2010).
288 “Facebook Like Usage Statistics,” <http://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/Facebook-
Like> (last accessed March 22, 2011).
289 The Like button is intensively used. Facebook claims to have 3,2 billion Likes and comments 
per day: <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512175673/
d287954ds1a.htm> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
290 There are, however, more privacy-friendly initiatives which focus on audience 
segregation and controlled disclosure of personal information. For instance, Clique 
allows users to have several ‘faces’ in one account. See <http://clique.primelife.eu/>. 
This social networking site is one of the results of the EU FP7 PrimeLife project.
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provide website providers with content such as advertisements or specific 
functionalities like maps or videos. A piece of content is delivered from the 
servers of the third party and can be sent together with the cookie. The cookies 
can be used to generate information on the number of visitors and which 
items on a website attracted the most attention. In this way, third parties can 
provide a service to the website provider. A web user is usually not aware of 
this. He just types in the URL of the website he wants to visit and the page is 
loaded. That the loading of the page involves numerous HTTP requests291 for 
content from the servers of the visited websites and often several third-party 
servers is a process which takes place behind the scenes. Or, in more popular 
terms: that is where the magic happens.
A cookie is placed on the web user’s computer via his browser. Each cookie is 
connected to a web server, so only the server from which the cookie was sent 
has access to the cookie. The provider of a website does not have access to 
other cookies placed by third parties via his website. Once a cookie is available 
on the user’s computer, this cookie will be sent together with the HTTP 
request in each later request for content from the server which installed 
the cookie. The HTTP request also includes data on the referrer, which is 
the website on which the content will be displayed. Since the referrer data 
is always included, third parties can follow exactly which sites a user visits. 
When data concerning web visits are combined based on the unique cookie, 
the browsing history of a web user can be mapped. The content is needed to 
load a page so, for tracking purposes, it is irrelevant whether a user actually 
clicks a piece of content or not, or whether the content is clickable at all.
4.1.2.1. Scenarios
The Facebook Like button is also a piece of third-party content. The website 
provider does not directly place an image of this button on his website. 
In fact, the button is a piece of HTML code which includes the request to 
the Facebook server to provide the image when the website is loaded. This 
implies that the button can be used to set third-party cookies or to recognize 
them as well. Setting of a cookie can be included in an HTTP response 
providing a piece of content to be displayed on a web site. In future HTTP 
requests, information in the cookie is sent along and the device of the user 
can be recognized. A few different scenarios can be distinguished: (1) A 
web user has a Facebook account, (2) a web user does not have an account, 
(3) a web user becomes a member of Facebook, and (4) a member deletes 
291 HTTP stands for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, the programming language used for 
internet traffic. An HTTP request is a request for a specific piece of content sent from 
the user’s computer to a web server. The web server replies by sending the requested 
content. If the content is not available, the reply includes an error code.
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
131
his account. These scenarios have been tested by the author in a practical 
experiment using Techcrunch.com, CNN.com, and Gizmodo.com.
4.1.2.1.1 The web user has a Facebook account
The first option is a scenario in which the web user has a Facebook account. 
When the account is created, Facebook issues a cookie, containing a unique 
user ID, to the computer of the user. This cookie facilitates the display of 
a username in the login field at returning visits. When accessing Facebook 
from another device, a temporary cookie is issued, which is replaced by a 
cookie with the same ID after logging on to the account. In this way, different 
devices can be linked to one account and thus one user. Every time the user 
visits the Facebook website, the cookie is sent together with the HTTP 
request for the site. As a result, Facebook already knows who292 wants to log 
in before the actual login has taken place.
However, the cookie is not only sent to the Facebook servers when a member 
logs on, but on every occasion when content such as the Like button has to 
be provided from the Facebook servers (Fig. 1). Thus, every single time a 
website containing the Like button is visited, Facebook receives information 
concerning the user, including his unique ID, via the cookie. If the user 
actually clicks the button, he has to provide his Facebook login details, and a 
message about the ‘Like’ is posted on his profile page. 
Users are often not aware of the fact that data about the user are sent to 
Facebook regardless of whether the Like button is actually clicked. The 
cookie contains the unique user ID and thus allows information on browsing 
behavior to be connected to the account. Even though the user is not involved, 
Facebook can collect far more individual data than the data made available 
on the profile page only.
Below is an example of a request for the Like button where the cookie 





User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; 
rv:1.9.2.10) Gecko/20100914 Firefox/3.6.10
292 Or to be more precise, Facebook knows what device is used and can then have an 
expectation of which user is using that device. If a device has multiple users and cookies, 













user=100001XXXXXXXXX; sct=1287731574; sid=0; xs=55dcbdfe4719c
2693d477d0c0dd83ab6
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Figure 14. The HTTP GET request for the Like button on Gizmodo.com, including the 
cookie with user ID (anonymised by the author).
In this scenario, there is a link between the Internet user and Facebook, 
because there is an account. Now, consider a scenario where there is no 
membership link.
4.1.2.1.2. The web user does not have a Facebook account293
If a user does not have a Facebook account, there is no cookie and no user ID 
available. A visit to, for example, Techcrunch.com includes an HTTP GET 
request for the Like button. However, in this scenario, when the button is 
provided, no cookie is issued. Thus, it seems that the Like button itself is not 
used to issue cookies. However, when a site is visited which includes Facebook 
Connect294 (for instance Gizmodo.com), this application does issue a cookie 
(Fig. 14). Facebook Connect is the feature which allows members to log on 
to other websites with their Facebook credentials. From that moment on, 
visits to other websites which display the Like button result in a request for 
the Like button to the Facebook server including the cookie. An important 
part of the process depends on visiting a site which has implemented 
293 This scenario does not apply anymore since Facebook changed its systems after the 
publication of my initial research findings: Roosendaal 2010. The Facebook Connect 
feature is now called Facebook for Websites and is no longer used by Facebook to issue 
cookies. To receive a Facebook cookie, it is now necessary to visit the Facebook.com 
domain In an internal communication (on file with the author) to the Hamburg Data 
Protection Authority (Germany) Facebook stated that the tracking of non-users was 
the result of a ‘bug’ in their software development kit.
294 Facebook Connect is the feature that allows Facebook members to log on to other web 
services by using their Facebook username and password. In the meantime, the name of 
Connect has been changed to Facebook for Websites.
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Facebook Connect. The chance of visiting such a site is considerable. Within 
a year from its launch in December 2008, Facebook Connect was used on 
almost 1 million websites and in March 2009 over 40 million unique visitors 
of Facebook Connect implementations were registered.295 The number of 
implementations increases exponentially, so the likelihood of accessing such 
a website is increasing at a fast pace as well. 
As indicated, after visiting a website on which Facebook Connect has been 
implemented, the request for the Like button includes a cookie. This cookie 
has an expiration date two years from the moment it was issued. However, 
by browsing across websites, additional cookies can be placed on the user’s 
computer and these can be added later on in new requests. Not all cookies 
are used in this way. For instance, a cookie issued via the extern login status 
plug-in296 is not included in later requests.
1. Set-Cookie: datr=ckviTDm3989eNbvw6xMhAWle; expires=Thu, 15-
Nov-2012 09:14:26 GMT; path=/; domain=.facebook.com
2. Set-Cookie: datr=ckviTC8tNJ-1ZKqCu_SrIga7; expires=Thu, 15-Nov-
2012 09:14:26 GMT; path=/; domain=.facebook.com
Figure 15. A cookie issued via Facebook extern login status (1) and one via Facebook 
Connect (2) on Gizmodo.com.
Based on the cookie, the entire web behavior of an individual user can be 
followed by Facebook. Every site that includes some kind of Facebook 
content will initiate an interaction with the Facebook servers, disclosing 
information to Facebook about the visited website together with the cookie. 
Since there is no link to a user account, the cookie functions as an R-identifier 
and facilitates recognition of the unknown individual. The accumulated data 
set concerning web behavior is, thus, a profile and not a digital persona.
4.1.2.1.3. A user becomes a Facebook member
It is possible that a web user already has a personal set of data collected 
by Facebook, based on the mechanism described above. The question is 
what happens if this user creates a Facebook account. In that case, he first 
295 Ken Burbary, “Five Reasons Companies Should Be Integrating Social Media with 
Facebook Connect,” August 20, 2009, <http://www.kenburbary.com/2009/08/five-
reasons-companies-should-be-integrating-social-media-with-facebook-connect/> 
(last accessed June 28, 2012).
296 This is a plugin that checks whether a user is logged on to Facebook while visiting 
another website. When a user is logged on, advertisements or other pieces of content 
can be personalized by linking to the Facebook account.
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has to go to the Facebook homepage (login page). The cookie on the user’s 
computer is sent to Facebook in the request for the web page to be loaded. 
The server responds and issues a few new cookies. These new cookies are 
temporary ones, or session cookies. When the account is actually created, 
a unique ID number is issued and sent in a cookie. The connection between 
this ID cookie and the old cookie is made behind the scenes by Facebook’s 
servers. This means that the entire historical information of the user can be 
connected to the newly created Facebook account. From this moment on, all 
subsequent requests for Facebook content are accompanied with the unique 
user ID cookie. The (anonymous) profile has now become a digital persona.
If a user deletes all his cookies, the process starts from the beginning with 
Facebook Connect placing a new cookie when a site containing Facebook 
Connect is visited. From the moment on that the user accesses his Facebook 
account, or connects to this account by clicking the Like button and providing 
username and password, this cookie is replaced by a cookie containing the 
unique user ID that belongs to the account.
4.1.2.1.4. A user deletes his Facebook account
A last possibility is that an existing Facebook member decides to exit the 
network. In this case, the user can delete his account. Facebook offers a 
simple process to deactivate an account. Deactivation, however, is not the 
same as deletion.297 In fact, when an account is deactivated, the account and 
all its contents are only made unavailable to the network community. The 
entire account is kept by Facebook just in case the user decides to rejoin the 
network.298 In that case, the complete account, including all connections 
and contents can be reactivated. Clearly, during the inactivity of an account, 
Facebook is still able to connect data to the account in a way similar to when 
the account was active. 
There is also an option to really delete an account. The deletion process 
includes a specific request to Facebook that takes two weeks to process. If 
the account is accessed in this period, the deletion process is stopped. After 
14 days, accessing the account is no longer possible and the contents can 
no longer be retrieved. Whether Facebook keeps any information or even 
297 See: <http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=185698814812082> (last accessed June 
28, 2012).
298 Illustrating in this context is the initiative Europe versus Facebook, in which Austrian 
student Max Schrems submitted a data subject access request and received a file of over 
1200 pages. The data were incomplete, but also contained data that had been explicitly 
deleted by Schrems. See: <http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Data_Pool/data_pool.
html> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
135
the entire account, probably disconnected from the login credentials, is 
unclear.299 However, even if the account is really deleted, the web user can 
still be tracked and the browsing data can still be connected to an individual 
data set. This means that, after deleting the account, all services which were 
connected to Facebook, for instance, by using the Facebook account to sign 
up, have to be disconnected as well and cookies have to be deleted. Once 
everything is cleared and disconnected, the web user can be considered to 
be someone who does not have a Facebook account and the scenario earlier 
described applies.
4.1.2.2. Recognition and identification
Facebook uses cookies for recognition. Web users can be recognized 
whenever they visit a site with any Facebook content (e.g. Like button, 
Facebook hosted Comment Field, or a ‘Most popular on Facebook’ list). 
Facebook members are identified as individual account holders, because 
the cookie includes their unique user identification number. When different 
devices are used to access Facebook, such as a home computer, a laptop, or 
a smart phone, these devices are recognized as belonging all to the same 
individual, so all web interaction from these different devices is connected as 
well. Individuals who do not have a Facebook account are recognized as well. 
Their browsing behavior, however, is not connected to a Facebook account; 
besides, recognition is machine- based and separated for every single device. 
Since there is no unique user ID in the cookie resulting from a log-on to 
Facebook, the different devices cannot be connected solely on the basis of 
the cookies. Single devices can be quite reliable for identifying or recognizing 
individual users, however, even though they can be used by different persons. 
More and more devices, such as laptops and smart phones, become personal 
and are usually used by one single individual. This implies that information 
collected based on the cookies and browsing behavior results in a very 
personal profile. Obviously, Facebook can use this to provide their members 
with targeted advertisements. The information collected about the browsing 
behavior of non-members probably provides a larger sample for profiling 
and targeting purposes.
The Facebook Like button is not the only button which frequently appears 
on websites to facilitate sharing or promoting content. Other examples 
are Twitter’s Tweet button, the Digg button, and Google’s Buzz, but there 
are differences. As described above, Facebook Connect is the system that 
actually issues a cookie the first time. From that moment on, the cookie is 
299 However, the fact that the data received in the Europe versus Facebook initiative 




sent together with all HTTP requests for content, so also when the Like 
button is provided onto a page of a third party. Thus, an additional system 
is used to initiate the cookie exchange. Twitter, for instance, does not have 
such a system.300 The Tweet button does not always send a cookie when the 
button is requested from the Twitter servers. Only when someone visits the 
Twitter homepage is a cookie issued which is used in future interactions with 
the servers, similarly as with the Like button. Logging on or even having 
a Twitter account is not necessary. A small but important difference with 
the Like button is that there is at least supposed to be some link to Twitter, 
because the web user needs to have visited this website for cookies to be 
exchanged. For Facebook, this is not necessary at all, which implies that 
individuals who consciously choose not to participate in Facebook are 
still tracked and traced by Facebook. Even if someone does not connect to 
Facebook himself, Facebook makes the connection.
Another important difference is that Facebook can trace the browsing 
behavior to member accounts. These accounts are, usually, quite rich 
concerning disclosed information, but the Like button as exploited by 
Facebook allows for far more information to be collected about individual 
members than the information disclosed on the personal profile page. Thus, 
people who have an account, but do not want to disclose much information 
are still profiled more extensively. Their browsing behavior discloses much 
information concerning personal interests, and this information can also be 
collected by Facebook and connected to the individual account. In the end, 
awareness in disclosing information, either by not participating on Facebook 
or by very limited disclosure of personal information, is insufficient to escape 
the monitoring and tracking techniques of Facebook. 
An additional point of attention lies in the function Facebook is exploiting as 
an identity provider. An increasing amount of websites offers the possibility 
to register or log on with Facebook credentials.301 The username and 
password are consequently used at places other than on Facebook’s site only. 
Obviously, the services that provide this possibility are linked to Facebook as 
well. However, a more pressing issue is the fact that, for some web services, 
such as music service Spotify, logging on is only possible with a Facebook 
account. This means that, without a Facebook account, accessing or using 
the services is simply impossible. If the amount of web services requiring 
a Facebook account increases, web users will become more dependent on 
Facebook as an identity provider so users can indirectly be forced to create 
an account.
300 Findings based on tests performed by myself. The test results have not been published.
301 For instance: www.slideshare.net or creating an account on Spotify www.spotify.com.
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4.1.2.3. Friend Suggest
Another interesting way of Facebook to collect information and to connect 
this information to individuals is the system behind the Friend Suggest 
feature. This is a feature to show profile pictures of other members on the 
personal page of a member as suggestions to become friends with. In order to 
make it as attractive as possible for members to indeed make the connection, 
the suggestions have to be relevant. This relevance can be derived from the 
fact that usually members do know the suggested friends in real life. The 
question arises how that is possible.
A first method is rather straightforward and just looks at the connections 
that friends of the member have in their network. If a number of friends 
share a connection, there is a considerable chance that the member knows 
this person as well. A second method is to look at the email-address books 
that members have uploaded. One of the first steps in the process of creating 
an account offers the possibility to look for friends in the email address 
books of the new member in order to find out who of a member’s friends 
are already on Facebook. This makes it easy to find them and to establish a 
connection. When allowing this search functionality, the entire address book 
is uploaded to Facebook.302 By looking for matches in the address books of 
different members with registered email addresses connected to accounts, 
other members can be suggested as friends. 
The practice of processing email addresses is also used by Facebook when 
it concerns individuals who are not (yet) a member. Members can indicate 
to Facebook to whom they want to have an invitation sent to join Facebook. 
This is done by selecting or entering the email address of the person to whom 
an invitation has to be sent. Facebook, then, processes this email address 
to look for matches in the database, in particular to find out which other 
members have this email address in their (uploaded) address books. Where 
matches are found, the profile pictures of these members are displayed next 
to the invitation message the non-member receives in his email. That is why 
it is not a coincidence that, when an individual receives an invitation to join 
Facebook, the members displayed in the invitation are usually people the 
individual actually knows.303
As shown, Facebook has several tools and mechanisms to collect data 
concerning individuals and to combine and use these data. Even though it 
has already broadly been recognized that this has implications for privacy 
302 Fogg & Iizawa 2008.
303 Explained by Luc Delany, European Policy Manager Facebook, in a personal 
communication on 10 November 2011.
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of members, and sometimes even non-members, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg is strongly convinced that privacy will no longer be important 
within a few years. In his own words: “Facebook users eventually get over 
privacy anxiety.”304
4.2. Google
Next to Facebook, an extremely important player in the area of web services 
is Google. Google was founded by Stanford students Larry Page and Sergey 
Brin, who wanted to make the World Wide Web searchable. There were 
several search engines available at the time, but Page and Brin criticized 
these because they were funded by advertisers and the use of keywords could 
influence the search results.305  According to Page and Brin, this approach 
was far too commercial and could not lead to reliable search results. To solve 
this problem, in 1996 Page designed ‘PageRank’, a software algorithm that 
indexed web pages by the number of links to the pages and the number of 
links to the pages that referred to other pages.306 This way of indexing should 
lead to a ranking based on relevance and reliability of web pages, including an 
automatic check by the users of the search engine. By now, the Google search 
engine is the biggest worldwide. In the meantime, advertisements have been 
introduced at Google as well and these advertisements even generate 96 % of 
the revenues (in 2011).307
The Google search engine facilitates the storage of information that can 
reveal interests of individuals, since apparently an individual is searching 
for specific information. Different searches from one computer can be 
connected based on the IP address, which is included in the search logs 
together with the search term.308  The accumulation of all search terms 
over the years can constitute a detailed overview of a person’s interests and 
habits. In first instance, these overviews are profiles. If the data sets contain 
unique combinations of data or specific information, they can be related to 
an identifiable individual and the data sets are digital personae. The profile 
can also become a digital persona if the user makes use of a Google account 
and, thus, identifies himself.
304 See: <www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-users-eventually-
get-over-privacy-anxiety/1534> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
305 Brin & Page 1998. 
306 Battelle 2005-2006, p. 75.
307 See financial information Google, available at: <http://investor.google.com/
financial/2011/tables.html> (last accessed June 28, 2012). Advertising revenues in 
2011 were 36,5 billion US Dollars on a total revenue of 37,9 billion US Dollars.
308 See: <http://code.google.com/intl/nl-NL/apis/searchappliance/documentation/46/
help_gsa/status_log.html> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
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Google started with providing a search engine, but over the years numerous 
services have been added to the portfolio of the internet company. For 
instance, Google Maps provides route planning, YouTube facilitates video 
sharing, Picasa can be used for photo editing and web albums, and Google+ 
is Google’s own social networking site. All these services are intensively used 
by web users. However, Google also has a number of services specifically 
for (commercial) companies. The most important of these is targeted 
advertising, which is available in a myriad of ways. The advertisements can 
be placed in the search engine, on top of or next to the search results, via 
AdWords. Which ads are displayed and for what price is the outcome of a 
sophisticated real-time auction system running behind the scenes.309 It is 
also possible to have Google display advertisements on numerous websites, 
related to the site itself, or as a contextual ad next to a news item, by using 
AdSense.
Another service, specifically aimed at companies and other website owners, 
is Google Analytics. This is an analytics tool which can provide website 
owners with statistics on how many (unique) visitors a site has, what pages 
within a site are visited, and how the visitors came to the website (directly or 
via a search engine or other link).
Essentially, all of the services indicated above can be integrated into websites 
by website owners. For instance, it is not uncommon to have a company 
website with internal search functionality (provided by Google), Google 
Maps integration with the contact details and route description, a YouTube 
promo video, and a Google+1 button for expressing a positive relationship 
with the company. The variety of services which are all widely used makes 
that Google has an astonishing coverage of the internet via integrations of 
their tools on third-party websites, namely 88,4 %.310 Obviously, Google 
receives information via all the integrations and is, therewith, able to create 
personal profiles of internet users by tracking them, combine these profiles 
with search terms, derive preferences and even predict events.311 Connecting 
several actions of individual users can be based on IP address or cookies. 
Furthermore, Google advertises personalization and offers web users 
the opportunity to create a Google account, where they can manage their 
preferences and access search history. When a user has a Google account, 
the tracking and combining of actions on the internet becomes even more 
trivial.
309 Levy 2009.
310 Gomez, Pinnick & Soltani 2009. In 2009 Google covered 348,059 out of 393,829 
distinct domains.
311 For instance, epidemic diseases and their spread in Google Flu Trends: < http://www.
google.org/flutrends/> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
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Google also collects data in the physical world, via their StreetView cars. 
In Google Maps it is possible to view panoramic images of city streets, 
with a service called Google StreetView. In order to compile these images, 
Google has a fleet of vehicles, equipped with special cameras, which they 
drive around. Google also intended to record the identity and position 
of WiFi hotspots in order to power a location service it operates.312 The 
position of the vehicle, and thus the image, could be defined accurately by 
using triangulation within these networks. The idea was to collect network 
data like SSID information (the name of the network) and MAC addresses 
(unique numbers given to devices such as routers) in order to identify and 
locate the networks.313 Google stated to collect only SSIDs and MAC 
addresses, but in May 2010 it appeared that this statement was incorrect 
and that payload data (information sent over the network) of open WiFi 
networks was collected as well.314 Google claimed this to be a mistake due 
to a piece of code that was included in the software, “although the project 
leaders did not want, and had no intention of using, payload data.”315 Google 
stated it was profoundly sorry for the error and took steps to delete the data 
immediately in cooperation with regulators. It also had an independent third 
party perform a check on the software and the data it collected.316 It was 
admitted that, even when it was a mistake, Google should have realized it 
much earlier and never allowed such data to be captured. In the words of the 
US Federal Trade Commission: “the company did not discover that it had 
been collecting payload data until it responded to a request for information 
from a data protection authority. This indicates that Google’s internal review 
processes - both prior to the initiation of the project to collect data about 
wireless access points and after its launch - were not adequate to discover 
that the software would be collecting payload data, which was not necessary 
to fulfill the project’s business purpose.”317 In April 2012, a notice of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)318 was made public, from 
which it became clear that Google simply had been lying the entire time. An 
engineer had “deliberately written”319 the code to collect payload data and 
312 Sayer 2010. 
313 See: <http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2010/04/data-collected-by-google-cars.
html> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
314 See: <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html> (last 
accessed June 28, 2012).
315 See: <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html> (last 
accessed June 28, 2012).
316 Stroz Friedberg 2010.
317 Federal Trade Commission 2010a.
318 Federal Communications Commission, Notice of apparent liability for forfeiture, DA 
12-592, April 13, 2012, available at: <http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/91652398> 
(last accessed June 28, 2012).
319 Page 10 of the Notice.
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had informed numerous people within Google, in particular the StreetView 
project leaders and all the members of the StreetView team knew.320 Even 
though this directly contradicts all earlier statements from Google, there was 
no condemnation of the company for the facts for which they came under 
investigations. The only consequence was that Google had been notified 
of apparent liability for forfeiture “for willfully and repeatedly violating an 
Enforcement Bureau directive to respond to a letter of inquiry.”321 Google 
simply lied, but the only consequence of this is that the FCC has stated that 
Google did not cooperate well. Thus, the FCC does not take proper action 
on this clear violation of privacy rights of individuals.
It is clear that Google can collect enormous amounts of data on individual 
users. These data are related to different web services provided by Google, 
but can be combined. The idea that individuals only have one identity which 
is applicable to the entire web is reflected by Google’s new privacy policy, 
which came into effect on March 1st 2012.
4.2.1. Google Privacy Policy: one policy for the entire web
In 2012, Google took a new step concerning the privacy of internet users. 
Due to the diverse set of services and applications provided by Google, 
all with their own privacy policies, the way Google handles personal data 
of internet users had become very opaque. Google wanted to solve this 
problem by streamlining and simplifying its privacy policies. Google did 
so by releasing a new privacy policy: one single policy for all Google web 
services. This new policy was announced on January 24th and would enter 
into force on March 1st. 
The new policy appeared to conflict with European data protection legislation 
on several points and, despite of the fact that Google publicly announced that 
the introduction of the new policy took place after extensively pre-briefing of 
the data protection authorities, there had hardly been any opportunity for the 
authorities to access the policy before the public release.322 In particular, the 
CNIL323 indicated that the new policy did not comply with the information 
obligations of Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC, and, moreover, 
320 Page 15 of the Notice.
321 Page 23 of the Notice.
322 Letter of the CNIL on behalf of the Article 29 Working Party and European Data 
Protection Authorities to Google, 27 February 2012. Online available at: <http://www.
cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Courrier_Google_CE121115_27-02-2012-EN.pdf> 
(last accessed June 28, 2012).




“rather than promoting transparency, the terms of the new policy and the fact 
that Google claims publicly that it will combine data across services raises 
fears about Google’s actual practices.”324 What data is combined between 
which services and for what purposes is extremely difficult to understand, 
even for privacy professionals.
The CNIL has requested Google to postpone the introduction of the new 
policy until the authorities had had the time to investigate the implications 
of the new policy. However, Google refused and launched the policy as of 
March 1st, 2012. The CNIL has sent a detailed questionnaire325 to Google, 
including 69 questions on the new policy, and asked for answers until April 
5th. The first response by Google only provided answers to a few questions, 
but on April 20th the response was updated and included the answers to the 
remaining questions.326 The answers are not really satisfying and leave open a 
lot of issues. Nevertheless, some things have become clear already, including 
the basics of combining data by Google across services. When a user is 
logged in, Google calls this an authenticated user, whereas a logged out user 
is in a non-authenticated state. For authenticated users, data are combined 
across services, such as Search, Maps, YouTube and News. However, logging 
out does not make a real difference, since then still data are combined, albeit 
not based on the login status, but based on cookie identifiers.327
Since the introduction of the new policy, Google also automatically 
combines subscriptions for their users. An individual can choose to create a 
Gmail account for sending emails. The creation of such an account can also 
be necessary for the use of a mobile device based on the Android platform. 
Android is an operating system from Google, which is used on most smart 
phones and tablet computers, except those from Apple.328 Applications can 
be downloaded and installed on the device with the use of the Gmail account. 
The purposes are clear. However, the creation of a Gmail account now 
implies a combined subscription. This can be derived from one of the first 
email messages that will be delivered to the newly created account, which 
welcomes the user to Google+, the SNS hosted by Google. The subscription 
to Google+ is not what the individual wanted to achieve and is not what the 
324 Letter of the CNIL on behalf of the Article 29 Working Party and European Data 
Protection Authorities to Google, 27 February 2012. Online available at: <http://www.
cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/Courrier_Google_CE121115_27-02-2012-EN.pdf> 
(last accessed June 28, 2012).
325 Available at: <http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La_CNIL/actualite/questionnaire_
to_Google-2012-03-16.pdf> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
326 Available at: <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiSUhFMHVpMmhFUG8/
edit?pli=1> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
327 See the answer to question 29.
328 Apple has its own operating system, which is used for iPhones and iPads: iOS.
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individual consented to either. Moreover, the practice is not mentioned in the 
Policy of Google, so the individual cannot even be aware of this beforehand.
4.3. The combination of online and offline data329
While in a web context, most of the decisions taken based on digital personae 
or profiles concern the displaying of advertisements and the presentation of 
offers, digital personae can also be used in other commercial contexts for 
different purposes. An important point of attention in relation to contexts 
that are not essentially web based, is that digital personae can be built up 
from combined online and offline sources. A basic profile is enriched with 
other data that were not provided by the concerned individual, at least not to 
the specific party with whom the actual interaction takes place.
4.3.1.Credit rating agencies
A case in point concerns credit rating agencies. These agencies are frequently 
used by banks and retail companies in order to decide whether someone will 
receive a loan or mortgage. The exact workings of credit rating agencies are 
not always transparent, so problem may occur when the individual wants 
to know why a certain loan has been denied. An individual, who visits a 
store and wants to buy something, but not directly pay the full price, can be 
affected by this. It is a common practice that expensive products, such as cars 
or furniture, are bought with a loan. Dealers of the products function as an 
intermediary between the loan provider and the customer. The customer has 
to identify himself and the dealer then checks whether a loan is granted. The 
decision to grant the loan or not is made instantly, based on the records of the 
credit provider. Usually, this credit provider (automatically) consults a credit 
rating agency to check past payment performances of the customer. If there 
is too much risk of not receiving the money back, the loan will not be granted. 
The exact reason, however, is not communicated to the dealer. Normally, he 
only receives a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ or a grade. A grade leaves the decision to the 
dealer, which integrates some human intervention in the decision making 
process.330 However, a grade below a certain level will always lead to a decline 
of the loan. This can even be based on internal guidelines of the company.331 
329 The information in this section is gathered from talks and 6 semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with representatives from the credit rating and debt analysis industry, from 
an insurance company, and software developers and providers specialized in on-the-fly 
web personalization. The interviewees expressed their wishes to remain anonymous.
330 This is the approach taken by Stichting PPS (Organization for the Prevention of 
Problematic Debts) in the Netherlands.




In cases where an individual is routinely singled out, based on a profile, he 
may want to challenge the profile. Nevertheless, “there appears to be no way 
to do so unless the profile is revealed.”332 This practice also implies that the 
dealer cannot explain why a certain loan has or has not been granted. The 
customer can fight the decision, but the outcomes of the algorithm that made 
the decision are not stored and cannot always be reproduced.
While traditionally credit records were based on past performances only, 
such as other loans, debts, or delayed payments, a relatively new practice is 
the combination of online and offline sources and tracking technologies to 
take decisions. These decisions can even be taken ‘on the fly’. Specialized 
companies, such as Experian, create detailed profiles at an individual or 
household level. These profiles are built up on the basis of numerous sources. 
These sources not only concern credit history, but also demographic data, 
information about employment, income, and interests. Other companies can 
obtain access to the databases of Experian and use this information for their 
own purposes. One important sector using this information is the banking 
and insurances sector. 
4.3.2. Tracking and profiling by banks and insurance companies
Banks and insurance companies also make use of digital personae to take 
decisions, for instance on whether they grant a loan or whether someone is 
refused an insurance. The creation or obtainment of these digital personae 
can take different forms. Since banks and insurance companies do not have 
a position as advertising provider or other functionalities which enables 
them to monitor web activity, as is the case with Facebook and Google, they 
have to obtain their information from other parties or sources. Essentially, 
there are two options to do this: one is to cooperate with a technological 
partner that can do the tracking and monitoring, the other is to obtain offline 
information about individuals.
Cooperation with a technical partner can help companies to monitor 
browsing behavior of individuals. The use of Google analytics may be helpful 
in displaying targeted advertisements to individuals that have previously 
visited the company website next to, for instance, a YouTube video. Google 
can recognize the web user and make the connection. It is, however, also 
possible to monitor visitors’ behavior on the specific company website and to 
combine this with information concerning the channel via which the visitor 
reached the site (direct URL, search engine) and what site the visitor goes 
to when leaving the company website. This kind of side-information is even 
used to decide on what content is displayed on a company website and in 
332 Solove 2011, p. 194.
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what form. An often used way of collecting information on the browsing 
track an individual followed is by looking at the URL333 and the referrer 
headers that are received by the website owner at the moment the individual 
visits a webpage. 
As indicated, another type of information concerns the type of content via 
which an individual accesses a website. This type of information can be 
labeled as ‘betraying elements’. For instance, an advertisement with an image 
of a good looking woman will be clicked more by men than by women. The 
information that can be analyzed can be divided into three types: explicit, 
organic, and implicit information. Explicit information can be found in 
the URL, which shows the path an individual took along a website. Other 
explicit information concerns the type of expression on which the individual 
clicked. Whether this was a piece of text (with title, content, and tags), an 
image, a banner, or a clear URL discloses information about the type of 
internet user the individual is. Organic information relates to the order and 
time of visits to a website and whether a visitor is a returning visitor or not. 
The last category, implicit information, is formed by the conclusions that are 
drawn from the explicit and organic information. This is the analytic part 
where products are matched to interests and where the individual is labeled 
as a specific type of customer.
Strategically placing advertisements can also provide information, even 
before the individual enters the website. For instance, when advertising on 
Facebook, specific categories of individuals can be indicated that should 
receive the advertisement (for instance, men of age 25-35). Facebook can 
target these individuals based on their profile information. An individual 
who visits a company website, because he clicked on such an advertisement, 
thus, certainly belongs to that category. The link, therewith, confirms the 
profile of the visitor.
Based on the combined information, the content of the visited website is 
tailored to the individual visitor. This can be done in real-time, where third 
party companies function as intermediaries and collect, combine, and apply 
the information. The tailoring of the website concerns the way content is 
displayed (text, images), but also the content itself. The presentation of the 
content can highly influence how the individual navigates over the website 
and what information receives the most attention. With regard to the content 
itself, specific products or serviced can be displayed and others can be left 
333 URLs can contain lots of information, sometimes, next to the web page, even 
including the name, postal code and bank account number of the individual visitor. If 




out. Finding alternatives is made difficult in this way. At the moment, there 
are no examples of companies that completely block the opportunity to find 
alternative products on their website, but this may be very well possible in the 
(near) future. Moreover, finding alternatives is made difficult and requires 
skills of the individual to cleverly navigate through the website. Options are 
implicitly limited, which can have important effects when it concerns, for 
instance, insurances. In the Netherlands, health insurance companies are 
obliged to offer basic insurance, but additional packages can be refused and 
this is to a large extent automated by this kind of web ‘personalization’.
With the help of third parties who are able to combine online information 
with offline information, individuals can be identified even when they are not 
logged on to the website of, for instance, their bank or insurance company. 
Recognition can be based on the IP address, but via the third party several 
cookies can be identified and establish the link to the offline individual. 
Combining information offers new opportunities. It is, however, heavily 
debated whether it is allowed to enrich online information with offline data 
sets334, for instance, when the individual has enabled DoNotTrack (DNT). 
The expressed wish not to be tracked may be respected, but still, additional 
information may be gathered from offline sources in order to extend the 
digital persona of a specific individual. The wish not to be tracked, however, 
indicates that the individual does not want to have an extensive profile built 
of his behavior and whereabouts. Doing so based on offline sources can, 
thus, be seen as disrespecting the wish of the individual. The individual 
is provided with an option, which is not a real choice. By analogy, in the 
context of cookie tracking, deleted cookies are respawned. Users “cannot 
fairly be said to have notice of these activities” and, “because [the cookies] 
are resistant to blocking, they rob consumers of choice.”335 Ultimately, the 
practices deny the opportunities for individuals to exercise autonomy.336
4.3.3. The shift from commercial contexts to administrative and law enforcement 
contexts
Finally, even though this study focuses on the commercial context, there is a 
trend towards governments increasingly accessing and using the information 
gathered by commercial companies. Profiles and digital personae created in 
334 As is, for instance, done by MindShare: <http://www.mindshareworld.com/who-we-
are/news/@Mindshare_Launches_Core>, last visited 6 October 2012. In the case of 
MindShare, the link between cookies is provided by 24/7 Media. Companies in the 
Netherlands make the combination via Google (with a Google Analytics subscription) 
and Omniture.
335 Hoofnagle a.o. 2012, p. 291.
336 Hoofnagle a.o. 2012, p. 274.
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the commercial context, including the analysis of the data and the attached 
conclusions, thus, also become input in the public administration and law 
enforcement sector.337 A concrete example, with significant consequences, 
is the case where an individual can be registered in an administration of 
incidents related to criminal activities. A woman was registered because of 
suspicious activities on her bank account. There was a suspicion of fraud, 
but there has never been a conviction. Nevertheless, the woman’s record can 
be kept for a maximum of 8 years. The register is consulted by all kinds of 
financial services, which are likely to refuse any service to the woman.338 
Also decisions to exclude individuals from options for insurance, such as 
additional health insurance packages, or the rejection of insurance claims 
can have a severe impact. The lacking opportunity for an individual to 
properly insure himself may result in the absence of the financial means to 
undergo proper health care. A decision to exclude an individual is, thus, to 
a certain extent also a decision on the value of providing the opportunity 
for proper health care services. The question that arises is whether specific 
individuals are less worthy to be insured properly. Indirectly, these decisions 
may indicate that certain individuals have less human dignity as an intrinsic 
value.
5. Implications of digital persona and profile creation and use
The three examples discussed above show how data are collected and what 
kind of data it concerns. The collected data together form digital personae. 
In the case of Facebook, the digital persona can take different forms. 
Individuals who become a member of Facebook share information by adding 
this to their personal profile page. The personal profile is initially created by 
the individual himself and the information in the profile has been shared by 
this individual. This information is enriched with information derived from 
friends of the member, but also information obtained via address books 
of email accounts. Moreover, information concerning browsing behavior 
is collected and added to the digital persona. A digital persona in the form 
of a Facebook profile, thus, starts as a projected digital persona and almost 
directly becomes a hybrid digital persona.
337 EDPS 2010, The Surveillance Policy in Europe, today and tomorrow. Speech by G. 
Buttarelli, Assistant Supervisor EDPS, at the Conference for the 30th Anniversary of 
the CRID, Namur 20-22 January 2010.
338 See <http://www.solv.nl/weblog/veroordeling-door-strafrechter-niet-vereist-voor-
opname-in-incidentenregister/18989>, last visited 6 October 2012, and Court The 
Hague, 31 May 2012, 407012 / HA RK 11-691, LJN: BX1743.
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For individuals who are not a member of Facebook, a digital persona can be 
created as well. This digital persona mainly consists of browsing behavior 
information. Nevertheless, additional details can be collected when members 
of Facebook share information about other individuals or initiate Friend 
requests. When the invited individual clicks on the link in the invitation, the 
email address is connected to the tracking cookies and, thus, the browsing 
behavior of the individual. A digital persona concerning an individual who is 
not a Facebook member is, thus, usually an imposed digital persona.
In relation to Google, a digital persona usually consists of accumulated data 
collected from the (intended) interaction between the individual and one 
of Google’s services. However, the individual can influence the contents of 
the digital persona by creating a Google account and adjusting preferences. 
Obviously, the consequence of this is that the individual actively identifies 
himself and, by signing up for the service, implicitly accepts the General 
Terms and Conditions of Google, which include giving consent for the 
processing of personal data. Moreover, signing up implies consenting to 
more services and processing than intended and it cannot be derived from 
the Terms what the exact scope of the consent is. The validity of this form 
of obtaining consent is, thus, questionable. This will be discussed more 
elaborately in Chapter 6 of this study. 
Facebook and Google apparently have opposite approaches to online 
identity. Facebook facilitates the construction of an identity on its platform 
and encourages members to use this identity for other web services as well. 
In contrast, Google builds an identity composed of information obtained 
from the use of various web services by the individual. The common ground 
in both approaches is the idea that an individual has only one single identity 
which is applicable to every context. Both Google and Facebook have access 
to numerous digital personae. There may, however, also be cases where 
the individual cannot (yet) be identified, but is only recognized based on a 
cookie identifier. In particular, this is the case for users who do not have an 
account to access the services. In these cases, the data sets that are created 
are profiles. These profiles can also be used to influence individuals and to 
adjust web content.
In the case of Facebook as well as Google, the information of which the digital 
persona consists is used for purposes of selecting and advertising. Based on 
the data, the individual will be excluded from certain information, because 
information provided is mostly reconfirming earlier (alleged) preferences. 
Diverging content is filtered as irrelevant for the specific individual. Pariser 
calls this the ‘Filter Bubble’.339 The sorting of individuals into categories can 
339 Pariser 2011.
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have a negative impact on privacy, and, even worse, monitoring and profiling 
can become a matter of social justice.340
Another approach to targeting individuals was shown in the example of 
combining online and offline data and the personalization of web content. 
The combination of data sources inevitably leads to problems in relation to 
contextual integrity. Not only online contexts, but also offline contexts are 
becoming intermingled and the individual cannot reasonably be expected to 
maintain control. Moreover, offline information becomes a decisive factor in 
what information is available online for a specific individual.
The technical means for individuals to prevent being monitored are limited 
and are fairly easy for companies to circumvent. Cookies can be blocked, but 
this may also negatively influence the performances of websites. Cookies are 
still a main factor in following individual users and an important tool to create 
profiles. Unfortunately, it seems that there is no real escape possible due to 
technological developments, which include, for instance, evercookies,341 
flash cookies342 and HTTP cookie respawning.343 Another problem is the 
circumvention of technological counter-measures, such as Google bypassing 
privacy settings of Safari browser users344 and misuse of P3P policies by 
providing erroneous machine-readable policies345 or by issuing third party 
tracking cookies as response to requests for the P3P policy of a website.346
However, more is going on. Over the last couple of years the use of SNS 
has increased enormously. The practice in these SNS is a good example 
of how a policy can lead to conflicting outcomes. It appeared that lots of 
personal information is disclosed on SNS and that people wanted to have an 
opportunity to switch to another SNS. Switching should not be too difficult 
and SNS implemented a system for the transfer of data between sites. As in 
other domains, interoperability of identities became a key aspect. Now, most 
340 Lyon 2006, p. 13.
341 Evercookies are cookies that can hardly be deleted due to backup cookies and 
respawning: <http://samy.pl/evercookie/> (last accessed June 20, 2012).
342 Soltani, Canty, Mayo, Thomas & Hoofnagle 2009 ; Ayenson, Wambach, Soltani, Good 
& Hoofnagle 2011.
343 McDonald & Cranor 2011.
344 Angwin 2012. 
345 Leon, Cranor, McDonald & McGuire 2010. 
346 This finding came out of my own (unpublished) research (on file with the author). The 
use of a privacy enhancing tool which maps third party content on websites and their 
privacy policies resulted on websites with a Facebook Like-button in a HTTP response 
from Facebook stating that Facebook did not have a P3P policy and including a tracking 
cookie which was then installed on the user’s computer. My findings date from 23 
November 2011 and the practice (‘bug’) has been fixed by Facebook after I reported the 
issue to the Facebook WhiteHat Program and email contact with Facebook engineers.
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SNS include an option to import friends from other SNS accounts or from 
address books in mail accounts. This makes it easier to switch to another 
SNS without having to completely fill a new profile and making a new friend 
list. However, SNS also try to encourage users to import their address books 
and other data to integrate different services. Not switching, but combining 
data to come to a more complete profile is the aim. As a result, individuals 
are more and more combining and aggregating data themselves. The use 
of these data, and therewith the consequences, are often unclear. However, 
technically the users give their consent for the data processing.
Even when individuals are aware and careful in sharing or connecting their 
personal data, it seems inevitable to be tracked and traced in some way. An 
individual can have different partial identities related to different contexts. 
In order to keep these contexts separated, for each partial identity another 
avatar can be created. So, different user names and passwords are means to 
keep different data sets unlinkable. However, even then third party cookies 
or browser fingerprinting can lead to a connection. When separated data 
sets are combined the contexts to which the data belong collapse.  
The collection of data and creation of digital personae and profiles is, to a 
large extent, meant to facilitate targeted advertisements. The more data 
are collected, the more accurate the representations can be. There are 
advertisement companies that function as intermediaries between the 
advertisers and the individual web users. In the UK, Xaxis claims to have 
built a database of individual profiles of over 500 million internet users 
across the world. The quality promised by the company is “an unprecedented 
level of precision” and “zero waste”, with only people interested in the 
product seeing the advertisements.347 It would, therefore, be expected that 
the quality of the presented advertisements is relatively high. Nevertheless, 
in practice, this seems not to be the case. Advertisements on Facebook show 
dating opportunities to people in a relationship, offer outings for hobbies 
the individual does not have, and credit card offers because Facebook 
friends ‘Like’ the credit card company.348 This appears not to match with the 
interests of the targeted individual, so even though data collection is massive, 
the targeting still seems to be of low quality. Other forms of advertising are 
often experienced as annoying. For instance, looking at a pair of shoes on a 
webpage may result in seeing these shoes displayed on your screen over and 
over again, for days. 
Facebook is one of the biggest companies involved in online targeted 
347 Foley 2011.
348 D. Searls. After Facebook Fails. Doc Searls Weblog, 23 May 2012. Online available 
at: <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/doc/2012/05/23/after-facebook-fails/> (last accessed 
June 22, 2012).
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advertising. The data used for the targeting are collected via the Facebook 
‘Open Graph’, which is a technical system that offers third party website 
functionalities to integrate with Facebook. Content on third party websites 
is real-time personalized based on Facebook content, such as Friends who 
liked a webpage. Facebook, on its turn, can distract all the data in a simple 
format which makes it readily for input in the data processing.349 Due 
to the enormous web coverage Facebook is getting, Google is becoming 
nervous because of the competition it brings. Nevertheless, Google’s ads 
are far better targeted, because they relate to the exact thing an individual 
is searching for at the moment the advertisement is displayed; something 
which is not the case on Facebook.350 In the case of Facebook, the concerns 
in relation to targeted advertisements may, thus, be a bit overrated. In 
addition, Facebook uses privacy preserving technologies towards the 
users of its targeted advertisement system. For instance, in the reports on 
audience reach, Facebook uses differential privacy technologies, which 
means that “a database system […] behaves similarly whether or not any 
particular individual is represented in the database, effectively producing 
anonymity.”351 A third party that receives a report from Facebook cannot see 
whether an individual to which an advertisement was displayed is identified 
or not.
Whilst the above may suggest that the impact of the use of digital personae 
for targeted advertising is relatively small, there definitely are concerns. First, 
it is important to distinguish between two separate parts of the targeted 
advertising system: the data collection and mining, and the displaying of 
advertisements. The fact that the advertisements are not very well targeted 
does not mean that there is not much personal data collected. Second, the 
practice of targeting seems to lead to more revenues. This is why the recent 
developments in relation to the duty to obtain prior informed consent 
before tracking cookies are placed have shown lots of worries from the 
advertising landscape.352 Even though the targeting is of low quality, the 
revenues generated via targeted advertisements are still higher than without 
this targeting. Moreover, there has been quite some outrage as a response to 
Microsoft’s announcement that in the new version of Internet Explorer the 
DoNotTrack feature will be enabled by default.353 Advertisers are afraid that 
349 Metz 2012. 
350 M. Somers. Facebook Advertising is Fool’s Gold. Behind Companies, 29 May 2012. 
Online available at: <http://behindcompanies.com/2012/05/facebook-fools-gold/> 
(last accessed June 28, 2012).
351 Chin & Klinefelter 2012.
352 S. Boone. EU Cookie Law Could Be the Death of Digital. AdAge Digital, 24 May 2012. 
Online available at: <http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/online-privacy-eu-cookie-
law-death-digital/234950/> (last accessed June 22, 2012). 
353 M. Santos. Microsoft sets ‘Do Not Track’ as Default on IE 10: Ruffles feathers. 
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they will not earn as much money as with targeted advertisements and warn 
for the internet becoming too expensive to maintain.354
The targeting of ads can only be done if (extensive) data sets are created at 
an individual level. Regardless of whether these data sets are digital personae 
or profiles, the collection of the data can infringe informational self-
determination and contextual integrity. As was shown by the case study of 
insurance companies and banks adjusting their offers based on a combination 
of online and offline information, the implications for the individual can 
be more severe when he is identified, so when the data set is considered a 
digital persona. The increased difficulty to find certain information can have 
discriminatory effects. In particular, since it is not clear that an individual is 
excluded from certain information, or at least has to take additional efforts 
to find it, the individual will usually not find the information. The practices 
can, thus, steer behavior and limit opportunities at an individual level. 
The fact that there is a very limited number of companies that is able to 
influence web content on a large scale also implies that the profiles and 
digital personae can be applied on a very broad scale. The lack of competition 
limits the opportunities to choose for an alternative service, but also has 
the result that many services will make use of the same big company as a 
provider of information concerning individuals. Google and Facebook have 
a very powerful position on the internet and many other services use the 
information these two companies have to base their decisions on. Individuals 
become largely dependent on a few companies, without having appropriate 
control over the data collection and without having good options to keep 
contexts separated. The information owned by these companies becomes 
decisive and the individual is limited in its free construction of an identity 
and in its freedom to pursue its own wishes and desires. Individual autonomy 
is affected and, in cases where structural exclusion has the effect of (indirect) 
discrimination, dignity is affected.
From the examples given above, it has become clear that the creation and 
use of digital personae has severe implications for individuals. In particular, 
conflicts occur with regard to respect for informational self-determination, 
contextual integrity, identity, and privacy. Ultimately, there is an impact 
EnGadget, 1 June 2012. Online available at: <http://www.engadget.com/2012/06/01/
do-not-track-is-default-on-ie10/> (last accessed June 22, 2012). 
354 Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA). Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) Comments 
on Microsoft Decision to Embed Do Not Track in IE 10 Set “on” by Default. Press 
Release 31 May 2012. Online available at: <http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20120531006914/en/Digital-Advertising-Alliance-DAA-Comments-
Microsoft-Decision> (last accessed June 22, 2012).
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on individual autonomy and human dignity. The exact implications will be 




Shortcomings in Data Protection Regulation:  
The Practical Level
1. Introduction
In the foregoing chapters, the main rights and values that need to be respected 
in relation to human dignity have been described and examples have been 
given of the creation and use of digital personae in practice. In this chapter, 
these findings will be combined by looking at the protection offered by the 
Data Protection Directive (DPD) and the extent to which digital personae 
are covered by the DPD regime. Moreover, profiles, as data sets that may 
become digital personae, will be discussed. Subsequently, the findings will 
be connected to the principles of privacy, autonomy, and identity in order 
to assess whether the DPD offers sufficient protection to ultimately protect 
human dignity and related values of the individual.
The relation between digital personae and profiles, as well as the types 
of identifiers discussed in chapter 2 of this study, will be at the core of 
this chapter. The problems that will be described are strongly related to 
identification and identifiablity and the applicability of the DPD to different 
data sets. Moreover, even in cases where the DPD is applicable specific 
problems appear to remain.
In this chapter, first the digital persona will be discussed in view of the DPD 
(section 2). This will provide the background for an analysis of shortcomings 
in data protection regulation. Also the requirements and rights from the 
DPD will be discussed. Then, in section 3, the applicability of the DPD to 
profiles will be assessed. In particular, the concept of identifiability will be 
discussed here, because this is essential in making the distinction between 
digital personae and profiles. In order to assess identifiability, all means 
likely reasonably to be used by the data controller or any other person have 
to be taken into account. Depending on the means available to someone who 
has access to a data set, identification of an individual is more or less likely. 
This will be the subject of section 4 of this chapter.
In section 5, problems occurring when the DPD is applicable to data 
processing will be described. These problems will be related to the main 
rights and values to be protected in section 6. Finally, in section 7, the exact 
problem of this study will be defined.
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2. Digital personae in view of the DPD
In the information society, numerous data sets are created. These data 
sets are sometimes necessary for executing a process and are sometimes 
unintended. Most of the times the creation of data sets is intentional and 
serves a specific goal. Data sets can take several forms, depending on the 
technical process involved and the functionalities as desired by the party 
who collects or creates the data. Not all data sets are digital personae; only 
data sets that form a representation of an individual natural person and that 
can be linked to the represented individual are. The exact way of linking the 
data set to the individual is not the most important aspect, but the fact that 
a link can be made and that an individual can be affected by decisions taken 
based on the digital representation is.
This gave rise in Chapter 3 to the following definition:
A digital persona is a digital representation of a real-world individual, which 
can be connected to this real-world individual and includes a sufficient amount 
of (relevant) data to serve as a proxy for the individual within the context and for 
the purpose(s) of its use.
In this definition, the connection between the real-world individual and 
the digital persona was stressed, as well as the representational function 
of the data set. Representation is connected to context and purpose of the 
digital persona, which emphasizes the fact that data in the representation 
are context-bound and the creation of the digital persona is related to 
an intended purpose or purposes. The amount of data needed for the 
representation depends on the context and purpose of the intended use of 
the digital persona. However, in the previous chapters it has also become 
clear that the purpose is not always present before the creation of the digital 
persona is taking place. Data can also be collected to build a profile of which 
the possible application is not foreseen yet.
In the following sub-sections, digital personae will be discussed in view of 
the DPD. The DPD has not been written with the concept of digital personae 
in mind and at the time of drafting many opportunities and risks brought by 
technological developments concerning data processing were unforeseen.
2.1. Identified or identifiable
A first question that needs to be addressed is whether the DPD is applicable 
to digital personae. In order to assess this applicability, it is necessary to 
look at the concept of personal data. The qualification of data as personal 
is decisive in whether the DPD is applicable to the processing of the data. 
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The concept of personal data is defined in Article 2(a) of the DPD as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity.” In Chapter 4, identifiability was briefly discussed on the 
basis of the Article 29 Working Party Opinion on the concept of personal 
data.355 The Working Party adopts a broad interpretation of personal data. 
In particular, with regard to identifiability of a person, the Working Party 
took the ability to ‘single out an individual in a group’ as the main criterion. 
This means that it is not necessary to have an individual’s name. Merely the 
indication to what individual in a group data relate is enough to qualify the 
data as personal. 
Identification, as understood by the Article 29 Working Party, is not taking 
place when data from a group profile are applied to a number of individuals. 
In order to qualify the data as personal data, they have to be individualized; 
the data have to relate to an identified or identifiable individual. Applying the 
general characteristics of a group to a number of individuals can be compared 
to the traditional practice of targeting an audience for advertisements or 
selecting a group of people who have to pay a higher insurance premium, 
based on postal code and the information that in most cases applies to the 
people who live in a certain area.356 However, in contrast with the offline 
practice of postal code selection, in online environments the link between the 
individual and the selection may be less clear to the individual.357 Basically, it 
is more difficult for the individual to know the other people in the group. It 
may even be unclear that the selection concerns a group at all. Nevertheless, 
the data remain data concerning a group of individuals, a group profile. 
Adding an R-identifier, such as a cookie, to recognize an individual within 
the group makes the profile an individual profile.358
The crucial distinction between individual profiles and digital personae 
relates to the identifiers that can be part of the data set. As was indicated 
in Chapter 2 of this study, while profiles may contain an R-identifier (or 
355 Article 29 Working Party 2007. 
356 The process of postal code differentiation is often even unlawful, for instance 
when this has the effect of indirect discrimination based on race. See: Factsheet 
‘Postcodediscriminatie’ 2009/2, Bureau Discriminatiezaken Hollands Midden en 
Haaglanden, online available at: <http://www.discriminatiezaken.nl/doc/Factsheet%20
postcodediscriminatie.pdf>.
357 With reference to Stepanek 2000, Lyon describes the shift from traditional postal code 
selection, called ‘redlining’, to ‘weblining’ through geo-demographic discrimination: 
Lyon 2007, p. 102.
358 Leenes 2008. See also Chapter 2 section 4.3.
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sometimes no identifier at all), digital personae by definition contain an 
L-identifier.359 This means that in the case of digital personae the individual 
can be identified by looking up identifying data related to the L-identifier. 
For instance, concerning IP addresses, the Article 29 Working Party is of 
the opinion that for ISPs these are in most cases personal data - they are 
L-identifiers -, since the necessary data of the user(s) of the IP address will 
be available.360 So, “unless the Internet Service Provider is in a position to 
distinguish with absolute certainty that the data correspond to users that 
cannot be identified, it will have to treat all IP information as personal data, 
to be on the safe side.”361 Equal application of these considerations is present 
for search engine operators.362 Commercial companies, however, often state 
that IP addresses are not personal data, because it is not known to them who 
the individual behind the IP address is; it is an address of a device and this 
device may be used by several individuals. In these cases, the IP address is an 
R-identifier, while for ISPs it is an L-identifier363 and the data set is a digital 
persona. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that an IP address 
as an R-identifier facilitates the linking of data as belonging to the same 
person. An accumulated set of data, constructed in this manner, may contain 
information that, in combination, allows for identification.364
Another example is the account name of an individual with which he signs 
in to a web service connected to an individual subscription. This is, for 
example, the case when an individual has a health care insurance and can 
check or update his insurance information online via a web portal of the 
health care insurance provider. Signing in to the web portal can be based 
on the insurance number and a password. The insurance number is an 
L-identifier, since the insurance provider can look up the corresponding 
name of the insured individual. As an implication of the L-identifier, the data 
that constitute the digital persona relate to an identifiable natural person and, 
thus, qualify as personal data. Because digital personae consist of personal 
data, the DPD is applicable to the processing of digital personae. This also 
means that all the requirements for lawful processing of personal data and 
all safeguards for data subjects as provided by the DPD are applicable to the 
use of digital personae.
359 Types of identifiers cf. Leenes 2008.
360 Article 29 Working Party 2008b.
361 Article 29 Working Party 2007. 
362 Article 29 Data Party 2008a. 
363 Note that the user information an ISP has usually identifies the subscription holder and 
not necessarily the specific user (or users) of the IP address. Using the IP address as 
an L-identifier may, thus, result in false connections between data set and individual. 
This is why for most purposes, ISPs will use IP addresses as R-identifiers and not as 
L-identifiers.
364 This will be discussed in the context of quasi-identifiers (section 3.2 below).
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2.2. Requirements from the DPD: data controllers
As was shown above, the DPD is applicable to the processing of digital 
personae, which means that any processing of these data, including mere 
collection or storage, has to be in accordance with the rules laid down in the 
Directive. There is a data controller, who is responsible for the processing of 
the data, and probably one or more processors of the data. The requirements 
of purpose binding, data minimization, and a legitimate ground for the 
processing have to be fulfilled and the information duties apply.
The processing must be for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.365 
The data controller has to specify the purpose of the collection of the data 
beforehand and all further processing has to be in accordance with this 
purpose. A soon as another purpose incompatible with the initial purpose 
of the processing is at stake, the requirements have to be met again and there 
has to be a legitimate ground for the (new) processing. In line with the data 
minimization principle, the data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive 
in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.366 
2.2.1. Grounds for legitimate data processing
As indicated, all data processing activities have to be based on a legitimate 
ground for the processing. The legitimate grounds for processing are 
mentioned in a limitative list in Article 7 of the DPD:
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject 
prior to entering into a contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller 
or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data 
are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1 (1).
365 Article 6(1)b of the DPD.
366 Article 6(1)c of the DPD and Preamble at 28.
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The most prominent ground is the consent of the data subject. The reason 
for this is directly related to individual autonomy. Obviously, when there 
is consent, the data subject is aware of the data processing and has given 
his permission. However, the exact meaning of consent and in what 
circumstances consent can reasonably be considered to be given in an 
informed manner is debatable.367 Obtaining consent provides the individual 
(data subject) with a certain degree of control over the processing that is 
taking place.
There are, however, two other grounds in the list that are of specific 
importance when it concerns legitimizing processing in light of the privacy 
of the individual.368 These grounds are under (b) and (f) respectively. Under 
(b), the performance of a contract is mentioned as a ground for legitimate 
processing. Many services apply General Terms and Conditions which have 
to be accepted prior to using the service. The terms and conditions may 
contain several provisions concerning data collection, also in the light of 
improving the service. Depending on the service and what can be improved, 
data collection and, for instance, web monitoring can be very extensive. 
Many web services, including Facebook and Google, require users accept 
General Terms and Conditions in order to use the service. In the case of 
Google, this is done automatically, by stating that by using the service you 
agree to the Terms of Service of the company.369 The ‘acceptance’ of the 
contract includes providing consent for several data processing activities 
that are not necessary for the contract itself. Simply visiting google.com, 
the homepage of the search engine, is considered to be using the service by 
Google, regardless of whether the individual actually enters a search term 
and asks for results by pressing ‘search’. Facebook requires users to agree 
to the Terms when signing up. Clicking ‘Sign up’ implies that you agree to 
367 See below, section 6.
368 The grounds under d and e are not considered problematic by me, since they are 
either directly in the interest of the individual himself (vital interest, such as medical 
emergencies) or in the public interest (such as municipal administrations). Even though 
the public interest may seriously conflict with individual autonomy, this ground has 
been accepted in most legal documents, including the ECHR. Not accepting this 
ground as an exception to consent of the individual would impose too heavy restrictions 
on the room to maneuver for public authorities in urgent cases for national health or 
safety. Obviously, in less urgent cases, the performance of a task in the public interest 
can have an impact on individual autonomy as well, but, though relevant, these tasks 
are specifically related to government-citizen relationships, which are out of the scope 
of this study. Under c, the processing is based on a legal obligation (such as taxation 
purposes) and can be considered to be based on a democratic legal process. 
369 This is even included in the Terms of Service itself, as “By using our Services, you are 
agreeing to these terms.” See: <http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/>, last 
modified March 1st 2012. The use of the service is supposed to be a declaration of the 
will to enter into a contract for using the service.
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the Terms.370 For both companies, the terms include several provisions on 
the collection and processing of personal data. Moreover, it is not possible 
not to agree with the Terms as used by these companies, except by leaving 
the site.371 There is no need to actively tick a box stating that you agree to 
the Terms and there is no button to decline. Active buttons indicating 
‘agree’ or ticking a box is, however, common practice when signing up for 
services on the internet. However, also in these cases, the user is forced 
to accept the Terms, because not accepting the Terms means no access to 
the service. The choice is therewith not a choice to accept the Terms, but 
a choice to access the service. Signing up for a service, or using a service, 
implies that a contract is established between the service provider and the 
individual. When the establishment of the contract includes General Terms 
and Conditions, these become part of the contract. Moreover, agreeing on 
the Terms can be explained as giving consent for the practices indicated in 
these Terms. The way Google and Facebook obtain agreement of the user to 
the General Terms and Conditions is legally not unproblematic. It is often 
not clear that a contract is entered,372 and provisions in the terms allowing 
for unilateral modification will possibly not result in a valid contract.373 
Entering into a contract requires that the party who offers a service, i.c. 
Google or Facebook, provides clear information about what the service 
entails and, if General Terms and Conditions apply, what these terms are. 
The mere presence of a hyperlink to the terms does not provide certainty 
about the user accepting these and, thus, making them become part of the 
contract.374 Verhelst analyses the legal possibility of entering into a contract 
concerning the processing of personal data and, based on discussion of the 
viewpoints of Cuijpers375 and Purtova,376 concludes that the conclusion of 
such a contract is allowed as long as there is no conflict with the minimum 
level of protection as provided for by the DPD.377 When the information 
obligations are not met, as seems to be the case with Google and Facebook, 
this minimum level of protection is absent. However, in the US, Courts are 
generally accepting and enforcing ‘browsewrap’ contracts, sometimes even 
based on the assumption that “people should generally be aware that TOS 
exist and therefore everyone has ‘constructive’ notice that the terms are there 
370 See: <www.facebook.com>.
371 Nevertheless, in the case of Google the visit to the homepage already implied acceptance 
of the Terms.
372 Preston & McCann 2011, p. 22.
373 In this respect, a solution is to explicitly ask for a user to agree again when the Terms will 
be modified. For instance, Apple iTunes always provides an overview of the changes to 
the Terms of its services and asks for the user’s consent.
374 Van Esch 2004, p. 182.
375 Cuijpers 2007. 
376 Purtova 2011.
377 Verhelst 2012, p. 72.
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somewhere.”378 Obviously, this does not meet the requirement of clear and 
prior information from the DPD. The requirement also has to be met by 
companies from outside the EU that offer services to EU citizens by means 
of equipment on the EU territory.379 Not meeting the requirement implies 
that the data controller has not fulfilled his information duties from the DPD. 
Under (f), the legitimate interest of the controller or of third parties who 
receive the data is provided as a ground for legitimate processing if this 
interest prevails over the privacy interest of the data subject. This ground 
for processing data is a rest category and can be used in numerous cases. 
The interest of the data controller can be almost anything. For instance, for 
advertising companies who collect data as third parties, the interest may be 
completely commercial. They want to earn money and they can earn more 
money if they use targeted advertisements, so it is in their legitimate interest 
to process personal data to achieve that extra benefit.
In practice, it is not that difficult to bring forward a legitimate interest for 
the processing of personal data. A commercial business interest (making 
money) is recognized as a legitimate interest. This implies that the grounds 
for legitimate processing can have a broad reach and legitimize most data 
processing. This is also what was allowed for by the DPD. Personal data 
and the rights of the data subject have to be protected, but the DPD clearly 
facilitates the processing of personal data because of economic incentives. 
The weighing of interests is, thus, more a safeguard on paper than in practice, 
since in practice the data controller weighs the interests and is likely to have 
their own (commercial) interests prevail. Even more, a notification to the data 
protection authorities of a company that processes personal data is sufficient 
to have the processing approved. There is no prior check by the authorities 
on whether the processing is legitimate and certainly no active weighing 
of the interests at stake. As a result, as long as a company has a legitimate 
interest and can argue that this interest prevails380 over the privacy interests 
of the individuals concerning whom the company processes personal data 
ground (f) can be applied successfully.
378 Preston & McCann 2011, p. 30.
379 Cf. Article 4 of the DPD, which also applies when, for instance, “cookies or 
similar devices” are used to access the terminal equipment of a user: Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) on the new EU cookie law (e-Privacy Directive): <http://
www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/privacy_and_electronic_communications/the_
guide/cookies.aspx>, last accessed August 3, 2012.
380 This can be contested by the data subject, assuming that the data subject is informed 
about the processing.
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2.2.2. Information duties
With regard to the information duties of data controllers, there is a slight 
difference between the information that has to be provided when the data are 
obtained from the data subject (Art. 10 DPD) and the information that has 
to be provided when the data have been obtained otherwise (Art. 11 DPD). 
In both cases, the identity of the data controller and his representative (if 
any) has to be provided (Artt. 10 (a) and 11(a)), together with the purposes 
of the processing (Artt. 10(b) and 11(b)) and the recipients or categories of 
recipients of the data (Artt. 10(c) and 11(c)). Both articles sub (c) also indicate 
the duty to inform the data subject about his rights. The difference is under 
the remaining parts of subs (c). Article 10 requires information on whether 
replies to questions are mandatory or voluntary and what the consequences 
of failure to reply are. This indicates that there is an explicit request for data 
from the individual. Article 11 requires information about the categories 
of data concerned. This is something the individual cannot derive himself, 
since the data are not obtained from him. In all cases, the information has to 
be provided as far as necessary, and including additional information when 
appropriate, in order “to guarantee the fair processing of information in 
respect of the data subject.” Since fair processing is the overarching concept 
determining what information has to be provided, the difference between 
the two articles is not that big, even though, in practice, determining what 
article is applicable may be problematic. While article 10 applies to situations 
where the data are obtained from the data subject and gives the example of 
a questionnaire, the question arises whether data relating to online behavior 
are obtained from the data subject. The data have not been obtained from a 
third party, but the individual is not as actively (and consciously) involved as 
in the case of filling out a web form. The problem here is that the distinction 
between the articles seems to be based on the source of the data, while 
conscious involvement of the individual in the data collection may appear to 
be a more proper distinction. Even though tracking of web behavior seems 
to concern data obtained from the individual, because there is no third party 
involved between the data controller and the individual, information about 
the categories of data that are processed is probably the most appropriate 
information to provide in combination with the identity of the controller and 
the purpose of the processing. The distinction between articles 10 and 11, 
thus, can be problematic when it has to be decided which of the two applies 
to a data processing practice. In any case, the data subject has to be informed 
properly about the data processing and the purposes of this processing. 
In the context of online services, a common practice for the provision of this 
information is the use of general terms and conditions or a privacy policy. 
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Often, finding these terms or policies requires an active search381 and huge 
amounts of reading efforts are expected from the data subject to understand 
the contents.382 The data subject, thus, has to inform himself instead of 
being informed by the data controller. When there is no explicit contract383 
established, the individual may have a suspicion that data are processed, 
but is not informed by the data controller. In that case, data are shared with 
or collected by others who decide what data they want to receive. Digital 
collecting and processing of data makes it possible to collect more data and 
to analyze these data revealing more knowledge384 than was available initially. 
2.3.  Rights from the DPD: data subjects
The duties described in the previous subsection apply when digital personae 
are processed. As a counterpart, the individual has rights that are important 
to stimulate data controllers to be compliant. Otherwise, individuals 
can have their data deleted, which results in the data controller having no 
legitimate opportunity left to process the data, unless a new legitimization 
is found. Evidently, when the data are essential for the commercial purposes 
of a company, this should be a strong mechanism to enforce compliance. 
Obviously, exercising the rights individuals (data subjects) have, to a certain 
extent, depends on the compliance of data controllers with the DPD and the 
performance of their duties. In this respect, the most important duty for data 
controllers is to provide information about the processing and the purposes 
of processing. Without this information being provided, the individual may 
be unaware of his data being processed and is, thus, not able to exercise his 
rights.
Properly providing the necessary information is essential to facilitate the 
exercise of data subject rights. As indicated, the information that has to 
be provided concerns a number of specific issues. The identity of the data 
controller and his representatives is essential to enable the individual to 
contact the data controller to exercise his rights. Contact details have to be 
included in the information.
381 Verhelst 2012, p. 208.
382 Privacy policies are often very extensive and basically have the individual withdraw all 
his rights relating to data or content provided to or collected by the visited website. See, 
for instance, the research project Accept or Decline executed in April and May 2011: 
<http://www.bright.nl/files/brght39_accept.pdf>.
383 By explicit contract I mean that the individual has explicitly expressed his will to enter 
into a contract, instead of being automatically bound to a contract because of the use of 
a service, without further notification of this contract being in place.
384 Schermer 2011.
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The indication of the purposes of the processing is necessary to allow the 
individual to decide whether he feels comfortable with the processing or 
not. The requirement directly relates to the purpose binding principle and 
the duty to only collect data for specific purposes that have been defined 
beforehand.385 The processed data have to be relevant for this purpose and 
not excessive to this purpose,386 which also explains why categories of data to 
be collected have to be disclosed by the data controller. The purpose is also 
relevant in relation to the ground for legitimate processing, which will be 
discussed below (section 6). 
Another point of discussion, but relatively less present in academic and 
public debate,387 concerns Article 15 of the DPD. The Article and its 
conditions for applicability have been scarcely mitigated by the recitals or 
travaux préparatoires of the DPD,388 but is at the core of contemporary data 
processing activities. This Article prohibits taking decisions concerning 
an individual by fully automated means. That is to say: at some point in the 
decision making process a human being has to be involved.389 The provision 
is closely related to profiling practices.390 The Article reads as follows:
Automated individual decisions
1. Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be 
subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him 
or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated 
processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, 
reliability, conduct, etc.
2. Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, Member States 
shall provide that a person may be subjected to a decision of the kind 
referred to in paragraph 1 if that decision:
(a) is taken in the course of the entering into or performance of a 
contract, provided the request for the entering into or the performance 
of the contract, lodged by the data subject, has been satisfied or that 
there are suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate interests, such 
as arrangements allowing him to put his point of view; or
(b) is authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard 
the data subject’s legitimate interests.
385 Article 6(b) of the DPD.
386 Article 6(c) of the DPD.
387 The issue has been taken up, however, for instance by Hildebrandt: Hildebrandt 2008b, 
p. 65.
388 Bygrave 2001.
389 See also: Custers 2004, p. 150.




With regard to the ratio of the Article, three aspects can be distinguished.391 
First aspect is the protection of the interest of the data subject to participate 
in the process of taking decisions that are important to (affect) him. The 
second aspect is providing counterweight to the risk of a ‘human decision-
maker’ attributing too much weight to the apparently objective result 
of automated data processing by the machine, therewith neglecting his 
responsibilities. And, third, the provision has to provide counterweight to 
the threat automated decisions form with respect to human dignity.
Article 15, thus, provides that for decisions concerning an individual that 
have either a legal effect or significantly affect the individual some form 
of human involvement has to be present in the decision making process. 
There are lots of industrial opportunities for automated decisions, but “[e]
ven when fully automating a decision process is possible, fiduciary, legal or 
ethical issues may still require a responsible person to play an active role.”392 
What kind of human involvement is required and how big this involvement 
should be, however, remains unclear.393 A routine human intervention may 
be enough to make the Article inapplicable.394 However, as indicated above, 
too much routine and relying on the machine has to be avoided, so the human 
being has to perform active influence in the reaching of the outcome of the 
decision making process.395
2.3.1. Data subject access rights
When the individual is informed about the processing and the identity of the 
data controller, he can exercise his access rights. These rights are set out in 
article 12 of the DPD:
Right of access
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain 
from the controller:
(a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive 
delay or expense:
-  confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being 
processed and information at least as to the purposes of the 
processing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipients or 
391 Groothuis 2004, pp. 60-61.
392 Davenport & Harris 2005.
393 For this reason, the Article is sometimes referred to as the “Kafka-Article” by privacy 
activists and automated processes are sometimes called “Kafkaesque” with reference to 
Kafka’s book ‘Der Prozess’, Kafka 1925. See, for instance:  Winkelhorst 2005, p. 149.
394 Hildebrandt 2008b,  p. 65.
395 Groothuis 2004, p. 63.
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categories of recipients to whom the data are disclosed,
-  communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing 
processing and of any available information as to their source,
-  knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of 
data concerning him at least in the case of the automated decisions 
referred to in Article 15 (1);
(b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the 
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this 
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature 
of the data;
(c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed 
of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance 
with (b), unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate 
effort.
The first part of this article corresponds with the information obligations. It is 
the counterpart of the information duties, which now gives the individual the 
right to obtain the information from the data controller. Moreover, the data 
subject has the right to receive the data that are being processed concerning 
him in an intelligible form as well as, in cases of automated processing, the 
logic involved in the processing. When the processing does not comply with 
the provisions of the DPD or the data are incomplete or inaccurate, the 
individual can ask for rectification, erasure or blocking of the data.
With regard to data processed for fully automated decisions, in the meaning 
of Article 15 of the DPD, the individual also has the right to know the logic 
involved in the processing.396 This may not provide real protection in practice, 
however, since the individual has to be able to understand the algorithms 
to have an idea of how a decision is taken. For instance, an algorithm that 
selects website visitors which use a Mac computer and then suggests more 
expensive hotels may be difficult to understand for a layman. The simple 
explanation that an individual is offered more expensive hotels than PC 
users, because he uses a Mac computer and Mac users generally spend more 
money on hotel rooms is easier to understand.397 The effect on the individual 
using a Mac is that it requires more effort to find a cheap hotel. This may not 
seem a significant effect, but can become one once it is made impossible to 
find and book cheaper hotels by blocking access to these for Mac users. The 
effect may also become significant when the selection for more expensive 
products is widely exploited, which implies that the extra effort required to 
find cheaper products becomes very substantial. A comparable hypothetical 
practice was described in the case study in relation to banks and insurance 




companies in Chapter 5. The choice left, then, is either to invest much more 
time, or to take the loss and buy more expensive products. In effect this is 
price discrimination.
If a data controller has not fulfilled the requirements for proper information 
provision towards the data subject and is not corrected in this, there is 
an enforcement problem. Data protection authorities do not have the 
means to verify compliance with the DPD of every company. In practice, 
data controllers can be non-compliant without effect. If a DPA starts an 
investigation concerning compliance of a company with the DPD, this is 
often instantiated by an incident, such as data leakage. In these cases, there 
is a clear indication that there may be problems with the way the company 
processes data.   
However, even when the information duties are fulfilled there may be 
problems. Basically, it may be problematic to provide clear and comprehensive 
information when it is not that clear what the impact of the processing may 
be for the individual. This will be discussed more elaborately below, in 
section 5.
3. Profiles in view of the DPD
In the previous section it was shown that digital personae consist of personal 
data and that the DPD is applicable to the processing of the data. Another 
category of data sets that is of importance in relation to the subject of this 
study are profiles. As indicated in Chapter 2, profiles can become digital 
personae at some point in time. With regard to legal certainty, it is important 
to know whether the DPD is applicable to profiles as well and under what 
conditions. This is the topic of this section.
There are a number of options concerning profiles and the (potential) 
applicability of the DPD to the processing activities related to these profiles. 
The key concept in determining whether the DPD applies is the concept of 
personal data. In commercial contexts,398 if data qualify as personal data and 
the processing falls under EU jurisdiction, the DPD applies. The essential 
issue is, thus, whether the data in the profile are to be considered personal 
data. Personal data are data that directly or indirectly relate to an identified 
or identifiable natural person. Identified and identifiability will be discussed 
here separately.
398 When data is processed for commercial purposes, the household exemption will not 
apply. This is generally also the case on SNS (see: Article 29 Working Party 2009a; 
Marbus, Fennell-van Esch & Roosendaal 2009).
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Whether the individual is identified or not is relatively easy to assess. If 
the data set contains a direct identifier, such as a name, the individual is 
identified.399 The same is the case if the data set contains an L-identifier and 
this identifier is connected to a direct identifier by combining available data 
sets. The data set now qualifies as a digital persona and the DPD is applicable. 
If the data set contains no direct identifier or L-identifier, the individual is 
not identified or identifiable400 and the data set is a profile instead of a digital 
persona. 
An individual profile can contain an R-identifier, such as a cookie or an 
IP address. With an R-identifier, the individual is not identified. In online 
contexts, the R-identifier is connected to the device used by the individual.401 
The likeliness of a device being used by one single individual is growing, 
because the increasing use of mobile (smart) phones and laptops makes that 
devices are ever more personal. Besides, according to McIntyre “the IP address 
can go beyond identification and actually associate a person with the content 
of his online activity,”402 so the IP address directly connects the identity of 
the individual to other data. McIntyre403 argues for recognizing IP addresses 
as personally identifiable information (PII, the US equivalent of personal 
data404) by showing that IP addresses can be traced back to individuals, even 
when the addresses are dynamic or are used in private networks. The key 
entity in this respect is the ISP. It has become commonplace for litigants to 
subpoena ISPs to reveal the subscriber’s identity related to an IP address. 
ISPs have no direct reason to fight these subpoenas, which has the result that 
usually the requested identifying data are provided to the litigants.405 Even 
though the argument as such may be valid, there is an important difference 
with the line of argument in this study. As indicated, an IP address is an 
R-identifier for certain parties, so based on the IP address the individual 
is not identified as McIntyre states. However, for ISPs, the IP address is 
an L-identifier and by combining the data the individual is identified. The 
identification is based on the name or bank details of the individual which 
is available in the databases of the ISPs and not on the IP address as such. 
So, when a profile contains no identifier at all or only an R-identifier, the 
399 Unless the name is present several times in the set of individuals and as such cannot 
single out which individual within the set it concerns.
400 The L-identifier in fact facilitates identifiability and, therewith, makes the DPD 
applicable. If the L-identifier is connected to identifying data, the individual is identified. 
In any case, a profile does not contain an L-identifier.
401 Or to a pseudonymous or anonymous account.
402 McIntyre 2011.
403 McIntyre 2011.





individual is not identified. This contradicts the viewpoint of the Article 
29 Working Party, which states that “web traffic surveillance tools make it 
easy to identify the behaviour of a machine and, behind the machine, that of 
its user.”406 This singling out via the contact point of a computer is deemed 
equal with identification of the individual.407 I disagree, since it is not possible 
to single out the individual natural person based on an R-identifier in a data 
set, even though it is possible to categorize the individual based on attributes 
and take decisions that may influence the individual. Not the identifiers (IP 
addresses or cookie identifiers) as such are always to be considered personal 
data, but the fact that these allow for combining information in data sets 
(profiles) makes them a specific point of attention, since this can lead to 
the creation of an extensive profile which can be related to an identifiable 
natural person at some later point in time. In the wordings of the European 
Commission: “When using online services, individuals may be associated 
with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and 
protocols, such as Internet Protocol addresses or cookie identifiers. This may 
leave traces which, combined with unique identifiers and other information 
received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the individuals and 
identify them.”408 So, the combination of data and data sets by the use of 
identifiers can make the data personal data. The crucial point seems to be 
that the Article 29 Working Party does not connect the element ‘natural 
person’ from the definition to ‘identified or identifiable’ when discussing 
R-identifiers, but merely explains natural person as a means to exclude dead 
or unborn people and legal persons (companies). For the distinction between 
a digital persona and a profile, the element of the natural person connected 
to the data set is a central part. In the case of digital personae, the individual 
is identified or identifiable, so the combined set of data as a whole should be 
considered personal data and processing is subjected to the DPD. 
If the individual is not identified it may be the case that the DPD is not 
applicable, but only if  the individual is not identifiable. This is a more 
problematic issue, which can take different forms. First, it can be the case 
that the individual is not identifiable at all; second, the individual may be 
identifiable, but the data are not recognized as identifiable in practice, and; 
third, the individual may be identifiable in the future as a result of new data 
combinations or additional data or technologies that become available. 
These three options will be discussed in the following subsections.
406 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 14.
407 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 14.
408 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
Preamble at 24.
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3.1.  The individual is not identifiable
An individual is not identifiable if a profile contains no identifying 
information at all. For instance, consider the case where Google is collecting 
data on browsing behavior of an individual by means of a tracking cookie. 
At some point, the ID of the tracking cookie is deleted from the data set. 
The tracking cookie on the user’s machine was an R-identifier, but now the 
data set at Google contains no identifier to make the link to the tracking 
cookie. As a result, there is no option to link the profile to an individual, so 
the individual whose data was aggregated cannot be identified (recognized) 
anymore. Because the individual is not identified nor identifiable, the DPD 
is not applicable to the data set and the set is or rather, has become an 
anonymous profile. 
There are two important remarks to be made on this scenario. First, the 
deletion of the cookie can also be done by the individual. The tracking cookie 
is, then, no longer available on the device of the individual and the device 
cannot be recognized by Google. Even though the ID of the cookie is still 
present in the data set Google has, it cannot establish a link to the device. 
The R-identifier has become void. The data in the profile no longer point to a 
recognizable or identifiable person and the DPD is still not applicable, albeit 
for a reason Google may not be fully aware of.
The second remark challenges the inapplicability of the DPD. While the 
starting point in this scenario is an R-identifier, or the absence thereof, the 
applicability of the DPD strongly depends on the other data in the profile. 
Even without an R-identifier, at some point the data set may become so rich, 
or contain such specific data, that it is possible to indirectly identify the 
individual. The set as a whole, then, contains information that in combination 
is unique and facilitates identification. This is also the most important 
counter-argument against Google’s statement409 that it only processes 
anonymous data, because the IP addresses are deleted from the profiles. In 
particular, the data collected via the Google search engine can form a unique 
profile when accumulated. Moreover, there are so-called vanity searches,410 
which in fact directly disclose the name of the individual belonging to the 
profile in a search term. “[A] mere hypothetical possibility to single out 
the individual is not enough to consider the person as ‘identifiable’.”411 
However, accumulation of data in profiles or the combination of data with a 
direct identifier or L-identifier may not always be very hypothetical. Where 
409 Whitten, A. (Google Software Engineer), Are IP Addresses Personal?, on Google 
Public Policy Blog, 22 February 2008. See: <http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.
nl/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html>. 
410 Soghoian 2006. 
411 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 15.
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to draw the line is difficult to say. This has to be assessed in relation to the 
means likely reasonably to be used for identifiability, which will be discussed 
below in section 4. In any case, in this scenario the profile may seem to be 
anonymous, but in fact the related individual may be identifiable, which is the 
second option and will be discussed below.
3.2. The individual may be identifiable
A second option is that the individual is not identified, but may be identifiable 
(even though he is not identified in practice). The formulation ‘may be’ 
indicates that identifiability is uncertain, as opposed to the identifiability of 
digital personae based on an L-identifier. As Koot states: “[a]nonymity is not 
a binary property; it is not either present or absent. Rather, a subject is more 
easily or less easily identifiable at any given time, and anonymity is a point 
on a scale.”412 The gradual difficulty to identify an individual is exactly what 
makes it difficult to make clear distinctions between data sets in the context 
of whether they contain personal data or not. Anonymity is the opposite of 
identifiability, which can clearly be derived from the definitions proposed 
by Pfitzmann and Hansen.413 According to them, “[a]nonymity is the state 
of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.”414 
Identifiability is defined as “the possibility of being individualized within a 
set of subjects, the identifiability set.”415 Identifiability is, thus, a possibility 
and the likeliness of the possibility taking place depends on the data set. 
The size of the data set is important, as well as the overlap of data between 
subjects.
Typical issues relate to the endeavor of companies to maintain anonymous 
data sets. Basically, the DPD is not applicable to “data rendered anonymous 
in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable.”416 In order to 
achieve this anonymity, “a common practice is for organizations to release 
and receive person-specific data with all explicit identifiers, such as name, 
address and telephone number, removed.”417 Nevertheless, the remaining 
data in the set can often be used for re-identification of individuals. To 
re-identify, the data can be linked or matched to other data, or unique 
characteristics can be found in the data which leads to identification.418 So, 
even though no identifiers are present in the profile, the combination of the 
412 Koot 2012, p. 13.
413 Pfitzmann & Hansen 2008. 
414 Pfitzmann & Hansen 2008, p. 3.
415 Pfitzmann & Hansen 2008, p. 12.
416 Preamble of the DPD, Recital 26.
417 Sweeney 2002, p. 558.
418 Sweeney 2002, p. 558.
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data in the set or linking the data to other data sets can make the individual 
identifiable. 
A set of attributes that are individually anonymous, but can uniquely identify 
an individual when combined, is called a quasi-identifier.419 For instance, 
anonymous data, such as gender, date of birth, and postal code, cannot 
uniquely identify an individual, since potentially there are several individuals 
sharing these attributes. However, in the data set there should be enough 
individuals with similar characteristics in order to prevent identification. For 
instance, if there is a group of ten individuals composed of nine females and 
one male person, the attribute ‘gender’ is identifying for the man. Would the 
group consist of five females and five males, identification based on ‘gender’ 
solely would not be possible. If combinations of data are made, the likeliness 
of identifiability increases. For instance, an empirical study showed that in 
a sample of nearly 2,8 million Dutch citizens, approximately 99,4% of the 
people in the sample could be identified based on the combination of gender, 
date of birth, and full postal code (in the Netherlands this is 4 numbers and 2 
letters). When only using the four numbers of the postal code, in combination 
with gender and date of birth, the identification rate was still 67,0%.420
The problem of identifiability described above can be avoided by a mechanism 
called k-anonymity.421 k-Anonymity means that each release of data is such 
that every combination of values of quasi-identifiers can be indistinctly 
matched to at least k respondents.422 The combination of data within a set 
should, thus, never be unique. “It remains a matter of policy what value of 
k can be considered sufficiently strong anonymity for particular personal 
information.”423
In any case, the important issue is that profiles may seem to be anonymous 
and the individual is not identifiable. However, the presence of so-called 
quasi-identifiers can make the individual identifiable. In line with this, the 
earlier mentioned Google profile, which does not contain an IP address 
or cookie identifier, can concern an identifiable individual when the 
combination of attributes in the profile is unique. The attributes together 
form a quasi-identifier. So, even though companies try to anonymize the 
profiles they have, the profiles may still be personal data in the meaning of 
the DPD. Companies can be perfectly unaware of this, or just ignorant. In 
any case, there seems to be a discrepancy between theory and practice here. 
419 Koot 2012, p. 23.
420 Koot 2012, p. 35.
421 Sweeney 2002.
422 Ciriani, De Capitani Di Vimercati, Foresti & Samarati 2007. 
423 Koot 2012, p. 40 (Emphasis in original).
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Uncertainty about the possibility of identifiability makes that the DPD is 
not applied to the profiles, while it may very well be the case that the profile 
relates to an identifiable individual and is, in fact, a digital persona, because 
of the presence of quasi-identifiers. The combination of data is identifying 
information, which can function in a comparable manner as an L-identifier. 
The identity of the individual may be looked up by comparing the data, for 
instance, with accounts on an SNS424 or with a register, such as a telephone 
book.425 The DPD should be applied to these profiles.
3.3.  The individual may be identifiable in the future
Any data set may pertain to individuals who may be identifiable in the future. 
The profile as such does not contain an L-identifier or quasi-identifiers and 
can be considered anonymous at some point in time. It may, however, be the 
case that at a certain point the profile becomes so rich that it can be related 
to an identifiable person. It may also happen that the profile itself does not 
change, but can be connected to another database that becomes available to 
the data controller. And, there is the option that an individual ‘claims’ to be 
the profiled person and, therewith, identifies himself or adds an L-identifier 
to the profile.
As an example, consider the Google profile again. By means of a tracking 
cookie, a profile has been built concerning the browsing behavior and 
search terms of an individual. The profile is quite rich, but not unique in 
the sense that it contains quasi-identifiers. Based on the profile, targeted 
advertisements are presented to the individual when he visits websites 
which have Google AdSense implemented. Moreover, search results are 
‘personalized’. The individual, however, is annoyed by the bad quality of 
some advertisements and suggestions, because they do not meet his interests, 
but continue to show up. For instance, as a male person, age 54 and fired for 
the third time in two years, he is not interested in expensive cars. And by the 
way, he does not wear bikinis. Nevertheless, Google appears to think that he 
is interested in bikinis and BMWs. To solve this problem, Google offers the 
individual the opportunity to correct his profile. This can be done by adding 
or removing interests on the Google Dashboard.426 To use this dashboard 
functionality, it is required to sign in with a Google account or create one. 
For this purpose, the individual may use an email address which contains 
identifying information and, therewith, either directly identify himself 
424 Google even has its own SNS, Google+, on which the company can access all data 
provided by the users.
425 Koot 2012 refers to public administration records, but these will usually not be available 
to commercial companies.
426 See: <https://www.google.com/dashboard>, (last accessed: June 27, 2012).
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(e.g. ArnoldRoosendaal1979@email.com) or provide an L-identifier (e.g. 
LawSchoolDean@tilburguniversity.edu ). The first contains a full name and 
year of birth and the second contains information about a unique function and 
affiliation. At the moment of creating the account, the individual identifies 
himself and the profile becomes a personal profile (a digital persona) instead 
of an anonymous profile.
The future event that facilitates identifiability may, thus, originate from 
different sources. Either the data controller himself adds data to the profile 
or adopts new technologies, which makes the profile containing identifying 
information, or an external party facilitates the additional information that 
enables (possible) identification. As soon as the profile can be related to an 
identified or identifiable natural person, the DPD is applicable. The problem 
is that it may be very uncertain whether a future event will happen that leads 
to identifiability of the individual to whom the profile relates.
4. Means likely reasonably to be used for identification
The second and third scenario described in the previous section concerned 
a probability that the individual may be identifiable, now or in the future, 
based on the data in the profile. As indicated, in these cases it is not always 
clear whether the DPD is applicable to the processing of the data. The basic 
requirement for applicability is the identifiability of the individual. However, 
whether an individual is identifiable can depend on internal or external 
factors. It is, thus, difficult to quantify the probability that identifiability is 
possible or will become possible.
According to the Preamble of the DPD, “to determine whether a person 
is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably 
to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said 
person.”427 Two parts of this sentence are important here: ‘likely reasonably 
to be used’ and ‘by the controller or by any other person’. Both will be 
discussed below.
4.1. The controller or any other person
To start with the latter, identifiability is present when the controller or 
any other person is able to identify the individual. The presence of quasi-
identifiers in the data set may make the data personal data, even though the 
data controller may be unaware of the identifiability of the individuals in the 
data set. The data controller will classify the data as anonymous and it may 
427 Recital 26, my emphasis.
Arnold Roosendaal
176
not be likely that he will apply means to identify an individual in practice. As 
the data controller is unaware of the possible identifiability, he will probably 
not be aware of this identification taking place when ‘any other person’ 
obtains access to the data. It may also be possible that a profile becomes 
identifiable in the future, due to the application of new technologies, the 
combination of data, or because an individual identifies himself in relation to 
the profile. Even though the DPD should be applicable to the processing of 
the data in those cases, the data controller fails to take the actions prescribed 
by the DPD and hence does not comply with the DPD.
Also the interpretation of ‘any other person’ is important here. Most likely, 
this is meant to be any other person that has legitimate access to the data. 
These are, for instance, data processors who work under the responsibility 
of a company (the data controller), either within the company or in another 
company based on an outsourcing agreement. It is, however, also possible 
that access is obtained by someone outside of the organization. Legitimate 
access in this category can be obtained by law enforcement.428 Whether a 
law enforcement agency is able to identify someone based on the profile in 
combination with other available data is unclear to the company, because the 
company has no insight in the available data at the law enforcement agency. 
Identifiability may be likely, however. Consider the case of illegal web content 
such as child pornography. Google may be requested to deliver an overview 
of the search and browsing history related to an IP address and the police 
may have received the identifying data belonging to the IP address from an 
ISP. The police can, then, connect the profile to the identifying data, which 
makes the anonymous Google profile personal data for the police. The police 
falling in the category of ‘any other person’ makes that the data controller has 
to process the data as personal data, even though the controller himself may 
not be able to identify the individual.
Other persons may also be involved directly in cases where processing of 
data involves numerous parties. As was described earlier in Chapter 5, 
web interactions usually involve several parties. Next to the party the data 
subject is interacting with consciously and intended, there are interactions 
with third parties. These can, for instance, be content providers, delivering 
pieces of content for a web site, tracking companies, who follow the internet 
browsing behavior of individuals over the web,429 or third parties who are 
involved in making the interaction possible by providing platforms or 
technologies for communication and storage of data. For the individual 
428 See, for instance, Hustinx 2009, who explicitly mentions law enforcement officials as 
an example of any third party.
429 Turow refers to the phenomenon of connecting as many devices and locations as 
possible as the “long click”: Turow 2011, p. 139.
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it may be difficult to distinguish between first and third parties. However, 
the individual may think not to be identifiable to the first party, but may be 
identifiable by a third party of which he is not aware that he is involved in the 
interaction. The distinction between first and third parties can be based on 
user expectations: an entity acts in a first-party capacity if a user reasonably 
expects to interact with it; it acts in a third-party capacity if a user does 
not expect this interaction.430 The user expectation can be influenced by 
factors such as domain names, branding, and business relationships. Even 
when advertisements are displayed, the user may not expect to interact with 
other parties than the domain name owner, because the advertisements may 
be placed by the domain name owner, like is the case in a newspaper. The 
advertisers have bought advertising space, but do not receive information 
from the readers. Mayer and Narayanan give some examples:431
•	 A user visits The New York Times’ website; Google’s Doubleclick ad 
network collects user data. Google is a third party because it operates 
at a different domain, uses a different brand, and only has an advertising 
relationship with The New York Times.
•	 A user visits Amazon.com; data is collected with the Amazon Web 
Services platform, located at amazonaws.com. Here Amazon Web 
Services is a first party because, though domain names differ, Amazon 
Web Services is functionally a business unit of Amazon.com and is 
branded as an Amazon.com product.
•	 A user visits the ESPN website at espn.go.com; Omniture, an analytics 
provider, collects data at the domain w88.go.com. Omniture is a third 
party because, though it shares a second-level domain, it is branded 
independently and only has an advertising relationship with ESPN.
The examples above clearly distinguish between first party and third party 
cookies, based on user expectations. In practice, however, companies 
sometimes argue that they should be treated as first parties, while an 
objective viewpoint from the user perspective would classify them as third 
parties. For instance, Google and Facebook provide plugins, such as Maps 
or YouTube player, or Like buttons and Comment fields. They argue that 
the website owners have implemented their features in the core code of the 
website, which makes them part of the first party website.432 Objectively, 
this argument does not hold, since the user instigates an interaction with 
430 Mayer & Narayanan 2011, p. 4.
431 Mayer & Narayanan 2011, p. 4.
432 Discussed with Chris Hoofnagle, Ashkan Soltani, and Aleecia McDonald at Workshop 
DoNotTrack organized by Berkeley Law and Technology Center and Institute for 
Information Law (IViR Amsterdam) with cooperation of EU Commissioner Kroes 
and FTC Commissioner Brill, Brussels, June 23, 2011.  
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the website connected to the URL he is visiting. That is the only first party 
and all other actors on the website are third parties. In some occasions, the 
distinction becomes very fuzzy. For instance, on techcrunch.com Facebook 
provides the Comment Field. This Field is not a feature as part of the core 
website, but is completely hosted by Facebook. This implies that, when 
a visitor of techcrunch.com wants to leave a comment to a news story, the 
comment is directly typed in a part of the website that is actually a facebook.
com domain. Facebook, on its turn, provides the comments to Techcrunch 
and displays the comments on the techcrunch.com webpage. Facebook acts 
as a first party in this scenario, because the data are directly sent to Facebook, 
even though the visitor is at the techcrunch.com webpage and leaves a 
comment to a news story provided by Techcrunch. The user, thus, expects 
Facebook to be a third party, which is in fact, based on the URL of the visited 
webpage, a more valid interpretation. Difficulties in assessing the possibility 
of being identified from the perspective of the user are, thus, relevant as well, 
even though in these cases the data have to be treated as personal data by the 
third parties who can identify the individual.
Similar difficulties concerning responsibilities and the role parties play in 
the processing of data show up in the context of information enrichment 
in data flows. At each step of the data flow model, different parties can be 
involved.
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become ineffective as regards the protection of the data. This is a specific 
risk related to the complexity of information ecosystems. As the adage says: 
a chain is as strong as its weakest link.
The important issue concerning the involvement of multiple parties in data 
processing, as first or third parties on a website, or as part of an information 
chain, is the difficulty to indicate for whom the processed data are personal 
data. An anonymous visitor of a website may very well be identified or 
identifiable for a third party who delivers content on that website. For the 
website holder, the DPD does not apply, but for the third party it does. It 
also means that the website holder may provide information to the third 
party. Because for the third party (any other person) the data concern an 
identifiable individual, the first party website holder, for whom the data 
are anonymous, has to treat the data as personal data. The DPD is, then, 
applicable even though this may be unexpected or unclear to the website 
holder, and sometimes even unreasonable. The same problem arises in 
information chains where at some point one of the parties in the chain may 
be able to relate the data to an identified or identifiable individual.
Illegitimate access to the profiles is possible as well. Databases can be 
hacked or data can be leaked. In the DPD it is required to take appropriate 
organizational and technical measures to prevent this. Moreover, data should 
be protected in such a manner that, if they are inadvertently leaked, the data 
are unintelligible. This means that, for instance, encryption technologies 
should be used. However, when data are considered anonymous, the DPD 
does not apply and there is no duty to comply with its requirements. This 
is the start of an a contrario circular argument. The DPD is not applicable 
to anonymous data, but to consider the data anonymous the requirements 
on technical and organizational measures from the DPD have to be met. 
These measures, however, apply to data that were personal data and were 
made anonymous, so in a stadium where the DPD was already applicable 
to the processing. In this respect, the Article 29 Working Party indicates 
that the implementation of appropriate technical measures is not the 
consequence of the legal obligation from the DPD,433 but rather a condition 
for not considering the data to be personal data of which the processing is 
subjected to the DPD.434 The DPD is not applicable, but only if a number 
of requirements from the DPD are met. How far the category of ‘any other 
person’ reaches is unclear, but the Article 29 Working Party seems to include 
any possible person that might obtain access to the data at a given time. The 
result of this interpretation is that in fact all data sets about individuals fall 
under the DPD, because there may always be a person that is able to make 
433 Provided for in article 17 of the DPD.
434 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 17.
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the individual identifiable by combining the data with other data or by 
applying other techniques. In particular, due to the fact that the future has 
to be taken into account, it is impossible to foresee what technologies may 
be available to any other person that may lead to identifiability of the data 
set. If the data are “intended to be kept for 10 years, the controller should 
consider the possibility of identification that may occur also in the ninth 
year of their lifetime.”435 Nevertheless, the Working Party also indicates 
that, as these developments may happen, the systems of the data controller 
should be able to adapt to these developments and to “incorporate then” the 
appropriate technical and organizational measures in due course.436 The 
unforeseeability is, thus, understood, but the Working Party also seems to 
believe that the possibilities any other person may have which may facilitate 
identifiability, can always be foreseen by the data controller before the data 
are obtained by this other person. Moreover, it has to be somehow likely that 
this other person wants to employ his means to identify the individual (see 
next subsection). In practice, however, this is impossible to foresee and may 
lead to unreasonable requirements for data controllers in the sense that the 
DPD always has to be applied to anonymous data as well.
4.2. Likely reasonable means
The first part of the sentence explaining identifiability is even more 
interesting: what are means likely reasonably to be used? This may depend on 
the function and competences of the data controller. A commercial company 
will, usually, not gain access to governmental administrative records, such 
as citizen records of the municipality, while an enforcement body will have 
this access. Returning to the example of IP addresses, an enforcement body 
may claim the identifying data belonging to the user of an IP address from 
an ISP. A commercial company will not receive this data and will have to 
submit a subpoena to the ISP. As indicated earlier, ISPs are likely to provide 
the data in such a case.437 However, it is not very likely that a commercial 
company will submit a subpoena concerning each IP address in their profile 
databases in order to identify individuals. This is far too costly and too much 
of a burden. Moreover, it will usually not be possible to legitimize all these 
subpoenas by supporting them with an unlawful act.
Combining different databases, by buying additional databases from data 
brokers or obtaining them by buying other companies, however, is a more 
likely scenario in a commercial context. It is even a common practice.438 “[I]
435 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 15.
436 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 15.
437 McIntyre 2011.
438 In the US, Acxiom processes more than 50 trillion data transactions a year in their 
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nformation or data brokers are private corporations which make it their 
sole business to collect, analyze, and sell personal information. In many 
ways, their presence and value represent the embodiment of the information 
society.”439 Another option is for companies to make use of so-called list 
brokers. These are specialized parties who ‘rent’ address lists which can 
be used to target specific audiences. The lists are ‘hired’ for single use, so 
only when an individual responds to a message, his details are added to the 
data set of the company.440 Finally, there are Information Agencies  and 
Credit Bureaus which are specialized in obtaining information from several 
sources concerning specific individuals, for instance to provide information 
about their financial situation and creditworthiness.441 One relevant factor 
in assessing the means likely reasonably to be used by companies will 
be the purpose of the processing of the data. If the processing is aimed at 
identification of individuals, it is more likely that specific means will be 
used.442 
If all means have to be taken into account, including future means, this may 
imply that possibly all profiles have to be considered data concerning a 
(potentially) identifiable individual. As a result, the DPD would be applicable 
to every data set concerning an individual or that may become a data set 
related to an individual. The entire applicability of the DPD is, then, based 
on probability. For data controllers, this may provide legal certainty, because 
the DPD is always applicable. However, this approach seems unreasonable 
and impracticable, because it requires data controllers to perform, for 
instance, information duties towards, currently, non-identifiable individuals. 
Moreover, the legal obligation to perform all duties from the DPD in case 
any set of data is processed would impose too much of a burden on data 
controllers, in particular when they do not intend to relate the data to an 
identified or identifiable individual. 
The remaining problem is that if a less stringent approach is taken, the 
DPD is not applicable to profiles as long as they cannot be related to 
an identified or identifiable natural person. In online communications, 
however, the profile can be used to affect the individual, because it is possible 
to direct communications towards the individual, for instance based on an 
R-identifier. Even though the data relate to an individual and this individual 
can be affected by the use of the profile, the fact that the individual is not (yet) 
identifiable means there is no legal protection offered by the DPD. When it 
activities to mine and analyze consumer data. See: Singer 2012.
439 Van der Meulen 2010, p. 205.
440 Schermer & Wagemans 2009, pp. 24-25.
441 Schermer & Wagemans 2009, p. 30.
442 Article 29 Working Party 2007, p. 16. 
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is assumed that identifiability is possible by use of means likely reasonably 
to be used, or when a data set (digital persona) contains an L-identifier, the 
DPD is applicable because the data are considered to be personal data. Now 
it is clear when the DPD is applicable, the next question is what this means 
with regard to the protection of the individual. This will be discussed in the 
next section. 
5. Problems when the DPD is applicable
Also when there is no doubt that the DPD is applicable to the processing of 
data, as is the case with the use of digital personae, problems exist. The major 
advantage is, of course, that the protection of the data subject offered by the 
DPD is present and that the duties of data controllers are clear. Nevertheless, 
it may be very difficult to fulfill the duties and to properly balance the interests 
of the individual with the interests of the data controller.
A first problem concerns the information duties. As indicated earlier, 
the information duties may not be fulfilled by the data controller if the 
data controller is not compliant with the DPD. This may be related to an 
enforcement problem when the information is simply not provided. It may, 
however, also be caused by difficulties to indicate the exact purpose of the 
processing. The purpose has to be strictly defined beforehand. Current 
practices, however, indicate that purposes may sometimes change over 
time, simply because new applications of the data are found. Innovation 
and function creep may result in processing for purposes that were not yet 
taken into account. If the purposes are incompatible, this requires a new 
notification of the processing, a new legitimate ground, and fulfillment 
of the other duties from the DPD, but a more current practice is to use a 
relatively general description of the purpose which covers most of the 
possible future use as well. For instance, a purpose that is often mentioned 
is the ‘improvement of the service’.443 This can be basically anything, from 
improving the user-friendliness of a service by changing the layout of a 
website to maximizing commercial benefits from targeted advertisements. 
If an individual has to give his consent for the processing, ’improvement of 
the service’ is insufficient to serve as a specified purpose which can serve as 
a basis for the informed consent of the individual.
443 See, for instance, Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-
info#howweuse> (last accessed June 20, 2012), or Amazon: <http://www.amazon.
com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496> 
(last accessed  June 20, 2012) which even uses the terminology: “We use the information 
that you provide for such purposes as…” This seems to be meant as non-limitative. 
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The lack of clarity and certainty with regard to the processing activities and 
the impact it may have on the individual also leads to problems concerning 
the legitimate grounds for processing. In particular, the ground of consent 
and the legitimate interest of the data controller are relevant in this respect. 
Both will be discussed more elaborately below.
5.1. Consent
According to Article 2(h) of the DPD, the data subject’s consent means “any 
freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the 
data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed.” Thus, the indication of wishes has to be ‘specific’, meaning that 
the indication has to relate to a specific set of personal data being processed 
for a specific purpose. This requirement relates to the purpose-binding 
principle. The indication also has to be ‘informed’, meaning that the data 
subject has to know what the processing entails and what the purposes of the 
processing are. This requirement closely relates to the information duties of 
the data controller. 
A specific point of attention concerns the issue that the indication signifies 
the agreement to the processing of personal data relating to the data subject. 
When an indication signifies an agreement is debatable. For instance, in 
cases concerning the use of cookies to track and trace web users and to place 
targeted advertisements, it is heavily debated whether (default) browser 
settings can form an indication signifying such an agreement. The Article 
29 Working Party is of the opinion that in general “providing information 
and, to some extent, facilitating the user’s ability to reject cookies (by 
explaining how this can be done) cannot generally be deemed as informed 
consent ex Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive and also in light of Article 
2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC.”444 The European Commission has also asked 
for clarification of the conditions for consent “in order to always guarantee 
informed consent and ensure that the individual is fully aware that he or 
she is consenting, and to what data processing, in line with Article 8 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.”445 As Kosta indicates, the focus 
of the Article 29 Working Party as well as the European Commission 
is on the definition of consent and on how it should be implemented in a 
harmonized way, “leaving outside from the discussion whether the consent 
of the data subject in the way it is treated today serves the role that it was 
intended to.”446 The intended role was strictly related to individual autonomy 
and informational self-determination. The current review of the EU data 
444 Article 29 Working Party 2010, p. 15.
445 European Commission 2010, p. 9.
446 Kosta 2011, p. 29.
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protection framework gives an opportunity not only to look at the definition 
of consent, but also at its primary function in specific contexts.447
With regard to cookies and giving consent to the placing and use of cookies 
by other parties there are some important recent developments. Directive 
2009/136/EC has amended, amongst other things, Directive 2002/58/
EC. One of the main points of discussion here was the means for giving 
consent to cookie use. As discussed above, the question arose whether 
browser settings could indicate such consent. By discussing the means for 
expressing consent in the context of the ePrivacy Directive, apparently the 
European Commission has taken the viewpoint that it considers the content 
of cookies to be personal data and that data protection legislation applies to 
the setting and reading of these cookies. In the discussion on the scope of 
the definition of personal data, this point has remained rather implicit. If a 
third party wants to place and use cookies448 on the user’s computer, he has 
to provide information about this and offer a right to refuse. “Exceptions to 
the obligation to provide information and offer the right to refuse should be 
limited to those situations where the technical storage or access is strictly 
necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service 
explicitly requested by the subscriber or user.”449 So, in case of a subscription 
or request for a specific service, the ground for legitimate data processing is 
based on Article 7(b) of Directive 95/46/EC: the performance of a contract. 
In all other cases, consent to the processing has to be obtained from the user.450 
When technically appropriate, meaning that a clear and comprehensible 
system is available, this consent can be expressed by browser settings. Even 
the advertisement industry firmly took the viewpoint of browser settings as 
sufficient means for establishing consent, instead of, traditionally, arguing 
that personal data are not processed in the first place. Adjusting the settings 
447 Kosta 2011, p. 316.
448 Or wants to use other types of information, such as information about the device which 
can be used for device fingerprinting.
449 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/
EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws, Preamble at 66.
450 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/
EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection 
laws, Preamble at 66.
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as to accept all third party cookies can, however, hardly be explained as 
specific consent.
Another aspect relates to the duration of consent. User control is one of 
the core principles of data protection regulation, so giving consent to an 
organization to use personal data must be understood to be restricted to 
the specific purpose of data processing for which consent was given and in 
the sense that consent may be limited in time (in relation to the purpose) 
or can be revoked. When taking a right-to-control as a starting point, the 
individual retains ultimate control over his data in spite of consenting to its 
use by some organization. “Consent does not give the organization ultimate 
control over personal information in perpetuity.”451 From this perspective, 
individuals have the right to withdraw their consent and therewith stop 
organizations from further processing the individual’s personal data. In 
other words, “the continued use of an individual’s personal information 
must be understood as a necessary consequence, not of the initial consent 
to collect the information, but rather of that person’s continuing consent 
to the organization to use that information.”452 In this approach there is 
recognition of the fact that individuals may be subject to change concerning 
their desires and preferences. Taking the dynamics of individuals into 
account then automatically means that consent can only be given for specific 
data processing activities and only for the period of time that the individual 
actually agrees with this processing. Indicating that period beforehand, or 
even consenting to an unlimited timeframe, appears to be difficult, if not 
impossible, then. At this moment, a consent given is restricted only by the 
purposes for which the data are processed.453
The limits of consent are subject to interpretation. The more direct problem 
with consent, however, is related to what consent means. As indicated, it is 
a freely given specific and informed indication of the wishes of the data subject. 
What the indication (the expression of the will) looks like can be difficult, 
as was seen above in relation to browser settings, but it is clear that the data 
subject has to do something actively. A tick box indicating consent, for 
instance concerning the acceptance of general terms and conditions, has to 
be ticked by the data subject and may not be ticked by default. An active form 
of expression is preferred in a web context, since other indicators, such as 
body language, are absent. Moreover, if the individual ticks the box himself, 
this is beneficial for companies as well, because it makes it easier to prove 
451 Barrigar, Burkell & Kerr  2006 (emphasis in original). This article is written from 
a Canadian perspective, but the doctrine of ongoing consent is relevant for data 
protection laws in general.
452 Barrigar, Burkell & Kerr 2006 (emphasis in original).
453 Clauß, Hansen, Pfitzmann, Raguse, & Steinbrecher 2009.
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that consent has been obtained from the individual. The other parts of the 
definition (emphasized above by my italics) relate to the practicalities of 
expressing a will. 
Consent has to be freely given. This is directly related to individual autonomy. 
The data subject has to decide for himself whether he wants to consent to 
certain data processing activities or not. In cases where the individual wants 
to use a service or wants to have access to specific content, and this use or 
access is subjected to general terms and conditions, not accepting the terms 
implies not having access. This may be reasonable, for instance, when the 
terms relate to the content itself and the use of it. Content that is copyright 
protected, for instance, may not be copied or made public. Terms can explicate 
this and acceptance of the terms means that the individual expresses his will 
to obey these terms and not to engage in unlawful or criminal behavior. There 
is a logical and direct link between the service and the terms. However, if the 
terms for access to copyrighted materials also contain provisions in which it 
is indicated that the data subject may be tracked and monitored and that his 
data may be processed for targeted advertising and probably be sold to other 
companies, the link between the service and the terms is absent. Consent 
thus not freely given, but forced by the choice of having access or not.
In the above example, two things are of particular importance. First, the 
acceptance of the terms and conditions entails a concrete action to be taken 
by the individual and, second, it can be argued that there is a contract of which 
the general terms and conditions are part. The latter, however, does not hold. 
Indeed, there may be a contract including terms and conditions. This does, 
however, not imply that the processing is lawful. As was described earlier in 
this Chapter (section 2.2.1), the DPD indicates as a legitimate ground for 
processing that the processing takes place on the basis of a contract. This 
ground, however, only applies to the parts of the processing that are necessary 
for the performance of the contract. All other processing has to be based 
on consent.454 The direct connection between processing in relation to the 
contract and other processing activities, by putting them in one document 
with terms and conditions, takes away the free choice of the individual. The 
individual cannot decline further processing, but accept processing that is 
necessary for the performance of the contract.
454 This is also recognized by European Social Networks, an organization representing 9 
EU based SNS. However, instead of emphasizing the importance of consent, they asked 
the European Commission to make profiling and targeted advertising being recognized 
as necessary for the performance of the contract, based on the argument that these 
practices generate the income to finance the services they provide. See: European Social 
Networks 2011, p. 5.
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Another situation where the problem is even clearer is the assumed 
acceptance of all terms by merely using a service, as is the case with Google. 
When visiting a web page implies, according to terms and conditions, that 
you have accepted these, there is no freely given consent. The choice has 
not even been present. Moreover, recent changes within Google’s practices 
have the result that the creation of a new Gmail account now implies 
membership of the SNS Google+, of which the welcoming message is one 
of the first messages you will receive in your Gmail inbox. Not having the 
option to choose is clearly problematic and is a direct restriction on the free 
will of the individual. Moreover, the implied membership of the SNS is not 
mentioned in the terms and conditions, so the individual cannot be aware of 
this beforehand. Here, individual autonomy is affected.
Another condition of consent is that it has to be informed. This means that 
the individual has to have a good understanding of what the processing 
entails. However, it is hard for the individual to understand the impact of 
the processing activities. On the one hand, it cannot be expected that the 
individual predicts all the effects related to the processing of his personal 
data. On the other hand, this is often even impossible for the data controllers 
to predict, because they may find new applications of the data or gain new, 
unexpected insights by applying data mining techniques. In the area of 
commercial data processing, consent can, thus, often not be informed.
Finally, the consent has to reflect the wishes of the data subject. As indicated 
above, the wishes of the data subject do usually not relate to consenting to 
monitoring and profiling, but to accessing a service against reasonable terms. 
Consent, in this case, reflects the wishes of the individual with regard to the 
use of the service, but not with regard to the tracking practices. The tracking 
is included in the Terms and cannot be denied while still gaining access to the 
service. Only because there is no option to choose or to accept only a part of 
the terms and conditions, the individual agrees to the terms. 
To conclude, consent as a legitimate ground for processing as such is not 
problematic. The problem, however, is more of a practical nature. Consent is 
often not given explicitly for a specific type of processing for a specific purpose, 
but as connected to the entering into a contract or without any request to the 
individual. Even though data controllers can argue, based on a ticked box, 
that the individual has explicitly expressed his wishes, the individual does 
not have an option to choose, cannot understand the impact, and did not 
express his wishes concerning all the processing of personal data included 
or implied in the Terms and Conditions. The only option for individuals to 
avoid this is by not visiting certain websites or by not accepting the terms in 
general, therewith not being able to make use of the service. In some cases, 
such as services provided by Google, this is becoming problematic, since 
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Google has so many services that became part of everyday life that it may be 
difficult to circumvent these and it may happen relatively easily that, even if 
an individual wants to avoid this, he still visits a Google website by accident. 
The argument of leaving a website and choosing for another service is, thus, 
not as straightforward as it may seem. In particular in a web context it may 
become very difficult to avoid interaction with specific parties.
5.2. Weighing of interests
The other legitimate ground for processing which may lead to problems 
in practice is the legitimate interest of the data controller, which has to 
be weighed against the interests, in particular the privacy interest, of the 
individual. The weighing of these interests can be very difficult, because 
it is not always possible to have a good overview of the interests of the 
individual and to attribute weight to these interests. The fact that the data 
controller makes the weighing without necessarily involving the individual 
contributes to this difficulty. For instance, consider the case where a third 
party collects and processes individual data for advertising purposes. 
The commercial interest of the third party may legitimize the processing. 
However, when, as a result, the individual is confronted with less convenient 
advertisements there is a privacy problem. Imagine a case where displayed 
advertisements reveal searches for wedding rings and the ‘wife-to-be’ sees 
these advertisements, which implies that the ‘husband-to-be’ cannot have a 
secret. Another example is when data collected on individuals are compared 
with others and the individual is negatively impacted because of the behavior 
of others. This is what happened in relation to a credit card company. The 
company (American Express) collected information on visited shops where 
their customers paid with their credit card. It appeared that some customers 
who visited certain Wal-Mart stores had a poor repayment history. As a 
result, customers with a high credit rating were also lowered in their credit 
limits.455 The interest of the credit card company was to reduce risk, but the 
individual has an interest of not being inappropriately indicated as a ‘risky 
customer’. This kind of processing and decision making without involving 
the individual leads to unreasonable decisions and negative effects for the 
individual. The interest of the credit card company is overrated by applying 
an attribute of a group of customers to all customers, without assessing the 
interests of the data subjects. Privacy problems may, thus, occur in cases of 
unlawful processing of data, but also in cases of lawful data processing.
A comparable issue concerns the balance in trade-offs for pay-with-data 
exchanges. Numerous web services are ‘free’, which in practice means that the 
455 See: <http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/GetsAnswers/Story?id=6747461#.UGn0kE3hKX->, 
last visited 1 October 2012.
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individual does not have to pay a certain amount of money or a subscription 
fee. The use of disclosed personal data, for instance for advertising purposes, 
finances the service. In traditional (offline) interactions, the individual 
makes a trade-off of what data to share and, in the interaction with the seller 
of a product or service, role-appropriate norms are developed. For this to 
happen, the individual has to be able to ascribe weights to the things being 
balanced. The problem is that role-appropriate information is lacking, in 
particular in pay-with-data exchanges, which makes it impossible to make 
a proper balance between disclosure of information and the received 
service.456 The individual does not have a proper option to balance interests 
and to provide the data controller with appropriate information concerning 
his interests. So, in practice the decisions do often not involve the individual 
at all. However, the interests of the individual have to be taken into account 
in order to make a proper weighing of interests.
5.3. Consequences for the individual
The practices indicated above can be translated into a number of specific 
threats related to profiling practices and the use of digital personae as a basis 
for decisions. These threats are:457 the surreptitious influencing, formatting 
and customization of individual behavior,458 threatening individual 
autonomy;459 knowledge asymmetries leading to power inequalities;460 
wrong decisions as a result of false positives461 and false negatives and a 
threat to due process;462 unfair decisions based on correct profiles that allow 
for unwarranted and invisible discrimination;463 the taking of unmotivated 
and unilateral decisions about individuals.464 People become vulnerable due 
to the “lack of any meaningful form of participation in the collection and 
use of their personal information.”465 All of the mentioned threats will be 
discussed more elaborately below.
456 Warner & Sloan 2012.
457 Gutwirth & Hildebrandt 2010, p. 34; Hildebrandt & Van Dijk 2010,  pp. 70-72; 
Hildebrandt 2008b, p. 64.
458 Lessig 1999, pp. 153-154; Hildebrandt 2008a, p. 307; Zarsky 2002-2003, at pp. 38-40; 
Zarsky 2006.
459 Hildebrandt 2008b, p. 63.
460 Lyon 2007, p. 101, with reference to a new conceptualization of the ‘digital divide’.
461 False positives or false negatives can also result from a problem Garfinkel calls the ‘False 
Data Syndrome’, which means that “[b]ecause much of the information in the data sea 
is correct, we are predisposed to believe that it is all correct.” See: Garfinkel 2001, p. 74.
462 Steinbock 2005.
463 By Turow referred to as “narrowed options and social discrimination” (emphasis in 
original):  Turow 2011, p. 89.
464 Lyon 2007, p. 101.
465 Solove 2004, pp. 47-48. 
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The surreptitious influencing, formatting and customization of 
individual behavior is taking new forms with the advent of real-time web 
personalization.466 Websites can have different content and different types 
of displaying content, depending on the individual visitor that passes by. The 
more a website is tailored to the individual, the better it can influence the 
individual in clicking certain links or advertisements. It not only concerns 
the products advertised based on the interests of the individual derived 
from an analysis of web behavior, but also the way the advertisements or 
information is displayed. Whether something is presented as a picture, a 
piece of text, or a banner makes a difference and different individuals have 
different preferences. It can, thus, be assessed what type of presentation is 
the most attractive for an individual. By choosing how to display different 
content parts on a website, the individual can be surreptitiously influenced to 
click on a specific part of the web page. The next step, once the individual has 
clicked on a piece of content, is to decide what options are presented to the 
individual. For instance, banks and insurance companies, based on this type 
of behavioral analysis, choose what options for insurances or money saving 
or loans are presented. Alternative options may still be available by browsing 
the website, but are much harder to find and much less likely to be chosen due 
to their presentation form. A side step from the paved way is discouraged and 
even made harder in a practical manner. This highly influences individual 
behavior and the limited options and indirect exclusion threaten individual 
autonomy, in particular when there is no consent or transparency. 
Knowledge asymmetries leading to power inequalities are directly related 
to the access to information individuals have. In the online context, these 
power inequalities can be automatically created. The practice of structurally 
excluding individuals from access to information or options limits the 
opportunities for the individual to get a full picture of the available options 
and interests at stake. Reconfirming the position of the individual can 
be compared to the reconfirming of the interests, which results in a filter 
bubble.467 The individual is caught in his social position (as profiled by the 
service provider) and opportunities to escape from this position are reduced. 
Wrong decisions as result of false positives and false negatives can lead 
to unfair inclusion or exclusion. The data on which a decision is based 
are incorrect. However, in online contexts, the individual often does not 
have the opportunity to correct the data. In particular, in the case where 
distributive profiles are applied to a group of individuals, for instance, 
with weblining based on IP addresses, the individual can receive offers for 
credit cards with lower limits, while he may financially be perfectly able to 
466 See Chapter 5, section 4.3.
467 Pariser 2011.
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have a higher limit. Applying for a higher credit wil, however, be difficult 
online. It is the decision as such with which the individual is confronted. It 
may even be the case that the individual does not even notice the decision 
being taken, because he is simply not receiving information or an offer. In 
case the individual becomes aware of the decision, there may be an option to 
fight this decision. Nevertheless, the data on which the decision was based 
may remain incorrect. Moreover, being subjected to decisions “based on 
false assumptions derived from infringements of privacy is self-evidently 
damaging and potentially unfair.”468 In relation to profiling, Bernal even 
argues that privacy and autonomy are threatened by the use of true data as 
well as false data. Even if things are true, privacy includes the right to keep 
things secret and private.
Threats to due process are in particular relevant in relation to law enforcement 
or national security practices and not in the commercial context. However, 
as was shown, the cooperation between commercial companies and law 
enforcement agencies is increasing and includes processes where certain 
decisions on what kind of behavior is deemed suspicious are taken by 
commercial companies. These decisions can even be based on automated 
analyses and filtering technologies that constitute profiles of ‘suspicious’ 
individuals. Moreover, the activities undertaken by commercial companies 
to find ‘suspicious behavior’ are less embedded in legal requirements than 
when these activities are performed by law enforcement authorities.
The risk of unfair decisions based on correct profiles that allow for 
unwarranted and invisible discrimination is directly relevant in the context 
of the democratic state as well. When data controllers do not operate 
responsibly and fairly, the categorization of individuals will lead to increased 
social exclusion and marginalization of individuals that were already 
vulnerable.469 Social classes will be reconfirmed and articulated. Society 
as a whole becomes probably less democratic, while at the individual level 
the impact of social exclusion is increased, as is the case with weblining.470 
Internet access will further reduce options instead of increasing them by 
facilitating access to information.
The taking of unmotivated and unilateral decisions about individuals has 
a strong relation with activities such as weblining, which were described 
above. Opportunities of individuals are denied based on their digital 
personae. Credit cards may be offered with a lower limit, not because of 
the individual credit history, but because of more general attributes, such as 
468 Bernal 2011, p. 286.




race, sex or postal code or the types of web sites the individual visits.471 In 
the context of advertising, there is the paradox of the mass-personalization: 
in order to make information relevant to the individual, the individual has 
to be categorized. The individual’s view of the online world is unique, but 
similarly unique as for others.472 
The current use of digital personae and profiles can, thus, severely affect 
the individual. The reasons can be related to the increasing technological 
possibilities, including data mining, combining data bases, (re-)identifiability, 
and connecting to individuals without identification. Also the types of data 
that become available are emerging and can be used in other contexts than in 
which they were initially disclosed when they are ‘publicly’ available.473 The 
possible level of impact for the individual is related to whether the data set 
used as a basis for decisions is a profile or a digital persona. The use of a 
digital persona can have a higher impact than the use of a profile, in particular 
in relation to legal effects, where it is often necessary that the individual is 
identified. However, a profile can often easily become a digital persona and 
the two are on a sliding scale. All actions taken based on profiles can, thus, 
also move into the direction of taking decisions based on digital personae. 
6. Conflicts with the main values and rights to be respected
The conflicts with data protection principles imply that privacy can be 
harmed by the use of digital personae and, to a certain extent, profiles. It was 
also shown that the DPD in its current form is inadequate to deal with these 
threats to privacy when decisions are taken on the basis of digital personae. 
Next to privacy, the other main values and rights presented in Chapter 4 are 
at stake. In this section, conflicts with the main values and rights, resulting 
from the use of digital personae, will be discussed.
The scenarios and practices described above bring considerable challenges 
to contextual integrity and informational self-determination. To start with 
the latter, it is obvious that an individual cannot control with whom to share 
data when he is not aware of the data being collected on another party’s 
initiative. If there is no clear notification of the collection of personal data 
and the entire process is part of a technical mechanism which is not directly 
visible, the individual cannot be aware of his data being processed. Data 
subjects have to be informed about their data being processed and by whom. 
In many cases this information is absent or has to be found by searching 
471 Andrews 2012.
472 Van ‘t Hof, Van Est & Timmer 2012, p. 232.
473 For instance, the use of Facebook data by credit rating agencies: <http://gigaom.com/
europe/credit-agency-mines-facebook-data/> (last accessed June 20, 2012). 
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for a privacy policy on a website. In the case that a contract for a service is 
closed, however, this information may be disclosed properly. At least, the 
contracting parties are known and the data processing can be indicated by 
the data controller. Whether the individual understands the purposes and 
impact of the processing is questionable, as was seen above.
The storage of information on an external memory, instead of only disclosing 
in a one on one interaction, makes that telling and listening become two 
“distinct events separated in time,”474 implying that one cannot directly see 
one’s audience. Here, two particular reasons can be identified for the loss 
of control over information. First, each sharing of data is a loss of control in 
itself, and, second, each online interaction reveals information to the other 
party, even when no files are shared.475 The nature of online interactions, 
thus, makes that there is always more data disclosure than only explicitly 
communicated data. In particular, the additional data, such as web browsing 
behavior or click trails within a website that can be automatically collected 
and analyzed is what commercial companies are looking for. 
With regard to contextual integrity, problems also arise due to the 
multiplicability of data. Data can easily be copied and transferred to other 
environments than those in which the data (the digital persona) were 
created or collected. The specific context in which data are disclosed may 
become blurred because of the covert presence of other parties that may 
take or transfer the data to a different context immediately. Control over 
contexts, deciding what data to disclose in what context, and defining the 
contextual norms in an interaction become, thus, problematic to maintain. 
However, even without active copying or transferring the data can often be 
accessed by other parties. Online environments, such as SNS, contain lots 
of information which is meant for a specific context,476 but can be accessed 
by people or organizations from other contexts as well.477 Moreover, each 
time information is retrieved it becomes de- and recontextualized because 
pieces of information are retrieved without their accompanying contexts and 
presented in a new context of search results.478 In particular, when data is 
disclosed in a specific context and not in general, the data may be assumed 
to be interesting for other contexts. For instance, consider the case where 
474 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, p. 29.
475 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, pp. 85-87.
476 Leenes 2010.
477 Information is often sold by entities to other entities: Solove 2003, p. 7. SNS sell 
advertising opportunities to companies who can have their advertisements targeted at 
specific groups of SNS users. The SNS functions as an intermediary in this case and 
sells access to their advertising space and not directly to the profiles. 
478 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, p. 90.
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credit reporting agencies479 sell information to insurance companies who 
can set their rates based on this information. The “very fact that people 
are willing to provide their data for one, distinct purpose makes those data 
especially attractive as bases for action for quite different purposes.”480 Data 
in electronic form cannot only be easily spread to multiple points, but is also 
accessible from multiple points. “The grapevine is thorough, scientific, and 
precise; records of whom we are and what we have done follow us around and 
even sometimes precede us.”481 Next to information being publicly accessible 
or being decontextualized, the digitization of data also increased the risk of 
data leakage. Obviously, when data are leaked, the risk of decontextualization 
is very high if not directly present.
The risk of decontextualization is increased by the behavior of individuals 
themselves as well, resulting from technological possibilities. People work 
from home, make business phone calls in public environments, and send 
private emails from their offices. Mobile technologies used by businesses, 
together with the economic landscape which has individuals 24/7 available, 
make that context and location no longer coincide.482  
When different partial identities are connected to each other the contexts to 
which these partial identities relate collapse. This means that information 
from one context becomes available in another context. People who have 
access to a context will then also have access to the information, even when 
they initially were not able to access the other context as well. One can 
imagine examples of an employer getting access to information, posted, 
for instance, on Facebook by either the employee or by others, about an 
employee’s drinking party last night and the resulting hangover while the 
employee was reporting ill because of a fever.483 Obviously, an employer 
will confront the employee with the clear facts and the employee then 
becomes aware of the information being available to the employer. Painful 
as it may be, the employee at least gets some knowledge about the collapsed 
contexts. However, in the case of digitally available information  things may 
even be worse, because this knowledge is often lacking. The collection and 
combination of data takes place behind the scenes. Individuals are not, or 
only partially, aware of their data being collected. How and by whom these 
data are combined is even more opaque. It is clear that the individual has no 
479 Experian, for instance, can provide information on creditworthiness of individuals 
based on combinations of online and offline data.
480 Goold & Neyland 2009, p. 9.
481 Nissenbaum 2010, p. 40. 
482 Hildebrandt 2011, p. 37.
483 For this and other examples, see: < http://www.natlawreview.com/article/status-
update-fired-social-media-great-way-to-market-company-it-also-great-way-to-get-
fired-> (last accessed June 20, 2012).
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freedom to disclose what he wants and to decide to whom things are disclosed. 
Because the individual is not actively involved, there cannot be consent for 
the disclosure and the lack of knowledge implies that there is no mechanism 
for control afterwards. Also the purposes for which the data are used remain 
unclear or may even be undetermined beforehand. With individuals being 
totally unaware, there can be no informational self-determination, and with 
collapsing contexts there is no contextual integrity. Thus, privacy is violated 
on its main aspects.
Another issue concerns the construction of identity free from unreasonable 
constraints.484 As an example of an unreasonable constraint the forced 
disclosure of data irrelevant or unnecessary for the service at stake was given. 
Obviously, when numerous data are collected and combined this unreasonable 
constraint is at stake as well. There are no means for individuals to avoid 
disclosure, because new technologies and ways of circumventing privacy 
enhancing tools are developed continuously.485 As a result, the individual is 
not able to carefully construct several partial identities and to stay in control 
over the data disclosed in each partial identity. An additional problem is the 
difficulty to determine whether some constraint is ‘unreasonable’. The use of 
proactive technologies, for instance to serve personalized advertisements or 
to automatically apply personalized preferences, has a nudging influence,486 
which is invisible to the individual. Potentially, automated decisions are an 
unreasonable constraint to the freedom of identity construction. Whether 
the constraint is indeed unreasonable, however, can only be judged when it 
is clear on what grounds (data) the decision was based and what the effects 
will be.487 It is, thus, very difficult to foresee what information is derived 
from individual behavior and what inferences result in a particular proactive 
treatment by a service provider, which is also known as the ‘inference 
problem’.488
Individual autonomy means that the individual is able to make his own choices 
and to specify his own desires. When data are collected and analyzed in order 
to make decisions concerning the individual, autonomy can be affected. 
The individual is not always involved in the decision making process, but is 
particularly affected when decisions have a nudging effect and/or when there 
are no clear options for the individual to challenge the decision. Besides, 
targeted advertisements and even the relatively simple decision to confront 
484 In line with the privacy definition by Agre 1997 (see Chapter 4).
485 See, for instance, evercookies (<http://samy.pl/evercookie/>) and HTTP cookie 
respawning (McDonald & Cranor 2011).
486 See above, section 5.3.
487 Hildebrandt 2011, p. 43. 
488 Dwyer 2009, as referred to by: Hildebrandt 2011, p. 42.
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an individual with a certain advertisement or not can have influences on 
the freedom of choice. In particular, the options that are not shown to the 
individual cannot, or only in limited cases, be detected by the individual, 
therewith limiting the overview of options an individual could have. The 
phenomenon of limited choices, combined with difficulties to take notice of 
alternative viewpoints and information, is what Pariser has called the ‘Filter 
Bubble’.489 Targeted advertising or selectively providing information can 
create a vicious circle, which continuously reaffirms earlier choices based 
on limited information. Content providers supply ‘tailored’ information as a 
reply to (implicitly or explicitly) provided personal information concerning 
traits and interests of individuals. Newly provided personal information will 
be based on the information previously provided by the content provider. 
This ‘vicious circle’ will “ ‘push’ individuals towards certain products or 
services in which they initially were not interested […]. This is achievable by 
narrowing down the options they receive and offering persuasive arguments 
at exactly the right time, thus impeding their autonomy.”490 Taking the idea 
of the ‘database of intentions’491 a step further makes clear that companies 
are trying to predict future behavior in a broad sense. Also possible desires 
or wishes are determined, or companies decide to influence an individual 
directly in order to steer the development of desires. In that case the 
individual is no longer sufficiently free to decide for himself which choices 
to make and which desires to specify. As was shown in Chapter 5, on-the-
fly web personalization facilitates the steering of decisions and desires at 
an individual level by including specific content displayed in specific forms, 
while making it more difficult for other content to be found. Long term goals 
are specified by other parties and the individual is at least influenced in his 
decisions.492 An individual must be able to retreat from such influence in 
order to achieve some kind of autonomy.493
Strikingly, negative impact on individual autonomy may also occur as a result 
from general inclusion. For instance, in the US, in the context of underserved 
classes, internet access has been promoted.494 At first sight, internet access 
would bring new chances and benefits. Basically, lack of access to the internet 
and limited abilities to benefit from this access, for instance concerning 
job search and retrieving information, can result in social inequalities495 
and providing internet access can help solving these problems. However, 
it also allowed for data profiling of underserved classes in order to offer 
489 Pariser 2011.
490 Zarsky 2002-2003, p. 38.
491 Battelle 2005-2006.
492 Zarsky 2002-2003, p. 38.
493 Hildebrandt 2008a , p. 310.
494 Gangadharan 2012.
495 Witte & Mannon 2009.
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subprime mortgages. The “subprime lending boom highlights the harmful 
consequences of mining, triangulating, and targeting. It highlights the 
intersection between data profiling and exclusionary practices of the 
subprime industry to exploit and disempower the underserved.”496 The 
inclusion in new technologies, thus, can also create more social exclusion 
instead of only promoting equality and social justice.497 In this respect, the 
‘digital divide’ acquires a new meaning. There is a shift from a ‘digital divide’, 
the distinction between haves and have-nots, to digital inequality, which is the 
inequality among persons with formal access to the internet.498
Another aspect is lack of transparency. An individual gets confronted with 
a decision. This can even be in the sense that an individual just notices 
nothing but is excluded from some service or product, such as an insurance 
which is not shown on a website, because, based on profiling information, 
the individual seems not to belong to the target group. What data a digital 
persona consists of is often difficult to know completely. However, the way 
the data are processed and which data or indications lead to a certain decision 
is even more difficult to find out. Besides, it is not always clear where data 
come from and with whom they are shared. In particular, in cases where it 
can be argued that there are no personal data, data protection regulations 
may not be applicable, leading to less protection of the privacy of the 
individual. Nevertheless, privacy is often indicated as a necessary condition 
for the fulfillment of the right to autonomy.
Lack of transparency and (informational) self-determination leads to 
barriers for the proper fulfillment of the right to autonomy. The use of digital 
personae creates a distance between the service provider and the individual. 
The individual is no longer necessarily involved in the interaction, or to a lesser 
extent, to come to a decision. It can be the case that a service provider only 
asks for some information from the individual, which is then accomplished 
with data the service provider already has in the digital persona representing 
this individual. It can, however, also be the case that a service provider asks 
for all information, but compares the information from the individual with 
the information in the digital persona and still comes to another decision. 
In these cases, misinterpretation of data can have huge consequences and 
relying blindly on the data and ignoring the information from the individual 
even makes it worse. In the commercial sector this kind of mistake is often 
made, with great negative impacts. Mainly in the US, employers have 
commercial companies run background checks on future employees. To 
perform these checks, several sources are combined, ranging from public 
496 Gangadharan 2012.
497 Gangadharan 2012.
498 DiMaggio & Hargittai 2001.
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records and court records to private records and internet profiles which 
disclose interests of the individual. Mistakes can occur, for instance when 
there are more individuals with the same name, and the data are not checked 
accurately. As a result, individuals can be denied a job or loan.499
A relatively new practice is the close cooperation between Facebook and law 
enforcement authorities.500 Facebook is automatically scanning postings 
and chats in order to search for criminal or suspicious behavior.501 When 
something suspicious is found, the information is handed over to the police. 
An example was a man who was arrested because he allegedly solicited a 
minor.502 The automated scanning activities now imply that over 1 billion 
individuals, the amount of monthly active members Facebook now has,503 
are closely monitored. At the moment it is unclear whether ‘suspicious’ chats 
or posts are deleted afterwards or whether they are stored permanently.504 
Even though it may be a good thing that Facebook is helping to prevent 
crime, there is an important problem. It is unclear how the algorithm works 
and what activities or words are flagged as suspicious. When a series of 
events (or probably one single event) is registered, the information is handed 
over to the police. The workings of the algorithm, however, influence what 
information is presented and how. Because of the automated process, the 
risk of decontextualization of the information is high. The risk of false 
positives is, thus, equally high. The individual, however, may be arrested and 
accused of criminal activities.
In relation to digital personae and inclusion or exclusion of customers based 
on categorization of these digital personae the lack of choice and the lack 
of protection against influences external from the individual are important. 
An individual can be positively affected when, for instance, serendipity is 
increased by attending him to products he would not have found otherwise.505 
499 Robertson 2011.
500 See Facebook’s help page on ‘Law Enforcement and Third Party Matters’: < https://
www.facebook.com/help/?page=211462112226850>, last visited 4 October 2012.
501 Morozov 2012. What ‘suspicious behavior’ exactly means is unclear. Most likely, it 
is related to a number of specific criminal acts that often take place via SNS, such as 
soliciting minors or trafficking. 
502 See < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-internet-predators-
idUSBRE86B05G20120712>, last visited 4 October 2012.
503 See < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/us-facebook-
idUSBRE8930N320121004>, last visited 4 October 2012.
504 See < http://mashable.com/2012/07/12/facebook-scanning-chats/>, last visited 4 
October 2012.
505 This is, for instance, in line with the corporate philosophy of Google, which aims to 
understand what people mean and to make information accessible and as relevant as 
possible: <http://www.google.nl/about/company/products/> (last accessed June 27, 
2012).
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On the other hand, however, there can be a negative effect in the sense that 
an individual is excluded from certain choices or products.506 For instance, 
banks can decide on the basis of carefully collected information how much 
time and effort to spend on a specific customer. If the customer seems not 
to have much money, it is not worthwhile to invest much time. But jobs can 
also be denied based on profiling. While there is a right which allows job 
applicants not to indicate that they are pregnant, and there is no obligation to 
share their race or sexual preferences, this information can be derived from 
online sources and used to discriminate against certain applicants.507 The 
limitation of opportunities negatively affects autonomy.
To conclude, when choices are influenced by others or when collected 
and analyzed information leads to restrictions on identity construction, 
the individual is affected. So, the creation and use of digital personae and 
profiles certainly has implications for the real-world individual. Lack of 
transparency in data collection, data usage, and decision making processes 
makes the individual vulnerable to restrictions on autonomy and identity 
construction. Unfortunately, it seems that there is no real escape possible 
due to technological developments.508 Also protection measures taken by 
website providers are often insufficient to prevent privacy leakage.509 Even 
in the case of promising initiatives, such as the DoNotTrack (DNT) system, 
problems arise concerning the interpretation by businesses510 as well as 
expectations amongst internet users.511 A user may clearly indicate that he 
does not want to be tracked, but a company can decide to do so, but not to 
use the data for targeted advertising purposes. When an individual wants to 
have certain aspects of his browsing behavior excluded from tracking, but is 
fine with other parts, he may switch the DNT feature on and off. A result of 
the diverging interpretation by a company may be that the part that should 
be excluded from tracking is still used as inut for targeted advertisements.
Ultimately, when the individual is unable to construct his own individual 
identity in a manner that is free from unreasonable constraints, and in 
line with his own wishes and desires, the human dignity of this individual 
506 As is the case with weblining, where, comparable to redlining, groups of people are 
systematically excluded from offers based on where they live (via IP address) or what 
their expected spending behavior is: Stepanek 2000.
507 Stefanovic 2012.
508 See Chapter 5.
509 Krishnamurthy, Naryshkin & Wills 2011. 
510 Businesses appear to interpret DoNotTrack as DoNotTarget, meaning that they still 
track individuals over the web, but do not use the collected information for providing 
targeted advertisements. More on the DNT technology: Tene & Polonetsky 2011; and 
on the distinction between tracking and targeting: Bilenko, Richardson & Tsai 2011.
511 McDonald & Peha 2011. 
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is affected. The uniqueness of the individual as a human being, unique in 
his own kind, and developing according to his own desires, is affected by 
others. Moreover, practices of companies making their profit out of the use 
and sale of personal information may conflict with human dignity, since the 
individual is seen as an asset. The classifications are based on the interests 
of the profiling companies and their clients and not on the interests of the 
individual.512 The individual is in these cases negatively affected and not able 
to profit from his economic value, which would better balance the interests 
of companies and the individuals. The current information society, or data 
society, is to a large extent based on the monetization of data, which was not 
yet the case at the introduction of the DPD in 1995. Moreover, the increasing 
use of monitoring and profiling technologies to analyze and influence 
individual behavior has an effect on individual autonomy. Autonomy is 
affected by actual threats as well as by perceived threats,513 in the form of 
a chilling effect, where individuals adapt their behavior in order to prevent 
being classified in a certain manner. Behavior is no longer completely free. 
A way to solve the problems described above may be to protect the digital 
persona, because this is the direct link between the individual and the 
information concerning the individual which is used to affect the individual. 
Protecting digital personae may offer legal safeguards and in the end offer 
better protection for the individual as a human being with an inherent value. 
Appropriate protection of privacy and individual autonomy facilitates free 
identity construction. The current legal system is insufficient to offer this 
protection. In particular, the narrowing down of human dignity to privacy, 
and of privacy to data protection, are crucial points of attention when 
addressing this problem. This implies that an alternative approach has to 
be taken in regulation, which explicitly addresses the individual with human 
dignity as the ultimate goal of protection.
7. Problem definition: Legal uncertainty for data controllers and 
inappropriate protection of individuals
In this section, the key problems related to the protection of the rights and 
values of individuals will be described on the basis of the analysis provided in 
this and the previous chapters, which leads to a definitive formulation of the 
main research question of this study.
512 Bernal 2011, p. 150.
513 Bernal 2011, p. 288.
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7.1. Two key problems
In principle, the practical issues described in the previous sections can be 
summarized as two key issues. First, there are problems related to the 
applicability of the DPD.  Commercial companies often deny the link to 
the individual, therewith trying to declare the DPD inapplicable to their 
data processing activities. The fact that data are collected from individuals 
does not necessarily imply that it concerns personal data. Aggregated sets 
or sets of data that are not linked to an individual, such as group profiles, are 
considered anonymous data. However, at some point in time an individual 
may be recognized as carrying one or more attributes from the data set and 
the data set can be connected to this identified or identifiable individual. 
The data set, then, becomes an individual or personal profile, and a digital 
persona. The problem is that all the data that were processed before the link 
to an individual could be made were not subjected to the DPD, but the data 
set can be very rich and include inferred data as well. When the processing 
was started, however, a ground for legitimizing the processing was lacking, 
simply because it was not yet needed. Moreover, the profiles as such are 
also used to affect individuals, so some form of protection of individuals in 
relation to profiles is needed as well. 
The concept of personal data is broadly interpreted by the Article 29 Working 
Party and, in their opinion, can include IP addresses and cookie identifiers. 
Nevertheless, this opinion focuses on the option of the data becoming 
related to an identifiable individual while this may be very uncertain. In fact, 
the inclusion of too many data sets (and profiles) in the DPD regime leads 
to legal uncertainty for data controllers and individuals. The EGE indicates 
that, as a consequence of the broad and flexible concept of personal data, 
there are “numerous cases where it is not always clear whether individuals 
enjoy data protection rights and whether data controllers should comply 
with the obligations imposed by the Directive.”514 Besides, if the DPD is 
rendered applicable, data controllers can probably not always fulfill their 
information duties515 as long as the individual is not identifiable and, thus, 
not be compliant with the DPD. Adding information in order to identify the 
individual for this purpose would have a counter-effect on the protection 
offered by the DPD. Taking account of the fact that any other person might 
be able to relate data that are anonymous for the controller to an identified 
or identifiable person is too much of a burden in the current technological 
514 European Group on Ethics 2012, p. 46.
515 It can be argued that based on the cookie or IP address a device can be recognized 
and the information can be provided. This would, however, in many cases need the 
cooperation of numerous parties, in particular when third parties provide services to 




system of web interactions, which include several parties and possibilities for 
others to obtain the data.
The second issue is a complex of purpose binding and legitimate ground 
difficulties. One difficulty relates to the weighing of the economic interests 
of companies against the privacy interests of the individual. There are several 
aspects to this, ranging from the way the weighing of interests is performed 
by the data controller to the practice of covering data processing activities 
based on contracts. Also enforcement is relevant in this respect. Enforcement 
takes place ex post and data protection authorities are insufficiently equipped 
to adequately perform their tasks.516 As a result, the balance between the free 
flow of information and the privacy of the data subject, which are the two 
protection goals of the DPD, is absent. Moreover, data mining practices may 
reveal information that was never intended to be disclosed by the individual, 
even though the separate pieces of data may have been gathered with his 
consent. As it is unknown what information may be revealed, it is impossible 
to specify the exact purpose for which the data will be used, which may make 
data mining practices incompatible with the use limitation and purpose 
specification principles.517  Besides, it is simply impossible to make a proper 
weighing of interests if the effects of processing are unpredictable, making 
it hard to determine how the data subject’s interests are affected. The same 
problem is present in relation to informed consent. The individual cannot 
properly be informed when purposes are too vague or when possible future 
implications are unclear and difficult to predict. Technological practice, thus, 
runs out of step with the protection needed from the DPD.
7.2. Synthesis and research question
Digital personae often contain personal data in a broad sense. They are related 
to individuals that can be affected by decisions based on the representation. 
This is also the case for profiles, even though the decisions may be less 
significant in most cases. There is the possibility to make a connection to the 
individual. Whether this individual is ‘identified’ or ‘identifiable’ in the sense 
of the Data Protection Directive is not relevant. More importantly, however, 
the problem is not just related to the processing of personal data. In cases 
where digital personae indeed contain personal data, the processing of these 
data can completely take place in conformity with the law. The DPD provides 
requirements for the lawful processing of personal data. Nevertheless, the 
processing is the central focus point in data protection legislation and not 
516 Robinson, Graux, Botterman & Valeri 2009, p. 35. Whether an infringement of data 
protection legislation is taken up for investigation by a DPA is dependent on capacity 
and priorities. A complaint, thus, not always results in enforcement.
517 European Group on Ethics 2012, p. 57.
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
203
the effects this processing may have. The right to data protection has to 
be seen as a procedural right.518 In the case of digital personae, real-world 
individuals are affected by decisions taken based on the processing of the 
data. Even when the processing is lawful, i.e. in accordance with the DPD, 
the impact of a decision concerning the individual can have implications for 
his privacy and autonomy, and ultimately impact human dignity. The right 
to privacy and identity, and the related concepts, are substantive rights.519 
Because of the procedural nature of data protection rights as opposed to the 
substantive nature of the rights and concepts it aims to protect, a mismatch 
occurs. This implies that current data protection legislation only provides 
limited protection for the individual. 
Even when all data of which the processing can affect an individual should be 
considered personal data, this problem remains. The reason for that is that 
the digital persona is a potentially extremely fine-grained representation of 
an individual in the form of a data set. It does not concern separate data parts 
that can be considered personal data or not. Instead, the concept entails 
the complete picture that is available as a representation of the real-world 
individual. The completeness of the representation makes it a valuable source 
for decision making. Basically, decisions are taken based on characteristics 
which are the attributes or facets of the personality of the individual, and 
the right to identity of the individual is infringed,520 because the individual 
does not have the option to keep partial identities separated and to decide 
what his identity looks like autonomously. By using the digital persona as a 
representation instead of directly interacting with the represented individual, 
the distance towards the individual is growing.521 As a result, the impact of 
the decisions still affects the individual, because he is excluded from certain 
options or services or is denied a job or a loan, but the means for control 
by the individual are diminished or simply not available. Even though data 
protection regulation offers data subject rights, such as the right to access, 
erasure, or modification of data, these rights cannot help the individual to 
protect his autonomy. Assuming that the data subject has knowledge of the 
data set, the rights may only be helpful to have data changed or erased, but 
the data subject cannot directly influence or challenge the decision based on 
the data. Next to that, obtaining insight on the algorithms used to process 
the data may not provide sufficient clarity, since this is often too technical for 
individuals to understand.
518 Andrade 2012, p. 125.
519 Andrade 2012, p. 125.
520 Andrade 2012, p. 125.
521 Gürses & Berendt 2010, p. 309.
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In the DPD, the legitimate ground for the processing of personal data with 
which the data subject seems to have most control is consent. Basically, in 
these cases the individual has given his consent for the processing of his 
personal data. If the data processor abides by the DPD, the processing is even 
bound to a specific purpose beforehand. Nevertheless, the description of this 
purpose can be very general. But more importantly, the data subject cannot 
foresee the impact the processing may have. As a result, the autonomy of 
the individual may be seriously affected despite the consent for processing 
personal data.
The DPD stems from 1995 and the technical possibilities for processing 
personal data at the time were not at the level they are now. Back in 1995, the 
key activities were mainly related to relatively simple registration purposes, 
such as digitizing address books and probably some mailing lists, whereas 
now personal data processing is part of a large variety of activities. From that 
perspective, it is not that strange that the data subject’s rights included in the 
DPD seemed sufficient safeguards. However, even in the current reform of 
the DPD the focus is on consent and personal data protection. Taking into 
account that the current technologies can have many more implications for 
the autonomy of the individual, it is not likely that the reforms will solve these 
problems when the regulators stick to the original starting points and try to 
strengthen them. The processing of personal data as such is just not the main 
issue, but the effect it may have on the individual is the most important point.
For the same reason, applying a broad interpretation of the concept of 
personal data and, thus, considering the DPD applicable to most processing 
activities, does not help. Of course, data such as IP addresses and location 
data can sometimes be considered personal data and bringing these data 
within the scope of the DPD can be useful. However, the focus should not 
be on separate types of data, but on the affected individual. Data protection, 
as regulated by the DPD, is only a part of privacy and privacy is instrumental 
to individual autonomy. In the end, individual autonomy is therefore a much 
broader and higher level concept than personal data protection. Protecting, 
or regulating, the way personal data can be processed does not necessarily 
offer sufficient protection of privacy. Nevertheless, in the preamble of the 
DPD, privacy is mentioned several times as a right of the individual to be 
protected by the Directive.522 
522 “[T]he rights and freedoms of individuals, notably the right to privacy, which are 
contained in this Directive”. Preamble (2), (7), (10), (11), and (68). Strikingly, the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation (see Chapter 7 below) hardly refers to 
privacy as a normative background, but mentions a right to data protection instead 
(Costa & Poullet 2012, p. 255).
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Moreover, the problems as described in this study are more related to human 
dignity, individual autonomy, and identity being affected as a result of 
insufficient protection of privacy. The DPD has a process-oriented approach 
towards privacy and data protection, whereas the problem described in this 
study is result-oriented, looking at the impact on the privacy and autonomy 
of the individual. Privacy and autonomy are necessary conditions for the 
achievement of respect for identity and human dignity in the end.
The problem is that there appears to be a lot of legal uncertainty. In the 
case of profiles, the DPD is not always applicable or the applicability is 
uncertain. Data controllers have to base their decisions on the applicability 
on probabilities. Moreover, applying the DPD to profiles concerning non-
identifiable individuals is difficult in practice and not logical from a legal 
perspective. The exact scope of the DPD is unclear and, even though profiles 
can be anonymous, individuals may be affected by the use of their profiles. 
Individual autonomy and the construction of identity free from unreasonable 
constraints may be infringed upon. The focus in the DPD, however, is on 
the protection of privacy by means of regulating the processing and not the 
impact of the processing.
In order to better respect human dignity and the related concepts that deserve 
protection, a starting point may be to protect digital personae. Moreover, the 
importance of profiles has become clear throughout this study. Therefore, 
when including profiles as well, the final main research question of this study 
is: 
Can the (legal) protection of digital personae and profiles as coherent data 
sets, taking into account that they are used by businesses as a basis for making 
decisions that affect real world individuals, improve the protection of privacy and 
autonomy of the individuals represented by these digital personae?
Protecting the persona by providing a certain status or by granting rights 
will set limitations on the use of digital personae. Since the digital persona 
represents the real-world individual, the limitation of use on the digital 
persona could in the end help to protect the individual against decisions 
based on the digital persona. When searching for a solution to improve 
the protection of individuals, profiles will also be kept in mind, since this 
study has shown that these are relevant in relation to decision making 
concerning individuals as well. In the next chapter, several legal approaches 
from existing legal regimes will be assessed on their applicability to digital 
personae in order to find out whether these could be helpful for achieving 
better protection of the individual.
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Chapter 7  
Protection of Digital Personae
1. Introduction
In this Chapter, existing legal concepts that may be helpful in solving the 
problem will be explored. The previous chapter showed shortcomings in 
the DPD. Shortcomings in the data protection system in general were an 
incentive to revise the data protection framework. In January 2012, a draft 
proposal became available for a General Data Protection Regulation, which 
will replace the current Data Protection Directive (DPD). In order to assess 
whether the shortcomings with regard to the use of digital personae may be 
solved by the newly proposed Regulation, the relevant changes proposed in 
this Regulation will first be discussed here. Then, a number of legal concepts 
that are currently in place will be discussed in order to assess whether these 
can offer a solution, either directly or by analogy. These concepts will be 
discussed hypothetically, as if they are applied currently, in order to provide 
a lively view of the implications if these concepts would be applied to digital 
personae. 
2. Draft proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation
In Chapter 6, it was argued that the current legal framework for privacy 
and data protection insufficiently protects the privacy and autonomy of 
the individual in view of digital personae. The main source of protection 
with regard to data processing is the DPD. This Directive is currently 
under revision and will be replaced in due time. The revision of the EU 
data protection framework concerns the complete framework, including 
data protection in the context of law enforcement.523 A proposal for the 
new regulatory framework is already available, so an assessment can be 
made of the major changes that may have an impact on the creation and use 
of digital personae and on the privacy and autonomy of the individual. An 
important change with regard to data protection in commercial contexts is 
in the instrument: the new proposal is a Regulation524 instead of a Directive. 
This Regulation - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) -  has 
523 The entire proposed package is available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
newsroom/data-protection /news/120125_en.htm> (last accessed June 28, 2012).
524 Brussels, 25.1.2012, COM (2012) 11 final. Proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 




general applicability in all EU Member States and has direct applicability 
without discretionary power for the Member States (as was the case with 
the DPD). For the context of Police and Criminal Justice a separate Directive 
is proposed. This Directive sets the minimum standards for EU Member 
States for the protection of personal data and the free movement of these 
data for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties. Since this study 
focuses on commercial use of digital personae and not on the use by public 
authorities or law enforcement, only the draft Regulation will be discussed 
here. 
The Preamble of the GDPR contains a number of important recitals in 
relation to digital personae. For instance, recital 24 concerns identifiers. 
It states that: “When using online services, individuals are associated with 
online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, 
such as Internet Protocol addresses or cookie identifiers. Since this leave[s] 
traces which, combined with unique identifiers and other information 
received by the servers, can be used to create profiles of the individuals and 
identify them, this Regulation should be applicable to processing involving 
such data.” IP addresses and cookie identifiers are explicitly mentioned 
here. Furthermore, it is indicated that these identifiers facilitate the creation 
of profiles of individuals and identify them. In the context of cookies and 
IP addresses, identification is, thus, also considered possible based on 
recognition or singling out of an individual web visitor. Cookie identifiers 
or IP addresses can function as connectors between online activity and the 
offline individual. When combined with, or including a unique identifier, the 
data sets become digital personae instead of profiles. For instance, Facebook 
can connect online activity of an individual member to this person’s account 
based on the user ID in the cookie. The name of the individual member is 
known525 and is a direct identifier.
Recital 30 specifies a number of the data protection principles: lawfulness, 
fairness, transparency, data quality, and data minimization. The principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity are also highlighted. Proportionality is 
underscored in relation with limitation to “the minimum necessary for the 
purposes for which the data are processed”, and subsidiarity by indicating 
that “[p]ersonal data should only be processed if the purpose of the 
processing could not be fulfilled by other means.” 
The GDPR is with 91 Articles significantly more extensive than the DPD (34 
Articles). The most important changes concern clarifications and updates of 
existing definitions, and the introduction of new concepts. An important 
525 Facebook requires users to use their real name and actively checks this.
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change as regards the definitions is in the definition of ‘consent’,526 where 
the criterion ‘explicit’ is added. The reason for this is to avoid confusion with 
‘unambiguous consent’ and to have “one single and consistent definition of 
consent, ensuring the awareness of the data subject that, and to what, he or 
she gives consent.”527 Obtaining consent, thus, requires an explicit action 
by the data subject. Next to that, the burden of proof that consent has been 
provided lies with the data controller, who, thus, has to store the (actions 
signifying) consent. The data controller has to include an explicit step for 
the individual to give consent in his processes and show that this step really 
shows an explicit action of the individual. With regard to digital personae, 
this means that meeting the condition for legitimate processing based on 
consent is made more severe.
A new right introduced in the GDPR is the ‘Right to be forgotten’ (Article 
17). It is an extension to the right to erasure of data in the DPD. It provides 
“the conditions of the right to be forgotten, including the obligation of the 
controller which has made the personal data public to inform third parties on 
the data subject’s request to erase any links to, or copy or replication of that 
personal data. It also integrates the right to have the processing restricted 
in certain cases, avoiding the ambiguous terminology ‘blocking’.”528 
These conditions are somewhat limited compared to an earlier draft529 of 
the proposal, in which the obligation to inform third parties was still an 
obligation for the data controller to erase any public internet link, copy of, or 
replication of the personal data relating to the data subject contained in any 
publicly available communication service. In the earlier draft proposal it was 
provided that the data controller “shall in particular ensure the erasure of any 
public Internet link to, copy of, or replication of the personal data relating to 
the data subject contained in any publicly available communication service 
which allows or facilitates the search of or access to this personal data.”530 
The final proposal asks for the data controller to “take all reasonable steps, 
including technical measures, in relation to data for the publication of which 
the controller is responsible, to inform third parties which are processing 
such data, that a data subject requests them to erase any links to, or copy 
or replication of that personal data. Where the controller has authorised a 
third party publication of personal data, the controller shall be considered 
responsible for that publication.”531 In particular the right to have all publicly 
available copies of data erased was a big step taken in the draft proposal. It 
526 Article 4(8) GDPR. 
527 Explanatory Memorandum of the GDPR, p. 8.
528 Explanatory Memorandum of the GDPR, p. 9.
529 Version 56, 29.11.2011. Online available at <http://statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-
com-draft-dp-reg-inter-service-consultation.pdf> (last accessed July 29, 2012).
530 Article 15(2) of draft Version 56.
531 Article 17(2) GDPR.
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includes all public Internet links, so it seems that the aim is on links to pages 
on which the content is publicly available, i.e. without the need for a login. 
However, it would be inefficient not to include data on, for instance, social 
networking sites on non-public profile pages that are only accessible for 
Friends of the profile owner after logging in. Parts may be erased by the data 
subject himself, but there may also be information, such as tags on photos, 
which were placed by others and cannot always directly be erased by the 
profile owner. The extensive approach taken in the draft proposal might have 
been unrealistic, since the data controller will not always have the means to 
achieve deletion of all copies made by others. In the final proposal, are more 
reasonable approach is taken, which is based on a duty of effort of the data 
controller.
As opposed to the draft proposal, the relatively limited provision regarding 
the right to be forgotten in the GDPR proposal avoids an obligation for data 
controllers to police the entire internet,532 while at the same time there is an 
emphasis on the responsibility of the data controller. Next to this practical 
approach, there is discussion on the scope and meaning of the right to be 
forgotten. Koops533 indicates that there are several opinions on what the 
right should entail, mostly related to the envisioned aim of the right. He 
distinguishes between three guises: A right to have data deleted in due 
time, a claim on society to have a clean slate, and an individual interest in 
unrestrained expression in the here and now.534 The latter seems to be of a 
different kind than the others, namely more related to forgetting as such, 
than to a legal right.535 For the first two options, have data deleted in due 
time and the claim to have a clean slate, Koops sees (potential) ‘harm’ as 
main characteristic leading to a plea for a right to be forgotten.536 Looking 
at the reasonable effort to be expected on a case-by-case basis seems the 
most appropriate way to go forward in distilling the exact, and feasible, 
meaning of a ‘right to be forgotten’. With respect to digital personae, the 
right to be forgotten would be mostly relevant in the interpretation of the 
right to have data deleted in due time or the right to have a clean slate. Digital 
personae consisting of (outdated) data should be deleted and not be used as 
a basis for taking decisions. Next to that, a clean slate would imply that an 
old digital persona should not be compared to a more recent one. The most 
recent version should be leading or even the only one available. Some of 
the obligations for controllers, such as accuracy and transparency, support 
this idea: data have to be updated regularly and have to be checked on their 
532 Kuner 2012.
533  Koops 2011.
534  Koops 2011, p. 236.
535  Koops 2011, p. 254.
536  Koops 2011, p. 240 and 250.
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accuracy in the current situation. The right to be forgotten can, thus, also 
support the principle of data quality.
Another new proposed right for the data subject is the right to data 
portability.537 The data subject should be able to transfer data concerning him 
“from one automated processing system to and into another, without being 
prevented from doing so by the controller. As a precondition, it provides the 
right to obtain from the controller those data in a commonly used electronic 
format.”538 A digital persona, then, can be used in different systems on the 
initiative of the represented individual. This is even the case when the digital 
persona is not (solely) created by the individual. The individual can ask the 
controller to provide the digital persona in an electronic format and share it 
with other parties.
The DPD contains a prohibition against automated individual decisions 
in Article 15. In the GDPR, Article 20 builds on this article with some 
modifications and additional safeguards. It gives every natural person “the 
right not to be subject to a measure which produces legal effects concerning 
this natural person or significantly affects this natural person,” based on 
automated processing for profiling purposes. By the formulation of this 
provision, digital personae and profiles are both covered, since the profiling 
has to concern a ‘natural person’. This person does not necessarily have 
to be identified or identifiable yet, but as soon as identification is possible, 
rights of data subjects as provided for by the GDPR apply.539 The exact 
reason for the changed terminology is unclear, but in any case it opens ways 
for including profiles as well. In the DPD, the term ‘data subject’ was used, 
which implies being identified or identifiable. Profiles could, thus, not be 
covered by the provision. According to Article 20, the profiling has to be 
meant to “analyse or predict in particular the natural person’s performance 
at work, creditworthiness, economic situation, location, health, personal 
preferences, reliability or behaviour.” Obviously, the question rises what 
‘significantly affects’ means. The fact that the effect for the individual is not 
restricted to legal effects only is important. Moreover, the explicit mentioning 
of analyzing or predicting personal preferences or behavior is directly in line 
with the problems that arise from contemporary profiling practices. Being 
included or excluded for certain offers seems not to be a legal effect per 
se, but it certainly affects the individual. In addition, for drafting the new 
537 Article 18 GDPR.
538 Explanatory Memorandum of the GDPR, p. 9.
539 Strictly spoken, the GDPR only applies in cases where the data concern data subjects 
(identified or identifiable natural persons). As long as the data concern anonymous 
individuals, the individuals cannot exercise data subject rights either, or at least this 
may be very difficult. 
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Article account was taken of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on 
Profiling,540 in which it was considered that “profiling an individual may 
result in unjustifiably depriving her or him from accessing certain goods or 
services and thereby violate the principle of non-discrimination.”541 Mere 
inclusion or exclusion can, thus, be indicated as a legal effect when it results 
in violation of non-discrimination principles. These principles form the 
starting point for legal provisions in which specific forms of discrimination 
as such are prohibited and are a specification of the fact that each individual 
has human dignity, regardless of personal characteristics or circumstances. 
Besides, the Recommendation indicates that different contexts should be 
kept separated when data are collected and analyzed for profiling purposes, 
since the right to privacy and protection of personal data “entails the 
existence of different and independent spheres of life where each individual 
can control the use she or he makes of her or his identity.”542 This is interesting 
in relation to digital personae. These are, as indicated earlier, created within 
a specific context. The transfer of digital personae to other contexts, or the 
use of digital personae for other purposes than originally intended, that 
is to say other than intended at the time of creation, is prohibited. In line 
with this, the combination of different digital personae that represent the 
same individual for different purposes or contexts is not allowed,543 since 
this almost inevitably collapses the boundaries between different spheres 
of life. The link between profiling and potential limits on individual control 
in relation to the use of an individual’s identity indicates that disrespecting 
contextual integrity can be considered a significant effect.
Section 4 of Article 20 GDPR provides some specific safeguards. The 
controller has to provide information as to the existence of processing for 
a measure and the envisaged effects of such processing on the data subject. 
These safeguards are very welcome in light of the protection of the data 
subject. Moreover, attention is paid to the effects of the processing and 
not only to the processing itself. However, there are some limitations. The 
safeguards only apply in a few cases, which are mentioned in section 2 of the 
Article, namely the entering into or the performance of a contract, lodged 
by the data subject; processing based on authorization by law, or; based on 
the consent of the data subject. In these cases, reference is made to the data 
subject, which means that the safeguards do not apply to profiles. In some 
cases, the safeguards may apply to digital personae, but only if the processing 
540 CM/Rec (2010)13. 
541 Preamble to the Council of Europe recommendation on Profiling.
542 Preamble to the Council of Europe recommendation on Profiling.
543 See also the proposed Article 5(b) on purpose binding: “Personal data must be collected 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes.”
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is based on a contract (which is often not that straightforward) or for the 
performance of a contract. However, in particular in cases where profiling 
techniques are applied to target advertisements or to make other types of 
automated decisions on the fly, according to Article 20(2)(a) the safeguard 
would also require the opportunity for human intervention. This may be 
lacking in practice. The safeguards as presented are thus very ambitious 
and relate directly to the core problems of restrictions on autonomy and 
contextual integrity. Nevertheless, the wordings used as well as the limitation 
to cases where there is a data subject result in less protection than may be 
desirable. 
The attention paid to profiling activities in the proposal is not surprising in 
light of a broader debate that is taking place with regard to online tracking 
and monitoring practices performed by several companies. The European 
Commission is closely collaborating with the American Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in order to come to a standard approach towards 
profiling. As can be derived from the preamble of the GDPR concerning 
(cookie) identifiers and the provision on automated decisions, the aim is to 
give users more control over the use of their browsing data. In particular, 
online behavioral advertising (OBA) is focused upon.544 This was also 
reflected in Directive 2009/136/EC,545 in which it is required that a user 
gives his consent546 for being monitored and tracked. How this consent has 
to be expressed is still debated, but Recital 66 of the Directive states that 
such consent can be expressed by using the appropriate settings of a browser 
or another application.
Next to the regulatory initiatives concerning OBA, there are technical means 
being developed to provide the user with control. The most successful 
example thus far is the DoNotTrack (DNT) initiative. This initiative started 
back in 2007, when several interest groups asked the FTC to create a Do 
Not Track list for online advertising, comparable to the Do Not Call lists 
that already existed.547 The idea was to have internet users being able to opt-
out for tracking in one single step, instead of having to delete cookies on a 
544 Including a right to object to processing for direct marketing purposes in Article 
19(2) GDPR.
545 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 






regular basis. Several mechanisms have been experimented with, leading to 
the conclusion that the best option was to include a browser header that is 
being sent to advertising networks automatically when they provide content 
for a website a user is visiting. 
The FTC took the lead towards a broad implementation of the system by 
publishing a staff report548 on consumer privacy in relation to technological 
developments in 2010. The report was also aiming at receiving additional 
input on feasible technological systems for the implementation of a Do Not 
Track mechanism.549 The internet standardization body, the W3C, is now 
taking care of the standards that have to be applied for implementations of 
the technology.550 Nevertheless, the W3C seems to be hindered in this by 
lobbyists from the advertising industry (who have to cooperate towards 
a standard) and lots of issues are still heavily debated. For instance, the 
combination of online and offline data is part of the controversy. It is not clear 
whether a data controller is allowed to buy offline data on specific individuals 
if these individuals have DNT enabled. The combination of online and 
offline sources, however, is an emerging practice in marketing.551 Besides, 
user expectations differ a lot as well.552 Users may believe that DNT will stop 
all data collection, while in fact data collection often continues in aggregated 
form. Other users expect data collection with DNT to take place only for 
law enforcement or demographic purposes, or to measure interactions with 
ads, while none of these purposes is related to DNT. The currently available 
implementations (e.g. in IE9, Safari) in different browsers are not consistent 
with each other either. This indicates that a clear choice has to be made in the 
standardization process of the technology.
Altogether, the GDPR has some important improvements in comparison to 
the DPD. The introduction of a right to data portability and a right to be 
forgotten are welcome additions that can be of help in providing the individual 
with more control over his data and preventing the individual from being 
confronted with information that is outdated or irrelevant for the context 
in which it is used. Also the specification of the prohibition on profiling as 
including analyzing personal preferences and individual behavior as a basis 
for making decisions is highlighting an important practice. This addresses 
one of the main problems discussed in this study and gears attention to 
548 Federal Trade Commission 2010b.
549 This input was, for instance, delivered by Stanford scholars, who participated in the 
development of DoNotTrack: Mayer & Narayanan 2011.
550 Schwartz 2011.
551 See, for instance, Mindshare’s CORE which offers this service: <http://www.
mindshareworld.com/who-we-are/news/@Mindshare_Launches_Core> last accessed 
July 29, 2012.
552 McDonald & Peha 2011.
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the effects of data processing activities instead of the requirements of 
the processing alone. Influencing personal preferences, which relates to 
individual autonomy, is indicated as an effect of profiling and targeting 
activities. Nevertheless, it is still uncertain whether the GDPR will offer the 
required level of protection. The main focus is still on the processing of the 
data and not on the effects. Besides, even though the aim of the instrument 
of a Regulation is total harmonization amongst all EU Member States, 
there is still room for a number of aspects to be explicated in additional 
legislation, sometimes even at the national level of the Member States.553 
The Articles where Member States have discretionary powers concern, for 
instance, Art. 9 (processing of sensitive personal data), 17 (exception on 
the right to be forgotten), 20 (exception on the provision on profiling), 21 
(limitation of the scope of several Articles of the Regulation), 27 (mandatory 
processing of data), 44 (diversions from the rules on transfer of personal 
data), 78 (determination of sanctions), 81 (processing of health data), and 
82 (processing of data in the context of an employment relationship).554 
A number of the improvements of protection offered by the GDPR are, 
thus, not necessarily always applicable and at a national level there may be 
exceptions on the rights.
To conclude, the GDPR reaffirms the current principles behind data 
protection legislation and provides a number of new rights for data subjects 
and requirements and accountabilities for data controllers. There are, 
however, still exceptions and open ends that have to be specified in lower 
regulation forms or at national levels. Moreover, the Regulation indirectly 
pays more attention to individuals affected by data processing, for instance 
in the form of data breach notification duties and the right to be forgotten, 
but does not directly add strong new tools for individuals to have their rights 
to autonomy and identity better protected. So, even though the Regulation 
proposal seems to be able to take data protection a significant step forward, 
the impact of the Regulation beyond the mere processing requirements will 
be limited. Individuals remain very dependent on the willingness of data 
controllers to comply with the Regulation.555
 
553 Cuijpers, van Eecke, Kindt & de Vries 2012, p. 199. 
554 Cuijpers, van Eecke, Kindt & de Vries 2012, p. 186.
555 Even though the Data Protection Authorities will receive more enforcement powers. 
Arnold Roosendaal
218
3. Legal personality556 and legal status
The GDPR is still a proposal, and is expected to be adopted not earlier than 
the end of 2013 and enter into force in 2014 at the earliest. Nevertheless, as 
indicated above, it is not to be expected that the GDPR will provide better 
protection of the privacy and autonomy of individuals in relation to the use of 
digital personae and profiles. There are, however, a number of legal concepts 
that are already in place that may be helpful in achieving better protection 
for the individual with regard to the rights and values discussed in Chapter 
5. A first approach is to look at granting certain rights or forms of protection 
to the digital persona itself.557 This is possible by analogously applying the 
concepts of legal personality and legal status.
3.1. Legal personality and legal status in general
Digital personae can be seen as persons, albeit in a digital form. Therefore, 
a first step when considering existing legal concepts is to look at legal 
personality. Legal personality is a concept incorporated in law in order 
to have entities acquire the capacity to be the bearer in their own name of 
rights and obligations (legal capacity), to enter in other legal transactions 
(acting capacity), and to participate in a law suit (litigation capacity). Legal 
personality is the capacity of an entity to perform legally significant acts, 
such as concluding a contract. To be a legal person, thus, means to be the 
subject of rights and duties.558 Adult natural persons essentially have legal 
personality, because they have to be able to perform legal acts, such as 
concluding contracts. Without legal personality for (adult) natural persons, 
no transactions would be possible and daily life would be obstructed. 
Associations of natural persons until relatively recently did not have legal 
personality. The lack of legal personality made that these associations as 
such had no rights and duties and were not covered by a state’s jurisdiction. 
The associations are not natural persons with rights and duties, but entities 
formed by a group of natural persons. Legal personality is a legal fiction that 
was conceded to an entity in order to gain jurisdiction over natural persons 
behind it.559 Moreover, these natural persons were enabled to perform legal 
acts on behalf of the association and, thus, to represent the association in 
transactions. By analogy, digital personae can be considered to be entities 
556 ‘Legal personality’ and ‘legal personhood’ are used as synonyms in this section. The 
choice for which of the two to use depends on the term used by the discussed or cited 
author.
557 Profiles can become digital personae and are closely related, so, in order to avoid 
repetition, I will not discuss these as a separate category throughout this Chapter.
558  Zimmer 2005, p. 270.
559  Zimmer 2005, p. 269-270.
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related to the natural persons they represent. In order to protect individuals, 
it is, thus, worthwhile to consider whether a digital persona can be attributed 
legal personality in order to give it rights and duties. A corporation cannot 
act on itself, since it is not autonomous, but individuals have to act in the 
name of the corporation. The same holds for digital personae. Because it 
might be possible that the digital persona as a legal entity can be connected 
to the natural person behind it, i.e. the represented individual, granting 
certain rights to digital personae may offer protection against undesired use.
In continental law systems, there are several theories concerning corporate 
bodies and legal personality. The most important approaches concerning 
legal personality include legal personality as a legal fiction, corporate realism, 
theory of the Zweckvermögen, and the aggregation theory.560 According to 
the first concept legal personality of entities is, other than that of human 
beings, artificial, i.e. the result of a fiction. The legal capacity is based on 
positive law, so the state grants legal personality to certain types of entities. 
In corporate realism, legal personality is based on the real existence of a 
corporate body. The mere fact that a corporate body exists (as recognized 
by registration) or the presence of warrants concerning this existence is 
enough to grant a corporate body a certain legal status. The theory of the 
Zweckvermögen exists in legal systems where certain institutions are legal 
persons, characterized by an object and a purpose. These are seen as entities 
on their own and not as representing individual members. Finally, the 
aggregation theory conceptually relates to the fictionist theory. Here, human 
beings are considered the only subjects of rights and duties. The corporate 
body, thus, is not a legal person, but merely a collective name, a symbol for 
the members of the cooperation. 
In modern national laws, legal personality is often treated as a combination 
of the realist and the fictionist view. On the one hand, the social reality behind 
legal personality is recognized, whereas on the other hand the legal person 
is in some respects treated as a legal fiction.561 The theories are usually 
applied to corporations or other institutions formed by a group of people 
with a shared interest, but with different rights and liabilities than individual 
human beings.562 Legal personality, however, is also relevant in relation to 
non-human entities that are not corporations, such as electronic agents. The 
debate on electronic agents and the possible attribution of legal personality 
may provide more tools for assessing legal personality in relation to digital 
personae.
560 Cp.  Zimmer 2005, pp. 267-269.
561 Zimmer 2005, p. 269.
562 Karnow 1994, p. 3. 
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There is a tendency to personify non-human entities, which makes it relevant 
to look at when these non-human entities can be seen as legal persons. To 
a large extent, this is related to the participation in legal transactions. The 
corporation or institution is a legal entity that itself is not a natural person, 
but that acts (legally and factually) similar to a natural person. With regard to 
non-human entities and legal personality, much of the debate has taken place 
with regard to electronic agents. A major contribution was delivered in 1992 
by Lawrence Solum,563 who discussed whether artificial intelligences could 
have legal personhood. At the time, this question was only theoretical, but 
he brings some important insights to the fore. Legal personality is related 
to the capacity to perform legal acts. The performance of these acts has to 
be autonomous. What autonomous means is often debated and there are 
different approaches towards autonomy or intelligence. To avoid this debate, 
Solum took a rather pragmatic approach for a legal discussion, comparable 
to the consequence-based approach described above, by discussing concrete 
scenarios564 and looked at what the objections might be for legal personhood 
being attributed to artificial intelligences in these scenarios. He looked at 
the advantages and possible drawbacks of attributing legal personhood 
and related this to the level of consciousness of the entity. The conditions 
for legal personhood given by Solum can be described as the capacity to 
perform complex actions and to act in a deliberate way (personhood as 
consciousness). The level of consciousness determines whether an entity can 
be made the subject of legal rights and duties The “particular bundle of rights 
and duties that accompanies legal personhood varies with the nature of the 
entity.”565  Next to (adult) human beings, however, this legal personhood “is 
often attributed to entities that do not qualify for such personhood. Legal 
theory refers to this as a legal fiction: the law attributes personhood though 
in ‘normal’ life we would not think of the relevant entity as a person.”566 This 
opens the way for attributing legal personhood to artificial intelligences.
Allgrove presents three ways to approach the question of legal personality 
for artificial intellects.567 The characteristics of legal personality are 
similar in al three approaches, but depending on the approach taken, other 
categories of entities may be eligible for legal personality. First, it is possible 
to look at the entity itself, an entity-centric approach, which is comparable 
to corporate realism. In this approach, the characteristics and capacities 
of the entity it concerns are central in order to decide whether the entity 
563 Solum 1992.
564 Whether an artificial intelligence could serve as a trustee, and whether an artificial 
intelligence could invoke constitutional rights.
565  Solum 1992, p. 1239.
566 Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle 2010, pp. 519-520.
567 Cp.  Allgrove 2004.
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has or should have legal personality. When looking at the characteristics, 
a general approach should be taken, including capacities such as a certain 
degree of consciousness or an intrinsic value of the entity. Depending on the 
characteristics, different levels of legal personality can be distinguished. For 
instance, legal effects related to liability differ according to legal contexts, 
such as criminal liability or civil liability. Liability in criminal law requires 
a higher level of consciousness than in civil law.568 If the only relevant 
characteristic would be a certain intrinsic value, there is no legal personality, 
but probably a legal status (see below). 
A second approach is consequence-based and looks at the consequences of 
attributing legal personality to a certain entity. In this approach there is an 
incentive for regulators to investigate whether an entity should be granted 
legal personality, because the entity is relevant in a legal transaction, for 
instance, the closing of a contract. Without legal personality, the contract 
would not be legally valid. The main focus is on a legal consequence related 
to something the entity does or does not and the legal consequences of the 
act of an entity plea for a legal status. Legal personality can, then, validate 
the acts as legally relevant and also instigate legal protection mechanisms 
towards others, such as liability. This approach seems appropriate, since it is 
practical and allows for attributing legal personality when the acts an entity 
performs have legal significance.
A third approach is conditions-based. In this approach, the central question is 
under what conditions an entity is treated as a legal person.  So, “[i]t looks at 
the circumstances, and not the identities, involved.”569 The conditions as well 
as the scope of legal personality may differ per situation. The legal construct 
sought for determines the outcome. This is a very practical approach, strongly 
related to what is needed from a legal point of view in a specific situation. 
Without the legal construct, there is no legal consequence. For instance, the 
legal construct for entering a contract can form a condition for granting legal 
personality to companies, so that representatives of the company (agents) 
can close a contract on behalf of the company, but only when they are in the 
capacity of their function within the company. The condition is, thus, not 
necessarily present continuously and legal effects (validity) only occur when 
the legal act is performed under the specific condition.
All the approaches discussed above take as a starting point that the entity is 
able to perform certain acts with some degree of autonomy, so it concerns 
active agents. Digital personae, however, are passive entities, so legal 
568 Compare Jaquet-Chiffele, Anrig, Benoist, Haenni, Hildebrandt, Kosta & Lefever 2008, 
p. 18.
569 Allgrove 2004, p. 38. 
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personality as described here does not seem relevant or necessary. A form 
of protection for passive entities that cannot perform legal acts, but deserve 
to be protected because of their intrinsic value may be more appropriate and 
can be found in legal status.  
A legal status provides legal protection to an entity which cannot perform acts 
or invoke rights autonomously. Legal status is related to legal personality, but 
“legal status can both be relational and absolute, whereas legal personality 
can only be absolute.”570 Nevertheless, legal personality is a form of a legal 
status. 
If legal personality is not a necessary requirement for recognizing an entity 
as having legal status, the possibilities for attributing legal status increase 
significantly, because autonomous capacities become less relevant. An 
entity does not need to be capable of acting on itself, or to perform a legal 
duty. It can, however, enjoy certain rights and, therewith, gain some legal 
protection.  In order to receive this protection, a legal status is necessary. 
For instance, Allgrove states that “[t]hough not legal persons at Common 
Law, some jurisdictions treat the killing of a foetus as murder pursuant to 
statute, implicitly, if not expressly, recognizing its legal personality […].”571 
The reasons for legal recognition, however, “have nothing to do with its legal 
rights, but are designed to secure the rights of others.”572 And “[o]f course, 
an entity can have extra-legal significance and differential legal treatment 
as a result, without necessarily warranting recognition as a legal person.”573 
In the context of a foetus, its independent legal status is designed to nail 
down the parents’ legal rights, so they can file a malpractice case against the 
doctors.574
The specific form of the legal status is related to the function of granting 
the protection. These functions can be “distributive, determining who is 
to have ownership or access to the resources; conservatory, preserving 
the resources as such, or at least doing so at levels that can sustain 
exploitation; or proscriptive, prohibiting, for conservatory, ethical, or moral 
reasons, exploitation of the resource or particular forms and methods of 
exploitation.”575 For instance, animals have been granted legal status in 
order to protect them. This status is usually referred to as ‘animal rights’. 
The background of these rights is based on two different perspectives; the 
570  Allgrove 2004, p. 49.
571  Allgrove 2004, p. 39.
572  Stone 1985, p. 23.
573  Allgrove 2004, p. 39. 
574  Stone 1985, p. 23.
575  Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell 2009, p. 593-594. 
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perspective of welfare advocates, considering that “all species should be 
protected for ethical and humanitarian reasons”, and the perspective of 
environmentalists, who state that “particular species should be protected for 
ecological reasons, that is, as part of an ecosystem.”576 Next to the practical 
application of legal status to animals, there have been discussions and thought 
experiments in academic debate on legal status for non-human entities with 
the aim of protecting a specific interest. For instance, in order to protect the 
environment, it has been debated whether trees should have legal status. 
If trees have a legal status, they may also have standing in litigation. The 
question of whether trees should have standing is not aiming at trees itself, 
but seeks for a way of litigating environmental issues.577 To have standing, a 
tree should be considered a legal actor, even though a tree is a passive entity. 
The tree itself cannot go to court, so others do so on behalf of the trees. It 
can be argued that the fact that organizations or individuals take action on 
behalf of trees does not turn these trees into legal actors. Teubner, however, 
argues that “it is attribution of communicative events to an entity as ‘its’ acts 
and the attribution of rights to an entity that transforms this entity into an 
actor. And if an agent acts on behalf of this entity then the ‘actor’ is not the 
agent but the entity itself.”578 Thus, according to Teubner, trees have a legal 
status and can perform legal acts (have standing) when being represented by 
another entity.
3.2. Legal personality and legal status for digital personae?
Having discussed legal personality and legal status, it is now time to see 
whether these concepts can be of help in order to protect the rights and 
values of the individual when represented by a digital persona. Legal 
personality may not be the most appropriate concept to offer protection for 
the individual who is represented in the form of a digital persona. In practice 
it would only bring some value in the case of active digital personae (Agents), 
since closing a contract requires acting579 to express the declaration of the will 
of the contracting parties. A passive digital persona cannot close contracts 
or express a will, because it does not act. Nevertheless, the debate on legal 
personality for digital agents brought some insights on the conditions 
and reasons for protection. The discussed forms of protection or legal 
responsibilities are welcome as a backdrop for assessing digital personae as 
non-human entities. 
576  Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell 2009, p. 597.
577  Stone 1985, p. 2-3.
578  Teubner 2006, 497-521, p.1, fn. 1.
579 This ‘acting’ can be performed actively or passively.
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Passive entities, unable to close or perform a contract, cannot be granted 
legal personality580, but can be valuable to protect. For instance, animals, 
which were briefly mentioned already, cannot perform legal acts, but they 
are recognized as entities that need protection. In order to grant such 
protection, animals have a legal status. The concept of a legal status offers 
some benefits. As indicated, it can be argued that the attribution of rights to 
an entity may fictively turn this entity into an actor which ‘acts’ by means of an 
agent – there is a principal-agent relationship. Acting on behalf of this entity 
(representation/agency) can then be interpreted as if the entity acts itself. 
The entity is unable to perform acts, but his ‘rights’ can be invoked by others. 
When applying this line of thinking to digital personae, the digital personae 
might be worthwhile protecting with the aim of protecting the individual 
which is represented. If someone takes action on behalf of a digital persona, 
for instance to object against unlawful processing by a third party, it can be 
said that the digital persona itself is seeking protection. The represented 
individual data subject, or someone else, instantiates a communicative action 
between the digital persona and the third party, because the digital persona 
is unable to object autonomously.
In the case that an individual takes action on behalf of its digital persona, 
he controls the processing and affects the way the data can be used to take 
decisions concerning the individual. This form of control, either immediately, 
or post-hoc, if something went wrong, retro-actively via standing in court, is 
a desirable characteristic of a legal status for digital personae. An action by 
an individual is essentially similar to an action based on the data subject’s 
access rights as they are formulated in the DPD. However, in the case of the 
DPD protection mechanism it is the individual himself who has a right as a 
data subject, whereas in the case of a digital personae with a legal status, the 
digital persona has a right on itself, which has to be effectuated by an agent.
Attributing a legal status to digital personae may bring some protection for the 
personae. That means that they may, for instance, not be harmed. The primary 
focus is then on the digital persona, and the represented individual seems out 
of scope, even though the individual might enjoy better protection, just like 
the environment enjoys protection via the protection of trees. Nevertheless, 
the link between the digital persona and the individual that needs protection 
remains an indirect link, while, in the end, the data that form the digital 
persona are data concerning the individual. Direct control over the data might 
be a more appropriate approach, in particular from the viewpoint of aiming to 
protect the autonomy of the individual. It is thus worthwhile to look at whether 
some form of ownership to the data can be helpful. 
580 Apart from the fact that there is no specific need for granting them legal personality, 
since they do not participate in legal transactions.
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4. Property
Property law gives rules defining who has rights concerning a thing and 
what these rights are. Property law distinguishes a number of categories of 
things that can be the subject of a property right. Absolute property rights 
can concern things (movable as well as immovable), proprietary rights or 
entitlements (shares, securities, etc.), and intellectual productions of the 
human mind. First, property rights with regard to things will be discussed, 
followed by a discussion on intellectual property rights.581
4.1. Ownership of things
“To put it at its simplest, property law is about the legally recognized 
relationships we have with each other in respect of things.”582 So, a thing 
itself is not property, but can be the subject of property, while property itself 
is the right one has in relation to this thing.583 584 So, when talking about 
property the rights that someone has are discussed.
Property laws define what can be the object of a property right. Only things 
that are mentioned as such in law can be potential objects of property rights. 
The objects are, thus, limited and defined in categories, such as goods, real 
estate and proprietary rights. Property rights give the holder of these rights 
forms of control over the object on which the property rights see, because 
the holder has certain entitlements. Usually, the holder of a property right is 
called the owner of the object. The owner, for instance, has the right to sell 
the object, to give it away, or to change or destroy it. The only limitations are 
given by public order and rights of others that may not be infringed upon. 
The rights of the owner have an erga omnes effect. That means that the rights 
can be enforced against everyone. This is an important difference with a 
personal right in relation to a particular thing, which can only be claimed 
against the person who is obliged to the holder of the personal right,585 such 
as the right to usufruct where the right holder (e.g. someone who may reap 
the fruits of a tree) has a claim against the owner of the thing (the owner of 
the tree).
581 The proprietary rights will not be discussed separately, since their legal construction is 
basically the same as for property rights to things.
582  Clarke & Kohler 2005, p. 3.
583 Cp.  Clarke & Kohler 2005, p. 17.
584 It is important to distinguish layman’s speech from legal speech. The term property is 
often used by laymen to indicate a thing which is claimed to be a property.
585  Mattei 2000, p. 78.
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Because property are the rights itself and not the object of these rights, 
property from a legal perspective is neither tangible nor intangible.586 This 
implies that the object of the property rights can in principle be anything and 
that lawmakers have some space in facilitating the applicability of property 
law on new (categories of) things. “Consequently, a noticeable characteristic 
of the concept of property is its fluidity,”587 and actual property rights are 
meant to address practical needs that have emerged in society.  It is, thus, 
possible to make digital personae the object of property rights. 
Property law is a rigid field of law, with fine-grained provisions on what 
rights someone can have, how these rights can be obtained and transferred, 
and what the limits of property rights are. What can be the object of property 
rights is also defined by the main categories mentioned earlier. Something 
can be the object of property when it is recognized as such by law. The 
requirement is that the rights have to be listed in law as property rights, 
which is also known as the numerus clausus principle. The approach taken 
is often very practical: can subjecting something to property law provide 
benefits, for instance with regard to regulating behavior or for economic 
purposes?588 As Purtova states: “provided that it serves the current needs of 
a jurisdiction and there is political will to transform it, there is nothing in the 
nature of the legal phenomenon of property to prevent it from changing to 
include personal data as one of its objects.”589 The same conclusion would 
apply to digital personae as possible new objects. 
Once there is property, one can also enjoy ownership rights. “[T]he 
relationship between property rights and ownership is that of genus to 
species.”590 Ownership “refers to the legal right that a legal system grants 
to an individual in order to allow him […] to exercise the maximum 
degree of formalized control over a scarce resource”591 (the object of the 
property right). In Continental law systems, ownership rights are basically 
distinguished in three prerogatives: usus, usufruct, and abusus. Ownership is a 
bundle of rights and these separate rights can be held by different people.592 
In that case, there is a fragmented ownership of an object. Someone can 
have the right to usus (absolute right) and grant a right of usufruct to another 
person (restricted absolute right). The absolute property rights have an erga 
omnes effect; they apply against everyone.  As a result, the central question of 
586  Purtova 2011, p. 54.
587  Purtova 2011, p. 59.
588 Compare Purtova 2011, p. 59, referring to the practical needs that have emerged in a 
particular society.
589  Purtova 2011, p. 62.
590  Mattei 2000, p. 78.
591  Mattei 2000, p. 77.  
592  Purtova 2011, p. 70.
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whether something should be considered for protection with property rights 
is whether an interest should deserve erga omnes protection.593
Property and property law are concepts with a variety of interpretations 
in different jurisdictions. A major distinction can be made between the 
Common Law and the Civil Law approaches towards property. The aim of 
this study, however, is not to elaborately discuss property law. In the context 
of this study, it is sufficient to take a more general perspective, and discuss 
some of the main characteristics of property and property law. I will clarify 
the exact rights related to property based on the Dutch law, but the concepts 
are applicable in most European (Civil Law) countries.
A property right is a right a person has in relation to a ‘thing’.594 In the 
Netherlands, property rights are laid down in the Burgerlijk Wetboek, (Dutch 
Civil Code (DCC)).595 According to Article 3:2 DCC, ‘Things’ are tangible 
objects that can be controlled by humans. Things comprise of movable and 
immovable things. Article 5:1(1) DCC states that “[o]wnership is the most 
comprehensive property right that a person, the ‘owner’, can have to (in) 
a thing.” Next to ownership, there is ‘possession’, which is defined as “the 
legal status in which a person holds an asset for himself.”596 The person who 
has the possession over an asset does not have to be the person who has 
ownership of the thing. The requirement is that the person holds the asset 
for himself, regardless of whether he has reasonable grounds to think that he 
is the owner or whether he knows not to be the owner (for instance a thief). 
In case someone holds an asset for another person he is the keeper, and this 
is called ‘keepership’.597 
Possession assures a certain power over the thing. Possessing something 
means that you also have access to it. At the same time, the owner is not 
always necessarily the possessor of the thing, since it can be stolen or lent to 
593  Purtova 2011, p. 79.
594 At a European level there is an initiative for a European Civil Code. This project, 
however, has a limited scope concerning property, implying that is does not sufficiently 
cover the issues raised in this study, and has not led to an applicable framework, yet. For 
that reason, in this study reference is made to the provisions on property at a (Dutch) 
national level. The concepts are applicable in most civil law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
there is a Common Frame of Reference: Study Group on a European Civil Code, 
Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group): Principles, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Sellier 
European Law Publishers, Munich (2009).
595 For the English translation of the Burgerlijk Wetboek, I made use of Brecht’s Dutch 
Civil Law, the Civil Code. Online available at: <http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/
civilcodegeneral.htm>.
596 Art. 3:107(1) DCC.
597 Artt. 3:107(4) jo. 3:108 DCC.
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someone else. The owner of the thing is free to “use the thing to the exclusion 
of everyone else, provided that he respects the rights and entitlements of 
others to the thing and observes the restrictions based on rules of written 
and unwritten law.”598 Someone who merely possesses a thing- without 
being the owner - does not have this right. However, in the case of keepership, 
holding an asset for someone else, it may be that the keeper has certain rights 
concerning the thing. Think, for instance, of a borrowed bike, which the 
keeper may use to go to his work, but has to return to the owner at one point. 
The same goes for hired things, such as cars or tools. Whether someone 
is a possessor is to be determined based on the factual circumstances. 
These factual circumstances have to indicate that the thing belongs to the 
possessor. In other words, the factual relation between a person and a thing 
has to reflect the power position that is provided by law to the person.599 
Whether someone is the owner, the possessor, or the keeper of a thing 
determines what rights this person has with regard to the thing. The 
limitations of the rights are relatively clear, and so are the distinctions in 
power with regard to the thing. Nevertheless, it may sometimes be difficult 
to determine whether someone is the owner, possessor, or keeper. In order 
to assess this, it is helpful to look at how someone can acquire ownership 
to a thing. The ways of obtaining ownership are usually divided into two 
categories: original and derivative obtainment of ownership. Original 
obtainment of ownership takes place when a new right originates with the 
recipient. Derivative ownership is the obtainment of a right to ownership 
that previously belonged to someone else.
Original obtainment of a movable thing can take place by occupation 
(taking possession),600 finding,601 accession,602 and the creation of a new 
thing.603 604 Derivative obtainment of ownership takes place in, for instance, 
cases of heritage605 or marriage,606 and in cases where a property right is 
transferred.607 608 Once there is ownership, the owner can use the thing to the 
exclusion of all others. This means that he can do whatever he wants with the 
thing, but also that, in case someone else is keeping the thing for him, decide 
598 Art. 5:1(2) DCC.
599 Asser 2006, nr. 118.
600 Art. 5:4 DCC.
601 Art. 5:6 DCC.
602 Artt. 5:3 and 5:14 DCC.
603 Art. 5:16 DCC.
604 Compare Asser 2006, nr. 192.
605 Art. 4:189 DCC.
606 Art. 1:93 DCC.
607 Art. 3:83 DCC.
608 Compare Asser 2006, nr. 193.
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what the keeper is allowed to do with it as long as it is in his possession. In the 
end, ownership implies a huge amount of control (claims of right), provided 
by the law,609 and is therefore a strong concept to protect things against 
unauthorized use.
An important point of attention is that ownership rights are related to things 
and that these things are described as tangibles.  There are also ownership 
rights related to intangibles, namely shares and proprietary rights. These 
can better be described as entitlements instead of the standard property 
concept. Digital personae, as intangible data sets, are not considered things 
to which ownership applies.610 Next to that, if ownership would be applied, it 
might turn out in many cases that the data subject is not the owner, because 
he is not the (sole) creator of the digital persona. Nevertheless, the owner 
is the one who would obtain the strongest rights with respect to the digital 
persona, implying that in most cases another person than the represented 
individual has the most control over the digital persona. Ownership is, then, 
counter-effective as a means to protect the privacy of the individual. A form 
of an entitlement might solve this issue.
It is possible to create a sui generis property right for digital personae. In 
that case, the rules of property law can be applied by analogy. This approach 
was taken by Purtova611 with respect to personal data. She recognized the 
problem of personal data being processed outside the control of the data 
subject. This lack of control was brought to the fore as a major problem 
with regard to the protection of the privacy of the data subject. To solve 
this problem, propertisation was proposed as a solution. The data subject 
gains control as being the owner of his personal data. He has the right to sell 
the data for specific purposes. What purposes and uses are allowed can be 
defined in licenses. A second important advantage of granting data subjects 
property rights to their data is the erga omnes effect of these rights. Property 
rights work against everyone who has access to the personal data. Current 
data protection legislation is aimed at ‘controllers’ of the data, which has a 
more limited scope, so, an erga omnes effect can have a positive impact when 
it concerns protection of the individual against unwanted processing of his 
personal data.
609  Coyle & Morrow 2004, p. 10.
610 Even though there are discussions on whether certain intangible goods, such as 
electricity, have to be considered as things subjected to property. However, a criterion 
in the discussion seems to be the uniqueness of possession: only one person can ‘own’ 
or ‘use’ the electricity, which would not necessarily be the case with digital personae, 
since these can be copied.
611  Purtova 2011.
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Furthermore, Purtova indicates that property rights are better than contracts. 
There is less opacity, since property is a relatively clear right, and it is less 
burdensome. A contract has to be concluded and determines what rights and 
duties the contracting parties have. This means that these rights and duties 
do not always have to be the same. This may facilitate flexibility, but also 
means that it is not always evident what the contract entails. The property 
right exists by law, which means that no extra action has to be undertaken 
to establish the right. When there is property, licenses can be granted with 
respect to the propertised object. There can be standard licenses which are 
easy to grant, instead of the necessity of drafting a specific contract every time. 
A license is a form of a contract, but with standardized licenses it is possible 
to let people use the object under the attached license. It is not necessary to 
draft the contract including identifying information concerning the parties 
involved. For instance, Creative Commons612 licenses are standardized 
formats attached to contents. The contents may be used by anyone as long 
as they accord to the license. An individual agreement between the rights 
holder and the entity who wants to use the content is not necessary. Finally, 
property rights in personal data improve top-down implementation, since 
there just is a license or not. This makes it easy to implement the system on a 
general overarching level.
The idea of property rights in digital personae seems promising. In 
particular, the erga omnes effect is relevant because it sets discussions about 
controllership aside. This is absolutely contributing to a solution for the 
current problems. However, some points of attention remain, such as the 
question who obtains ownership rights and the issue of the intangibility of 
digital personae.
. 
Suppose that a sui generis right is established which grants property rights 
to the individual whom the digital persona concerns, so this individual can 
exercise ownership rights. These rights are exclusive and have an erga omnes 
effect. The individual can decide to grant some rights to others, such as 
usufruct, allowing for using the digital persona and reap the fruits of it. The 
‘fruits’ could be considered to be the commercial value resulting from the 
use of the digital persona. The individual can grant similar rights to multiple 
people, since the digital persona can be copied without losing the original. 
This can make it difficult to decide upon the value of a digital persona when 
granting a license. It is very well possible that the value of a right of usufruct 
is heavily influenced by the number of parties that have this right. The more 
parties that are allowed to use the digital persona, the less the value for each 
individual party may be, due to competition and, in the end, probably even 
612 Used for licensing intellectual property, mainly copyright protected works. See: <www.
creativecommons.org>.
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general availability of the digital persona as an asset. Most likely, this issue 
will in practice be solved by market functioning. The value of the digital 
persona depends on how many parties show an interest in the data set related 
to the scarcity of the digital persona. If only one party obtains a license to use 
the digital persona, this may bring stronger commercial opportunities, due 
to the exclusivity. The value of this position will be relatively high, which will 
be reflected in the price of the license.  
To summarize, ownership to things is a valuable concept which functions 
as a means to provide extensive control over things. When merely applying 
the concept to digital personae, problems occur: digital personae are not 
tangibles and differ from the intangible objects or property rights that 
are in fact entitlements, and there are many instances in which the data 
subject would not obtain ownership rights. This may be solved by law when 
implementing provisions that would recognize digital personae as objects of 
property rights. However, it is worthwhile to look whether there are other 
existing concepts that may also cover these issues. To start with intangibility, 
a look will now be taken at intellectual property rights.
4.2. Intellectual property
Under the heading of intellectual property, there are also ownership rights 
related to intangibles, namely products of the human mind. Intellectual 
property rights relate to, for instance, music, videos, images, databases, and 
books. There are several types or categories of intellectual property rights, of 
which copyright is the most prominent one. The rationale behind intellectual 
property rights is to stimulate innovation and cultural expression.613 
Developing an idea takes time and often other investments as well, such as 
pen and paper (book), recording materials (music or video), or prototypes 
(patentable invention). Inventive minds, however, were not able to gain back 
their investments, which might hamper innovation. For instance, until about 
two centuries ago, publishers had rights concerning books, but the authors 
did not. This meant that publishers were able to gain back their investments 
in the printing of the books. Once an author had sold a text to a publisher, 
there was no opportunity left to generate income from the text or to have 
some form of control over how the text was used. 
This position of the authors was considered unfair and, as a result, copyright 
protection at an international level started in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, based on bilateral treaties.614 Separate treaties were not convincing 
in appropriateness, however, and a standard way of dealing with copyright at 
613 WIPO 2004, p. 3.
614 WIPO 2004, p. 262.
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an international level was welcome. “The need for a uniform system led to the 
formulation and adoption on September 9, 1886, of the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.”615 The aim of the Berne 
Convention is ‘to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, 
the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”616 In 1996, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty. This Treaty is meant to reinforce the protection as provided by the 
Berne Convention, but also to provide “adequate solutions to the questions 
raised by new economic, social, cultural and technological developments.”617 
It was recognized that technological developments and the convergence of 
information and communication technologies had a profound impact on the 
creation and use of literary and artistic works.618 This becomes particularly 
clear when looking at the provisions that offer protection for computer 
programs as literary works (Art. 4) and for compilations of data (databases) 
that constitute intellectual creations (Art. 5). Databases were also granted 
protection at an EU level earlier in 1996, by means of the Database Directive 
(see below).
Images are protected by copyright. Digital personae are, in fact, ‘images’ 
of the individual in the form of data sets. When digital personae are 
recognized as images, copyright can, thus, provide legal rights concerning 
digital personae. However, digital personae are also essentially data sets and 
data sets as such can be protected by database rights. So, protection along 
the lines of database rights may be another option with regard to digital 
personae. In the following subsections, copyright and database rights will 
be discussed in order to examine whether digital personae can be considered 
images or databases and, if so, what this would imply in terms of rights 
related to digital personae. I will start with copyright, since this provides the 
basic terminology in the context of intellectual property rights.
4.2.1. Copyright
Copyright law governs the rights concerning ‘works of literature, science or 
arts’.619 The holder of a copyright has the right to reproducing the work and/
or making it public. These are exclusive rights for the holder of the copyright 
or his assignees.620 An important characteristic is that a copyright exists by 
615 WIPO 2004, p. 262.
616 Preamble of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
617 Preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996.
618 Preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996.
619 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 1.
620 Art. 1 Dutch Copyright Law (Auteurswet).
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law.621 At the moment the object is created the author automatically has the 
copyright.622 No formalities need to be undertaken before the rights can be 
exercised. A form of expression of the work is needed, however, because the 
work as such has to be recognizable: others have to be able to take notice 
of the work. A mere idea of something is not protected, but first has to be 
expressed, for instance by putting it on paper, by speaking out a text, or by 
playing a song.
Copyright is an exclusive right. This means that the holder of the copyright 
is the only person entitled to make the work public or to reproduce it. The 
copyright holder can grant licenses to others to do so. This is an important 
aspect of copyright as opposed to ownership, where, for instance, selling or 
usufruct implies that the owner distances himself from certain rights and, in 
general, cannot enjoy these rights at the same time himself. The ownership 
rights to the thing can usually only be exercised by one person at a time. 
However, intangibles often have the characteristic of multiplicity. Copies can 
be made without the original work being affected. The copies can be copied 
again and again. As a result, numerous instances of the same work can exist. 
In the same way, when talking about a digital persona as a work in terms of 
copyright law, the digital persona could be copied without the original being 
affected, and the reproduction could be regulated by licenses. 
As stated, the copyright exists by right with the author of the work. Copyright 
consists of so-called exploitation rights that can be transferred to others, and 
moral rights, that cannot be transferred. These moral rights belong to the 
author of the work and are meant to avoid that others make derivative works 
that are so distinctive in meaning from the original work that it cannot have 
been the intention of the author. The personality of the author is protected, 
which means that he can object to these works, so he is not associated with 
the derivative work. The author can, thus, object to derogatory treatment of 
the work.623 A second part of moral rights is the right to be recognized as 
the author of a work and to be mentioned correctly as the author.624 Moral 
rights, thus, provide the author of a work with the means to limit the use of 
his work by others.
The central aspect of copyright is the ‘work’. There is no straightforward 
definition of a ‘work’, but it is described as a work of literature, science or 
art. In this respect, books, magazines and all other writings, pictures, music, 
621 Art. 5(2) Berne Convention.
622 Other forms of intellectual property, such as patents, require registration of the object 
to obtain the right.
623 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p.4.
624 See also: Bainbridge 2007, p. 28.
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films, oral presentations, and computer programs are, among other things, 
recognized as works that can be protected by copyright. The protection 
applies regardless of the way or form in which the work is expressed.625 
Copyright is not as encompassing as ownership. Copyright only applies to 
the subjective form of the work, not to objective content, which means that 
facts and data as such are not protected; these may be reproduced.626 The 
focus of copyright on the subjective form of the work also indicates that 
the work itself is leading. In order to obtain copyright protection, the work 
has to be original. What original exactly means is usually determined at a 
national level, with some jurisdictions using a stricter test than others. In 
the Netherlands, the work has to have an individual, original character and 
has to carry the personal mark of the author.627 From this description, three 
requirements can be derived: own character, personal mark, and originality. 
If these requirements are fulfilled, the work is protected by copyright and the 
copyright is held by the author of the work. 
The individual character requirement means that the author, when creating 
a work, uses existing elements, such as facts, theories, style figures, or an 
idiom, but connects these in his own way in the work.628 The author has 
“expended skill and judgment in its creation, in a conceptual way rather than 
just in the manufacture of the physical embodiment of the work.”629
The personal mark of the author as a requirement for a work to be protected 
by copyright implies that there needs to be a human being involved in the 
creation of the work. The work reflects the personal vision of the author.630 
The required involvement in the creation does not mean that the use of 
technical means is not allowed. It might only become different when the 
creation is completely automatically performed, without the author (who is 
then merely an operator) exercising any influence. This may, for instance, 
be the case when a computer translates source code to object code.631 There 
is discussion on whether copyright protected works can also be created by 
computers. The central aspect in this discussion is whether creativity can be 
performed by artificial intelligences. It is often argued that computational 
creativity is inherently algorithmic, so works produced autonomously by 
computers are not comparable to creative works as created by humans,632 
625 Article 10 Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet).
626 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 4-5.
627 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 65.
628 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 65.
629 Bainbridge 2007, p. 40.
630 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 72.
631 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 74.
632 Bridy 2011.
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which implies that these computer generated works are not protected by 
copyright. Nevertheless, increasingly digital content used in everyday life 
has little or no human intervention in its creation, while it is still delivered 
with copyright claims attached.633 Approaches towards this issue can be 
based on the question who should be rewarded; the program maker, the 
program user, the program, or nobody.634 Current copyright law may also 
offer a solution via the “work made for hire doctrine, which is a mechanism 
for vesting copyright directly in a legal person who is acknowledged not 
to be the author-in-fact of the work in question.”635 In that case, the entity 
that initiated the creation of a digital persona by a computer will receive the 
copyright, while not being the creator.
The requirement of originality does not necessarily mean that the work 
has to be innovative or new in an absolute sense. It does not have to be 
unique. “Rather, originality is more concerned with the manner in which the 
work was created and is usually taken to require that the work in question 
originated from the author, its creator, and that it was not copied from 
another work.”636
The question that arises is whether a digital persona can be a ‘work’ and 
whether a digital persona can be protected by copyright law. The data that 
together constitute a digital persona are stored in a digital format. The 
choice of what to store exactly and in which form determines what the digital 
persona will look like. A digital persona can, thus, be considered ‘a form of 
writing’ as far as it concerns text, and images or films as far as it concerns 
photos or videos. As a result, a digital persona can very well be recognized as 
a ‘work’ (of literature or art).
In order to assess whether a digital persona can also be protected by copyright, 
the three additional requirements mentioned above need to be discussed.
The individual character requires a conceptual way of combining elements. 
The data that form the digital persona are the elements. The way the data 
are combined, the selection of data used, and the way in which the data 
are captured may result in an individual character of the work. A series of 
digital personae with similar characteristics with regard to the conceptual 
combination is very well possible. Obviously, the paintings of Mondriaan 
in which elementary colours are used in square forms all have their own 
character, even though they are created in the same conceptual way. The 
633 Perry & Margoni 2010.
634 Perry & Margoni 2010.
635 Bridy 2011.
636 Bainbridge 2007, p. 37.
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individual character can, thus, also be a specific (personal) style. A digital 
persona can, thus, fulfil the requirement as to ‘individual character’.
The personal mark requirement implies that there has to be human 
involvement in the creation of the digital persona. If a digital persona is only 
created by a computer collecting and storing, for instance, internet browsing 
data, there is no personal mark of the author.637 Simply, there is no author. 
It is not the case that creating the software and programming the computer 
to perform its tasks is fulfilling this requirement, either. This, probably, 
results in a copyright in the software, but not in the output of the software 
when used. The output as such has to be assessed on the fulfilment of the 
requirements for copyright protection. However, with regard to computer 
generated works there is no ‘work’ in the meaning of copyright law, since the 
computer does exactly what the software programmer wants. Nevertheless, 
there are numerous cases where there is indeed human involvement in the 
creation or composition of a digital persona. For instance, if a party collects 
data and manually adds these to a data set, there is human involvement already. 
The amount of human involvement as opposed to automated processing is 
irrelevant as long as a personal mark of the author can be recognized. This 
personal mark, however, may not be easily present, in particular in cases 
of massive creation of digital personae along a structured line, without any 
creativity added to each digital persona.
Originality requires that the work is not copied from an existing work, but created 
by the author. The creation of the work, then, has to involve a certain amount of 
labour investment. However, it may occur that two persons create a similar work 
independently from each other. In that case, both authors obtain a copyright 
in their work. For all new digital personae being created, the requirement of 
originality as not having been copied is easily met.638 The requirement does imply 
that digital personae that are essentially copies, but which have the data stored in 
a different order may not meet the requirement of originality. They consist of the 
same elements, but may be combined in another way. This may lead to an ‘own 
character’ with a ‘personal mark’ of the author, but not to ‘originality’ which 
would make it a new work that is protected by copyright. Moreover, originality 
requires that the work is not something obvious, without creativity. A list of 
mere facts is, thus, not protected by copyright, unless they are written down in 
an original, creative manner. In the case of digital personae created automatically 
or with limited human intervention, this original, creative presentation of factual 
data will often be lacking.
637 This can be challenged, however, when a lighter test is applied to prove the ‘originality’ 
of the work. See the discussion above on works created by artificial intelligences.
638 Unless a digital persona is considered to be a copy of the represented individual. This is 
not likely, however, due to its different presentation form.
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To conclude, there may be occasions in which a digital persona can be 
recognized as a work that can be protected by copyright, but the majority 
of digital personae will most likely not meet the requirements of a personal 
mark and originality. Copyright law could, thus, only to a limited extent be 
an applicable concept in the context of digital personae. Another concept 
that may be applicable is database law. Digital personae are essentially data 
sets and so are databases. It is, thus, worthwhile to consider what protection 
database rights can bring and how this relates to copyright protection.
4.2.2. Database rights
Databases are protected as intellectual property, based on the 
implementations of the EU Database Directive.639 The Directive created a 
sui generis right, parallel to copyright, because a proper protection regime 
for valuable databases was lacking.640 In the Directive, a database is defined 
as “a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in 
a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or 
other means.”641 The core provision of the Directive is Article 7. “Art. 7(1) 
requires a substantial investment, paralleling ‘originality’ in copyright as 
threshold for the right to come into existence.”642 The exact meaning of this 
‘substantial investment’ is the most discussed issue concerning the Database 
Directive. Recital 40 of the Database Directive states that the aim of the 
Directive is to protect “any investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting 
the contents of a database” and that “such investment may consist in the 
deployment of financial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and 
energy.” The substantial investment concerns the entire database. It seems 
that the Database Directive offers a broader protection than the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, since the latter requires that the selection or arrangement 
of the contents constitutes an intellectual creation.643 This ‘intellectual 
creation’ seems to be related to the requirements of own character and 
personal mark of the author as these exist in copyright,644 whereas the 
substantial investment mainly relates to originality. Art. 7(2) of the Database 
Directive sets forth the exclusive rights enjoyed by the maker.”645 These 
exclusive rights are practically similar to the rights provided by ‘normal’ 
639 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 
on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20–28.
640 This was also recognized by the WIPO, which introduced database protection later in 
1996 in the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
641 Article 1(2) of Directive 96/9/EC.
642 Westkamp 2003, p.2.
643 Art. 5 WIPO Copyright Treaty.
644 See above.
645  Westkamp 2003, p.2. 
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copyright. They are described as the right to prevent others from ‘extraction’ 
and ‘re-utilization’ of the database. Extraction means the transfer of the 
whole or a substantial part of the database, temporarily or permanently, to 
another medium by any means or in any form, and can be compared with 
reproduction in copyright. Re-utilization is any form of making available to 
the public. With these rights, reproduction or making public is allowed by 
the creator of the database exclusively. Nevertheless, similarly as in copyright 
law, the rights are transferable.646 
The substantial investment concerns the creation and maintenance of the 
database as such. In the cases on the British Horseracing Board (BHB) and 
Fixtures Marketing647 the database owners had generated the data during 
the course of their businesses. A key question was whether the investment 
in generating these data amounted to an investment in obtaining the data 
for the purposes of the Directive. The ECJ “ruled that the investment 
made in creating and verifying the data at the point of its creation in these 
circumstances should not be taken into account. As a result, neither the 
BHB’s nor Fixtures Marketing’s databases qualified for protection despite 
the large amounts of investments involved.”648 Taking this into account, it 
may be questionable whether a database with data concerning, for instance, 
individual browsing behaviour is protected by a database right. The data are 
collected during, and as part of, the business of advertising and analytics 
companies. Putting these data in a database as such does not protect the 
database; a(nother) substantial investment is necessary. 
In the context of digital personae, usually someone has created a database 
with a number of data sets, each constituting a digital persona. This database 
is covered under the Directive. This does not offer any protection for the 
individual’s persona (records) constituting the database, but only for the 
database as a whole. The Directive, however, may also offer protection 
for individual records if the database is modular; a database is divided 
into different parts (modules) which can be used independently, but can 
also be combined in the entire system. If the digital personae can be used 
independently, these can be considered modules, while the combined set of 
digital personae forms a database as well. A database with digital personae 
can, thus, be seen as a whole, but also as a modular database. In the Apis 
646 Article 7(3) Database Directive.
647 The British Horseracing Board and Others v. William Hill Organisation Limited, Judgment 
of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 9 November 2004, Case 
C-203/02, and the associated cases involving Fixtures Marketing, C-46/02, C-444/02 
and C-338/02, 9 November 2004.
648 Nettleton & Llewellyn 2009, p. 478. These authors also indicate that the BHB database 
costs four million pounds per year to maintain and requires extensive hardware and 
software and approximately 80 employees to run it.
Digital Personae and Profiles in Law
239
case,649 the European Court of Justice decided that, for the applicability of 
the protection regime to a modular database, it first had to be established 
whether each separate module constituted a database on itself. The modules 
would then be protected as separate databases. For instance, a database 
with demographic data of the entire world is one big database. The database 
can, however, be split up in a number of modules, each containing the 
demographic data of a continent. The separate modules are independent 
databases that can be protected, because they can be used independently 
from the rest of the set. 
Depending on the contents, it can be argued that one digital persona should 
be considered a database. Based on the definition of a database, then, there 
has to be a systematic or methodological arrangement that would facilitate, 
for instance, the comparison or selection of data, which would add value 
to the mere collection of data. Basically, all data concern one individual, so 
there is not that much to compare. But if the digital persona consists of, for 
instance, browsing data, it is very well possible to make selections of data 
based on a day of the week or a certain time on a day, or to look for categories 
of browsing interests of the individual. The possibility of a modular database, 
with each digital persona being a separate module, will then be related to 
the type of data and the amount of data collected that belong to a specific 
category (such as the browsing data). Putting modules (digital personae) 
together facilitates comparison or selection of individuals based on browsing 
behaviour. In the case of smaller data sets or ordinary data such as name and 
address, comparison or selection only has added value when it concerns 
a number of individuals that share or not share certain characteristics or 
information. In that case, the digital personae will not be recognizable as 
separate modules.
Database rights will, thus, not be applicable to a large part of personal data 
collections. This is due to the lack of a substantial investment and digital 
personae as records are not likely to make the database a modular database. 
Besides, if the mere collection of data would constitute a protected database, 
numerous databases with similar or at least comparable digital personae 
would be protected with database rights, because several companies 
collect information on, for instance, browsing behaviour and, thus, create 
comparable contents. The rights would be held by the owners of the 
databases.
649 Apis-Hristovich EOOD v. Lakorda AD; Judgment of the Fourth Chamber of the 
European Court of Justice dated 5 March 2009 (C-545/07). The case was about the 
extraction or re-utilization of a substantial part of a database. 
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From the perspective of this study, it seems that database rights cannot offer 
the appropriate protection. If a database right would apply, there is protection 
against extracting and/or re-utilizing substantial parts of the database, so it 
is not allowed to copy a large amount of individual profiles. This means that 
there is legal protection possible against transfer of data to other contexts. 
Nevertheless, the rights are obtained by the owner of a database, not by the 
individuals represented in the database. When the database contains data 
about a number of individuals, these individuals do not own the database. A 
database concerning one single individual, held by the individual himself is, 
as indicated, not likely.
4.2.3. Limitations of copyright and database rights as protecting concepts
A specific issue, relevant in the context of digital personae, is the mentioned 
requirement of human performance in the creation of the work in order to 
recognize the work as protectable by copyright. Something solely created by 
(the processing of) a computer does not meet this requirement. As a result, 
there are cases where the digital persona cannot be the object of a copyright. 
Besides, digital personae consisting of data entered into predefined forms 
may lack the creative element necessary for originality or the personal mark 
of the author.
In the cases where the requirements to qualify as a work are met, copyright 
protection may be applicable to a digital persona. The problem of the 
intangibility, which made that ownership could not directly be applied, is 
solved by seeking protection under copyright. Similarly as with ownership, 
the right can come into existence by creating an object. The creation of a 
digital persona is by law protected under copyright law. The fact that 
copyright exists by law is also a drawback, because it means that in the case 
someone else creates the digital persona (imposed persona) he, as being the 
author, obtains the copyright, and not the represented individual. In the case 
of projected personae the individual himself does have the copyright, but for 
hybrid digital personae it may be problematic to determine who the author 
is. 
Database rights cannot offer a complete solution either. Single digital 
personae can sometimes be considered as a database, but the more common 
situation will be a database with numerous digital personae in it as entries. 
The database as such is protected, then, against extraction and re-utilization 
of the entire database or at least a substantial part. A few entries may not be 
considered a substantial part, but can still be a number of digital personae, or 
contain specific elements of a selection. Next to that, the contents as such are 
not protected, but the database and its functionality are. This means that the 
use by others of the digital personae as contents of the database is allowed. 
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Database rights can, thus, overcome the issue of intangibility, but protect the 
wrong object, i.e. the database instead of its contents.
Moreover, the second problem that was identified in relation to ownership, 
namely that the wrong party obtains the right, is not resolved yet, neither 
by copyright nor by database rights. Even in the case that digital personae 
autonomously created by machines would be recognized as copyright 
protected works, the represented individual will usually not be the one who 
obtains the right. The fact that the rights will not always be applicable to 
digital personae is not contributing to legal certainty either.
The challenge is to find a solution for intangibles where protection is focused 
on the image of an individual and not on the creator of the image. This 
protection may be found in a specific part of copyright law: portrait law.
4.2.4. Portrait law
Portrait law650 is a form of intellectual property law regarding images of 
individuals. A portrait has value. This idea was first recognized in the context 
of famous people whose image was used for commercial purposes. The idea 
that the printing press could spread photographs and images at a large scale 
and that this could conflict with legitimate interests of portrayed individuals 
was already developed by Warren and Brandeis, back in 1890.651 They stated 
that “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”652 In order to avoid the 
unauthorized use of portraits or the commercial gain based on portraits 
without the permission of, or without any gain for the portrayed person, 
portrait law was introduced. Portrait law offers the individual the opportunity 
to object to unauthorized use of their portrait by the creator of the portrait 
and all other third persons.653 The objectives are twofold; the protection of 
the privacy (reasonable interest) of the individual, and the protection against 
unauthorized use of a portrait where the individual could be able to capitalize 
his popularity. Because it is often in the context of commerce, the portrayed 
people are usually famous people with a specific personal ‘image’ that can 
be used to add a certain status or image to a product. Even though portrait 
law is an element of copyright law, it is actually not about copyright itself; 
one does not create one’s own appearance. Instead, it is about protection of 
650 In the Netherlands regulated in Articles 19-22 of the Copyright Act.
651 Warren & Brandeis 1890.
652 Warren & Brandeis 1890.
653 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 310.
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privacy of the portrayed person.654 The personality rights of the portrayed 
individual are protected. In this respect, portrait law is a lex specialis where 
leges generali, such as Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code on unlawful 
acts can be used as secondary means to compensate damages. That means 
that an individual who is harmed by or suffers damages because of the use 
of his portrait can base a claim on portrait law. In the case that portrait law 
offers insufficient protection, Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code can be 
applied, because such an act infringes on a personality right of the portrayed 
individual, which constitutes a tort.655 Insufficient protection by portrait law 
can, for instance, occur when the use of the portrait is accepted because of 
the public character of a famous person. Being famous means that a person 
has to accept that people take pictures (make portraits) in public that can be 
used in magazines or books. 
A case in point concerned a famous Dutch soccer player, Johan Cruijff, 
who objected to publication of a book with pictures of him.656 The pictures 
were taken during his career as a soccer player and, in fact, gave a historical 
overview of his career. A claim on privacy was dismissed: the pictures were 
taken in public, were not defamatory, and were taken in relation to the free 
gathering of news. A situation in which the right to protection of private life 
(Article 8 ECHR) was infringed upon or should prevail over the freedom 
of expression (Article 10 ECHR) was not at stake.657 Next to that, in the 
decision of the Court of Appeal it was stressed that there is no requirement 
of consent from the portrayed person to make a portrait public, because 
this would hinder the freedom to send or receive information or views via 
pictures too much.658 It is not the case that portrait law provides an exclusive 
right of exploitation as is the case with (normal) intellectual property rights. 
That would deny the rights of the author of the portrait, without whose 
creative performance the pictures would not even exist. To the contrary, 
portrait law should be seen as a limitation on the exploitation rights of the 
author, provided for by copyright, with an eye on the reasonable interests of 
654 Spoor, Verkade & Visser 2005, p. 303.
655 The provisions on unlawful acts can, in principle, always be invoked due to their general 
applicability. However, when there is a specific provision for a situation this often is 
more favourable to use, since it matches a specific case, which leads to a lower burden 
of proof. The general provisions on tort require proof of damage and causation, which 
may be relatively difficult in practice. For instance, the unauthorized use of a digital 
persona may not always result in directly specified damages. Even if it is possible to 
prove damages, it has to be shown that these damages are the result of the unauthorized 
use of the digital persona (causation).
656 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, 03-01-2012, 200.070.228/01, LJN: BU9938.
657 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, 03-01-2012, 200.070.228/01, LJN: BU9938, at 3.4.
658 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, 03-01-2012, 200.070.228/01, LJN: BU9938, at 3.5.
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the portrayed.659 Portrait law is, thus, an exception or limitation on copyright 
and not a right in itself.
The general aim of portrait law is to protect the privacy of the individual and 
to prevent illicit use and unlawful publication of the individual’s portrait. In 
order to qualify as a portrait, the individual needs to be identifiable from the 
picture. Similar to data protection law, when the individual can be identified, 
the regime is applicable. To assess whether the individual can be identified, 
the ‘test of identification’ can be applied, which tests whether someone can 
recognize the portrayed person from the image. For identification, courts 
use a broad interpretation, which means that direct identification is not 
necessary. Closer investigation and comparison of the portrait with the 
portrayed person himself is sufficient. Other circumstances can help to 
identify the portrayed person. The portrait right usually protects the portrait 
of the face of a person with or without further parts of the body visible. But 
also an image of a part of a body which identifies the individual, even without 
seeing the face, can be considered a portrait. For instance, a tattoo on 
someone’s back or arm may identify the individual. The scope of protection 
of the portrait right is very broad. The court applies a test of identification, 
in which the face can be inspected more closely and can be identified with 
the help of other characterizing circumstances, such as a typical posture of 
the body.660 So, even when only a limited (or no) part of the face is visible, 
the total picture may lead to identifiability of the portrayed person. In case of 
identifiability, a portrait right is applicable.
Portrait law is about one’s image and offers protection against unauthorized 
use. That is why this is potentially relevant for the protection of digital 
personae. 
4.2.5. Protection of digital personae by portrait law?
The digital persona is also an image of an individual, albeit in the form of an 
entire data set and not a picture or video (even though these may be part of 
the data set). In the same way, protection is sought. The portrayed person 
has the portrait rights and obtains these rights by being portrayed. This 
implies that the rights also come into existence at the moment of creation. 
The creation of a digital persona would then, by analogy, mean that the 
represented individual automatically obtains portrait rights with regard to 
his digital persona. To obtain the rights, identification of the individual has to 
be possible, which, by definition, is the case for a digital persona. The broad 
interpretation of the identification test can be applied to digital personae by 
659 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, 03-01-2012, 200.070.228/01, LJN: BU9938, at 3.7.
660 Pinckaers 1996, p. 132-133.
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analogy as well. It is not necessary to identify the individual immediately. 
A closer look at the digital persona and comparing the digital persona with 
the individual can be sufficient for fulfilling the identification requirement. 
This is very important, since this opens the way for considering data sets 
that have no name included but still form a clear image of the individual as 
portraits. Even though the data set does not directly identify the individual, 
the identification test, based on recognition, may still be passed successfully. 
Digital personae with specific characteristics can, thus, be protected by 
portrait law in the same manner. In terms of data protection law, this can 
be considered a form of indirect identification, which is also sufficient 
to consider data personal data and, therewith, make data protection law 
applicable to the processing of the data.
The aim of this study is to find protection for the data subject who is 
represented by a digital persona. When approaching the digital persona as 
a portrait, the concept of portrait law may offer the desired protection.  By 
means of portrait law, protection is provided against unauthorized use of the 
portrait and the individual data subject has the right to object to publication 
of the portrait or to receive a reasonable (financial) compensation. With this 
right, the portrayed individual can limit the rights of exploitation the author 
of the portrait has. The intangible form as well as the object of protection is 
in conformity with the needs.  
A limitation of portrait law in its current form is the focus on either 
commercial use of the portrait, which also means that most protection 
is given to famous people or celebrities, or the protection of reasonable 
interests of the portrayed that would limit the rights of others to publish the 
portrait. Famous people often gain money with their image, for instance, in 
advertisements. The use of digital personae central in this study is not on 
displaying the digital personae in advertisements, but on making money by 
using the digital personae to select advertisements to be displayed to the 
individual, or to take other decisions that may affect the individual. It is, 
thus, about monetizing the image of the individual, since many applications 
are related to financial gain for a company. The use of the image is aimed 
at maximizing this gain by increasing the chance of an advertisement 
being clicked on or by selectively presenting offers to individuals. The use 
of digital personae, however, also affects the autonomy of the individual in 
taking decisions and setting goals. Using portrait law as a solution would, 
thus, not only require application by analogy, because digital personae are 
not strictly portraits, but also broadening the scope of portrait rights, since 
monetization is not based on displaying/publishing the portrait.
Another limitation of portrait law is that it is not providing rights in itself, 
but merely providing an instrument to limit copyrights of the author of an 
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image. The application of portrait law, however, not necessarily requires 
that the portrait has to be protected by copyright.661 Nevertheless, in 
cases where copyright is applicable, this is the primary line of defense. 
The portrayed person can object to publication of the portrait or ask for a 
reasonable compensation. In the case of digital personae, the creator would, 
thus, have copyrights, including the right to make the digital persona public 
and to multiply it. The digital persona can be commercially exploited by the 
creator of the digital persona. In most cases, not the individual data subject 
but another person will have this right. The individual can only object to the 
publishing (making public) of the digital persona. Internal use by a company 
for the selection of targeted advertisements or any other purpose may be 
allowed and cannot be prevented based on portrait law.662
Even though portrait law, applied by analogy, does not offer a complete 
solution for the problem discussed in this study, it offers valuable insights 
that may be helpful in working towards a solution. In any case, the approach 
of offering rights or protection mechanisms to the portrayed individual, next 
to, or instead of, the rights the author receives, seems promising. Besides, 
portrait law is applicable when the individual is identifiable, regardless of 
whether the portrait as such is protected by copyright. The identification 
of the individual is approached broadly and includes recognition when 
comparing the portrait and the individual. 
5. Conclusion
Regulating the creation and use of digital personae may be helpful to improve 
the protection of privacy and autonomy of individuals. In this Chapter, a 
number of existing legal concepts have been discussed in order to assess to 
what extent these can be helpful in offering regulatory means that can be 
applied to digital personae. 
The legal concepts described above offer certain characteristics that can be 
of help. It has become clear that attributing legal personality or a legal status 
to the digital persona is not a good solution. The focus is, in these cases, on 
the digital persona itself. Legal personality implies that the digital persona 
is an active entity, which by definition is not the case. Legal status could be 
attributed to digital personae. This would bring some level of protection, but 
still recognize the digital persona as an entity in itself, without capabilities 
to enforce this protection on itself. Claims in name of the digital persona 
661 Dutch Supreme Court, November 22, 1966, NJ 1967, 101.
662 Note that this internal use may be prohibited by copyright when it implies reproduction 




appear to be comparable to the exercise of currently existing data subject 
access rights. However, the concepts and practice are too diverging to apply 
the concepts as a solution to the problem.
This observation led to the idea of looking at positions of control over the 
digital persona. A strong form of control is provided by the legal concept of 
property or, more specifically, ownership. In particular, the erga omnes effect 
is useful, because it makes the property right an absolute right. With regard 
to digital personae, however, ownership has two important drawbacks 
that make it not applicable directly. Firstly, ownership concerns tangibles. 
The main requirement for ownership, however, is legal recognition, so 
this problem could be solved by recognizing digital personae as objects of 
property in the law. Secondly, however, ownership rights can be obtained 
by the creator of a thing because he creates it, which implies that digital 
personae often would become owned by others than the data subject. The 
control is, therewith, still not in the hands of the data subject.
The issue of tangibility can also be solved by following the regime of 
intellectual property rights. For digital personae, copyright seemed to be 
appropriate. Copyright is applicable to intangibles and gives the right holder 
exclusive rights to make the digital persona public or to make copies. The 
copyright holder can also give licenses to others to do so. Another important 
aspect of copyright are the moral rights, which cannot be transferred, and 
are meant to protect the digital persona against derogation. The rights holder 
can object to these derogatory works and also has the right to be mentioned 
as the author of a work. Depending on the exact way the digital persona is 
created, i.e. not completely automatically, a digital persona can be considered 
to be a ‘work’ in the sense of copyright law if the requirements of own 
character, personal mark of the author, and originality are met. In most cases 
of digital persona creation it is not likely that the latter two requirements 
will be fulfilled, so copyright will not be applicable to all digital personae. 
Moreover, the issue of who obtains the rights remains also in copyright. The 
creator of a work obtains the copyright. As was the case with ownership, 
the right is, thus, often obtained by others than the data subject. Next to 
that, copyright exists automatically by law, which implies that transfer of the 
rights is necessary to give these to the data subject. With property this was 
also the case. In copyright law, however, the moral rights always remain with 
the author, so complete transfer of the copyright would not even be possible.
Since digital personae are essentially data sets, a closer look was also taken 
at database rights. The problem of who would obtain the rights also exists 
in this legal concept. Besides, the rights obtained concern the database 
(infrastructure) as such, and not the contents of the database. Copying 
of parts of a database would, thus, not be prohibited so that a part of the 
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records could be extracted. One record might be a complete digital persona, 
so database rights certainly do not offer appropriate protection. After 
this observation, it seemed necessary to focus on the data subject as being 
represented, and not on the work itself as the central focus. This focus is 
provided by a specific category within copyright law, namely portrait law.
The most promising approach appears to be the analogous application of 
portrait law. Nevertheless, two important issues remain. Firstly, portrait 
law is, in cases where the digital persona is also protected by copyright, only 
a limitation on the rights of the copyright holder, but it does not provide 
independent protection right away. Nevertheless, the opportunity to limit 
the rights of the user of the digital persona could provide the individual 
with a good instrument to exercise control. Secondly, internal use of a 
digital persona is not covered by portrait law, since it focuses on the making 
public of a portrait. However, in relation to individual autonomy, the most 
problematic uses of digital personae are the internal uses for taking decisions 
which affect the individual. The scope of protection of portrait law would 
need to be broadened up to cover this important part as well.
Although the existing legal concepts thus turn out not to offer a complete 
solution directly, an important conclusion is that the digital persona as a 
concept is promising. In this chapter, it has been assessed to what extent 
digital personae as an existing fact are legally protected. The digital persona 
can be related to several legal constructs and an analysis demonstrates 
why legal constructs can or cannot be applied and what the problems with 
application of the legal constructs are. This means that the digital persona 
could be introduced as a legal concept since it is well-defined enough to 
work with. Even though the digital persona can change in its exact form and 
appearance over time, the key characteristics indicate whether a data set is a 
digital persona or not. An interpretation of the concept from a teleological 
viewpoint is helpful in this respect. When using the concept, the focus 
should be on the protection of privacy and autonomy of the individual. The 
implementation of the digital persona as a legal concept is a means to achieve 
such protection.
The digital persona as a new legal concept could offer opportunities to 
achieve better protection of privacy and autonomy of the individual. What 
this would look like will be described in the subsequent chapter. A specific 
challenge that will be taken into account is related to profiles. The use of 
these can also impact the rights and values of the individual. Nevertheless, 
protection may be even more complicated. As was seen in this Chapter, 
an important part of the discussion in relation to existing legal constructs 
concerned the obtainment of rights. Either the data controller or the 
individual could obtain these and, therewith, some level of control. Profiles, 
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however, are related to individuals that are not identified or identifiable. The 
paradoxical issue here is that, in order to achieve some control, the individual 
needs to be identified as being the represented individual, while remaining 
anonymous seems to provide better protection of privacy. To conclude, 
even though profiles and digital personae are closely related, the link to an 
identified individual appears to be a crucial point when trying to regulate 
the use of digital representations with a view on the rights and values of the 
individual that need better protection.
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Chapter 8  
The Digital Persona as a New Legal Concept
1. Introduction
Over the past years, there has been much EC funded research related 
to the ontology of privacy and identity, such as FIDIS,663 Prime,664 and 
PrimeLife.665 Combinations of legal, sociological, and technical research 
have proven successful in these projects. A large part of contemporary issues 
in the field of privacy and identity concerns the collection of personal data. 
In relation to this, these projects show, amongst others, analyses of data 
collection, problems surrounding linkability of data to individuals, and 
issues arising from the persistence of data as lifelong digital representations. 
The collection of data related to individuals leads to digital personae and 
profiles. The sources of data are numerous, but, at least from the perspective 
of the individual, not all data are considered publicly available. For this 
reason, these data should not always be accessible by others to include 
them in a digital persona or a profile, which is important from a privacy 
perspective. Moreover, the interpretation of the data may diverge from the 
individual’s own ideas, which leads to tensions with their sense of identity, 
in particular when data are accessed and used unexpectedly. “In cyberspace, 
there is no real wall between private and public. And the version of you 
being constructed out there – from bits and pieces of stray data – is probably 
not who you think you are.”666 Nevertheless, even when the representation 
is very accurate, privacy and autonomy of the individual may be affected 
by the creation and use of the digital persona or profile. In this study, the 
relation between privacy and autonomy was emphasized, in particular in 
relation to other rights and values that aim to ultimately protect human 
dignity. The creation of identity free from unreasonable constraints is what 
makes individuals unique. Privacy and autonomy are necessary conditions 
to achieve free identity construction. The more practical principles of 
informational self-determination and contextual integrity support this, 
and these are the principles that are most clearly supported by current data 
protection legislation.
In this study, the concept of the digital personae has been described from 
different disciplinary viewpoints, leading to an integrated definition. The 
663 See: <http://www.fidis.net/> (last accessed June 27, 2012).
664 See: <https://www.prime-project.eu/> (last accessed June 27, 2012).




differences between digital personae and profiles have been discussed, which 
also made clear that the two concepts are closely related and on a sliding scale. 
It has been analyzed how the use of digital personae and profiles relates to the 
values and rights of human dignity, autonomy, identity, informational self-
determination, contextual integrity, and privacy. Existing legal instruments 
fall short in properly protecting individuals when they become represented 
by digital personae or profiles, as we have seen in Chapters 6 and 7. In 
order to find proper ways of protecting digital personae and profiles, their 
legal status in light of current data protection legislation was assessed. 
Subsequently, relevant other legal constructs were analyzed in order to test 
whether they could be of help in providing protection for digital personae. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from that analysis. First, the digital 
persona has proven useful as a concept to be used in law, because it defines 
a relevant category of data, a set of data relating to an individual, which can 
be used to improve legal certainty for individuals as well as for companies 
who want to use the digital persona. Second, even though valuable insights 
and starting points could be derived from existing legal constructs, none of 
the current legal constructs offers an adequate and satisfactory system for 
protecting digital personae. This means that this study has a theoretical 
value in defining relevant concepts and the related problems that occur in 
light of data processing activities. A remaining challenge is to find a proper 
way of implementing or embedding digital personae in law that improves the 
protection of the individual’s interests online in practice. The exact manner 
in which digital personae and profiles can be implemented goes beyond the 
scope of this study. However, while in a late stage of writing this study, the 
proposal for the GDPR has been presented by the European Commission 
as part of the Data Protection Reforms. Part of the problems seems to be 
covered by the GDPR, which makes the GDPR a good starting point for 
further development of the protection of the individual’s interests. The need 
for radical changes in the legal framework has become less prevalent with the 
GDPR, but still, the findings of this study can be used as input for the further 
negotiations and drafting of the GDPR towards its final form.
Since it seems that the concept of the digital persona is useful, but cannot 
be directly applied based on existing legal constructs, this Chapter will 
look into alternative ways of embedding the digital persona in law. First, 
an analysis will be made of the effect of incorporating digital personae in 
portrait law, because this field of law has proven to show the most promising 
starting points for the digital persona as a representation of an individual 
(2.1). Second, a proposal will be presented for embedding the concept in 
data protection law, because this field of law is the most directly related to 
digital personae as data sets related to individuals (2.2). In section 2.3, a 
combined approach will be presented, which combines the benefits of both 
approaches. Subsequently, in section 3, there will be an analysis of the extent 
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to which the issues are already taken up in the proposed GDPR. In section 4, 
remaining points of attention will be discussed and some suggestions will be 
made for directions in how to practically embed digital personae and profiles 
in law. Finally, in section 5, a final conclusion to this study will be drawn, 
including an answer to the main research question.
2. Proposal for implementing the concept of the digital persona in 
law
In this section, two alternative ways of embedding the concept of the 
digital persona in law will be analysed. These two ways, embedding in 
portrait law and data protection law respectively, result from the findings 
on the applicability of existing legal constructs from Chapter 7. The aim of 
assessing the embedding of digital personae in these regimes is to find the 
main advantages and limitations which can function as preliminary input for 
a legal solution to the problem described in this study. First, however, some 
of the main aspects relating to the use of digital personae that have to be 
taken into account will be described. 
2.1. Main points of attention related to the use of digital personae
The most important aspect is that the digital persona is recognized as a set of 
data that belong together and form a digital representation of an individual. 
The approach as a set of data is crucial to avoid discussions about pieces of 
data and whether these data qualify as personal data or really can identify 
the individual. In many cases, especially those central to this study, the data 
are consciously collected to create a representation of individual internet 
users. It is those representations that cause specific concerns. Ongoing 
technological developments have to be taken into account as well. While 
currently technologies can help alter judgments with obvious economic and 
social consequences, in the near future technologies may make “information 
about individuals seep into interactions where it is presently unavailable.”667 
With the emerging trend of ubiquitous computing, the availability of 
information will become independent of time and location and may enter 
everyday interactions in offline environments as well. For instance, smart 
phones can be used to show real-time advertisements for an offer in the 
neighborhood where the individual at a specific time is or provide additional 
information to support (or steer) decisions the individual is taking.
 
A second point of attention is that identification can be based on a direct 




necessary to have a real name included in the data set. The data set just has to 
contain enough relevant data to make it easy to single out an individual. This 
can be based on, for instance, a unique identification number, which also 
implies that the data set does not necessarily have to contain much further 
data. This became particularly clear in relation to profiles, which may contain 
an R-identifier and therewith enable decisions being made at an individual 
level. Another possibility is that the data are so specific or characteristic that 
it is relatively easy to know whom the data concern. This can also be the 
case when entries in a database are unique sets and where identifiability is 
possible due to a low k-value in k-anonymity.668 Finally, a data set can be very 
extensive and based on the accumulated data facilitate identification of the 
individual to whom the data relate.
A third relevant aspect is the direct relation between the use of digital 
personae and its potential impact on human dignity, autonomy, identity, 
informational self-determination, contextual integrity, and privacy.  As was 
shown in Chapter 6, the use of a digital persona can affect the represented 
individual and, therewith, infringe upon their autonomy or privacy, or 
restrict the construction of an identity and ultimately impact upon human 
dignity. The possibility to influence an individual based on the available 
data is what makes the data set a digital persona. The protection of digital 
personae by embedding the concept in law ultimately aims at offering better 
protection of individuals in light of the mentioned rights and values. This has 
to increase awareness of data controllers concerning their data processing 
activities and to limit legal uncertainty concerning the applicability of data 
protection regulations.
Digital personae can be considered to reflect partial identities of an 
individual. When a digital persona, and in specific cases even a profile, is 
used to effectively steer the individual in his behavior or development, this 
affects the creation of the (partial) identity of the individual. Structurally 
limiting or predefining options to choose from, can unreasonably limit the 
development of the individual’s self. The individual, then, is not respected 
in the construction of his own unique identity. Limitation of options and 
steering or even forcing specific choices to be made also impacts on individual 
autonomy. The individual cannot freely define his own short term and long 
term desires and goals to achieve, because of a lack of possibilities available. 
Ultimately, because of these restrictions human dignity is not respected. 
Another important consideration is the relation between a digital persona 
and specific contexts. The context in which the digital persona is created 
and used should be very clear to the individual as well as the entity using 
668 See Chapter 6, section 3.2.
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the digital persona. The data that belong to this context as well as the norms 
and rules applicable to that context should be leading in the way the digital 
persona is used or treated. On the one hand, data stemming from another 
context should, in principle, only be collected and added on the individual’s 
initiative or with the individual’s consent. A digital persona is usually related 
to a partial identity. This partial identity may be the outcome of conscious 
choices made by the individual to disclose certain data or to keep data 
secret for the specific context. Bringing in these data from other contexts 
would have implications for the free construction of identity, in particular 
as supported by informational self-determination. On the other hand, the 
digital persona should in principle not be transferred to or otherwise used 
in another context, since this would also conflict with contextual integrity. 
There may be circumstances where specific interests should prevail, such 
as in cases where the availability of information is of vital interest for the 
individual or for public security. These cases are listed in the DPD in Article 
7(c), (d), and (e) as legitimate grounds for processing. Contextual integrity 
requires considering specific protection of the data in relation to the norms 
and rules applicable to the context from which the digital persona originates.
The creation and use of digital personae by others than the individual himself 
may also constitute an infringement of the right to privacy of the individual. 
In particular, when data are analyzed or when data sets are enriched with data 
resulting from profiling practices, this may reveal information concerning 
the individual which the individual himself may not have been aware of. 
Also monitoring activities on the internet to create profiles can lead to an 
infringement of the right to privacy, since the behavior of the individual is 
observed in detail while they stay unaware of the monitoring taking place. 
The websites an individual is visiting, or the information he is looking for, 
however, belong to the private sphere of the individual and is not publicly 
shared information or information that is consciously shared. When this 
information is collected and used to create a profile or enrich a digital 
persona, the privacy of the individual is affected, because informational 
self-determination and contextual integrity are affected. At least, in line 
with legal information obligations of data controllers, individuals have to be 
made aware of their data being processed and for what purposes the data 
are processed. The duty to inform lies with the data controller. Currently, 
companies can fulfill their information obligations by providing terms of 
service or privacy policies to their users. In these privacy policies, the way 
the company processes data is described and an indication is given of the 
purposes for which the processing takes place. However, the privacy policies 
are usually very extensive (and unattractive to read) and do not always offer 
clear information. In fact, privacy policies will not solve the information 
asymmetries between individuals and companies with regard to the data 
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processing.669 Moreover, information duties may be difficult to fulfill in the 
case of profiling, since the data processor cannot (yet) identify the individual.
Finally, individual autonomy is at stake when behavior is steered and, more 
particularly, when the individual is forced to take certain decisions. For 
instance, individuals can sometimes be obliged to create a digital persona 
in the form of a user account, which can also be used and enriched by the 
service provider for which the account is needed. For many services, a user 
account is necessary. This is comparable to leaving certain personal details, 
such as a delivery address, to enter into a contract in the offline world.670 
Online, however, as was shown in the example of Spotify,671 an individual 
can be forced to use the same account for several different services. In 
order to sign up to Spotify as a new user, a Facebook account is required,672 
requiring non-Facebook users to create a Facebook account first. Moreover, 
it is possible that an individual has a Facebook account, but does not want 
to use this for other purposes outside the Facebook platform. Facebook, 
however, does not allow creating a (different) profile under a pseudonym, 
so creating a separate account would be a violation of the general terms of 
Facebook. As can be seen, access to a service depends on the presence of a 
specific type of digital persona. The creation and use of this persona is not 
always a free choice. At least, the choice is not whether the individual wants 
to create or use such a digital persona or not, but whether the individual 
wants to access a certain service. Combining services and means of access 
limits the individual autonomy of users, because the used digital persona will 
contain data originating from different services, while the individual has no 
option to prevent this. Not only autonomous choice is limited, but there is 
also a conflict with contextual integrity as different contexts are combined 
in one digital persona.
It has been shown that the use of digital personae and profiles can have 
an impact on the privacy and autonomy, and related rights and values, of 
individuals. Embedding digital personae, and as a subcategory profiles as 
well, in law, may be helpful to improve the protection of the individual. The 
following subsections will preliminarily analyse what embedding of the 
concepts in portrait law and in data protection law would mean respectively, 
in order to extract advantages and limitations that have to be taken into 
account in the search for a legal solution. The main points resulting from this 
669 Vila, Greenstadt & Molnar 2003. 
670 In many offline cases this is not even required, because the individual directly buys a 
product in a store and takes it home himself.
671 Chapter 5, section 4.1.
672 For the Netherlands, this has been changed back in September 2012. Scrolling to the 
bottom of the sign-up page now shows the option to register with an email account.
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exercise will be assessed in relation to the GDPR subsequently. The concept 
of the ‘digital persona’ is proposed to be incorporated under the following 
definition:
A digital persona is a digital representation of a real-world individual, which 
can be connected to this real-world individual and includes a sufficient amount 
of (relevant) data to serve, within the context and for the purpose of its use, as a 
proxy for the individual.
2.2. The digital persona in portrait law
When looking at the existing legal regimes it turns out that portrait law and 
data protection law seem to be the most promising to embed digital personae 
and profiles in order to achieve better protection of the rights and respect 
for values of the individual. Nevertheless, both have drawbacks which limit 
reaching the desired result. The two regimes will briefly be discussed to 
summarize advantages and drawbacks, which will serve as input for working 
towards a legal solution for the problems identified in this study.
Portrait law offers some specific advantages. A first important advantage 
is the right for the portrayed individual to object to the publication of the 
portrait. In case the person using the portrait still wants to publish it, he 
has to prove that the interest of the portrayed individual to object to the 
publication is unjustified. So, there is a right to object for the individual 
and the burden of proof that the objection is unwarranted lies with the 
publisher. When applying this by analogy to the use of digital personae, it 
would provide the data subject with a right to object to the processing of 
his digital persona. Moreover, the burden of proof concerning the legitimacy 
of the objection would be with the data controller. In terms of control, this 
would be an achievement for the individual. Another important advantage 
of portrait law as a legal frame is that the emphasis lies on the relation to 
the individual. This may have a psychological effect, paying attention to the 
interests of the individual, instead of to the processing of data. The focus 
on the legitimate interests of the individual, in particular privacy rights, is 
emphasized as the background of data protection law.
An important drawback of this approach is that copyright law, of which 
portrait law is part, does not include notification duties. As a result, the 
individual cannot always be aware of his digital persona being created and 
used, in particular when this use is taking place internally, such as copying 
and internal use within a company.673 Without this awareness, the individual 
673 This may often involve copying as well, but can also be ‘consulting’ the digital persona 
to make a decision.
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cannot exercise his right to object to the use. Obviously, the same argument 
holds for ‘traditional’ portraits, but in the case of digital persona the issue 
of awareness is much more pressing due to the invisibility of the portrait 
being used. Moreover, the test of identification as a basis to decide whether 
something is a portrait or not implies that identification has to be possible for 
the application of the portrait law regime. Profiles can, thus, not be included 
in this form of regulation.
2.3. The digital persona in data protection law
A second option to implement the digital persona in law and to offer it 
protection is by making it part of (current) data protection law. A prerequisite 
for making the digital persona part of the data protection regime is that the 
relation to personal data has to be clear. As was shown in this study, the 
digital persona can be connected to an individual and can be used to identify 
this individual, so, the digital persona fits in the data protection regime. The 
category of profiles consists of data concerning an unknown individual and 
does not fit in the data protection regime. However, they have to be taken 
into account as well, because they can become a digital persona and, at least, 
can be used to affect an individual, even without identification. 
When protecting the digital persona in data protection law, it should be 
explicated that the digital persona is a set of data and that the data are to be 
protected as a set. The data are used as a set as well and derive their value 
from being a data set. Separating them could have the effect of no longer 
being able to connect single data to an individual. The digital persona then 
becomes an anonymous profile and the DPD would not be applicable. 
With regard to the applicability of the DPD it becomes clear that this is not 
always evident, in particular when it becomes unclear whether a data set is a 
digital persona or a profile. When the digital persona contains an L-identifier, 
the DPD is applicable and when the data set cannot be connected to an 
individual in any manner the DPD is not applicable. There are, however, a 
number of categories in between. Removing the L-identifier from a digital 
persona does not always imply that the individual is not identifiable. There is 
a sliding scale from direct identifiability, via identifiability with some effort, 
to (group) profiles. The significance of the effects of the use of the digital 
persona or profile is parallel to the sliding scale, from very significant to 
hardly relevant.674 Whether the DPD is applicable depends on the specific 
case, which means that there is a lot of legal uncertainty. The thin line 
between the categories and the ease of transforming a profile into a digital 
674 Although it should be noted that even in the case of group profiles, the use of profiles 
for structural exclusion may in the end have discriminatory effects.
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persona by adding an L-identifier, make that profiles also deserve attention 
when aiming to improve the rights of the individual. For instance, in the 
context of consumers, Pridmore talks about the combination of information 
files: “some information gathered on consumers through more personalized 
interactions may be attached to a personal information file – the digital space 
within databases from which a data-image is drawn.”675 And, “[r]egardless 
of whether additional personalized information is added, the consumer is 
routinely seen as the digitized collection of various segments or categories 
(deemed significant by the corporation) that he or she is perceived to belong 
to.”676 The use of digital personae and profiles can, thus, be identical and 
both can be used as a basis for decisions concerning the individual. The main 
difference is that a digital persona clearly concerns a specific individual, 
while for profiles this may be more difficult to see.
The fact that digital personae and profiles are both used to affect the 
individual indicates that an improvement of the protection of the rights of 
the individual must also be related to legitimate use of these data sets. It 
can be assumed that the best protection is offered when the legitimate use 
is directly related to an action of the concerned individual which explicitly 
indicates consent. While this ground for legitimate use is the most closely 
related to individual autonomy, proper protection based on this ground can 
only be achieved when consent is indeed well-informed. Even though this 
has appeared to be problematic, consent should still be used as the most 
appropriate ground for legitimate processing and specific attention should 
be paid to informing individuals of the purposes and possible implications 
of the use of profiles and digital personae. 
Embedding the digital persona in data protection law directly will clearly 
define this category of data sets as data concerning identified or identifiable 
individuals. For data controllers, it will be clear that the DPD is applicable 
to the processing activities. Nevertheless, the burden of proof with regard 
to consent, as well as legitimate grounds for processing may be difficult to 
distinguish from the general provisions when the digital persona is merely 
defined as a set of data concerning an individual. It is still the case that data 
controllers process data and are not fully aware of the fact that they are 
affecting individuals. The weighing of interests may still be unbalanced, and 
when the processing is based on consent of the data subject, the data subject 
may have difficulties to withdraw this consent and stop the processing of 
his digital persona. A stronger emphasis on the digital persona as a holistic 
image of the individual, combined with the specific effects the processing 
of digital personae has on the individual would be welcome. Besides, a 
675 Pridmore 2008, section 4.1.
676 Pridmore 2008, section 4.1.
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legal opportunity to object to processing may provide the individual with a 
stronger position against data processors. 
2.4. The digital persona as a portrait in data protection law?
It appeared that both forms have their drawbacks or limitations, but a 
combination may achieve better protection of the privacy and autonomy of 
the individual. The positive elements from portrait law that are absent in 
data protection law can be used as a source for inspiration to improve the 
protection of the individual. This would mean that the individual, next to the 
familiar rights provided by the DPD, also has the right to object to the (non-)
commercial use of his digital persona based on his privacy rights or to claim 
financial compensation.677 A right to object also exists in the DPD, but there 
are some important differences. One difference concerns the burden of 
proof. In portrait law the right to object is the starting point and the party who 
wants to use the portrait (the data controller) has to prove that the objection 
is unjustified, while under the DPD the data subject has to prove that he has 
“compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation” to object 
against the processing.678 On the basis of portrait rights, the individual has a 
stronger position, because the burden of proof concerning the legitimacy of 
the processing and the prevailing interest lies with the data controller. 
Moreover, portrait rights are related to the identifiability of the individual, so 
the direct link between the digital persona and the individual is emphasized 
as well. With regard to the making public of a digital persona, rights to object 
based on portrait law may also be of help in solving problems stemming 
from changes of settings by service providers. Such problems, for instance, 
occurred in relation to the introduction of Facebook Timeline, where profile 
data of users became available to a larger audience, because Facebook 
changed the settings without prior notice to its users.679 There are more 
options for users to manage the data available in their timeline with regard 
to visibility, but the example clearly shows the power position of the provider 
who can make major decisions concerning the public availability of lots of 
data of millions of users by simply introducing a new feature or switching 
a setting. In particular, the legal backdrop of such an initiative as implying 
677 Financial compensation for the use would be most appropriate in relation to 
commercial usage, where the data controller wants to make money by the use of the 
digital persona of the individual.
678 Article 14(a) DPD.
679 With the introduction of Facebook Timeline, Facebook made all previous posts of a 
member visual in a virtual CV: S. Choney, Facebook Timeline: There’s no escaping 
it now, Technolog MSNBC: <http://www.technolog.msnbc.msn.com/technology/
technolog/facebook-timeline-theres-no-escaping-it-now-84762> (last accessed July 
31, 2012). 
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the making public of the portraits of all users will make clear that this kind 
of processing differs from the processing necessary to provide the service. 
An important remaining issue concerns profiles. These do not directly fit 
under the portrait law regime or under the DPD regime, since the individual 
to whom the profile relates is unknown. A profile will, thus, not pass the 
test of identification at first glance. However, as became clear in Chapter 7 
of this study, the test of identification can also be passed when the portrait 
is compared to an individual and the individual is recognized as being the 
portrayed person. With regard to individual profiles, which contain some 
form of an R-identifier, such as a cookie ID or an IP address, this means that 
they can be covered by the legal regime combining portrait law and the DPD, 
because the individual is identifiable. The profile data have to be combined 
with or related to other data to come to the identification and to establish 
the link between the profile and the individual. This is in line with the idea of 
the L-identifier, where the data can be compared with other data to identify 
the individual whom the data concern. Once the link is made, the profile 
becomes a digital persona.  
Group profiles cannot be covered in this manner, since these are not 
individualized. The implication is that it cannot be argued that the profiles 
concern individual natural persons. However, as was shown in this study, the 
impact of the use of group profiles is usually less severe, unless they are used 
for structural inclusion or exclusion. This practice tends towards weblining. 
The most appropriate solution in this respect might be to prohibit weblining 
in a similar way as the prohibition of the offline equivalent redlining. In the 
context of the DPD, it would be useful to indicate the possibility of affecting 
individuals based on profiles as a point of attention, in order to emphasize 
the link to individual profiles. As soon as an R-identifier is added and the 
profile can be applied to an individual, the profile becomes an individual 
profile and can be covered by the regime as described above.
The shift in the burden of proof and the recognition of the digital persona 
as a portrait will bring advantages for the individual. The required efforts to 
object to information processing will be limited to some extent. Moreover, 
the digital persona as a portrait will emphasize that the data concern an 
individual and that decisions based on the data will affect an individual. This 
might be an incentive for data controllers to be accountable. Moreover, in 
line with portrait rights, options may be opened for individuals to monetize 
the usage of their digital personae. Finally, options are opened to include 
individual profiles in the DPD regime as well.
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3. Issues covered by the GDPR
A number of the issues discussed above are taken up in the proposal for 
the GDPR. For instance, a shift in the burden of proof is covered by Article 
19(1) of the GDPR.680 In my opinion, this right should also be applicable 
to the use of profiles, since these can be used to affect individuals as well. 
In the context of direct marketing, this is facilitated by section 2 of Article 
19 GDPR. Moreover, Article 20 GDPR provides a prohibition on measures 
based on profiling without the consent of the individual. The scope of the 
GDPR is, therewith, much broader than the DPD. The fact that anonymous 
profiling is not really an opportunity is addressed in this manner, because 
the formulation of the provision makes no differentiation between types 
or purposes of profiling. The topic of tracking of browsing behavior, which 
was discussed elaborately in this study, is, thus, covered as well. The lack of 
differentiation, however, is also a drawback, because it emphasizes the use of 
a type of technology instead of the interests of the individual that need to be 
protected by the provision.
A positive effect of the lack of differentiation is that it can also contribute 
to legal certainty for data controllers. In cases of uncertainty in practice as 
to which information collected by a service provider or internet company 
is personal data, the Article 29 Working Party indicates that all data have 
to be treated as personal data, including the applicability of the DPD to the 
processing of these data. The approach taken in the GDPR seems to be in line 
with this opinion. Nevertheless, this stringent approach clearly may conflict 
with the interests of commercial companies who wish to process anonymous 
data or who have developed innovative privacy-friendly approaches towards 
profiling.681 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) seems to be 
more lenient and indicates that this approach is “reasonable except where it 
becomes clear that the existence of personal data in a system is negligible.”682 
This is more in line with a purpose-based approach towards identifiability 
and limits the influence of ‘any other person’ who may be able to identify 
an individual based on the data set. According to the EDPS, in cases where 
it is not reasonably likely that the data controller will (try to) identify the 
individual the profile is anonymous and not subjected to the DPD. This 
approach may offer an ‘escape’ for data controllers when they argue 
not to have the intention to identify individuals. Based on the foregoing 
680 “The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to their particular 
situation, at any time to the processing of personal data which is based on points (d), 
(e) and (f) of Article 6(1), unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate 
grounds for the processing which override the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject.”
681 Cave et al. 2012, p. 74.
682 Hustinx 2009, p. 7.
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observations, such an escape should only be available in relation to group 
profiles. Digital personae and individual profiles are always subjected to the 
DPD, since they relate to identified or (potentially) identifiable individuals. 
The approach taken in the GDPR is, thus, the most effective approach 
from the perspective of protecting the interests of individuals. Obviously, 
balancing these interests with the interests of commercial data controllers is 
a challenge.
One of the opportunities to tackle this challenge is by providing the 
individual with a choice (control) that is applicable to numerous profilers. 
The individual gains control, but can make a choice concerning a number 
of profiling activities at once, which makes the control less burdensome 
and is positive for the commercial companies as well. After all, they benefit 
from providing a user with a nice web user experience, because this leads 
to convenience and a positive attitude towards the companies. Providing 
the user with more control is something on which much work is done 
currently, at a European level, by requiring consent for the use of cookies 
via a Directive,683 even though this concerns separate profilers. Thus far, the 
initiative is not very effective, however, because it appears difficult to have 
clear distinctions between types of cookies for which consent is required684 
and how to implement the obtainment of consent in websites. Moreover, the 
Directive is circumvented, for instance, by giving visitors of a web shop a 
free item, which is added to the shopping cart immediately. Keeping track 
of the items in the shopping cart by the use of cookies is allowed. As a result, 
web shop owners can track their visitors when browsing through the store. 
Obtaining consent for or objecting to profiling at a more general level seems 
more efficient, in particular when supported by technical means. A user-
friendly way for obtaining this consent or objection is sought for by regulators 
and advertisers685 and a valuable initiative in this respect is the DoNotTrack 
683 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws, which changed Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC and 
includes this requirement of consent.
684 For tracking cookies, consent is required, but not for functional cookies, which are, 
for instance, use to ‘remember’ language preferences or items in a shopping cart. The 
exact scope of functional cookies is unclear, however.
685 In the EU, Commissioner Kroes first gave the advertising branch the opportunity 
to come up with a proper solution before imposing rules from the EC. Initiatives 
from the branch, however, were not present in time or did not meet the requirements 
from the Directive. See: Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission 
responsible for the Digital Agenda Online Privacy, speech at Online Tracking and 
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system of the W3C mandated by the FTC,686 which is incorporated in several 
browsers already. Nevertheless, the fact that profiles are on a sliding scale 
and can become digital personae at some point in time always has to be taken 
into account.
At least at the practical level, the GDPR brings an improvement in the 
protection of individuals as opposed to the current DPD. The improvements 
are to a large extent in line with the protection sought for in relation to 
the problems described in this study. The GDPR is, thus, a welcome 
instrument, even though some room for improvement is still present. From 
the perspective of the use of digital personae and profiles and the related 
interests of individuals that need to be protected, the following section will 
provide some indications for improvement. At least the theoretical value 
which can be achieved by embedding the concepts of digital personae and 
profiles in law is a worthwhile exercise and can be a source of inspiration for 
further development of the practical embedding of the concepts.
4. Further points of attention and suggestions
Having discussed the issues that are covered by the GDPR, some specific 
points of attention remain that need to be taken into account when further 
developing legal protection of the interests of individuals in an online 
environment. Besides, some suggestions towards a practical approach of 
some of the issues will be presented.
The individual has data protection rights which are also applicable to digital 
personae. The identifiability of the individual is assumed to be present 
when the digital persona can be connected to a specific individual. Since the 
individual can be reached, he should also be provided with information to 
contact the commercial data controller who uses the digital persona. For 
instance, based on cookie identification, information can be displayed on the 
website where the cookie is used.687 The individual, then, can choose either 
Browsers Workshop, Brussels 22 June 2011, speech/11/461. Online available at: < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-461_en.htm>, last accessed 6 
December 2012.
686 See Chapter 7. A drawback of the system is its dependence on the data controllers 
who have to respect the wish of the individual not to be tracked.
687 In the case of third party cookies, the third party has to negotiate for this displaying 
space with the website owner, at least when the third party does not display visible 
content on the website. This can be part of the contracts between the parties. A 
positive side-effect will be that website owners become (more) aware of the amount 
of cookies they have on their websites and to which parties those cookies belong. A 
difficulty is the possibility that a website owner does not know which party will display 
an advertisement on his website beforehand, for instance, because this depends on 
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to accept the use of the digital persona or to object to it. When the individual 
chooses to object, this has to result in termination of the use and even 
deletion of the digital persona,688 unless the data controller can show that the 
objection is unjustified.689 The argument of the data controller has to provide 
convincing evidence of his prevailing legitimate interests that cannot be 
overruled by the objection of the individual. An objection of the data subject 
can also be conditioned, meaning that the use of the digital persona may be 
allowed in case a financial compensation is provided by the data controller. 
In that case, an agreement can be reached and the processing is based on 
consent. This is comparable to the right for the individual to monetize his 
image based on portrait law. 
As indicated in this study, profiles are often used for targeted advertising. 
These advertisements appear not always to be in line with the interests of the 
personally targeted individual. Choices of advertisers to include or exclude 
individuals may have negative effects for the individual. However, direct 
negative effects which cannot be circumvented690 or direct legal effects691 can 
usually only be based on a digital persona and not on a profile. Legal effects 
which take place directly will normally only be possible to achieve when the 
individual is identifiable, because such an effect is directed to a specific person. 
A data set which can be used for direct legal effects is, thus, a digital persona and 
the outcome of a bidding process. This should be taken up via intermediaries that 
connect advertisers to web site owners.
688 If the persona has to be deleted, but separate data remain available, the normal regime 
of the DPD applies to these data.
689 In cases where the use of the digital persona is related to a service the user wants, a 
distinction should be made between processing of data that are necessary for providing 
the service and the processing of additional data for other purposes. Processing of the 
latter category should be stopped then, but might not imply that the service cannot be 
used anymore. Moreover, if no identification is necessary for a service, such as is the 
case with publicly available services which can be accessed without an account, using 
the service should be possible without a digital persona being created. In this respect, 
the current practice of the Dutch public broadcasting (Nederlandse Publieke Omroep, 
NPO) of not allowing access to their website and services without accepting cookies 
is an example of an unnecessary creation of a digital persona in relation to a public 
service.
690 Circumvention for example is possible with an advertisement by simply ignoring it. 
Moreover, advertising to influence behavior of individuals takes place continuously 
in the offline world as well and does not directly have legal effects either. The only 
analogy might be that weblining is comparable to redlining and might be prohibited. 
691 Direct legal effects are effects that take place directly because of a specific action, 
such as granting or refusing a contract. Indirect legal effects take place as a result of 
an action, but are not the initial aim of the action. For instance, making a selection 
of individuals who receive a loan based on a number of characteristics can have an 




not a profile. The use of a profile, however, can have significant effects as well. 
Structural exclusion, for instance, can be a form of indirect discrimination. 
Even though group profiles are hard to cover under data protection legislation, 
simply because they do not relate to an identified or identifiable individual, 
they have to be kept in mind when searching for further improvement of 
the protection of the interests of the individual. The solution may, perhaps, 
not be in a specific embedding in law in the form of a provision, but more 
in changing the general mindset. The focus should be on the interests of the 
individual, mainly privacy, but in relation to individual autonomy and identity 
and ultimately human dignity, that need to be protected by the legal regime. 
Currently, the focus is much more tended towards processing requirements 
and not on the effects the processing may have on the individual.
Slight differences with regard to the requirements for the use of digital 
personae, individual profiles, and group profiles are justified. The justification 
for this differentiation relates to the possible impact the use of the different 
categories of data sets may have. In the case of group profiles, companies 
may earn money by exploitation of data, while these data cannot simply be 
related to an identified or identifiable offline individual. In cases where this 
is possible, such as advertising via Facebook where the account is a digital 
persona and contains a direct identifier (the name of the individual as required 
by the real-name policy of Facebook), advertisers deliver their content and 
their target group, after which Facebook displays the advertisement on the 
profile pages of the members who belong to that target group. Identification 
is not possible by the advertiser, because he does not receive data about the 
members. Facebook can identify the individuals to whom an advertisement 
is targeted and has to be compliant with the GDPR. Moreover, Facebook 
ultimately decides to whom an advertisement is actually shown. This justifies 
a relatively lenient approach towards profilers and advertisers, who are using 
profiles, as opposed to data controllers using digital personae.
Next to the more general points of attention, more concrete issues remain for 
which some direction can be given as a starting point for implementation. 
First, the option to monetize the use of a digital persona in the form of a 
financial compensation, inspired by portrait law, is not included in the 
GDPR.692 When taking the proposed Articles 19 and 20 as a starting point, 
this aspect can be facilitated by adding an option to provide conditioned 
consent, in which case the condition is a financial compensation. In line with 
692 It can be argued that providing a service for free, because it is funded by targeted 
advertising, is a financial compensation as well. Nevertheless, not all services have such 
a business model and, moreover, it is not always necessary to create digital personae 
to display advertisements. In a lot of cases, contextual advertising, for instance, can 
help in displaying advertisements that relate to the interests of the individual as well.
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Article 19, this could mean that there is a right to object to the use of a digital 
persona, unless financial compensation is provided. In line with Article 
20, the consent to be obtained can be conditioned beforehand. Due to the 
diversity of situations and aims of the processing activities, it may be the 
most appropriate option to use delegated acts to make the compensations 
more concrete, or to adopt a Commission Guideline or ruling on this aspect. 
A similar approach is taken in Article 20(5)693 concerning suitable measures 
to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests. Moreover, the instrument 
of delegated acts allows for more flexibility when circumstances change as 
opposed to making it part of the Regulation itself.
The opportunity offered to individuals to monetize their digital persona 
can be criticized from the perspective of behavioral economics. Research in 
this area has shown that people do not highly value their privacy (in terms 
of money).694 The impact of implementing the digital persona in the way 
proposed above will be limited by this.  However, the findings of behavioral 
economics research are based on an important condition, namely that 
the individual is aware of his data being used for commercial purposes.695 
This awareness is an important achievement in relation to autonomy. If the 
individual is unaware of his data being used, he cannot make an economic 
decision to adjust his behavior or to take specific action. So, regardless of 
whether individuals value their privacy high or low, the choices made on 
this by the individual are more conscious and at least include a choice on 
whether to accept the use of a digital persona or not. This certainly improves 
individual autonomy and the free construction of identity, which implies 
that, in the end, human dignity is better respected.
693 “The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with 
Article 86 for the purpose of further specifying the criteria and conditions for suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests referred to in paragraph 2.”
694 See e.g. Acquisti, John & Loewenstein 2009; Beresford, Kübler & Preibusch 2012 
and; Presentation by Sarah Spiekermann at PI Lab launch event, April 3rd 2012, 
Tilburg: Privacy as Property. Online available at: <http://www.pilab.nl/presentations/
Spiekermann%20-%20Privacy%20As%20Property%20-%20PI.lab%20launch%20
-%20Tilburg%203%20April%202012.pdf> (last accessed June 23, 2012).
695 For instance, in one experiment, there was a clear choice between two shops 
where in one shop DVDs are cheaper, but the individual has to provide much more 
personal information than in the other shop. The difference in this data sharing was 
clearly indicated, but still, individuals choose for the shop with the cheapest DVDs 
(Beresford, Kübler & Preibusch 2012). In another experiment, a choice was offered 
between an anonymous loyalty card worth 10 US $ and a non-anonymous card worth 
12 US $. Individuals who received the non-anonymous card were not willing to 
switch to the anonymous card (‘paying’ 2 Dollars for more privacy) (Acquisti, John & 
Loewenstein 2009). Depending on the initial situation in the experiment (the priming 
of the research subjects), the differences in disclosure of personal information are, 
thus, clearly related to the financial benefit the customer receives.
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In order to balance interests, the data controller can, in principle, use a similar 
kind of analogy based on copyright law by posing himself as the author of the 
digital persona. The processing of the digital persona may then be allowed 
based on the legitimate interests of the author, supported by Article 7(f) of 
the DPD. This interest has to be weighed against the privacy interests of the 
individual, which is exactly what is provided for by the portrait rights. The 
privacy of the individual is a central issue, whereas in current data protection 
law the focus is more on requirements for processing. The weighing of 
interests that has to take place may also include a negotiation on financial 
compensation for the use of the digital persona. 
A problem that remains here is that the data controller can weigh the 
interests without involving the individual.696 Moreover, the data controller 
can still argue that the privacy interests of the individual do not outweigh 
their interest, or data controllers may try to apply general rules on financial 
compensation, therewith buying processing rights on a large scale. Since 
there is only an obligation to notify data protection authorities of the 
processing activities and no check is performed on the weighing of interests 
made by the data controller,697 this ground hardly offers an appropriate 
safeguard for the individual. This problem can very well be taken up by a 
prohibition to make the weighing without consulting the individual. This 
does not mean that the individual can always successfully object to the 
processing, but that the individual has to be informed about the weighing 
of interests. Moreover, the introduction of the concept in combination with 
this information duty related to weighing of interests improves awareness 
amongst data controllers of the fact that they are taking decisions that 
affect individuals, and therewith support accountability. The direct link to 
the individual becomes clearer, which may result in a different approach 
when making decisions as compared to taking the idea of a data set as a 
starting point. This is a more psychological effect, which cannot be fully 
substantiated here without psychological research. Nevertheless, a change 
of mindset will emphasize the protection of the individual, which is at the 
core of privacy rights, instead of emphasizing procedural aspects of data 
processing practices. Still, the weighing of interests may remain casuistic to 
a certain extent, in particular when company secrets are at stake. A situation 
without a weighing, however, is an illusion. The clearer the interests at stake 
696 Involving the individual and obtaining consent is still the most desirable ground 
for processing, but may not always be reasonable in practice, since it cannot always 
outweigh the legitimate interests of commercial data controllers.
697 The Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, 
CBP) only performs a formal check on the completeness of a notification. The 
notification as such does not imply a justification of the data processing or offer any 
legal rights. See: <http://www.cbpweb.nl/Pages/inf_va_melden_vrijstellen.aspx> 
(last accessed June 21, 2012).
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are, the better the weighing can take place. Moreover, the result may never 
be that the individual data subject is refused all information, which is already 
indicated in Recital 51 of the GDPR.
Second, the concept of the digital persona is not included. Including the 
concept in a specific provision may be an additional complicating factor. 
Moreover, Article 20 GDPR seems to cover digital personae as well as 
profiles, so there is already a major achievement in the proposal in this 
sense. However, more work should be done to achieve a different mindset 
concerning the impact processing of digital personae and profiles may 
have on the interests of the individual. Possibly, a start can be made by 
including the concept in the Preamble, in combination with a mind setting 
Recital emphasizing the link to individual persons that are affected by the 
use of digital representations. The relation between privacy, autonomy, and 
identity is essential to be stressed in this respect. The normative background 
is supported by a fundamental rights approach, which should be the starting 
point for the entire GDPR. This requires some rephrasing in the current 
proposal, because the proposed GDPR even increases the distance with 
privacy as a fundamental right, by explicating data protection rights instead 
of privacy rights as the normative background. 
If embedding digital personae and profiles in the GDPR seems a valuable 
improvement, a first step may be to add the following Recital to the Preamble:
Whereas:
(1)The creation of data sets concerning individuals leads to digital personae and 
profiles.
A digital persona is a digital representation of an individual, which can be 
connected to this real-world individual and includes a sufficient amount of 
(relevant) data to serve, within the context and for the purpose of its use, as a 
proxy for the individual.
A profile is a digital representation of a non-identifiable real-world individual, 
which can be used to affect this individual by means of unidirectional 
communications.
(2) The use of digital personae and profiles as a basis for making decisions affects 
individuals and may impact upon their individual autonomy and privacy. This 
can restrict the free construction of identity and may ultimately impact upon 
human dignity. The protection of the fundamental rights of the individual has to 
be seen in light of the relation between the processing of data and the implications 
thereof for individuals. Individuals may also be affected by decisions taken based 
on digital personae and profiles when this is not the primary aim of the data 
processing entity. The effect a decision may have on the fundamental rights and 
Arnold Roosendaal
268
related interests of the individual should be taken into account when making a 
decision.
The proposed addition to the Preamble emphasizes the mindset that has 
to be the basis for data processing activities that may affect individuals, 
regardless of whether the data sets are digital personae or profiles. The focus 
is not that much on the processing activities as such, but on the effects the 
processing may have for the fundamental rights and related interests of 
the individual. Obviously, more concrete implementations in the form of 
provisions would be needed to achieve a more serious effect, for instance, in 
line of the amendments related to Articles 19 and 20 as discussed above. The 
exact formulation of these provisions goes beyond the scope of this study 
and would need a specific effort, taking into account the interests of all actors 
involved. Nevertheless, this study has shown the importance of the topic and 
provides a theoretic value in describing and analyzing the concepts of digital 
personae and profiles and their protection.
5. Conclusion and reflection
Embedding the concepts of the digital persona and profile in order to 
provide better protection of privacy and autonomy of individuals, with 
the final aim to better respect human dignity, seems to be well-placed for 
success in achieving this aim. Practical work on the embedding needs to 
be done, but the theoretical analysis provided in this study has proven the 
concept of the digital persona as such to be valuable as a legal concept. The 
way of implementing the concept as described above does not broaden up 
the interpretation of the definition of personal data, but takes a holistic 
approach towards complete data sets, instead of separate pieces of data. The 
embedding of the concept, starting from a mindset in the Preamble of the 
GDPR, can bring a better protection of fundamental rights and values for 
the individual. Moreover, the relation between digital personae and profiles 
and their use is emphasized. 
The main research question of this study was the following: Can the 
protection of digital personae and profiles as coherent data sets, taking into 
account that they are used by businesses as a basis for making decisions 
that affect real world individuals, improve the protection of privacy and 
autonomy of the individuals represented by these digital personae? It can 
be concluded that this question can be answered positively. Even though the 
practical embedding requires more work and some other issues remain that 
could be taken up in further research, the embedding of the digital persona 
as a concept in law can improve the privacy and autonomy of individuals, in 
particular because it will provide for more awareness of individuals about 
their digital personae being created and used for commercial purposes, as 
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well as a better balance between the interests of commercial parties and 
those of individuals. Commercial companies will be more aware of the 
fact that they are making decisions based on digital personae that affect 
real-world individuals. This is important, since personalized treatment 
of individuals based on digital personae or profiles is common practice. 
However, “[i]n the area of automated personalization, we have come to 
realize that individualization is not a sufficient condition of dignified 
treatment.”698 Individualised approaches of companies towards individuals 
do not automatically mean that these individuals are not affected in their 
privacy and autonomy.
To conclude, digital personae and profiles are valuable concepts to use as 
a mindset when legally improving the protection of privacy and autonomy 
of individuals. Connecting the implementation of the concepts to the 
GDPR will emphasize the approach of the persona as a complete set of data 
concerning an individual, shifts the burden of proof concerning consent to 
the data controller, and will probably pay more attention to the effects of the 
processing of digital personae, instead of on the processing as such.
Even though the proposed embedding can bring improvements for the 
protection of individuals, a critical reflection brings two points of attention 
to the fore. The first is a privacy paradox. One of the important points of the 
proposed approach is to provide the data subject with a right to object, also 
when the data set is a profile. The individual, then, has to indicate that the 
profile concerns him. In order to exercise this right, the individual, thus, has 
to provide more information to identify himself. Better privacy protection, 
thus, implies less privacy. The same problem arises in relation to financial 
compensation. If an individual wants to receive a payment for the use of his 
profile, the data controller has to be able to provide the individual with the 
financial compensation. This will usually require identifying details from 
the individual. Nevertheless, the data subject may in many cases be able to 
object to the profiling without identifying himself. For instance, providing 
cookie information or an IP address may not directly identify the individual, 
but enables the data controller to recognize which profile it concerns. With 
regard to financial compensation, innovative solutions to trade browsing 
data with content providers may be helpful.699
The second point is of a more general nature and concerns the enforcement 
of data protection legislation. Once the GDPR is in its final form and enters 
698 Cohen 2012, p. 251.
699 An example is the New York City based start-up Enliken: < http://allthingsd.
com/20121212/enliken-wants-to-help-you-sell-your-browsing-data-to-your-
favorite-content-provider/>, last visited 12 December 2012.
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into force, this is the main challenge to be picked up. Enforcement will 
largely depend on the developments relating to the powers of data protection 
authorities. This empowerment is one of the important aspects taken up in 
the GDPR. The enforcement problems can best be combined with a plea for 
accountability of data controllers, which is also emphasized in the GDPR. 
In this respect, valuable work that can be used as a starting point has been 
done by Nissenbaum,700 who, already back in 1997, discussed accountability 
in relation to four specific problems related to the complexity of computer 
systems that fall under the responsibility of the data controller: (1) the problem 
of many hands, referring to the involvement of high numbers of people and 
parties in the development and use of data processing technologies; (2) the 
problem of bugs, which relates to inadvertent mistakes in software resulting 
from complexity; (3) blaming the computer, which comes across when a 
company has lost control over its systems, and; (4) software ownership 
without liability, which may occur in cases of non-proprietary software use 
or when processes are outsourced.
Another difficulty related to enforcement is due to the involvement of many, 
often international, parties. This can make it difficult to determine where 
jurisdiction lies in case of a conflict. In any case, the domestic EU legislation 
of the DPD has a transnational footprint.701 However, even if jurisdiction 
is found, it may still be difficult to enforce a court ruling when the service 
provider is located elsewhere. A number of issues related to globalization 
have been discussed by the Article 29 Working Party.702 Next to identifying 
problems concerning the applicability of data protection law, several 
directions for solutions are discussed, such as international standards, 
international agreements, and Binding Corporate Rules.703
In conclusion, the use of digital personae and profiles can have a serious 
impact on the privacy and autonomy of individuals. This study discussed 
the concepts of digital personae and profiles from different disciplinary 
perspectives. Protecting digital personae and profiles to ultimately improve 
the protection of the individual’s interests online has, at least theoretically, 
proven to be a useful approach. Further research is needed on some specific 
issues as well as on the way the concept can be embedded in data protection 
law. 
A number of the issues raised in this study are already being addressed in the 
GDPR proposal. Nevertheless, concrete legal recognition of digital personae 
700 Nissenbaum 1997.
701 Kobrin 2002, p. 4.
702 Article 29 Working Party 2009b, pp. 9-12.
703 On Binding Corporate Rules, see also: Moerel 2012.
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and profiles is not taking place in the GDPR. Moreover, the normative 
background for the GDPR is mainly focused on data protection and not on 
overarching rights, such as privacy and individual autonomy. The proposal 
of embedding digital personae and profiles in data protection regulation 
as indicated in this study does emphasize the important link between the 
use of data sets as representations and privacy and autonomy. In relation to 
privacy and autonomy, a number of other rights and values were discussed 
and it has been shown that identity construction and, in some cases, even 
human dignity is at stake. The mindset of data sets as digital representations 
in the form of personae or profiles stresses the link to an identity and to an 
individual human being. Even though several of the problems described 
in this study can also be addressed based on the current GDPR proposal, 
the specific approach towards digital representations and the emphasized 
aspects in relation to individuals and their rights and values which are at 
stake when digital personae or profiles are used, provides better insight in the 
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“Personal data is the new oil of the Internet and the new currency of the 
digital world.”704 This statement by the European Consumer Commissioner 
pinpoints the importance of personal data in contemporary society. Over the 
last decade, society has become an information society, with information 
and knowledge as key assets for development. Currently, we are heading 
towards a data society,705 in which the collection and processing of data is at 
the heart of the economy. 
A specific type of data that is frequently processed is personal data. Processing 
of personal data leads to tensions concerning control and power. Commercial 
organizations try to leverage data to create value, while individuals have 
perceptions of harm and powerlessness concerning the use and protection 
of their data.706 The personal data of customers have become a major asset 
for companies. Together with technological developments in the field of ICT 
and internet services, this implies that personal data about every individual 
are collected, further processed, and analyzed for commercial purposes by 
numerous businesses.
The massive use of personal data also leads to concern among individuals. 
“Three out of four Europeans accept that revealing personal data is part of 
everyday life, but they are also worried about how companies – including 
search engines and social networks – use their information.”707 People are 
concerned about lack of control and lack of transparency. Individuals have 
few means to prevent their data from being processed, while at the same 
time they have no clear view of the purposes of the processing. The impact 
the processing may have on the individual is even more opaque. However, 
there is an impact, in particular on the privacy of the individual, in the sense 
of the opportunities of the individual to create his own identity free from 
unreasonable constraints, and on his individual autonomy.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether privacy and autonomy of 
individuals can be better protected by implementing the concept of the digital 
704 Meglena Kuneva, European Consumer Commissioner, March 2009.
705 Van Lieshout et al. 2012, p. 20.
706 World Economic Forum 2012.
707 European Commission.Data Protection: Europeans share data online, but privacy 
concerns remain – new survey. Press release IP/11/742, Brussels, 16 June 2011, on 
survey results of the Eurobarometer on “Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic 




persona in law. A digital persona is a digital representation of an individual 
in the form of data. In cases where the set cannot be directly connected to 
an individual, the data sets are called profiles. The use of digital personae 
and profiles has an effect on the rights of individuals, because these data sets 
are used as representations of the individual when decisions are taken that 
affect the individual. These effects are described from a multidisciplinary 
perspective, and an analysis is made of possible ways to implement the digital 
persona in law. The main research question that is answered in this study is 
the following:
Can the (legal) protection of digital personae and profiles as coherent data 
sets, taking into account that they are used by businesses as a basis for making 
decisions that affect real-world individuals, improve the protection of privacy 
and autonomy of the individuals represented by these digital personae?
In order to answer this question, a number of steps are taken. In Part I of 
this study, the theory and abstract level are described. Chapter 2 gives 
a description of identity and representation from different disciplinary 
perspectives. In particular, the sociological viewpoints of Mead and 
Goffman are taken as a basis for further analysis in this study. This implies 
that specific attention is paid to the way individuals take different roles (ways 
of (re)presenting themselves) related to different contexts. Subsequently, the 
step is taken towards representation in digital form. Here, the concepts of 
the digital persona and profile are introduced. 
A digital persona is a representation of an individual, identifiable by the 
one who creates or uses the data set. The concept of the digital persona was 
introduced by Roger Clarke, who defined it as: “a model of an individual’s 
public personality based on data and maintained by transactions, and 
intended for use as a proxy for the individual.”708 The representational 
capacity is a key element. It follows from the definition that functioning as a 
proxy for a specific individual is intended, so the representations that qualify 
as a digital persona are limited to those data sets which contain an identifying 
link to an entity. Clarke distinguishes between projected personae and 
imposed personae. A projected digital persona is “an image of one’s self that 
an individual conveys to others by means of data,” for instance, by creating a 
personal page on a social network site, whereas the imposed digital persona 
is “an identity projected onto a person by means of data, by outside agencies 
such as corporations and government agencies,”709 for instance, a record 
created by a credit rating agency. 
708  Clarke 1994.
709  Clarke 1994.
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Another form of digital representations of individuals are profiles. They are 
the result of an automated process where large data sets are processed in 
order to compose (a set of) characteristics which can be used as a basis for 
decision making. A profile is a set of correlated data,710 which is created with 
the use of profiling technologies, a set of technologies with as a common 
characteristic the use of algorithms or other techniques to create, discover 
or construct knowledge from huge sets of data. Profiling can be defined 
as “[t]he process of ‘discovering’ correlations between data in databases 
that can be used to identify and represent a human or nonhuman subject 
(individual or group) and/or the application of profiles (sets of correlated 
data) to individuate and represent a subject or to identify a subject as a 
member of a group or category”711 or the creation of a representation based 
on automated monitoring of individual behavior. The data can be aggregated 
from different sources. In first instance, there is no direct connection to an 
entity, so individuals who may be affected later on are not necessarily aware 
of the data collection. When at some point in time an identifier is added to 
the data set, a profile can become a digital persona.
In Chapter 3, it is shown how digital personae are created in practice and 
for what purposes. Moreover, a third form of digital personae is introduced, 
namely the hybrid form. This form is nowadays the most prevalent form and 
combines elements from the projected and imposed persona as introduced 
by Clarke. The data the digital persona consists of are created or provided 
by the individual himself as well as by others. For instance, when opening 
an account in a web shop, the individual provides some data, such as name, 
address, and bank details. The web shop provider can enrich the data set, for 
instance, with information about browsing behaviour, past purchases, and 
specific categories of items the individual is interested in.
Part I ends with Chapter 4, showing which values and rights are at stake when 
using digital personae or profiles as digital representations. These are human 
dignity, (individual) autonomy, identity, informational self-determination, 
contextual integrity, and privacy. The concepts are interrelated and mutually 
supportive of each other. Specific rights are essential to maintain higher, 
more abstract values. The concepts of dignity, autonomy, identity, and 
privacy are closely related. On the one hand, autonomous (independent) 
choices have to be made in order to decide on the identity an individual wants 
to develop and, in relation to that, what information to share with whom 
and for what purposes. On the other hand, privacy, with the related main 
concepts of informational-self-determination and contextual integrity, is a 
necessary condition to facilitate this autonomy. Individual autonomy and 
710  Hildebrandt &Gutwirth 2008, p. 19.
711  Hildebrandt &Gutwirth 2008, p. 19.
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identity are directly connected to the inherent value human beings have. 
This inherent value is often referred to as human dignity. Human dignity is 
a central concept in the protection of individuals and the fundamental rights 
they have at an abstract level in international treaties.
In the context of the European Union, fundamental rights are now laid 
down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. An important basis for 
this Charter can be found in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). In the ECHR, Article 8 contains the right to respect for private and 
family life. In case law concerning this article, connections have been made 
between privacy, identity and autonomy.712 The EU Charter starts with 
human dignity as a central value. In addition, it contains a specific provision 
on the right to privacy (Article 7) which is almost similar to Article 8 ECHR. 
Moreover, Article 8 of the EU Charter introduces the right to protection of 
personal data. 
Two related key concepts that are distinguished are informational self-
determination and contextual integrity. It appears that the protection of these 
rights and values is important in light of the personal development of the 
individual as an entity with an intrinsic value. In order to protect autonomy 
and the construction of identity, privacy is legally protected. In practice, 
the focus in legislation aiming at the protection of informational privacy is 
on data protection. The OECD has adopted guidelines on data protection 
which list a number of basic principles that must be respected. The principles 
relate to the key rights and values that need to be protected. For instance, 
the Collection Limitation Principle supports privacy and informational 
self-determination, the Purpose Specification Principle directly relates to 
contextual integrity, and the Individual Participation Principle supports 
informational self-determination, identity, and autonomy.
The principles are reflected in the EU Data Protection Directive (DPD). This 
Directive (95/46/EC) forms a rigid European framework on the handling 
and electronic processing of personal data. It defines what personal data are 
and what processing is allowed under which circumstances. However, there 
are some difficulties with regard to the terminology and its meaning. Besides, 
the more fundamental level of privacy protection and, in relation to that, the 
protection of identity and autonomy, has been moved to the background. 
The framework, thus, may be rigid, but mainly provides requirements and 
guidelines for the processing of personal data. For instance, companies need 
to have a legitimate ground for the processing of personal data, the processing 
has to be bound to a specific purpose, individuals have to be informed about 
the processing, and companies have to take organizational and technical 
712  De Hert 2008.
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measures to adequately protect data. Once the requirements are met, the 
processing is legitimate and allowed. The difficulties in terminology and the 
interpretation of the requirements, however, have the result that it is often 
debatable whether the requirements are really met. Individuals are often 
unaware of the processing activities and the exact related purposes, so the 
framework does not provide sufficient protection of the fundamental values 
and rights that are presented in this Chapter.
Part II of this study concerns the practice and concrete level of the study. In 
Chapter 5, the use of digital personae and profiles is discussed. A technical 
background is provided by an analysis of web interactions. Moreover, 
different ways of recognizing and identifying individuals by technical means, 
such as cookies and user accounts, are discussed. A concrete description of 
how digital personae and profiles are created and used is given in three case 
studies. The first case study shows how Facebook collects data, enriches 
user profiles, and monitors internet browsing behavior of members and, 
sometimes, non-members. Obviously, profile information of members is 
collected, but also browsing behavior and activities on other websites are 
analyzed. Subsequently, decisions are based on this analysis, which results 
in steering or limiting choices for individuals. An important part of this 
case study consists of the tracking practices facilitated via Facebook’s Like-
button. The second case study concerns Google and particularly focuses on 
the wide range of applications and services offered by this company. The 
coverage resulting from the large number of implementations of their services 
provides Google with a very strong position in recognizing individuals and 
collecting information about them. Moreover, since Google launched its 
new privacy policy, on March 1st 2012, services are connected and users are 
automatically subscribed to different services by Google. Since the individual 
has no control over these subscriptions and because of the extreme difficulty 
not to interact with one of Google’s services, individual autonomy is at stake. 
The third case study describes the combination of online and offline data in 
order to take decisions affecting individuals, for example, by credit rating 
agencies and banks and insurance companies that collect data. Next to that, 
a description is given of how companies tailor their web contents real-time, 
based on characteristics of the individual visitor. Also in this case, choices 
are steered and options are limited. If exclusion from certain services or 
products takes place in a structural form as a result of automated decisions, 
this can amount to indirect discrimination. Chapter 5 ends with an overview 
of implications of digital persona and profile creation and use. It appears 
to be very difficult for individuals to maintain control over their data being 
collected and analyzed. Options for choosing between services and between 
sharing and shielding information are reduced. This leads to conflicts with 
the values and rights that were described earlier. 
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The practical level of data protection regulation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
The applicability of the DPD to digital personae and profiles is assessed, 
including the attached rights and obligations. The use of digital personae is 
subject to the DPD, but for profiles this is less clear. Specifically, the issue that 
profiles can relatively easily become digital personae is problematic from a 
data protection perspective. Data controllers have to take into account whether 
future identification may be possible. The discussion then centers on the 
question of what means are likely reasonably to be used for this identification 
and by whom. Subsequently, an elaborate description is given of the problems 
that arise, even when the DPD is applicable. Firstly, there is lack of clarity and 
certainty with regard to the processing resulting from improper fulfillment of 
the information duties. The exact purposes of the processing are often unclear 
and only described in very generic terms. Secondly, the legitimate ground of 
consent is frequently used by data controllers, while this consent does not 
meet the requirements of ‘freely given’ and ‘informed’. The latter relates to the 
information duties. Consent can often not be said to be freely given, because 
there is no option to choose. Thirdly, processing based on a legitimate interest 
of the data controller is often not preceded by a proper weighing of this interest 
with the interests of the data subject. A concrete problem here is the difficulty 
to ascribe weight to the interests that need to be balanced. The implication of 
these problems is that there are still conflicts with the main rights and values to 
be respected. Chapter 6 ends with a synthesis and the final problem definition. 
Two key problems are identified, namely legal uncertainty for data controllers 
as regards the applicability of the DPD to their processing activities, and 
insufficient protection of individuals resulting from lack of transparency, 
control, and choice.
Part III of this study is aimed at finding a solution for these problems. First, 
in Chapter 7, existing legal constructs are discussed in order to find out 
whether these can be of help in better protecting the individuals’ rights in 
online contexts. First, the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) that is to replace the DPD is discussed. In the proposal, some 
improvements as compared to the current DPD are made, but still some of 
the main problems remain. In specific cases, better protection is offered. 
For instance, more attention is paid to the individuals being affected by data 
processing, with the introduction of the data breach notification and the right 
to be forgotten, but no strong tools for individuals to have their autonomy 
and identity better protected are added. Moreover, the scope of applicability 
of relevant provisions seems to be too limited to achieve the desired effects.
Subsequently, other legal constructs are assessed on their usefulness in 
improving protection of individuals. These constructs are legal personality 
and legal status, property rights and intellectual property rights. Legal 
personality or a legal status for digital personae appears not to be a good 
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solution, since the digital persona is the focus point in these constructs. In 
order to be helpful, digital personae would have to be active entities, which 
is not the case. This observation leads to the idea of looking at positions of 
control over the digital persona. A strong form of control is provided by the 
legal concept of property or, more specifically, ownership. In particular, 
the erga omnes effect is useful, because it makes the property right an 
absolute right, i.e., that can be invoked against anyone. With regard to digital 
personae, however, ownership has two important drawbacks that make it 
not applicable directly. Firstly, ownership concerns tangibles. The main 
requirement for ownership, however, is legal recognition, so this problem 
can be solved by recognizing digital personae as objects of property in the 
law. Secondly, however, ownership rights can be obtained by the creator of a 
thing because he creates it, which implies that digital personae often would 
become owned by others than the data subject. The control is, therewith, still 
not in the hands of the data subject.
The issue of intangibility can be solved by following the regime of intellectual 
property rights. Therefore, a closer look is taken at copyright, database 
rights, and portrait law. The most promising approach appears to be the 
analogous application of portrait law, i.e., the right of a person to object 
to the publication of his portrait or to receive a financial compensation. 
Nevertheless, two important issues remain. Firstly, portrait law is, in cases 
where the digital persona is also protected by copyright, only a limitation 
on the rights of the copyright holder, but it does not provide independent 
protection right away. Nevertheless, the opportunity to limit the rights 
of the user of the digital persona could provide the individual with a good 
instrument to exercise control. Secondly, internal use of a digital persona 
is not covered by portrait law, since it focuses on the making public of a 
portrait. However, in relation to individual autonomy, the most problematic 
uses of digital personae are the internal uses for taking decisions which 
affect the individual. The scope of protection of portrait law would need to 
be broadened up to cover this important part as well.
Although the existing legal concepts thus turn out not to offer a complete 
solution directly, an important conclusion is that the digital persona as a 
concept is promising. Legal implementation of the concept of the digital 
persona may be a means to achieve better protection of individuals’ rights 
in online contexts. In relation to profiles, there is an extra challenge, 
because these relate to individuals that are not identified or identifiable. The 
paradoxical issue here is that, in order to achieve some control, the individual 
needs to be identified as being the represented individual, while remaining 
anonymous seems to provide better protection of privacy. To conclude, 
even though profiles and digital personae are closely related, the link to an 
identified individual appears to be a crucial point when trying to regulate 
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the use of digital representations with a view to the rights and values of the 
individual that need better protection.
Finally, Chapter 8 contains a proposal for implementing the concept of 
the digital persona as a portrait in data protection law. Two legal regimes 
are combined here, which brings two important improvements for the 
protection of the rights of the individual. First, the burden of proof as 
regards the processing activities when these are based on consent is shifted 
to the data controller. This means that the data controller has to prove that 
he has obtained the informed consent from the individual for the processing 
for the specific purpose at stake. The data controller has an increased 
accountability and the individual does not have to prove that he did not 
give his consent. The second improvement is the recognition of the digital 
persona as a representation (portrait) of an individual. The link between the 
data set and the individual that is affected by the use of the data as a basis for 
decisions is emphasized. The advantage for the individual is that the result 
of the processing gains attention, next to the procedural requirements of the 
DPD. There are also options to include individual profiles under the regime 
by taking this approach, since comparing the profile with the individual may 
lead to identification (based on recognition). 
Because of the forthcoming GDPR, a closer look is also taken at to what 
extent the described issues are covered by the proposed Regulation. At least 
at the practical level, the GDPR brings an improvement in the protection 
of individuals as opposed to the current DPD. The improvements are to a 
large extent in line with the protection sought for in relation to the problems 
described in this study. The GDPR is, thus, a welcome instrument, even 
though some room for improvement is still present. From the perspective 
of the use of digital personae and profiles and the related interests of 
individuals that need to be protected, some indications for improvement 
are provided. This includes aiming at a change in mindset by adding a 
Recital to the Preamble that recognizes the concepts of the digital personae 
and profile. This change is needed to reconnect data protection law to the 
concepts of privacy and autonomy of the individual. The requirements for 
the processing of personal data are a procedural background. Solely fulfilling 
these requirements, however, does make the processing legitimate, but does 
not enforce respect for the privacy and autonomy of the data subject. At least 
the theoretical value which can be achieved by embedding the concepts of 
digital personae and profiles in law is a worthwhile exercise and can be a 
source of inspiration for further development of the practical embedding of 
the concepts.
Embedding the concepts of the digital persona and profile in order to 
provide better protection of privacy and autonomy of individuals, with 
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the final aim to better respect human dignity, seems to be well-placed 
for success. Practical work on the embedding needs to be done, but the 
theoretical analysis provided in this study proves the concept of the digital 
persona as such to be valuable as a legal concept. The way of implementing 
the concept as described above does not broaden up the interpretation of the 
definition of personal data, but takes a holistic approach towards complete 
data sets, instead of separate pieces of data. The embedding of the concept, 
starting from a mindset that is reflected in the Preamble of the GDPR, can 
bring a better protection of fundamental rights and values for the individual. 
Moreover, the relation between digital personae and profiles and their use is 
emphasized. 
 
 
 

